Fintech ?? Food - Aug 22nd 2021
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Weekly Rant ??
Is it better to be a Super App or a Bank?
Every time I see a Fintech announce they are applying for a charter, I wonder, do you really want to be a bank? Being a bank means you get to lend, and lending is a great way to make money. But being a bank makes it much harder to win at other Fintech business models.
PayPal and Square are crushing every earnings season, and while they both have a charter (PayPal in Luxembourg and Square has an Industrial Loan Charter), their primary way of making money is not the same as banks. Where they started gives them a very different set of options to drive revenue.?
Then you have companies like Monzo or N26, who went the consumer banking charter route but have taken longer to hit profitability. Getting a license is hard; scaling with it is harder.
You'd assume then that being a Super App is the only sound strategy for consumer Fintech? Well, no. Look at Nubank, with 40m customers, adding another 1m customers per month, and heading towards IPO, Nubank is crushing it too.
As the first wave of US Neobanks head towards IPO, should they double down on lending, or look towards the Super App strategy?
The reality of?if?a charter makes sense comes down to how well the banking business model works in your market.??To unpack that, let’s look at the banking business model, vs the Super Apps and how geographies impact the revenue potential of these businesses.
Drivers of the banking business model ??
(Skip this if you already know finance, but laying it out for completeness vs. the Super App model. And yes, before you @ me, I know I've taken some liberties simplifying things here)
1. Net interest margin:?The core banking business model is based on?net interest margin?(NIM). To grossly oversimplify: This is the difference between banks' price for a loan (e.g., 8%) and the price they pay depositors (e.g., 1%) minus costs. So taking our example above, if a bank had $1000 of deposits, they'd pay $10 out but receive $80 of revenue. That $80 of revenue has to pay the $10 to deposits, leaving them with $70 to cover their expenses (e.g. offices, staff).
So a bank can attract lots of deposits with a high savings rate but would increase its “cost of funds” in the process.??This is the balancing act banks constantly have to strike, between growing deposits, and being able to lend effectively.
Banks can't choose any rate they want either. The rates are set by the central bank base rate. If the central bank lowers rates, the amount banks can charge for loans goes down (and vice versa).
Since the global financial crisis (and the pandemic), interest rates have been low and stayed low. This means the banking business model has been under pressure (and you can see this in their long-term share price).?
2. Scale:?One of the best ways to survive in a low-priced market is to generate scale. Banks with higher deposit bases have a lower cost of funds (again, oversimplifying: because of their ability to use that deposit base to drive better pricing in overnight markets and more).
One of the best ways to drive scale is to attract more sources of deposits through opening more consumer, business, and corporate bank accounts. Typically small businesses and corporates have much higher deposits than consumers but are more complex to serve. The older, larger banks have done well here historically.??
This is why I sometimes compare the banking business model to the movie Waterworld. Through M & M&A, competition, and in many market regulations, banking is a game where only the largest can turn a profit.
3. Managing cost:?As with all businesses, one of the best levers to grow profits is to reduce cost. The main drivers of cost for banks are people, property, and technology.??
Branches have been banks' primary customer acquisition and servicing point, but that property is expensive and requires people to staff it. Still, the assumption for many big banks has been, if you want more deposits, open more branches.??
Bank tech is also pretty old, inflexible, and expensive to maintain. So banks spend billions on "digital transformation" essentially to stand still.
The Neobank opportunity:?Without branches and with fewer people, Neobanks have a much lower operating cost. Neobanks often don't pay heavy marketing costs to get someone to switch direct deposit, so their entire customer acquisition cost (CAC) can be as low as $10 to $20.
In the US, if that customer is reasonably active and makes plenty of transactions in a given year, the Neobank can break even on the?interchange fees?they receive from Merchants alone. Interest rates in the US are low, meaning lending requires a good deal of scale.
In Europe, where interchange fees are capped, there is much less available revenue to Neobanks until they find another source of income. Interest rates in Europe are near zero or in some cases, negative, meaning lending requires a scale and low operating costs.
In markets like LATAM there is both more interchange and higher interest rates, so getting to a charter and lending business model quickly makes a ton of sense.
The Neobank problem:?If a Neobank gets a charter, they often have fewer deposits as a base than the megabanks do at the outset. The newly arrived bank has a higher cost of funds than their big rivals, so it may not drive profit from their lending activity as quickly. We've seen this in Europe, with Monzo (with nearly 6m consumers and an average deposit of ~$500) and N26 struggling for profitability.
Also, in Europe, Starling, with 2m consumers and 200,000 small business customers, has driven closer to profitability. Starling got into the SMB market early and was a significant provider of lending during the pandemic to SMBs. So profit is possible in the banking business model; it just takes a long time and requires banks to go wide and drive towards the right kind of scale for that model. (Side note, this is why I'm excited to see if Brex or Mercury get a charter).?
Drivers of the Super App business model ??
This is where things get interesting. The term Fintech "Super App" is loaded, but I'm thinking about Fintech companies whose primary business model is not (or has not been) banking and lending. For example, PayPal, Square, and even Revolut.?
Payments:?PayPal and Square both started in the Merchant payments sector but also have consumer offerings. Square gained significant adoption by offering "real-time payments" for a fee. Consumers valued the ability to move money instantly, and Square Cash App had an excellent wedge feature.
Product line extension:?In the past two years, both PayPal and Square have layered on other services like stock trading, Crypto, and now Buy Now Pay Later for Merchants. Revolut also offers stock trading, Crypto, and increasingly merchant payments to its SMB customers. Each of these products generates revenue in its own way, but the trend is these Super Apps often start by partnering to deliver them (for example, Paxos powers much of the Crypto trading in PayPal).
Merchant / Consumer ecosystem:?With both consumers and merchants on their platforms, the Super Apps can build intelligent ways to connect the two. Whether creating insights for merchants or rewards and offers for the consumer - having both sides of the transaction is powerful. It's technically true; banks could have similar data, too; they?just don't.??For the incumbents, the issue is legacy tech, and for the Neobanks, its focus.?
The Super Apps as a result often solve more of a problem for their customers than a bank would typically. Most banks (even Neobanks) don’t tend to go deeper into adjacent merchant problems like inventory management, advertising, or payroll. Some of the Neoabnks are going there, but their starting point is still the bank paradigm.
The Super App opportunity:?With more data comes the ability to identify user behavior and solve for more of the customer's financial lives. With a digital operating model, the Super Apps have a low cost of acquisition and more sources of revenue than the chartered banks. The Super Apps also don't have the same regulatory and tech debt overhead as the incumbent banks.??Once you become a bank, the regulatory scrutiny levels up several notches.?
These Super Apps often have all the features you'd expect in a bank account (like direct deposit or bill pay). In effect, they're?better?than a bank and reducing banks to?paycheck motels?for many consumers. Some consumers even consider their Super App their primary bank account.??
The Super App problem:?Regulatory loopholes don't last forever. The banks are moaning about the "lack of a level playing field" and lobbying hard to see that change. If Super Apps look like banks, act like banks (and in many cases can do more), shouldn't they be regulated similarly? The Super Apps would argue they are already.
The significant difference is that the banks have capital requirements and controls since the global financial crisis to prevent overly risky lending. The Super Apps have been wise to not get as deep into the lending (and financial markets) game as the big banks to avoid this kind of overhead.?Technically both Square and PayPal have a charter and do some of their own lending, but they’re unlikely to head towards “universal bank” status any time soon.
It comes down to what’s the best business model?
Picking the model
Depending on your Geo, different models may make more sense.?
In LATAM, there is so much money to be made from just?good banking and there’s a greater need. That doesn't prevent LATAM-based banks from evolving their offering towards a Super App strategy, but it may delay it. Perhaps in LATAM, we'll see non-banks (e.g., ride-hailing companies) start to try and take the Fintech Super App crown, much like Grab has attempted in APAC.
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In Europe, Starling is slowly, steadily making the banking business model work, but Revolut has seen much more growth with its Super App strategy and expansion. It's too early to say which model is correct, and perhaps they're both?not wrong. But in Europe, with low interchange, maybe the worst place to be is halfway between a Super App and a traditional bank. (That's why I'm so interested to see what the new UK entrant?Kroo?does as it becomes a bank. Will they find revenue sources beyond lending?)
The US is an interesting halfway house. Neobanks can make a good existence from their Interchange revenue to scale the business. The question becomes, what next? As I think about Chime, in particular, I wonder if they should push for a charter or is the better outcome to never get the charter and become a Super App? Or is there something in the middle I’m just not seeing?
The US isn't LATAM, but it isn't Europe. Being a bank with scale is rewarding, but maybe not as much as being a Super App. (Unless of course, central banks start hiking rates. But medium-term, that doesn’t seem likely.)
So how does it play out?
Every company wants some of that sweet Fintech revenue.??
If an app has all of the features of a bank (and more) with a better user experience, it has a real chance of winning market share and revenue. Banks will always struggle to ship at the same pace as non-banks. The banking business model works well at scale but comes with the overhead of actually being a bank.??
The banks have an opportunity to become more horizontal and gain ever more scale. But they can’t both have a license and ship at the pace of the non-banks (unless they dramatically shift their operating model - more on that; next week).
The Super Apps have a chance to bring together the merchant and consumer ecosystems with data and deliver more value to both sides.?
The incumbent banks are unlikely to execute a Super App strategy effectively. But what about everyone else in the middle? What about the Robinhoods and Chimes of the world?
Does Fintech get re-bundled under the super app, or do consumers want many apps for many contexts? Is the future of the Neobank being an also-ran to the Super Apps or competing with them?
I honestly have no idea.
But
Not knowing is half the fun. ??
ST.
4 Fintech Companies ??
Kroo?- Multiplayer Banking (with a license) UK
Pngme?- Open banking for the underbanked (Nigeria, Kenya)
Jenfi?- Revenue-based finance in SEA
Ondo?- Programmable DeFi Loans
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Cofounder @ Upstox
3 年Great read. This challenge exists in many parts of the world and there are definitely pros and cons of choosing which way to go. And once you go one way, it's not so easy to go back :) Sometimes regulation can be good because it forces fintechs to look at many aspects (ex: compliance) of the business that they normally would not. It's seen as a line item in cost and a friction point in UX. However, in the long run, it's probably better for the business and the consumer.
FinTech Growth and Strategy | 10+ Years Experience | Capital Markets | Consulting | B2B SaaS Product Marketing | WEF Global Shaper
3 年One of the finest Fintech articles, I have read in a long time. Thanks for sharing great insights, Simon.
Head of Partnerships | Ex Plaid, BBVA OP, AMEX
3 年Great read Simon Taylor! There could be another option - "buying a bank". The end state could be pretty much the same, but the acquisition path might make it "slightly" less painful? Both SoFi and Lending club took that route (SoFi after getting preliminary approvals). Having a license makes a lot of sense for both - much lower cost of funds for the core LOBs. It would be interesting to see whether any of the superapps would follow the acquisition route
Product @ Thought Machine. Prev: Kroo, ManyPets, City Index
3 年Thanks for covering Kroo, if you ever want to discuss further just let me know