FBI ACTIVITY REFLECTED IN RUSSIA SECURITY AGENCY ACTIVITY

Evan Gershkovich, Joe Parkinson, Drew Hinshaw, Thomas Grove,

I contact you after reading your jointly-written article "Tracking Putin’s Most Feared Secret Agency From Inside a Russian Prison and Beyond" in the December 12, 2024, issue of Wall Street Journal. I'm a subscriber, and read it daily. The article?attracted my attention not only because of my special interest and experiences in being targeted by the FBI for more than a decade and also my interest in state-security agencies operations in any?country. I'm particularly interested in state-security operations in Russia and China since from my experiences with the FBI, I see that FBI activity in this country resembles and in fact in many ways mirrors such operations in these repressive countries to a degree and in particular ways that are unrealized by the public at large in this country. I thought about a comment in reaction to your article, but did not get to?write and post it. What I wanted to relate in the comment follows in this email:

"As I wrote it one time having been targeted by the FBI for roughly 10 years now for my investigative journalism into crime and corruption throughout the Connecticut legal system based on extensive first-hand experiences, one can learn more what’s going on with the US security agencies by reading articles like this about the security agencies of other countries, especially China and Russia. As I wrote in that previous posting, one wants to understand China’s policy of social credits.?For certain individuals the FBI has come to target for one reason or another, the FBI will interfere with their lives to adversely affect?them. In my case, for instance, the FBI got bus drivers to pass by me as I waited at a bus stop. After this happened a few times, I contacted the city of Bridgeport transportation department to complain, preparing to be in touch with the Connecticut Department of Transportation and if called for the U. S. Dept. of Transportation in order that public transportation would be available to me. After my contact with the Bridgeport department of transportation, buses began again stopping when I was waiting at a stop. Other interferences?in my life which can be attributed to FBI social credit activities are checks from buyers of historical documents I sell to collectors and auctions not received and invasions of privacy by entries into my apartment when I was out as evidenced by objects having been moved around."?

However, FBI activity to control individuals and shape aspects of society go beyond implementation?of troublesome social credits to threats of physical?harm to?others or other negative effects in the lives of others who might try to resist FBI?enlistment in the agency's operations against targeted?individuals. In seeming to be interested in targeting certain individuals, the FBI is actually bringing many more individuals into its orbit of control. Anyone thinking FBI contact with them is casual or fleeting is kidding themselves. Contact from?FBI people for malignant purposes creates an indelible stain on an individual. Plus, for the FBI, contact with others to get them involved in its targeting schemes is a way by which the FBI spreads its falsehoods. Even when the FBI's contact with an individual is passing, the falsehood remains with the individual.

In my case, for instance, individuals have been forced to resign positions, mutually beneficial relationships with me have been undone, FBI agents have profited financially, the reputation of institutions and individuals has been seriously tarnished, and I have made out criminal complaints against FBI accomplices. Most drastically, there have been suspicious deaths of two individuals who had played conspicuous roles in the FBI targeting. My Kindle book "Children's Librarian, Stalker, Corpse -- Susan Ei. the FBI, and the Pequot Library, Southport, Connecticut" is a true-crime, creative nonfiction book about one of these suspicious deaths.

At times, I have described the FBI vicious, dishonest, malignant, determined targeting of me as "social cleansing". And that's what it is. Whether this social cleansing practiced by the FBI -- basically falsely and maliciously stigmatizing individuals by tainting them and gaining control over others in the process -- can or will be exposed and stopped is an open question.

If I get the time, I want to go through your Journal article to pick out certain paragraphs and comment on these with experiences of mine showing the similarities between the activities and aims of the Russian state security agency?Department for Counterintelligence Operations (DKRO) you write about?and the FBI. In my experiences, I have seen in fact little difference. Both agencies depend on the large majority of their respective public being easily intimidated, and with each agency, there is a willingness to engage in menacing, threatening actions against individuals who are not so easily intimidated.

Thank you for your attention. I have much more information and experiences which I can relate to you if you are interested in this subject of FBI activities in US society resembling those of the Russian agency you write about in your article.

Henry Berry

independent investigative journalist Connecticut