French Revolution 2.0

Theodore Bergwerk

French Revolution 2.0: Dangers of learning the wrong lessons from history.

?

Learning from history is more complex than it sounds. It is easy to learn the wrong things from history if they are viewed from a biased perspective. The French Revolution is one of the most studied historical events, yet people often learn the wrong things from it, even those who witnessed it. The term “French Revolution” usually evokes the events of 1789 and 1792, but France had several revolutions throughout the 19th century. The revolution of July 1830 was almost as dramatic as the previous one and was attended by many of the same men involved in the revolution of 1789. King Charles X of France witnessed many of the events of the 1789 revolution, but he learned all the wrong lessons and consequently lost his crown, though not his head. Charles X is a prime example of how a man can learn the wrong things from history by viewing them from a biased perspective, even though he witnessed it. Talleyrand accurately assessed the Bourbons during the restoration by saying, “They had learned nothing and forgotten nothing.”

?

After the downfall of Napoleon in 1814/1815, the Bourbons were restored to the throne of France in the form of the brothers of Louis XVI. The ultra-reactionary Charles X succeeded his more moderate older brother Louis XVIII in 1824. Charles X, though arguably not reactionary to the point of wanting undue all that had changed in France since 1789, was nonetheless intensely obstinate in implementing unpopular, highly conservative legislation in the face of opposition from Parliament (Frances legislative body since 1814). Charles X and his unpopular prime minister, Prince de Polignac, decided to go even further by issuing a series of legislation or “ordinances “ that would have sharply curtailed press freedoms and the size of France’s already tiny electorate, intending to make it more conservative. Among those who faced disenfranchisement were large segments of army officers. Power, in general, is a trick that ultimately depends on the masses’ consent to be ruled, especially the consent of those with the means to enforce that rule, i.e., the army. Revolutions throughout history have usually been decided whether the military would or would not consent to be ruled. Charles X had, in addition to the revolution of 1789, also witnessed Napoleon’s brief return to power via a coup in 1815. Yet, by all accounts, he never considered the military security of this his crown despite the opposition in the streets and parliament.

?

The storming of the Bastille in 1789 was partly started by anger over the dismissal of the popular Minister Necker, which in turn prompted fears that Louis XVI's government would disenfranchise the third estate. Charles X, then known as the Count de Artos, was involved in the dismissal of Necker in 1789. Yet in 1830, Charles X took no preemptive measures to counter an uprising despite having firsthand experience that unpopular policies, or even the fear of disenfranchisement, could lead to revolution. Instead, Charles became obsessed with the idea that Louis XVI’s downfall was caused by catering to the mob and dismissing the unpopular ministry of the Baron de Breteuil, which he (the future Charles X) had helped bring about by dismissing the more popular Necker ministry. So, he swore to stick by Polignac, no matter what. The mentality of Charles X is probably due in part to denialism. Acknowledging that a deeply unpopular move could lead to a revolution would mean acknowledging that he inadvertently played in the downfall of his brother Louis XVI forty-one years earlier. Charles X was legally within his constitutional rights by the charter of 1814 to stand behind Polignac and enact legislation by decree, but it was politically unwise.

?

Paris in 1830 was arguably even more ripe for an uprising than in 1789. Charles X’s timing could not have been worse since France was experiencing significant economic depression, a series of poor harvests, and sporadic instances of civil unrest since 1827. Creating a political crisis amid an economic crisis started the first French Revolution and would start the second Revolution. The first protests began on July 26, with press workers who had the most to lose from the ordinance’s restriction on the press. The protests grew as others who suffered from unemployment, high grain prices, and other economic burdens joined the protests, like in 1789. In 1789, the Parisian mob quickly seized control of Paris, but that was not the case in 1830 when there was actual fighting in the streets of Paris. There were hundreds of Napoleonic veterans and thousands of demobilized but still armed national guardsmen in Paris. They quickly took charge of the rebels, and, like their predecessors in 1789, they seized the armories. Though urban combat was new at the time, the Napoleonic veterans would have been familiar with mounting a defense from a fortified position, establishing a crossfire position from higher ground, and, in close quarters, everyday items such as knives would be more effective than muskets. They also had the advantage of, in some cases, literally fighting on their turf. Troops advancing through the narrow streets would often find themselves blocked by barricades and pelted by objects being thrown from upper-story windows. Barricades were also helpful in blocking troop reinforcements and confusing troop commanders. The events of July 1830 offered several blasts from the past and glimpses of the future. ?It also foreshadowed the revolutions of 1848 and 1871 and the urban warfare of the 20th and 21st centuries.

?

By July 27, sporadic incidents of civil unrest spread across Paris. The commander of the Paris forces, Maréchal?Auguste Marmont?(infamous for deserting Napoleon in 1814), did not take added measures to protect armories and the like from insurgents. In his memoirs, Marmont stated that he did not have enough troops to secure the city, which may be partially true. Charles X failed to deploy extra troops in Paris to deal with any civil unrest that would predictably follow the ordinances; this was another fatal mistake. In a pre-locomotive era, it was impossible to summon large amounts of extra troops to Paris in time (that’s also one of the reasons the first revolution happened). The troops already in Paris were more likely to sympathize with the Parisians. The military situation deteriorated rapidly. Mormont, perhaps deliberately paraphrasing the words that informed Luis XVI of the Bastille’s fall in 1789, wrote to Charles X “this is no longer a riot, this is a revolution”. By then, events had gone too far for him to do anything to salvage the situation. Charles X and most of his ministers were away?at his Country Palace at St. Cloud. Perhaps his only wise decision at the time was to avoid Paris so that no matter what, he wouldn’t end up a virtual prisoner of the Paris mob like his brother Louis XVI had been from 1789 onwards. Though this prevented him from encouraging his loyalists, it's implausible that the presence of the 73-year-old king, who had no military experience and was not physically brave, would have been an encouraging sight. It was impossible to regain control of Paris and its one million inhabitants with just 12,000 troops.

?

Though Charles X had failed to learn from the Revolution of 1789, many others did. By July 29, most troops in Paris had deserted or joined the mob. Mormont concentrated his remaining forces on the Tuileries Palace, defended by two regiments of the Swiss guard's. This situation was very reminiscent of the situation in August 1792 when the previous Swiss guard was massacred by the Paris mob at the Tuileries. Many officers in the 1830 Swiss Guard had relatives among the Swiss guards of 1792 and were terrified of suffering the same fate. Unsurprisingly (and perhaps wisely), the guard put up little resistance and fled before the mob and, in doing so, saved themselves from the fate of their predecessors. When the Tuileries fell, Talleyrand declared the reign of the senior branch of the Bourbon family had ended. Charles de Talleyrand, Napoleon's former foreign minister who betrayed his former master and helped restore the Bourbons in 1814 and was also a delegate at the estates general during the first revolution, was unsurprisingly one of the first of the elite to turn his back on Charles X. Another significant figure was the Marquis de Lafayette, a hero of the American Revolution and participant in the French Revolution of 1789, which made him very popular with the crowd. Both men were moderate constitutional monarchists disillusioned with the reactionary policies of Charles X. They were joined by a newer generation of politicians like Adolf Thiers, who would shape the history of modern France.

?

When word of the Tuileries's fall reached Charles X at Saint Cloud, he finally realized that the only way to save his crown was to compromise, pulling back from the ordinances and dismissing Polignac, which he had sworn not to do, but it was far too little, far too late. The following day, a crowd of Parisians marched on Saint Cloud. Charles X offered to abdicate in favor of his son and grandson. The Paris mob would not accept the continuation of Charles X’s line on the throne. The rest of Europe would not accept another French Republic, and the potential for civil war made the idea unpopular with most of the country. So, a more liberal constitutional monarchy was the only option. Napoleon was dead, and his only (legitimate) son was 19 years old, untested, and in Vienna. That left Louis-Phillip the Duke of Orleans. Louis-Phillip was a direct male descendant of Louis XIII, making him third in line for the throne (Salic law excluded the female line, and the Spanish Bourbons renounced their claim to the French throne). His father supported the French Revolution of 1789 but was eventually executed. Louis-Phillipe was popular in France for his liberal politics and would be acceptable to other European powers. In Paris, the remainder of the National Assembly elected the Duc of Orleans as the new head of state and its King.?In another replay of the first revolution, Lafayette embraced Louis-Philippe on a balcony in front of the mob as he once saved Marie Antoinette’s life from an angry mob by being with her on a balcony in 1789.

?

Meanwhile, Charles X, his family, and his shrinking entourage moved further and further away from Paris until they boarded a ship for Britain and exile for a second time. The 1830 revolution resulted in a change of dynasty, not a republic, though the new monarchy was considerably more liberal than its predecessor. ?Though the three days of fighting had been bloody, the body count was considerably less than in 1789 and 1793; also, there was no spread of violence to the rest of France nor war with the rest of Europe. In part, it was because there were no royal executions or an overthrow of the institution of monarchy but a change from one branch to another. At the time, republicanism did not have a strong enough presence to influence the immediate aftermath, as evidenced by the fact that a Republican uprising in 1832 (later immortalized by Victor Hugo in Les Misérables) was successfully suppressed. However, Louis-Phillip would eventually be overthrown in 1848. Napoleon’s nephew seized power in a coup in 1852, becoming Napoleon III until, like his uncle, he was deposed and exiled in 1870. Charles X’s grandson Henri was offered the crown in 1870, but he demanded that France abandon the tricolor and the public statements that he wanted to rule as his grandfather intended to, which was unacceptable to even the French monarchists. From then onwards, France became a permanent republic because Henri was as obstinate as his grandfather.

?

That Charles X made almost every conceivable misassumption helps explain why the revolution of 1830 was so swift compared to the previous revolution of 1789. Louis XVI had been fatally indecisive during his reign, unable to follow through on a coherent policy; Charles X was fatally obstinate and optimistic, unable or unwilling to deal with the political reality incompatible with his beliefs. It's somewhat baffling that he did not consider the military security of his regime, considering he witnessed both the revelation of 1789 and Napoleon’s 100 days, though somewhat understandable considering his personality. Charles X's obstinate and optimistic personality made him prone to wishful thinking and misjudgment. It also made him unable to consider the potential obstacles that would stand in the way, a fatal defect for any politician. Many statesmen familiar with Charles X, such as Talleyrand, Louis-Phillip, and the late Louis XVIII, accurately predicted that Charles X would be unable to keep the throne for long. At the time of Charles X's coronation in 1824, he was 66 years old, an elderly man by the standards of the time; he had minimal political experience and no military experience. Charles X’s age, mostly his personality, and his deeply held conservative views made it unlikely for him to learn from any. As previously stated, he learned all the wrong lessons from his experiences in 1789. It’s possible he was in denial over his role in the downfall of his brother Louis XVI. It may also reflect, in part, a very dangerous flaw in human nature to want simple solutions to complex problems; this flaw often leads to disaster. France needed to reform to deal with its problems, but the problem for Charles X was that he wanted to preserve the parts of old France that contributed to those problems. Charles X’s vision of the French monarchy depended on the support of the aristocratic land-owning class, which in turn depended on economically counterproductive policies such as tariffs on agricultural imports, hence the food crisis. Though it’s doubtful that Charles X wanted to make France an absolute monarchy again, his efforts to make the constitutional monarchy as conservative as possible by curtailing the electorate to the point that it would be like the British parliament with only a House of Lords and no House of Commons, was unacceptable to the French public and much of the political establishment, and ultimately the last thing France needed. Even in England, the House of Lords was gradually losing power in the face of growing demands for electoral reform, which was enacted in 1832

?

Even if Charles X had stationed extra troops in Paris or if he’d been able to summon more, there?is still no guarantee they would have remained loyal. Much of the officer class, especially the senior staff, were former Napoleonic loyalists. Many army officers faced disenfranchisement if the ordinances were passed. The election victories of the opposition in the previous years showed that Charles X’s policies were very unpopular with the electorate, as evidenced by the fact that elections constantly resulted in majorities for the liberal opposition. Army officers tended to be part of the electorate and risked disenfranchisement, so the Army had good reason NOT to remain loyal to the existing regime. Evidence of the army’s already shaky loyalty to Charles X is the fact that once Paris had fallen, almost none rallied to Charles X’s aid, nor was there a mass exodus of Army officers as there had been in 1793 (Louis-Phillip had been one such officer who deserted the French army to escape the terror in 1793). Unrest in the army and population at large was sporadic, with most embracing the July Revolution by unfurling the tricolor. It is unclear if Charles X knew he was alienating the army and the urban population by curtailing the electorate. Still, his hubris probably prevented him from listening to what he did not want to hear or was contrary to his beliefs. Sadly, it’s a common problem in any political system. Even today, individuals, in general, struggle to accept anything contrary to their beliefs. Perhaps Charles X most deeply held belief (common at the time) was that Kings welded power by divine right. As I previously stated, “power” is a trick that ultimately relies on consent to be ruled. The French people would not consent to be ruled the way Charles X wanted to rule. In the end, Charles X could not accept that he had to rely on the people's consent to rule, much less the consent of those he needed to enforce his rule, despite having witnessed that reality firsthand, nor did his grandson. ?