Fixing 2020- Reversing the Crime Trends

By Rick Arrington

The Wall Street Journal reported on March 23, 2020 that serious felonies had dropped by 17% during the March 16-March 22 time frame, as compared to the same time during the previous year.[i] Most crime researchers indicate that a drop would be likely to be reported in the most crime riddled communities as well. There was a significant drop in homicides in the “windy city” as well as other metropolitan areas, but the cause was not necessarily what one might think. Our police officers are great at their jobs, but it is not their efforts that created this drop in crime. It is also not the result of policies implemented by city councils and governing bodies.

The COVID 19 spread had a large part to do with the reported drop but again, not in the way one might think. Criminals are not impacted by the “stay at home” orders as one might hope. Criminals are not trembling in fear that they might be infected by the virus motivating them to avoid committing their crimes. Crime was decreasing because there were fewer available targets and fewer opportunities. Robbers can’t rob, if there are few available victims. For those that view crime prevention efforts as ineffective, this decrease proves (or at least indicates) the value of crime prevention and opportunity reduction programs.

With the good news that serious felonies fell early in the year, we look at the proverbial bad news. The good news related to the opportunity reduction; the bad news is a bit more complicated.

The decrease in crime was short lived. As of December 2020, a sharp increase in the number of murders in the United States has been reported. A report from the Council on Criminal Justice stated that in the 21 cities they examined homicide during May and June was up thirty-seven percent and aggravated assault up by thirty-five percent over the same time in 2019. Firearm assault did not significantly change over the previous years. Looking primarily at May/June, a two-hundred percent increase in commercial burglaries was reported and a twenty-seven percent increase in robberies was noted.[ii] Some analysts expect an overall increase in murder for the 2020 year over 2019 to reach be in the thirty-five percent or higher range.

It should come of no surprise to anyone that the biggest spikes in homicides came from those with large post-George Floyd death protests. Proactive policing practitioners recognize the increase in burglaries were linked to the looting. The question is not, is there a significant increase in violence in the United States, but why and what to do to reverse the trend?

THE PANDEMIC CONTRIBUTION

Criminals are resourceful and the longer we remain isolated at home by the government imposed orders, the more likely that other crimes will increase in prevalence. The crimes of domestic assaults, homicides and abuse are on the increase in many jurisdictions since the lockdown orders went into effect. 

The COVID 19 orders have done as much to frighten citizens as to care for them. Citizens intuitively fear that criminals will become emboldened and desperate. This is proven by an 85% increase in gun sales reported in the United States by the F.B.I. in March over the same time in 2019. Not insignificant is that the increase was during a time when some states had shut down gun sales as non-essential. The increase has continued throughout the protests, and riots. Add to this growing fear the publicized increase in Governors limiting the number of persons incarcerated, thus releasing many career criminals back into public, and the limitation of police response by officers to protect themselves from accusations, and one easily understands why citizens are concerned for their family’s safety.

THE GEORGE FLOYD PROTESTS, RIOTS AND CALL FOR POLICE REFORM

The death of George Floyd in police custody created a spark that ignited protests in many major cities based upon an assertion by activists that African Americans were being unfairly treated based on race, or worse yet, targeted because of their race. The media and social media fed frensy led to the protests growing and eventually turning violent. The widescale riots and looting in many communities resulted in increased fear in these major cities and others. Even normally law abiding citizens believed media reports without researching them for truth.

Although reform was already being addressed before the George Floyd death, it became more publicized afterward. The reform pushed after the death of Floyd was aimed at addressing an alleged problem of police officers racial targeting. 

The criminal justice system is not law enforcement alone, even though the target for reform has been almost exclusively law enforcement. A system is a group of parts that work together to make the whole. Any real reform must examine and improve all parts of the system. This was not done during the post-Floyd protests or reform efforts. Instead, the law enforcement community was unfairly targeted and most of the efforts attacked their tools such as eliminating no-knock warrants, bans on neck restraints, bans on rubber bullets and other non-lethal weapons. Other efforts attacked protections such as removing qualified immunity for officers acting within the law. The most devastating effort was the defund the police movement.

These proposed reforms would have done nothing to address an alleged race issue, but they were pressed by activists and politicians and the results devastated the law enforcement morale and ranks. Ironically, the hardest hit by the increases in homicides are the law income and minority communities. In a report from the Wall Street Journal, New York Police Department officials reported shooting victims had increased by over one-hundred percent from January through December 20, 2020 and most of the victims were persons of color.[iii]

The media coverage of the reforms led to an unfair loss of trust in officers, the overwhelming majority of which serve the public well. This result led many officers who could retire to depart their chosen profession and left departments to answer the same number of calls with fewer officers. Officers feeling dejected, may have chosen to not initiate activity but rather to respond only as was the case in Baltimore after the riots in 2015. About 362 of Baltimore’s officers responded to a survey by a city councilman in 2018 and forty-three percent said they did not feel “comfortable making self-initiated arrests.”[iv]

The defund movement and other reform activities contributed to the rise in crime, having resulted in fewer officers available and a lack of motivation over concerns of their being unfairly judged should force be required.

HISTORY REPEATING ITSELF AND THE SOLUTION TO RISING CRIME

The pandemic led to a decrease in property crime as most homes remained occupied and cars remained at home while workers were unemployed or tele-worked from home. The true impact on domestic violence is yet to be known, although calls to hotlines have increased.

The protests and related riots, as well as the subsequent calls for police reform are symptomatic of the real problem. The underlying problem of distrust of police, calls for reform, and citizens feeling unsafe are rooted in the lack of relationships that the police have with those they serve. The reversion to reactive policing occurring over the last two centuries led to the problem. The problem is far from new. The disconnect of the police from their community has led to similar results in the past.

A quick examination of the recent history of the United States crime rates shows that following the civil rights activities and Vietnam War protests of the 1960s and into the 1970s crime became a major concern. Crime grew significantly during this extended time into the 1980s. This along with the crack-cocaine abuse problem saw handgun related homicides grow by almost double between 1985 and 1990. Citizens, civic leaders, police executives and politicians all struggled to get a handle on the problem. Between 1968 and 1973, three Presidential Commissions made numerous recommendations for changes in policing. The U.S. Department of Justice and many law enforcement agencies conducted training, research and sought new ways to address the growing crime problem. 

In the 1970s the San Diego Police Department conducted several research studies, one of which evaluated a community-oriented policing (COP) project.[v] This project required officers to become knowledgeable about their beats. Officers were required to develop strategies to address citizen concerns. The finding by the officers that were involved was that random patrols were much less important than developing relationships with the community. The project also revealed that community interaction by officers could improve the attitudes of officers and job satisfaction. In 1979, Herman Goldstein developed and advanced the idea of “problem-oriented policing” (POP).[vi] POP transitioned policing from a reactive response to crimes to a proactive response to developing solutions to “problems,” which caused or evolved into crime.

As a Crime Prevention Unit Sergeant during this time, I watched the transition to community policing and experienced the success from implementing many community policing strategies. Community policing in its various forms began to show promise in improving community and police interactions, restoring trust and thus improving cooperation in solving both problems and crimes. So successful was the implementation of community policing that on September 13, 1994, the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act was signed. The Act authorized implementation of a six-year, $8.8 billion grant program to enable law enforcement agencies to hire or redeploy 100,000 additional officers for community policing efforts.[vii] The Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) was created in 1994 to assist law enforcement agencies through the implementation of community policing strategies. The years following saw a precipitous decline in violent crime from a high of 758 per 100,000 in 1991 to 361 in 2014 and 366 in 2019.[viii] Although there is a correlation to the reduction of crime, with the implementation of the COPS Office strategies and grants, research by the Heritage Foundation indicates that the COPS Office Hiring Program (CHP) may not have been a major contributor, at least in the first ten years. The program may not have contributed to more officers on the street. The report stated that, “FBI data for the 20 agencies receiving the largest volume of COPS grants strongly support the finding that federal COPS funding has had relatively little impact on growth in the numbers of officers that agencies put on the street. In fact, in the case of two of the 20 largest recipients of COPS funding, the number of officers employed actually fell. Other agencies saw only slight increases in officer strength, while police forces that received a fraction of their funding saw much larger increases in the number of officers.”[ix] The CHP was expected to provide $400 million in funding for 2020.

Regardless of the impact of additional officers, the strategies were certainly successful and brought about much needed changes in policing. Community engagement brought on by the change led to a reconnection with the community. The police image returned to one worthy of respect and with problem solving the norm, community and community resources worked side by side with officers to improve the safety of the locality. This success continued until the recession forced budget cuts (defunding) and officers who normally had time to engage the community were required to do more with fewer officers, thus again losing their connection to the community.

According to the FBI 2016 Crime in the United States Report murder, often seen as the primary indicator of overall crime trends, rose by 16.1% between 2012 and 2016. The same report shows that the overall homicide rate increased by 20% since 2014.[x] This was the first indicators of a renewed need to address violence.

The economy in recent years led to hard decisions for police executives. Not recognizing the cost-benefit of community policing, some executives moved again toward efficiency rather than effectiveness. Although crime through 2019 was still much lower than the 1980s and 1990s, the year 2020 violent crime increases pose a real concern. Is this year an anomaly or the spike that explodes into another violent crime epidemic? 

The same events and conditions that led to the crime epidemic of the past are occurring now, protests, riots, distrust of the police and politicization. We know what to do to stop the trend, re-engage our communities.

To do so agencies must begin now to train their command staff and supervisors in community engaged policing, followed by training the remaining staff. The proven techniques of problem solving must again be implemented in cooperation with the community as agencies begin again the return to proactive policing. It is essential to remember that without community participation, involvement in decisions, and open communication, it is not community policing, it is just policing.

The law enforcement executive and command staff must begin by developing plans to incrementally change the philosophy from reactive to proactive, to demonstrate the value of relationships with all communities served and begin the gradual transition in working with the community in providing transparency and partnerships.

A new twist that must be addressed immediately is the massive increase in firearms sales. The legitimate sales of firearms are not a concern, however the high probability of them being stolen in burglaries and ending up in the hands of criminals is. The failure of new gun owners to understand the need to secure such weapons may also result in tragic accidental shooting. These concerns provide law enforcement a perfect opportunity for officers to begin rebuilding trust. Officers may begin through offering training seminars on firearm safety, home security and so on.

Another new concern that 2020 has dealt already strapped officers is the number of career criminals released from prisons and jails due to COVID 19 concerns. A Bureau of Justice Statistics report from 2018 that examined prisoner recidivism over a nine year period (2005-2014) revealed that, “released state prisoners were arrested an estimated two-million times within the nine years following release in 2005.”[xi] About forty-four percent of those released in 2005 were arrested at least once during their first year. Eighty-three percent of offenders were rearrested withing the total nine year period. The release of the estimated 170,000 plus inmates during the pandemic, in conjunction with the research on recidivism creates a need that must be addressed by law enforcement and their partners in probation and parole and the community.

Finally, law enforcement must partner with communities of color to improve trust through inclusion in processes developed to address crime. The proverbial hate filled violent genie of racism which some say cannot be put back in the bottle, must indeed be banished. Those that purvey and proliferate the media with racism, must be addressed through truthful collaborations of communities. The community, not just the police, must say you will not seize our home for the furtherance of your agenda, the hate espoused in one location does not exist in our hometown, we are part of policing and they are part of the community.

Community engaged policing works. I was brought in as part of a transition to community engaged policing in Martinsville, Virginia. Then Chief of Police, Sean Dunn, made training of all staff in the process a priority. Inclusion of citizens at all levels, building in officer connection requirements and transparency made his plan a success. From 2014 to 2016, violent crime in Martinsville went down fifty-nine percent and property crime fell twenty-six percent, but most importantly, a mutual trust and respect grew from the process.

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Richard “Rick” Arrington is a retired police lieutenant, author, and subject matter expert on crime prevention and community policing. He operates the Crime Prevention Center for Training and Services, LLC and provides training to law enforcement on proactive policing throughout the United States. He serves on the International Association of Chiefs of Police Crime Prevention Committee and other national law enforcement advisory committees.  

[i] Ben Chapman. New York City Crime Falls as Coronavirus Takes Hold. The Wall Street Journal published March 23, 2020.

[ii] Rosenfeld, Richard and Ernesto Lopez. Pandemic, Social Unrest, and Crime in U.S. Cities. Washington, D.C.: Council on Criminal Justice, July 2020.

[iii] Chapman, Ben. New York City’s Shooting Surge Hit Black and Hispanic Communities Hardest The Wall Street Journal. December 27, 2020.

[iv] Anderson, Jessica. Councilman says Baltimore police officers 'afraid,' don't feel empowered to initiate arrests. The Baltimore Sun. February 14, 2019. Retrieved December 28, 2020 https://www.baltimoresun.com/maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-ci-police-survey-20190214-story.html

[v] Boydstun, John E., and Michael E. Sherry. San Diego Community Profile: Final Report. Washington, D.C.: Police Foundation. 1975:p.83.

[vi] Goldstein, Herman. “Improving Policing: A Problem-Oriented Approach.” Crime and Delinquency 25(1979):pp.241–3.

[vii] Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (Public Law 103-322).

[viii] Reported violent crime rate in the U.S. 1990-2019. Published by Statista Research Department, Sep 28, 2020. Retrieved December 28, 2020 https://www.statista.com/statistics/191219/reported-violent-crime-rate-in-the-usa-since-1990/

[ix] Rector, Ralph; Muhlhausen, David and Ingram, Dexter. The Facts about COPS: A Performance Overview of the Community Oriented Policing Services Program. September 25, 2000

[x] 2016 Crime in the United States Report. www.ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2016/crime-in-the-u.s.-2016 Retrieved Dec. 29, 2017

[xi] Alper, Mariel; Durose, Matthew R. and Markham, Joshua. 2018 Update on Prisoner Recidivism: A 9-Year Follow-up Period (2005-2014) U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs Bureau of Justice Statistics. May 2018. Retrieved December 28, 2020 https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/18upr9yfup0514.pdf