Floods & Disasters in Australia: Risk, resilience and preparation failures over many years, just like other locations and jurisdictions
Ridley Tony
Experienced Leader in Risk, Security, Resilience, Safety, and Management Sciences | PhD Candidate, Researcher and Scholar
Recent, significant flooding in Australia has been described as an unprecedented and unforeseeable risk by some.
But, is it really?
In reality, like many other significant disasters in recent years, the flooding and catastrophic outcomes where not only foreseeable but communicated at length to successive governments, decision makers and communities.
Moreover, collective building programs changing flood plain landscapes, lack of central oversight and a lack of focus on more than just physical construction solutions to mitigate flood risk compounded the vulnerability and threat.
This inherent risk management problem is not isolated to either Australia or recent events, regardless of weather extremes.
So much so, the same issue occurred on a smaller scale, just a few years ago in Townsville, Queensland, Australia.
Events in Townsville echoed experiences and failures experienced during Hurricane Katrina in the USA.
Below is a summation of the key issues and risk management vulnerabilities I noted a few years ago.
What changed?
As it turns out.... not enough.
As indicated by the wholesale abandonment of insurance options for locals and lack of 'insurability', which in itself remains a significant indicator of concealed, systemic risk.
------------------------------
The Townsville floods. Australia's 'Hurricane Katrina'. A Comparative Analysis.?
Key issues: risk, communities, communications, preparedness and response.?
Primary Focus: lessons learned for national preparedness, capabilities and response to natural disasters.?
There were just so many essential and underlying issues with Townsville’s recent floods that I did some research and looked at the scientific research and literature for similar events.?
I reviewed over 91 seperate references, listed below.
This led me to the voluminous, post-disaster content around Hurricane Katrina in the United States.?
In particular, I was struck by the significant, shared pre-event circumstances that contributed to Hurricane Katrina, taken from 91 independent scientific, academic and government sources and research papers, derived from hundreds of subject matter experts.?
Over a decade later, there are many unchanged factors, and current weaknesses that invite a repeat of the devastating impact natural disasters have on communities.?
Here are some of the critical issues taken from this research and the supporting expert findings.?
Large, deviating aspects of the calamity could have been minimised or averted.?
Human, political, social and ideological factors both diluted and altered the course.?
The failing was not solely failings of the federal government, and many failings were in fact years, even decades in the making.?
On the political front, numerous “policy surprise” factors influenced the disaster.?
Policy surprise means
Sudden policy failures, are often the result of repeated policy surprise decisions and are attributed to 3 factors.?
The lesson in this is that:
The frequency of policy surprises and warning-response failures demonstrates that governments, organisations, and individuals often fail to detect or adequately adjust quickly enough to crucial changes in their external environments.?
Furthermore, historical experience shows that even when the responsible authorities have adequate information, they tend not to act.?
On the psychology front, fundamental factors such as risk perception, cognition and decision making are identified as factors.?
Specifically, 5 core factors contributing to failure throughout a natural disaster.?
The most notable part of this research and advice is that it was first published in 1977!
In the lead up to Hurricane Katrina, military and civil engineers declared they had 200 to 300-year protection solutions.?
Starting when??
?For the most part, many thought it would never happen in their lifetime.?
For the most part, threat and risk predictions weren’t adequately prioritised.?
Most tellingly, that sort of timeline was well outside of any political and election cycle.?
This resulted in a big “not my problem”, phenomena and massive overconfidence.?
There were warning signs, however.?
Hurricane Ivan and a scientific computer model simulating the destruction were largely ignored.?
Experts, especially those within the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) repeatedly warned of direct and indirect issues that required immediate correction.?
National Response Plans (NRP) were described as “fantasy documents”.?
Not to be overlooked was the issue whereby individuals and communities of ‘younger’ generations had not yet experienced a large scale natural disaster in their lifetimes.?
The backdrop of this entire event is at a time when dozens of government agencies are consolidated into the newly formed Department of Homeland Security (DHS), as a direct response to a significant terrorist attack, to overcome interagency lack of information sharing, duplication and create a more holistic solution for the country.?
FEMA was consumed by this new entity and lost people, funding and priority on matters of emergency management and natural disaster preparations.?
Terrorism both at home and abroad was the rockstar attraction getting all the attention now.?
Multiple experts warned that this was both ill-advised and would create its own risks.?
Moreover, social psychological research has suggested that ‘social categorization’, the human tendency to make ‘us’ versus ‘them’ distinctions, and ‘cognitive categorization’, in which one group stereotypes and accentuates perceived differences of other agencies, tends to exacerbate intergroup conflict and hinder performance in situations where ‘groups must cooperate to achieve larger goals’.
A “branding battle” ensured, promoting DHS above all others with a sense of “superpowers”.?
Perhaps not surprisingly, during the battle to support those affected by Hurricane Katrina, one senior government official stated that ‘one surprise quite commonly led to additional surprises’.?
Most tellingly, after the event, Former FEMA Director Michael Brown summed up the issues by stating that
‘If we’d confirmed that a terrorist had blown up the 17th Street Canal levee, then everybody would have jumped all over that and been trying to do everything they could. However, because this was a natural disaster, that has become the stepchild within the Department of Homeland Security’.
Ouch!
Some commercial organisations outperformed federal and government agencies, most famously cited is Walmart and to a degree Starbucks.?
The US Coastguard were ready and responded admirably.
Aside from counterterrorism and weapons of mass destruction, natural disasters competed with immigration, border security, and other significant security risks such as the spectre of avian influenza for resources and the attention of the DHS elite.?
Counterterrorism was seen as the DHS’ reason for existence.?
These topics were good for politicians, votes and political parties too.?
For the first time in 37 years, federal budget cuts had all but stopped major work on the New Orleans area’s east bank hurricane levees, a complex network of concrete walls, metal gates and giant earthen berms.
Ironically, counter-terrorism was the neglected policy area that became the political priority that crowded out other security risks; the spectre of terrorism distracted authorities who may have been too busy trying to connect the dots in one area of (homeland) security policy to take action on what was an entirely predictable surprise in another.?
What does this have to do with Australia and the Townsville floods?
If you look at the fact that Australia’s Department of Home Affairs is a relatively new amalgam of multiple government departments, formed only at the end of 2017, you quickly see that it too is dominated by security, terrorism, law enforcement and other headline-grabbing agendas.?
Has emergency management and disaster response become the unappreciated stepchild in Australia?
The Townsville floods are not the first large-scale natural disaster in Australia, merely the most recent.?
In February of 2009, the southern Australian state of Victoria experienced a series of bushfires, numbering in the hundreds, which claimed the lives of 180 people.?
Policy over substance, understanding of the risks, a lack of funding, training and supporting infrastructure were some of the same factors noted during the bushfires,?Hurricane Katrina and?contributed to Townsville floods.
As experienced in the US, in the wake of a significant terrorist threat, has the pendulum swung too far in Australia??
Are Australia’s threats prioritised based on random politically charged topics such as “stopping the boats”, “offshore refugees” and “African crime gangs”?
These appear to the most topical agendas for politicians.?
You don’t seem to hear many politicians or political parties in Australia running campaigns based on making life and cities ‘safer’ or more resilient to identifiable and likely natural threats.?
Has this fear mongering and political point scoring resulted in a greater risk for Australian cities and citizens??
Time will most definitely tell.?
Questions around risk, comprehension, communications, communities, preparedness, response and federal government capability and support will dominate the post-Townsville flood analysis.?
The 3 critical questions posed by researchers and analyst in the wake of Hurricane Katrina was:
1. What was known about the risk??
?2. What was communicated about the risk??
?3. What was the response to that communication??
History may not repeat itself. But it rhymes.?
What do you think??
------------------------------
Tony Ridley, MSc CSyP MSyI M.ISRM
Security, Risk, Resilience, Safety & Management Sciences
Bibliography
Adam, B., & Van Loon, J. (2000). Introduction: Repositioning risk; The challenge for social theory. In B. Adam, U. Beck, & J. Van Loon (Eds.), The risk society and beyond: Critical issues for social theory (pp. 1-31). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Ajzen, I. (1991). The theory of planned behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 50(2), 179-211.
Ajzen, I., & Fishbein, M. (1980). Understanding attitudes and predicting social behavior. Englewood Cliffs, NY: Prentice Hall.
Aldoory, L., Kim, J.-N., & Tindall, N. (2010). The influence of perceived shared risk in crisis communication: Elaborating the situational theory of publics. Public Relations Review, 36(2), 134- 140. doi: 10.1016/j.pubrev.2009.12.002.
Aldoory, L., & Sha, B. L. (2007). The situational theory of publics: Practical applications, methodological challenges, and theoretical horizons. In E. L. Toth (Ed.), The future of excellence in public relations and communication management: Challenges for the next generation (pp. 339-355). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
领英推荐
Basolo, V., Steinberg, L. J., Burby, R. J., Levine, J., Cruz, A. M., & Huang, C. (2009). The effects of confidence in government and information on perceived and actual preparedness for disasters. Environment and Behavior, 41(3), 338–364.
Benoit, W. L. (1995). Accounts, excuses and apologies: A theory of image restoration discourse. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Benoit, W. L. (1997). Image repair discourse and crisis communication. Public Relations Review, 23(2), 177-186.
Berg, D. M., & Robb, S. (1992). Crisis management and the “paradigm case.” In E. L. Toth & R. L Heath (Eds.), Rhetorical and critical approaches to public relations (pp. 93-110). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Booth-Butterfield, M. (2003). Embedded health behaviors from adolescence to adulthood: The impact of tobacco. Health Communication, 15(2), 171-184.
Burns, B. (2011). The needs for longitudinal panel. Unpublished.
Burns, W. J., & Slovic, P. (2007). The diffusion of fear: Modeling community response to a terrorist strike.
The Journal of Defense Modeling and Simulation: Applications, Methodology, Technology, 4(4), 298- 317
Campbell, K. K. (1996). The rhetorical act (2nd ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
Carey, J. (2003). The functions and uses of media during the September 11 crisis and its aftermath. In A.
M. Noll (Ed.), Crisis communications: Lessons from September 11 (pp. 1-17). New York: Rowman & Littlefield.
Clark, R. A. (1984). Persuasive messages. New York: Harper & Row.
Coombs, W. T. (2004). Impact of past crises on current crisis communication: Insights from Situational
Crisis Communication Theory. Journal of Business Communication, 41(3), 265-289.
Coombs, T.W. (2006). The protective powers of crisis response strategies: Managing reputational assets during a crisis. Journal of Promotion Management, 12(3/4), 241-260.
Coombs, W. T. (2012). Ongoing crisis communication: Planning, managing, and responding (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Coombs, W. T., & Holladay, S. J. (2002). Helping crisis managers protect reputational assets: Initial tests of the situational crisis communication theory. Management Communication Quarterly, 16(2), 165- 186.
Coombs, W. T., & Holladay, S. J. (Eds.). (2010). The handbook of crisis communication. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Covello, V. T. (1992). Risk communication: An emerging area of health communication research. In S. A. Deetz (Ed.), Communication yearbook 15 (pp. 359-373). Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Dialogik. (2008). Public Information Response After Terrorist Events. Newsletter: Uni Stuttgart: Zirn & Dialogik. 5(11), 7 Retrieved from https://www.dialogikexpert.de/en/list/archiv/Issue%2005%20(Novermber%202008).pdf
Dillon, R. L., Tinsley, C. T., & Cronin, M. (2011). Why near-miss events can decrease an individual’s protective response to hurricanes. Risk Analysis, 31(3), 440-449.
Eggers, S. L., Thorne, S. L., Sousa, K. A. T., Butte, G., & Ackerlund, S. (2011). A strategic risk communication process for biosolids professionals: Advancing the field. Presentation at the annual Society for Risk Analysis conference, Charleston, SC.
Falkenberry, E. M. (1995). The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act: A tool for toxic release reduction in the 90’s. Buffalo Environmental Law Journal, 3(1), 1-36.
Fediuk, T. A., Pace, K. M., & Botero, I. C. (2010). Exploring crisis from a receiver perspective: Understanding stakeholder reactions during crisis events. In W. T.Coombs, & S. J. Holladay (Eds), The handbook of crisis communication, (pp. 635-656). New York: Wiley
Blackwell. Fischhoff, B. (1995). Risk perception and communication unplugged: Twenty years of process. Risk Analysis, 15(2), 137-145.
Flynn, J, Slovic, P., & Kunreuther, H. (Eds.). (2001). Risk, media, and stigma: Understanding public challenges to modern science and technology. London: Earthscan.
Freudenburg, W. R., Coleman, C.-L., Gonzales, J., & Helgeland, C. (1996). Media coverage of hazard events: Analyzing the assumptions. Risk Analysis, 16(1), 31-42.
Gigerenzer, G., & Hoffrage, U. (1995). How to improve Bayesian reasoning without instruction: Frequency formats. Psychological Review, 102(4), 684–704.
Griffin, R. J., Dunwoody, S., & Neuwirth, K. (1999). Proposed model of the relationship of risk information seeking and processing to the development of preventive behaviors. Environmental Research, 80(2), S230-S245.
Griffin, R. J., Neuwirth, K., Giese, J., & Dunwoody, S. (2002). Linking the heuristic-systematic model and depth of processing. Communication Research, 29(6), 705-732. doi: 10.1177/009365002237833.
Grunig, J. E. (1997). A situational theory of publics: Conceptual history, recent challenges, and new research. In D. Moss, T. McManus, & D. Vercic (Eds.), Public relations research: An international perspective (pp. 3-48). London: International Thomson Business Press.
Grunig, J. E. (2003). Constructing public relations theory and practice. In B. Dervin & S. Chaffee, with L. Foreman-Wernet (Eds.), Communication, another kind of horse race: Essays honoring Richard F. Carter (pp. 85-115). Cresskill, NJ: Hampton.
Hearit, K. M., & Roberson, K. M. (2010). Denial, differentiation, and apology: On the use of apologia in crisis management. In R. L. Heath & H. D. O’Hair (Eds.),
Handbook of risk and crisis communication (pp. 542-559). New York: Routledge.
Heath, R. L. (2010). Crisis communication: Defining the beast and de-marginalizing key publics. In W. T. Coombs, & S. Holladay (Eds.), The handbook of crisis communication (pp. 1-13). Malden, MA: Wiley- Blackwell.
Heath, R. L., & O’Hair, H. D. (2010). The significance of crisis and risk communication. In R. L. Heath & H. D. O’Hair (Eds.), Handbook of risk and crisis communication (pp. 5-30). New York: Routledge.
Heath, R. L., & Palenchar, M. (2000). Community relations and risk communication: A longitudinal study of the impact of emergency response messages. Journal of Public Relations Research, 12(2), 131-161.
Johnson, B. B. (2003). Are some risk comparisons more effective under conflict?: A replication and extension of Roth et al. Risk Analysis, 23(4), 767–780.
Johnson, B. B. (2004). Risk comparisons, conflict, and risk acceptability claims. Risk Analysis, 24(1), 131– 145.
Kasperson, R.E. (1992). The social amplification of risk: Progress in developing an integrative framework of risk. In S. Krimsky & G. Golding (Eds.), Social Theories of Risk (pp. 153-78). New York: Praeger.
Keller, C., Siegrist, M., & Gutscher, H. (2006). The role of affect and availability heuristics in risk communication. Risk Analysis, 26(3), 631-639.
Kim, J.-N., & Grunig, J. E. (2011). Problem solving and communicative action: A situational theory of problem solving. Journal of Communication, 61(1), 120-149. doi: 10.1111/j.1460- 2466.2010.01529.x.
Liu, B. F. (2007). President Bush’s major post-Katrina speeches: Enhancing image repair discourse theory applied to the public sector. Public Relations Review, 33(1), 40-48.
McComas, K. A. (2006). Defining moments in risk communication research: 1996-2005. Journal of Health Communication, 11(1), 75-91.
Mikami, S., & Ikeda, K. (1985). Human response to disasters. International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, 3, 107–132.
Mileti, D. S., Bourque, L. B., Wood, M. M., & Kano, M. (2011). Motivating public mitigation and preparedness for earthquakes and other hazards. Journal of Hazard Mitigation and Risk Assessment, Spring 2011, 25-31.
Mileti, D. S., & Fitzpatrick, C. (1992). The causal sequence of risk communication in the Parkfield earthquake prediction experiment. Risk Analysis, 12(3), 393–400.
Mileti, D. S., & O’Brien, P.W. (1992). Warnings during disaster: Normalizing communicated risk. Social Problems, 39(1), 40–57.
Mileti, D. S., & Sorensen, J. H. (1990). Communication of emergency public warnings: A social science perspective and state-of-the-art assessment. Oak Ridge, TN: Report #ORNL-6609 for the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
Morgan, G., Fischhoff, B., Bostrom, A., & Atman, C. J. (2002). Risk communication: A mental models approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Muralidharan, S., Dillistone, K., & Shin, J.-H. (2011). The Gulf Coast oil spill: Extending the theory of image restoration discourse to the realm of social media and beyond petroleum. Public Relations Review, 37(3), 226-232. 1.?????
National Cancer Institute. (2003). Theory at a glance: A guide for health promotion practice. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
Palenchar, M. J. (2005). Risk communication. In R. L. Heath (Ed.), Encyclopedia of public relations (pp. 752- 755). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Palenchar, M. J. (2008). Risk communication and community right to know: A public relations obligation to inform. Public Relations Journal, 2(1), 1-26.
Palenchar, M. J. (2010). Historical trends of risk and crisis communication. In R. L. Heath & H. D. O’Hair (Eds.), The handbook of crisis and risk communication (pp. 31-52). Routledge: New York.?
Perry, R. W. (1988). The communication of disaster warnings. Paper presented at the Symposium on Science Communication. Sponsored by the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency and the Annenberg School of Communications, University of Southern California. Los Angeles, CA.?
Pidgeon, N., Harthorn, B.H., Bryant, B., & Rogers-Hayden, R. (2009). Deliberating the risks of nanotechnologies for energy and health applications in the United States and United Kingdom. Nature Nanotechnology, 4, 95-98.
Poortinga, W., & Pidgeon, N. F. (2003). Exploring the dimensionality of trust in risk regulation. Risk Analysis, 23(5), 961–972.
Procopio, C. H., & Procopio, S. T. (2007). Do you know what it means to miss New Orleans? Internet communication, geographic community, and social capital in crisis. Journal of Applied Communication Research, 35(1), 67-87. doi: 10.1080/00909880601065722.
Rauschmayer, F., & Wittmer, H. (2006). Evaluating deliberative and analytical methods for the resolution of environmental conflicts. Land Use Policy, 23(1), 108-122.
Renn, O. (1999). A model for an analytic-deliberative process in risk management. Environmental Science & Technology, 33(18), 3049 -3055.
Renn, O. (2003). Social amplification of risk in participation: Two case studies. In N. Pidgeon, R.
Kasperson, & P. Slovic (Eds.), The social amplification of risk (pp. 374-401). Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
Reynolds, B., Deitch, S., & Schieber, R. (2006). Crisis and emergency risk communication: Pandemic influenza. Atlanta, GA: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
Reynolds, B., Galdo, J. H., & Sokler, L. (2002). Crisis and emergency risk communication. Atlanta, GA: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
Roberto, A. J., Goodall, C. E., & Witte, K. (2010). Raising the alarm and calming fears: Perceived threat and efficacy during risk and crisis. In R. L. Heath & H. D. O’Hair (Eds.), Handbook of risk and crisis communication (pp. 285-301). New York: Routledge.
Rogers, G. O. (1985). Human components of emergency warnings: Implications for planning and management. Pittsburg, PA: University Center for Social and Urban Research.
Rogers, M. B., Amlot, R., Rubin, G. J., Wessely, S., & Krieger, K. (2007). Mediating the social and psychological impacts of terrorist attacks: The role of risk perception and risk communication. International Review of Psychiatry, 19(3), 279-288.
Roth, E., Morgan, M. G., Fischhoff, B., Lave, L., & Bostrom, A. (1990).What do we know about making risk comparisons. Risk Analysis, 10(3), 375–387.
Rowan, K. E., Botan, C. H., Kreps, G. L., Samoilenko, S., & Farnsworth, K. (2010). Risk communication education for local emergency managers: Using the CAUSE model for research, education, and outreach. In R. L. Heath & H. D. O’Hair (Eds.), Handbook of risk and crisis communication (pp. 168- 191). New York: Routledge.
Seeger, M. W., & Padgett, D. R. G. (2010). From image restoration to renewal: Approaches to understanding post crisis communication. The Review of Communication, 10(2), 127-141. doi: 10.1080/15358590903545263.
Seeger, M. W., Reynolds, B., & Sellnow, T. L. (2010). Crisis and emergency risk communication in health contexts: Applying the CDC model to pandemic influenza. In R. L. Heath & D. O’Hair (Eds.),
Handbook of risk and crisis communication (pp. 493-506). New York: Routledge.
Shine, K. (2001, November 29). Hearing on risk communication: National security and public health. House Committee on Government Reform. Available at https://www7.nationalacademies.org/ocga/testimony/Risk_Communication_Natl_Security_Public_ Health.asp
Sheppard, Ben, Melissa Janoske, and Brooke Liu. “Understanding Risk Communication Theory: A Guide for Emergency Managers and Communicators,” Report to Human Factors/Behavioral Sciences Division, Science and Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. College Park, MD: START, 2012.
Sidell, F. R., Patrick, W. C., & Dashiell, T. R. (1998). Jane’s chemical-biological defense guidebook. Coulsdon: Jane’s Information Group.
Siegrist, M., & Gutscher, H. (2006). Flooding risks: A comparison of lay people’s perceptions and expert’s assessments in Switzerland. Risk Analysis, 26(4), 971-979.
Slovic, P. (1993). Perceived risk, trust, and democracy. Risk Analysis, 13(6), 675-682.
Slovic, P. (Ed.). (2000). The perception of risk. London: Routledge.
Slovic, P. (2002). Terrorism as hazard: A new species of trouble. Risk Analysis, 22(3), 425-426.
Slovic, P., Finucane, M. L., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2004). Risk as analysis and risk as feelings: Some thoughts about affect, reason, risk, and rationality. Risk Analysis, 24(2), 311-322.
Slovic, P., Fischhoff, B., & Lichtenstein, S. (1978). Accident probabilities and seat belt usage: A psychological perspective. Accident Analysis and Prevention, 10(4), 281–285.
Slovic, P., Kraus, N., & Covello, V. T. (1990).What should we know about making risk comparisons. Risk Analysis, 10(3), 389–392.
Smarick, K. (2010). Public warnings and evacuations: A study of the 2009 California station fire. College Park, MD: START.
Smith, R. A., Ferrara, M., & Witte, K. (2007). Social sides of health risks: Stigma and collective efficacy. Health Communication, 21(1), 55-64.
Torabi, M. R., & Seo, D.-C. (2004). National study of behavioral and life changes since September 11. Health Education Behavior, 31(2), 179-192.
Turner, R. H., Nigg, J. M., Paz, D. H., & Young, B. S. (1979). Earthquake threat: The humanitarian response in Southern California. Los Angeles: Institute for Social Science Research, University of California.
Trumbo, C. W. (2002). Information processing and risk perception: An adaptation of the heuristic- systematic model. Journal of Communication, 52(2), 367-382.
Turner, R.H., Paz, D.H., & Young B. (1981). Community response to earthquake threat in Southern California (Parts 4–6 and 10). Los Angeles, CA: University of California.
Ulmer, R.R. (2001). Effective crisis management through established stakeholder relationships: Malden Mills as a case study. Management Communication Quarterly, 14(4), 590-615.
Witte, K. (1992). Putting the fear back into fear appeals: The extended parallel process model. Communication Monographs, 59(4), 329-349.
Wood, M. M., Mileti, D. S., Kano, M., Kelley, M. M., Regan, R., & Bourque, L. B. (2011). Communicating actionable risk for terrorism and other hazards. Risk Analysis. Online preview.
Yamagishi, K. (1997).When a 12.86% mortality is more dangerous than 24.14%: Implications for risk communication. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 11, 495–506.