From Agriculture to Explosives: The Diversion of Fertilisers to IED Manufacturing in the Sahel and Beyond

The diversion of fertilisers, initially intended for agricultural and mining purposes, to the manufacture of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) is a critical issue affecting global security. This phenomenon, deeply entrenched in West Africa and the Sahel, reveals the complex interplay of licit trade, criminal networks, and terrorist activities. Materials are diverted and the technical knowledge necessary to make IEDs is transferred across continents, through the threads of organised crime and terrorism, which perpetuate these practices. Insights from Southeast Asia provide comparative perspectives on similar trends.

Fertilisers, particularly those containing ammonium nitrate (AN) and urea, play a pivotal role in global agriculture and mining industries. However, their chemical composition makes them attractive for the manufacture of IEDs, a weapon of choice for terrorist groups and criminal organisations. In West Africa and the Sahel, where state capacity to regulate trade is often limited, the diversion of these materials poses significant challenges to regional and global security.

Legal supply chains and weaknesses

The lawful trade of fertilisers is a cornerstone of many economies, including West African nations reliant on agriculture. However, reports highlight the lack of traceability and weak regulatory frameworks that allow fertilisers to enter illicit markets. Key points of diversion include storage facilities, transit hubs, and retail outlets where oversight is minimal.

For example, Nigerian authorities seized 14 tonnes of ammonium nitrate-based fertiliser in 2021, reportedly intended for use in IEDs by Boko Haram. The discovery demonstrates the vulnerabilities in supply chains where fertilisers, originally purposed for agricultural productivity, are repurposed for violence?.

Criminal and terrorist networks

The diversion often involves a nexus of actors ranging from corrupt officials and businesspersons to organised criminal groups. These actors exploit regulatory gaps, such as the weak monitoring of bulk ammonium nitrate shipments, to supply armed groups. For instance, materials from Ghana’s mining sector have been linked to IED incidents across the Sahel, illustrating how licit commercial activities are subverted for illicit ends.

Knowledge transfer across domains and regions

Technical Expertise and Training

The manufacture of IEDs requires specific technical knowledge, which is disseminated through both formal training and informal networks. Reports document how transnational groups, such as the Islamic State’s affiliates, have established training camps where recruits learn to adapt agricultural chemicals for explosives. Additionally, the International Security and Policy Institute (ISPI) has emphasised the role of online forums and encrypted messaging apps in transferring bomb-making expertise across continents .

Global and regional comparisons

In Southeast Asia, the use of urea-based fertilisers in IEDs is well-documented, particularly among groups like Jemaah Islamiyah. These groups share knowledge through digital platforms, manuals, and cross-border exchanges. Similar trends are evident in West Africa, where extremist groups adapt existing Southeast Asian practices to the Sahelian context.

Cross-border and cross-behavioural dynamics - from common crime to terrorism

The trafficking of fertilisers and other explosive precursors often begins as common criminal activity but escalates into support for terrorism. Organised crime groups provide logistics, while terrorist organisations focus on weaponising these materials. For example, Nigerian criminal groups have been implicated in supplying precursors to Boko Haram and Islamic State – West Africa Province (ISWAP).

Regional networks and continental implications

The porous borders of the Sahel facilitate the movement of materials and knowledge across countries. Materials diverted in Ghana can reappear in Mali, showing the transnational nature of these networks. Insights from investigations reveal how weak border controls and a lack of inter-state cooperation amplify these challenges?.

Lessons from Southeast Asia

The Southeast Asian experience with fertiliser diversion provides valuable insights for West Africa. The region has demonstrated some success with regional frameworks, such as ASEAN’s conventions on counter-terrorism, which emphasise intelligence sharing and coordinated law enforcement efforts. These lessons could inform African strategies, as both regions grapple with transnational terrorism and criminal networks.

References

1. Reuters. "Nigeria Says It Seizes 14 Tonnes of Fertilizer Meant for Boko Haram Bombs." September 9, 2021. (https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/nigeria-says-it-seizes-14-tonnes-fertiliser-meant-boko-haram-bombs-2021-09-09/).

2. Zagazola. "Nigerian Army Discovers 50 Bags of Urea Fertilizer Used for Bomb Making by Boko Haram/ISWAP." (https://zagazola.org/index.php/security-analysis/nigerian-army-discovers-50-bags-of-urea-fertilizer-used-for-bomb-making-by-boko-haram-iswap).

3. Pool Reinsurance Company. "Terrorist Use of Ammonium Nitrate in IED Construction." (https://www.poolre.co.uk/terrorism-threat-publications/terrorist-use-of-ammonium-nitrate-in-ied-construction/).

4. ISS Africa. "Benin Must Stay One Step Ahead of Violent Extremists Using IEDs." (https://issafrica.org/iss-today/benin-must-stay-one-step-ahead-of-violent-extremists-using-ieds).

5. Foreign Affairs. "How ISIS Makes IEDs." (https://www.foreignaffairs.com/how-isis-makes-ieds).

6. ISS Africa. "Breaking Terrorism Supply Chains in West Africa." (https://issafrica.org/iss-today/breaking-terrorism-supply-chains-in-west-africa).

7. Conflict Armament Research. Tracing the Supply of Components Used in Islamic State IEDs. 2016. https://www.conflictarm.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Tracing_The_Supply_of_Components_Used_in_Islamic_State_IEDs.pdf

8. Small Arms Survey. Out of Control: The Trafficking of Improvised Explosive Device Components and Commercial Explosives in West Africa. 2023. https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/resource/out-control-trafficking-improvised-explosive-device-components-and-commercial-explosives

9. Combating Terrorism Center. CTC Sentinel. Volume 10, Issue 10. 2017. https://ciaonet.org/journal_issues/2095