A fundamental shift is required to prevent and respond to coups in (West) Africa.

The spate of seizures of power by militaries in Africa, especially in the western region is a cause for concern. Until recently, the West African region appeared to have shed its history of coups and on a path toward more peaceful transfers of power. Unfortunately, in the past couple of years, it appears that coups and coup attempts are on the rise again. Since 2019, the West African region has experienced 7 successful and 2 unsuccessful coups, with the latest being the coup in Niger in July.

The regional body, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) despite being the most vibrant and vocal REC on the continent, has largely been unsuccessful in preventing coups and defending the democracy project in the region. While it has been vocal against coups, and recently even threatened military intervention in Niger, its efforts have often come up short, particularly when it comes to preventing and timeously responding to coups. This can be attributed to several reasons including limited capacity, lack of political will by leaders and foreign interference.

Overall, there seems to be several factors responsible for the resurgence in military seizures of government. They include unconstitutional circumvention of term limits, foreign interference, loss of public legitimacy by governments, lack of effective separation of powers and checks and balances, lack of or weak accountability mechanisms, and the entanglement between politics and the army.

ECOWAS has largely adopted a soft response against coups revolving around the imposition of sanctions, closing of borders, freezing assets of military leaders and instituting travel bans. However, the use of soft power has not deterred military coups nor urged military leaders to move quickly to restore civilian rule in their respective countries. Instead, sanctions tend to have more of an adverse impact on the general population than the individuals implicated in the coups.

Despite ECOWAS’s adoption of legal frameworks such as the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security, they have not found expression in practice. At the annual summit in Nigeria’s capital, Abuja, in December 2022, ECOWAS leaders announced that they will establish a regional peacekeeping force to intervene in member states to help restore security and constitutional order. While this is encouraging, it remains unclear how ECOWAS seeks to operationalise and fund intervention modalities, as well as how this regional peacekeeping force would work with the AU’s Standby Force and other continental instruments and mechanisms. The recently signed pact by Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso to protect each other in case of any uprising or external aggression also poses a dilemma for ECOWAS, as military action will lead to loss of lives and more instability in the region. Effectively, the three countries for now have insulated themselves from military action, thus securing a longer stay in power for the military leaders, who are undeterred by economic sanctions.

What of external influences?

The influence and role of external forces in destabilising the continent, particularly the West African region has come into the spotlight once again, with countries such as France, the United States and Russia pointing fingers at each other. The scramble for Africa, has seen France’s unfettered influence in West Africa and diplomatic power face greater competition from other states such as China, India, Israel, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. ?Unlike France, these states are styling themselves as developmental partners who consider African countries as equals compared to their relationships with former colonial masters. As a result, the heightened diplomatic competition for influence in Africa, forced President Emmanuel Macron to reimagine and seek to pursue a new kind of relationship with Africa. Over the past few years, President Macron has attempted a diplomatic reset with African partners and has been working at recalibrating the security and military aspects of France-Africa partnerships to more developmental and economic partnerships.

However, it seems Macron’s bid to reposition the image of France on the continent and in West Africa in particular is failing, due to not only competition from other countries, but also growing resistance from most citizens in West African countries. In 2022, there were anti-French protests in Chad, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Morocco and Algeria. Recently, Niger's military rulers denounced military agreements with France and expelled the French ambassador in the country, while Burkina Faso's military junta ordered the French embassy's defence attaché, Emmanuel Pasquier to leave the country.

On the other hand, China and Russia have made significant inroads into the African continent. China’s interaction with Africa is mainly economic, as seen through increased trade, infrastructure projects and less concealed attempts to influence politics. Russia seems intent on not only gaining economic influence, but also political influence on the continent. In 2019, US Army Gen. Stephen Townsend said he has a “pretty significant concern about the way Russia uses private military companies such as the Wagner Group in Africa and also is monitoring how China has expanded its presence there by moves such as laying communications infrastructure’’. The Russia linked Wagner Group has been engaged in training, fighting anti-government forces and quashing protests in Central and West Africa. As things stand, it remains unclear if the death of Wagner Group founder Yevgeny Prigozhin August will dimmish the group’s presence and operations in West Africa.

A fundamental shift is required.

When the African Union (AU) predecessor-in-tittle, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), was transformed, African leaders took stock of the nature of the continent’s peace and security challenges and the need for pragmatic responses.? The ditching of the doctrine of non-interference in member states’ domestic affairs and the US Standby Force came out of this context. However, the AU has also turned into a blunt force, unable to prevent and successfully intervene in instances of military coups or leaders who circumvent their country’s constitution. Consequently, the Peace and Security Council (PSC), which is responsible for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, is not as effective as it should be, especially in West Africa. In 2021, Shewit Woldemichael, Researcher, Africa Peace and Security Governance Programme, ISS Addis Ababa, stated that this is primarily because the AU’s ability to intervene in crises is restricted by its principles of national sovereignty (non-interference) and subsidiarity. This despite the principle of non-indifference set out in Article (4h) of the Constitutive Act. This needs to change. ?A levy towards the AU’s peace and security operations should be strictly imposed to capacitate the organisation’s ability to intervene in conflict situations and rely less on external funders.

Conclusion

A possibility for the AU and regional bodies to be more involved in domestic affairs exists and is in fact, even more necessary. Otherwise, it is not unconceivable that we might experience another military takeover in West Africa before end of the year. The pact by Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso might attract more countries, which will further blunt ECOWAS and its ability to act beyond economic sanctions to prevent undemocratic seizures of power. Thus, a fundamental shift from AU’s limited involvement in member states’ domestic affairs to more involvement is required, using the current peace and security architecture and specific continental instruments with more vigour.? With the scramble for Africa’s vast natural resources.? the role of non-African countries in the domestic affairs of African countries is a factor that must be addressed by the continental body, to limit their influence and deliberately destabilising countries for their selfish gains. That would mean that the AU itself should rely less on external donors and parties in its operations.