Fear and Dreams: Understanding the Non-Institutional Sources of Leader Strategy

Political leaders' strategies exhibit substantial variation, with profound implications for societal outcomes. While institutions have long been the focal point for explaining these differences, our recent research, including a groundbreaking study on Colombian paramilitarism, introduces a novel perspective. We suggest that non-institutional factors play a more significant role than previously recognized. This fresh approach offers compelling evidence that leaders' social preferences, shaped by their background and upbringing, can significantly influence their approach to governance and control.

The Colombian Conflict: A Natural Experiment

The protracted Colombian conflict, a unique and complex setting, provides an unparalleled opportunity to examine the determinants of leader strategy. Paramilitary groups, formed primarily to counter Marxist guerrillas, operated across much of Colombia from the 1960s to the mid-2000s. These groups, organized into blocks and fronts, employed various tactics to control territory and populations.

The study focuses on 72 paramilitary fronts, each led by a single commander, from 1997 to 2006. This era marked the height of paramilitary activity under the umbrella of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). To implement a spatial regression discontinuity design, the research leverages the idiosyncratic nature of front boundaries, often determined by geographical features or arbitrary demarcations.

The Peasant Factor

A key finding of the study is the systematic difference in strategies employed by commanders from peasant backgrounds compared to their non-peasant counterparts. Peasant commanders, defined as those born in predominantly rural municipalities, were significantly more likely to engage in both public good provision and mass violence.

Specifically, fronts led by peasant commanders were:

1. 8.9 percentage points more likely to provide public goods
2. 0.9 percentage points more likely to commit massacres
3. Active for approximately 1.5 years longer

These results are robust to various specifications and controls, including commander characteristics such as education, military experience, and criminal background.

The Reciprocity Hypothesis

The researchers propose that these patterns stem from differences in social preferences, particularly reciprocity. They argue that peasant upbringings in close-knit rural communities foster stronger reciprocal tendencies. This hypothesis is supported by survey data showing higher levels of both positive and negative reciprocity among peasants in Colombia.

The theoretical model developed in the study suggests that commanders with reciprocal preferences are more likely to offer public goods in exchange for support while also being more willing to punish non-cooperation through violence. This combination of "carrots and sticks" allows them to establish more durable control over their territories.

Methodological Rigor

The study employs a sophisticated empirical strategy to address potential confounding factors, ensuring the robustness of the findings. This rigorous approach enhances the credibility of our conclusions.

1. Spatial Regression Discontinuity: Exploiting the quasi-random assignment of commanders to fronts and the arbitrary nature of front boundaries.
2. Extensive Balance Tests: These tests demonstrate the comparability of areas on either side of front boundaries across a wide range of pre-treatment characteristics, ensuring that the study's findings are robust and not influenced by other factors.Commander Characteristic Controls: These controls account for other potentially relevant factors such as local ties, guerrilla victimization, and drug trade involvement.

The study's robustness is further demonstrated through its testing of alternative specifications. The study tests the robustness of its findings to different bandwidth choices, polynomial orders, and definitions of critical variables. This comprehensive approach ensures that the results are not dependent on specific methodological decisions.

This research challenges the primacy of institutional explanations for variation in leader behavior. Individual leader characteristics can substantially affect governance outcomes even in weak formal institutions.

The findings have broad implications for our understanding of State Formation: how non-state armed actors establish and maintain control in weak state environments. Development Outcomes: the potential long-term consequences of different governance strategies employed by local strongmen. Conflict Dynamics: how leader preferences might influence the trajectory and intensity of civil conflicts.

1. State Formation: How non-state armed actors establish and maintain control in weak state environments.
2. Development Outcomes: The potential long-term consequences of different governance strategies employed by local strongmen.
3. Conflict Dynamics: How leader preferences might influence the trajectory and intensity of civil conflicts.

Limitations and Future Directions

While the study provides compelling evidence for the role of leader preferences, several questions remain:

1. Generalizability: To what extent do these findings apply beyond the Colombian context?
2. Mechanisms: What specific aspects of peasant upbringing foster reciprocal preferences?
3. Long-Term Effects: How do these different strategies impact post-conflict reconciliation and development?

Future research might explore these questions through cross-national comparisons, more granular analysis of socialization processes, and longer-term studies of areas formerly under paramilitary control.

Conclusion

Rethinking Leadership in Weak Institutional Contexts

This study on Colombian paramilitarism offers a fresh perspective on the determinants of leader strategy. Highlighting the role of social preferences shaped by background and upbringing challenges researchers and policymakers to look beyond formal institutions to understand and influence political outcomes.

The research underscores the complexity of governance in conflict-affected areas, where leaders may employ a nuanced mix of coercion and public good provision. It suggests that efforts to promote peace and development in such contexts must grapple with local power-holders deeply ingrained preferences and worldviews.

As we unravel the intricate dynamics of political leadership, this work reminds us of the enduring importance of individual agency and the subtle ways personal history shapes power's exercise.

Questions ??

1) How have historical patterns of land distribution and rural community structures in Colombia shaped the formation of reciprocal preferences among peasant leaders, and to what extent might similar mechanisms be at play in other post-colonial contexts with entrenched rural-urban divides? ??

2) In what ways might the reciprocal strategies employed by peasant paramilitary commanders manifest in contemporary Colombian politics and governance, particularly in regions with a history of paramilitary presence? ??

3) As urbanization accelerates globally and rural communities transform, how might the socialization processes that foster reciprocal preferences evolve, and what implications could this have for future leadership styles in emerging democracies and fragile states? ??

Reference ??

Bautista, M. A., Galán, J. S., Robinson, J. A., Torres, R. F., & Torvik, R. (2024). Fear and Dreams: Understanding the Non-Institutional Sources of Leader Strategy. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series, No. 33011.?https://www.nber.org/papers/w33011