Forward Operating Bases: Defensive strongholds or terrorist targets?

Forward Operating Bases: Defensive Strongholds or Terrorist Targets?

One of the significant security proposals in Ghana’s New Patriotic Party (NPP) Manifesto 2024 is the greater focus on border security. Under Section 14, Protecting Our Borders, Keeping Neighbourhoods Safe (p. 33), the NPP Manifesto 2024 proposes, among other measures, to “complete the fifteen Forward Operating Bases (FOB) at our border frontiers of Ghana” to allow the military to swiftly respond to any external hostilities and threats posed by terrorists in the Region.

In this think piece, I briefly examine the proposal for FOBs in Ghana's border security management strategy, highlighting potential benefits and challenges while proposing a broad, balanced approach integrating advanced technology and socio-economic considerations.

Per the US Army Doctrine (JP 4-04), a FOB is a secured forward military position that supports tactical operations for combat missions, logistical support, and command and control functions. It is typically positioned closer to the area of operations to reduce response time and increase operational reach; equipped with necessary infrastructure such as barracks, command centres, medical facilities, and supply depots; fortified with defensive measures to protect personnel and equipment from enemy attacks; and provides logistical support, including food, ammunition, fuel, and maintenance services to sustain military operations.

The definition of a FOB implies the element of dispersion of forces. This also means increased exposure of such bases to pin-prick attacks, especially in counterterrorism settings. This dilemma is exemplified in the concept of Nigeria’s Super Camps enunciated by Lieutenant General Tukur Yusuf Buratai, the first Force Commander of the reconstituted Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTNF) under the auspices of the Lake Chad Basin Commission and the Benin Republic, and former Chief of Army Staff of the Nigerian Army (2015–2021).

In 2019, under his command, the Nigerian military adopted the Super Camp Strategy (SCS) of concentrating widely dispersed units and a degree of civilian villagisation to address force protection challenges arising from Boko Haram’s continuousselective pin-prick attacks and increasing casualties. The SCS was to address the intrinsic vulnerability of the Nigerian Army’s FOBs due to inadequate manpower and equipment, which made them subject to frequent raids and arms theft, as well as the inadequate management of soldiers’ long rotations, some in the same area for over four years with massive impacts on the troop’s morale and will fight.

General Buratai’s strategic approach to counterinsurgency operations was lauded for its effectiveness in degrading Boko Haram’s capabilities, making significant gains in the battle against the terrorist group(s), reclaiming territory and rescuing kidnapped civilians, and restoring regional security. He also boosted the counter-insurgency effort by acquiring T-72 tanks and paid particular attention to the selection of commanders. He exercised flexibility in command, including direct access to commanders through social media and using participation in the operation as a stepping stone to higher appointments and positions. However, the ICRC and Security Praxis contend that the SCS appears to have sacrificed the humanitarian protection of civilians in undefended villages. In practice, the Boko Haram menace continues unabated.

FOBs have tactical advantages, but they also face inherent vulnerabilities. Therefore, implementing the Manifesto’s proposals must consider the provision of significant capabilities. In the Manifesto’s bid to continue equipping Ghana’s security services to build their capability to protect the nation, the authorities must think seriously about acquiring Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) capabilities, notably AI-capable drones and satellite technology, for example, using AI for predictive analysis of potential threats or advanced sensor networks for improved border surveillance against the existential threat of terrorism, among others. Aside from the hard military defence and security, it is also important to target some of the socio-economic interventions mentioned in the Manifesto to the affected border areas.

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References

ICRC. Nigeria, Super Camps. The Concept of Total War. How does law protect in war? Case Book. Online at https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/nigeria-super-camps.

US Army. Contingency Basing (JP 4-04). 4 Jan 2019. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp4_04.pdf?ver=2019-03-12-145838-887.

WEF. The Fourth Industrial Revolution: what it means, how to respond. Jan 14, 2016. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/the-fourth-industrial-revolution-what-it-means-and-how-to-respond/.