Foreign Policy
Nehru's foreign and economic policies have proven to be disastrous for India. There is no room for soft thinking or romanticism in either of them. Nehru at least nurtured the democratic institutions. Mrs. Gandhi's economic policies and her almost destruction of the institutions were far more egregious.
Modi is on the right track with respect to both foreign and economic policies. I wish he was a bit bolder and moved faster.
Brahma Chellaney
Friday 26 January 2018 6:40 IST
Madeleine Albright famously said that “The purpose of foreign policy is to persuade other countries to do what you want or, better yet, to want what we want.” How has Indian foreign policy done when measured against such a standard of success?
In this century, India’s growing geopolitical weight, impressive economic-growth rate, rising military capabilities, increasing maritime role, abundant market opportunities, and favourable long-term demographics have helped increase its international profile. India is widely perceived to be a key “swing state” in the emerging international order. Yet Indian foreign policy offers little clue as to whether India is a world power in the making or just a sub-regional power with global-power pretensions.
India has yet to resolve an underlying tension in policy between realism and idealism. The struggle between idealism and pragmatism has bedevilled its diplomacy since independence, imposing serious costs. For example, Jawaharlal Nehru, the idealist, rejected a US suggestion in the 1950s that India take China’s vacant seat in the United Nations Security Council. The officially blessed selected works of Nehru quote him as saying that India could not accept the American proposal because it meant “falling out with China and it would be very unfair for a great country like China not to be in the [Security] Council.” The selected works also quote Nehru as telling Soviet Premier Marshal Nikolai A. Bulganin in 1955 on the same U.S. offer that “we should first concentrate on getting China admitted.”
Such have been the national-security costs for future Indian generations that just in the first seven years after independence, India allowed Pakistan to seize and retain one-third of Jammu and Kashmir; looked the other way when the newly established People’s Republic of China gobbled up the large historical buffer, the Tibetan Plateau; and tamely surrendered its British-inherited extra-territorial rights in Tibet without any quid pro quo, not even Beijing’s acceptance of the then-prevailing Indo-Tibetan border. The 1954 surrender of extra-territorial rights in Tibet included India shutting its military outposts at Yatung and Gyantse in Tibet and handing over Tibet’s postal, telegraph and public telephone services that it had been running to the Chinese government.
India thought that if it sought peace, it would get peace.. In reality, a nation gets peace only if it can defend peace. This reality did not sink in until China humiliated India in 1962.
The 1962 invasion, however, did not change another characteristic of Indian diplomacy — it has been driven not by integrated, institutionalized policymaking but by largely an ad hoc, personality-driven approach. This remains the bane of Indian foreign policy, precluding the establishment of a strategic framework for the pursuit of goals. The reliance by successive prime ministers on ad hoc, personal initiatives and decisions has helped marginalize the national security establishment and compounded India’s challenges. This needs to be corrected. The ministry of external affairs, for example, must play its assigned role in the formulation and execution of key aspects of foreign policy — a role that has increasingly been usurped by the Prime Minister’s Office.
Today, India confronts a “tyranny of geography” — that is, serious external threats from virtually all directions. To some extent, it is a self-inflicted tyranny. India’s concerns over China, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, the Maldives and even Pakistan stem from the failures of its past policies. An increasingly unstable neighbourhood also makes it more difficult to promote regional cooperation and integration.
As its tyranny of geography puts greater pressure on its external and internal security, India will need to develop more innovative approaches to diplomacy. The erosion of its influence in its own backyard should serve as a wake-up call. Only through forward thinking and a dynamic foreign policy can India hope to ameliorate its regional-security situation, freeing it to play a larger global role. Otherwise, it will continue to be weighed down by its region..
While India undoubtedly is imbibing greater realism in its foreign policy, it remains intrinsically cautious and reactive, rather than forward-looking and proactive. And as illustrated by PM Narendra Modi’s unannounced Lahore visit or by his government’s reluctance to impose any sanctions on a country it has called “Terroristan,” India hasn’t fully abandoned its quixotic traditions from the Nehruvian era.
India’s tradition of realist strategic thought is probably the oldest in the world. The realist doctrine was propounded by the strategist Kautilya, also known as Chanakya, who wrote the Arthashastra before Christ. This ancient manual on great-power diplomacy and international statecraft remains a must-read classic. Yet India, ironically, has forgotten Arthashastra.
The author is a strategic thinker, commentator and geopolitical expert
Port Management, Pilotage and SEQ since 7 years
6 年It is just not the external territory where blunders were made but if we look inside the same blunders are visible everywhere and the sad fact is that we as people of India prefer sticking to these blunders. It is really surprising to note that even after more than a 1000 years of being ruled over by various invaders, we are not able to value the freedom as a nation but as various ethnic groups which stay together in the same area, known as India.
Author. Growth Strategy, Strategy Implementation for mid-size Corporates and Entrepreneurs, Venture Capital.
6 年https://www.dhirubhai.net/feed/update/urn:li:activity:6363647082808606720
Interim Management, Board Advisor | Digital Solutions & Services | Consulting Businesses
6 年This is too vast and complex a topic to be covered in this way. While I am not a Security expert neither a Foreign policy specialist, I find that this article seems to dwell too much into the security aspects of 1950s and 1960s subcontinent dynamics, than on the times today. I get the point about past inaction setting us up for the situation we are faced with today. Someone needs to gently remind also that our security policy was so intricately linked to the British Raj apriori and that the generation of leaders we inherited to run the country never had experience of any kind to work out the dynamics as the situation unfolded. Remember, Indian army was nowhere close to the might of the British raj (which granted was waning by 1940s) and there is this famous story about our soldiers wearing sack mesh sweaters and old era rifles, to fight the Chinese soldiers at sub zero temp. India was a very different place in the 1950s and not much different from the African colonies, in terms of its own capabilities and little or no self dependence. What is India doing after Nehru and Indira Gandhi to be smart and proactive on this? Do we have a plan with a view to the horizon, on longer term outcomes over time (like China)? What is the way forward?
Managing Director
6 年Satish pathak, I don't understand your logic. Nehru was doing what was fashionable at the time about economics. Russian miracle had not been exposed yet and he was seduced by the fast growth Russia had shown. With respect to foreign policy, he was just naive. Especially during the cold war. He wanted to stay out of the superpower rivalry. At Least he built the democratic institutions that have taken hold and providing us the freedom that we enjoy in India. Mrs. Gandhi was disastrous on economic front but she did build the army up after 1965 standoff with Pakistan.