Focus & Errors in Crisis, Disasters, Risk and Resilience Assessments informing Management
Focus & Errors in Crisis, Disasters, Risk and Resilience Assessments informing Management

Focus & Errors in Crisis, Disasters, Risk and Resilience Assessments informing Management

Humans are obsessed in achieving control of their environment, including the incessant drive to classify all manner of events into neat little boxes to then assign scales of harm, threat, crisis, resilience and risk as if we not only have all the information but these relationship and natural events play-out with repeatable, guaranteed scripts for us to act, respond and recover.

In other words, our words, plans and structures attempt to negate anything from happening outside our view, confidence, calculation or preparedness.

Moreover, wherever more than one realm (human, natural, technology, hybrid) interacts or is affected, we know with absolute confidence and determinism just how these relationships will interact, the outcomes and scales of threat.

If only...

The reality is that our view, consideration and understanding is constrained. We often only 'see', understand or make sense of those things we want to see, understand or have past experience with.

Notwithstanding the complex nature of the real-world and our lack of ability to see all things, relationships and forecast future outcomes with either precision or consistency
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Therefore, any and all crisis, disaster, risk or resilience narratives that is constrained to a select group or set of typologies, should be considered as an incomplete analysis or data set.

As a result, the challenge for consumers, professionals, and organisations or governments remains consistent...


That is, where is the 'other' assessments and how do they influence or alter the one I'm presented with here?

In short, most views of crisis, disaster, risk or resilience is limited.

Seeking out and considering 'the rest' therefore becomes a matter of both good practice and obligation to stakeholders.

Tensions between prudentialism and laissez faire risk management will no doubt arise.

Prudentialism can be summed up as the assertion that nothing is safe until proven, whereas laissez faire posits that everything is safe until proven to the contrary.

Lives, communities, value, assets and futures are routinely gambled on with laissez faire approaches, without disclosure or full comprehension.

Irrespective of either ideology, full spectrum (or as broad as possible) consideration is required for single locations, assets and organisations.

To do other wise is to exclude valuable data and even possible the real risks and greatest harms.

In sum, the scope and value of any crisis, disaster, resilience and risk evaluation can be measured and assured by the scope of consideration and detailed inclusion/exclusion of these factors post analysis. Conversely, constrained, bound or curated considerations of crisis, disaster, resilience and risk (inclusive of security related factors) is both inherently limited but likely to conceal all hazards and threats for the purpose of expediency, budget, competencies or disclosures.

Regardless, such practices should be disclosed and noted in all such risk or resilience work product, especially those impacting people and communities excluded from participation or representation during the process.

Tony Ridley, MSc CSyP MSyI M.ISRM

Security, Risk and Management Sciences

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