Was The Fire Ball Crash At The Ohio State Fair An accident, Or Was It Caused By Negligence?

Let me preface my article by defining the difference between an accident, and manslaughter:

Accident-

"an unfortunate incident that happens unexpectedly and unintentionally."

Manslaughter-

"An unlawful killing that doesn’t involve malice afterthought"

?"Reckless disregard for life."

The Anglo–American legal system that was developed over a period of hundreds of years contains several key provisions that, when used properly, guard against wrongful criminal convictions. These protections are critical because not only do they defend citizens from false accusations, but they also demand that police and prosecutors proceed with discipline and care, proving every element of an accusation beyond a reasonable doubt.

Keeping this in mind, according to the flood of newspaper and television reports that hit the airwaves within minutes after the Fire Ball ride crashed at the Ohio State Fair claiming the life of one person, and critically injuring another seven, the cause of the crash was “accidental.”

What am I missing? How is it possible for anyone to determine that the root cause of the Fire Ball crash was “accidental” before a single inspector arrived on scene? I hate to be the bearer of bad news, but the inspectors may rule that the root cause of the Fire Ball crash could be negligence, in which case, the ride owner should face a jury of his peers. I realize the Fire Ball’s owner (s), insurance company, pre-commissioning inspectors, safety professionals, technicians, et al would like to believe the root cause of the crash was accidental, and perhaps it was. However, shouldn’t the news media, social media and the public, be sympathetic to the victim’s families, and stop speculating about what caused the crash.

Competent, non-partial, inspectors are on-site combing through the wreckage. In a matter of time they will complete their investigations, write their reports, and present their findings to the appropriate agencies. A press release will confirm inspector’s findings.

I have good reason to believe negligence may have played a part in Fire Ball crash because I am aware that many of the people that service, repair, inspect, and maintain amusement park rides are not trained in all aspects of amusement park ride inspections, maintenance, and repair. 

The overall safety and reliability of an amusement park ride is dependent on numerous factors i.e., mechanical, structural, materials, hydraulic, pneumatic, and electrical/electronic. The failure of one system can either result in a catastrophic outcome; like the “Fire Ball” ride, or it can simply idle the ride. In some cases, if one system fails, it can trigger a chain of events that can lead to a crash.

Since my education, training, and knowledge is in hydraulic safety, my article will focus on amusement park ride hydraulic systems. Co-incidentally, hydraulic systems are, in my opinion, an amusement park ride’s Achilles heel – here’s why:

? Over 99% of the people that perform service, inspections, and repair work on the hydraulic systems on amusement park rides, which are either partially or fully powered by hydraulic systems, have never undergone hydraulic safety training.

? Over 80%, cannot pass a competency test in hydraulic safety, theory, inspections, testing and/or diagnostics.

? There isn’t a university in America, I am aware of, that teaches engineers how to design safe hydraulic systems. Please correct me if I’m wrong.

? Over 99% of the hydraulic systems operating in America are inherently unsafe by design from the point of view of stored energy.

What should make amusement park riders think long and hard before boarding a thrill ride is the fact that state and federal safety agencies, and amusement park safety personnel and management, allegedly ignore the safety, skills, and engineering training problems.

With respect to the Fire Ball crash, I want to address the issue of what is referred to as the "pre-commissioning inspections" mentioned in the reports. According to reports, "for days, inspectors had overseen the assembly and then inspected around 70 rides ahead of Ohio State Fair’s opening day.”

To make my point as to why I believe investigators may find that the root cause of the Fire Ball crash was anything but an accident, I’m going to reflect on a tragic event I investigated some years ago.

Before I arrived on-site to conduct the investigation, I was led to believe the tragic work-related event was an accident. I wondered why the company’s management asked me to investigate an "accident," when they had already decided the incident was “accidental.”

It didn’t take me long to figure out that the events that led up to an explosion that left a 43-year old electrician blind weren’t accidental at all. He was a victim of the worst case of workplace negligence I have ever seen. In my opinion, the company’s executives, so-called safety managers, maintenance management, and supervisors, should have been charged with attempted manslaughter, and tried by a jury of their peers.

Here’s a summary of the events that led up to the accident:

1. Vehicle suffers a catastrophic hydraulic system failure.
2. Repair assigned to two mechanics with only on-the-job hydraulics training.
3. Mechanics repair and test hydraulic system. Due to their lack of hydraulic knowledge they make a critical error that would cause an explosion, somewhere in the vehicle’s hydraulic system.
4. Machine returned to service.
5. While electrician is operating hydraulic system, with hand-controlled valve, explosion occurs within two feet of his face. Breach in hydraulic system, caused by explosion, allows highly flammable hydraulic oil to spray into vehicle’s engine compartment. Had the oil mist contacted an ignition source, it would have caused a secondary explosion, or a fireball. The electrician narrowly escapes an incident that could easily have severely injured, burned, or killed him.
6. Even though the company’s safety department employed a vigorous near-miss reporting protocol, a near-miss report, about the explosion, was never filed. In fact, the company’s safety personnel were never advised of the explosion that could have severely injured, or killed the untrained mechanics, electrician, and/or set a giant earthmoving machine on fire.
7. No attempt was made, by safety personnel, maintenance managers, and supervisors to determine the root cause of the explosion.
8. The post-explosion hydraulic system repair was assigned to the same two untrained mechanics.
9. An identical replacement valve could not be found. The replacement valve was functionally identical. Regrettably, its mechanism of failure would be different.
10. Company writes explosion off as an “anomaly,” and untrained mechanics, while installing the new valve, duplicate their critical error, setting the wheels in motion for either them, or the electrician, to face a second explosion.
11. The untrained mechanics luckily avoid the explosion. When the electrician placed his hand on the new valve, little did he know that within a few seconds, the second explosion would usher him into a world of permanent darkness. He would never again see the smiling faces of his wife and children. He would never see his son hitting a home run, or his daughter sliding into first base. He would never see his children’s paintings posted on the refrigerator door. He would never see the delight on his children’s faces when they graduated from college. He would never play with his grandchildren in the park.

This was by no means "an unfortunate incident that happened unexpectedly and unintentionally" – as the victim’s managers, supervisors and so-called “safety professionals,” would like his family to believe. The only reason why the electrician will never again see the light of day, is because his company, and state and federal agencies, failed dismally, on their promise to “protect all workers from all hazards.”

Bear in mind that the two-untrained mechanics opined that they tested the hydraulic system after they performed the repair. The question is, how is it possible for a person that has no training, knowledge or experience in hydraulics, to "test" a hydraulic system. In the hands of untrained workers, the term "test" and "inspect" are relative terms.

Now, that I have made my point, let me address a statement in a report about the Fire Ball ride incident that is eerily like the electrician’s preventable accident: "for days, inspectors had overseen the assembly and then inspected around 70 rides ahead of opening day." The question is; were the people that oversaw the assembly of, and then inspected around 70 rides, trained, knowledgeable and experienced? 

People who are on the outside looking in might be comforted by statements that include words like "inspected," "tested," "oversee," "safety," etc. Don't let these words fool you. Over 99% of the people that work on and around amusement park rides have never attended a course in hydraulic safety. Over 80% have little or no formal training in hydraulics. Until OSHA, state and federal safety agencies, so-called "safety professionals," et al, do something about hydraulic safety, untrained workers will continue to make errors that set the wheels in motion for tragedies to occur. Let the electrician’s preventable accident be a wakeup call for supervisors and safety personnel. If you hand a work order to a worker that you know for a fact (personnel file) has no formal training to perform the work, you are deliberately putting that worker, and others, in harm’s way.

The only reason why, in my opinion, the electrician was handed a "life sentence," is because one of his company's supervisors, and the company's so-called safety professionals, deliberately looked the other way while untrained workers performed work that would set the wheels in motion that would rob him of his eyesight. Let's not forget the psychological damage this event bestowed on the untrained mechanics.

I am anxiously awaiting the final report on the cause of the Fire Ball ride crash. Only then will we know if the crash that took the life of one person, and critically injured seven others, was due to an accident or, due to negligence. My thoughts and prayers are with the victim’s families.

Up next. A global manufacturer hires me to conduct an accident investigation into why a malfunction took the life of an operator, and then fires me because I wouldn't "cook the books."