Fujian Unveils Incentives for Militia Training for a Cross-Strait Campaign

Ryan D. Martinson, “Fujian Unveils Incentives for Militia Training for a Cross-Strait Campaign,” Jamestown China Brief 25.5 (15 March 2025).

Executive Summary:?

• Fujian Province’s new “Measures for Guaranteeing Militia Rights and Interests” aim to incentivize maximum readiness for forces who likely will be key in any campaign against Taiwan.
• The measures provide financial support and other perks in an attempt to motivate troops and promote the professionalization of the militia.
• The measures do not signal that the PRC will go to war tomorrow, and so far Fujian is the only province to have issued such measures.

If the People’s Republic of China (PRC) decides to attack Taiwan, it will need to leverage the capabilities of all of its armed forces. This not only includes the land, sea, air, and rocket forces of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) or the relevant units of the People’s Armed Police, such as the China Coast Guard. It also includes the third component of the country’s armed forces—its militia.

The PRC’s militia comprises part-time soldiers who, aside from their military duties, typically hold jobs in civilian industries. As members of the militia, they can be mobilized to conduct military operations in both war and peace. Militia members belong to units that are managed by local PLA entities called People’s Armed Forces Departments (人民武装部). Individual militia units often specialize in a skill that is valuable to the PLA, such as cyber warfare or equipment repair.

Ensuring the competence of militia forces has always been a challenge. Militia members do not receive adequate compensation for their work, causing malaise and apathy on the training field and, ultimately, poor performance on the battlefield. This presents a serious risk for Beijing, which may need to rely on its militia forces in the event of a major conflict. In January 2025, Fujian Province, the province opposite Taiwan, took a significant step toward professionalizing its militia units by issuing a document called “Measures for Guaranteeing Militia Rights and Interests” (福建省民兵权益保障办法) (Fujian Government, January 26). If faithfully implemented, it could help ensure that Fujian militia show up for a cross-strait campaign both willing and able to do their duty. … … …

One Small Step Toward Military Readiness

The issuing of the “Measures for Guaranteeing Militia Rights and Interests” in Fujian Province is one small indicator that the PRC is taking steps to resolve problems that must be resolved if it is to prosecute a military attack against Taiwan successfully. This does not mean that Beijing is going to war tomorrow. Fujian is the first and only province to have issued such measures publicly. This is probably no coincidence, as Fujian militia forces would likely play a critical role in any major cross-strait conflict. In particular, the province’s specialized maritime militia units could be tasked with a wide range of front-line missions, including reconnaissance, search and rescue, transport, blockade enforcement, deception, and mine warfare.

If Fujian’s maritime militia forces are to acquit themselves well, individual militia members must be properly motivated to join the force, complete onerous training requirements, and answer the call in the event of a conflict. The province’s new measures represent an earnest effort to create the necessary incentive structures for maximum readiness. The document seeks to relieve fears of financial risk for militia members and their families and guarantees them a large set of perks for participating in the militia and doing their jobs well. It reserves the best rewards for members of elite militia units, such as those that would be expected to support a major campaign against Taiwan. Assuming the measures are fully implemented, they could translate into a better-trained and motivated militia prepared to serve as a force multiplier in any campaign to invade, coerce, or subdue Taiwan.

Beyond Fujian’s maritime militia, its land-based militia units could also play important roles in a cross-strait contingency. They, too, will benefit from the measures. Consider the city of Ningde, for example. While it does possess a number of maritime militia units, in recent years it has also funded the development of “new type” (新型) militia forces to include units specialized in “cyber attack and defense, electromagnetic spectrum control, electronic warfare, meteorological and hydrographic [support], and high-tech equipment repair” (网络攻防、频谱管控、电子对抗、气象水文、高新装备维修) (Ningde City, February 14, 2016). Most if not all of these units could see service in the event of a high-end conflict over Taiwan, and their performance will ultimately contribute to the PRC’s success, or failure.