Finland’s priorities for the 2024–2029 EU parliamentary term might be a tough sell in Brussels

On 17 January Finland published (EN) its priorities for the 2024–2029 EU parliamentary term.

Finland’s three main priorities are:

1.?????? Strengthening Europe’s strategic competitiveness

2.?????? Improving comprehensive security in Europe?

3.?????? Promoting a clean transition and the bioeconomy and circular economy

The above-mentioned three priorities are broken down into six policy areas: (1) strategic competitiveness, (2) economy and finance, (3) clean and digital transition, (4) comprehensive security and a stronger EU, (5) migration management, and (6) EU enlargement.

Finland, as a fairly small player in the EU, must work together with other countries to achieve its priorities. Natural allies include other Nordic countries, which, to some extent, share similar problems and viewpoints. Nevertheless, the Nordic EU members cannot reach a qualified majority in the European Council, which is needed to co-decide on legislative and financial initiatives together with the majority of the European Parliament. In summary, Finland needs to find coalitions to get its views passed to legislation.

In Brussels, the hardest battles are fought over funds, and specifically their allocation within the EU′s multiannual financial framework (MFF). The current MFF is comprised of two parts. The original MFF for the years 2021-2027 was budgeted with about €1 trillion. This was topped up by the Next Generation EU recovery plan, where the EU for the first time in its history borrowed roughly €750 billion from the financial markets to spend on the EU Member States’ recovery from the global pandemic.

So where do the funds go? Currently, roughly one third of the MFF, or the EU′s budget, is going to the agricultural sector and another third to the cohesion policy, which is aimed at equalising differences between European regions. Next to these, there are own funds for research & innovation, education, health, and external relations, just to name a few examples.

Reflecting on these facts, it is interesting to see how Finland approaches the development of the Union in the coming years.

According to Finland’s 2024–2029 EU priorities:

1. Current, temporarily relaxed state aid rules should be removed as quickly as possible. Finland sees no need for a continuation of these.
2. Strategic dependencies on third countries such as China, should be reduced.
3. A digital and green transition should be implemented on market terms and cost-effectively.
4. The next MFF should focus on activities promoting research, innovation, and know-how, as well as digitisation and the green transition.
5. The framework programme for research and innovation, should continue to be based on excellence instead of other indicators, such as GDP or geographic location.
6. Member States are responsible for the sustainability of their public finances. Finland does not commit to actions that shape the EU in the direction of an asymmetric income transfer union.
7. The level of the EU's 2040 climate goal must consistently and credibly support the achievement of climate neutrality by 2050.
8. The EU's digital leadership requires investments especially into breakthrough technologies, such as artificial intelligence, high-power and quantum computing, semiconductors and 6G technology.
9. The EU should be a stronger geopolitical actor. This includes increased support for European defence industries and for Ukraine.
10. Constitutional amendments are not a precondition for accepting new Member States into the Union, but the EU's operations must be reformed and made more efficient primarily within the framework of the current treaties. Finland sees that new EU members would increase the stability and security of the EU.

So, what makes these goals a tough sell in Brussels? To put it simply, the priorities come across rather as a wish list than a constructive position paper with concrete solutions. In their current form, the priorities are difficult to translate into concrete measures, not least because ?they do not clearly specify where to cut costs in order to turn the aspirations into reality.

Take the example of the EU′s next MFF for 2028-2034, which will be prepared in the coming years. On the one hand, Finland does not want to create nor continue financial instruments that would enable the EU to borrow money or to increase Member States’ payments to the EU. On the other hand, there are many wishes on the expenditure side: the EU should be more independent of autocracies by creating own solutions for critical materials while becoming a stronger military power. Moreover, funding for research should be increased and emissions cut.

Adding spending in these areas, while being hawkish on the EU′s total budget, would almost automatically mean that expenses should be cut in the major budget lines of agriculture and cohesion policies. This would hurt mostly South and East European net-receiving countries.

Another example comes from the governance model of the EU. Finland wishes to make the Union less bureaucratic and a stronger actor on the world stage but is not ready to move towards qualified majority voting in the European Council. ?This means that decisions can be blocked by one Member State, like Hungary has demonstrated recently. This does not entail easier decision-making processes in the Council, especially if the EU expands.

In contrast to Finland, some net-paying countries, like Germany, have advocated for changes to the EU′s governance model. The argument is that only by moving towards more qualified majority voting, will the EU be able to become a stronger player on the global stage. ??

The above-mentioned two examples illustrate that, with these priorities, Finland struggles to fit into any existing basket of Member States. Thus, it is likely that Finland will need to shift allegiances on a case-by-case basis, making it harder to build strong alliances of likeminded Member States.

In some instances, the Finnish EU priorities seem also contradictory to recent developments in the country: just a week after publishing them, the Finnish government announced a €400 million investment package, subsidised by the state, resembling several other EU Member States state aid decisions. This rapid shift in priorities was confirmed a couple of weeks later by the Finnish Confederation of Industries, which wrote in a report (translated from FIN) that? “It would be justified to analyze whether, in all cases, it is in Finland's interest to oppose the EU increase of resources, if the alternative is the unilateral economy of some (rich) member states increasing subsidies”. This is an example of how quickly political and economic priorities might shift.

Lastly, looking at these priorities from a regional perspective, one should not forget about the local decision-making and funding dimensions of the EU. Several studies have shown that Europeans trust more their regional and local authorities and elected representatives than their European or national counterparts. Yet, in the Finnish EU priorities local or regional decision-making levels are barely mentioned. Simultaneously, powerful European interest groups, such as Eurocities and Metrex, are calling for extra funding for cities and regions, as well as for a dedicated EU envoy or a Commissioner for urban areas. The decision to leave these ?considerations out of the Finnish EU priorities should also be noticed on the regional level. ?