Department of Transportation Inspector General Slams FAA For Lax Boeing Production Oversight

On October 9, the Department of Transportation Office of the Inspector General (DOT OIG) released a report with this title “FAA’s Oversight Processes for Identifying and Resolving Boeing Production Issues Are Not Effective[1]”. The 42-page report blasts the FAA in two broad areas and drills down into these statements on the first page:

1.????? Weaknesses in FAA’s oversight processes and systems limit its ability to identify and resolve Boeing production issues.

2.????? FAA continues to face challenges addressing allegations of undue pressure within Boeing’s aircraft manufacturing.

Before I dive into some details, I must say the report rings true, but I also must defend the FAA. In a sense, they’re caught between a rock and a hard place, and I’ll dive into that topic in a bit.

With that, here are my own high-level observations, informed only by a quick review:

1. There are indeed weaknesses in FAA oversight, and in the limit, those weaknesses have nothing to do with FAA accountability because Boeing and ANY manufacturer is fully accountable for the airworthiness of their products. The OIG report actually makes that statement (See a) and b) below) but a bit more information would have been helpful, because the “WHY” of that accountability is critical, which is why it may seem that I hit this topic in every other article.

In 1984 the Supreme Court (SCOTUS) published a decision[2] in two lawsuits (Scottish Insurance & Varig Airlines vs FAA) against the FAA (Varig Airlines & Scottish Insurance) that clearly stated industry, not the FAA, is accountable.?This is THE definitive foundation for FAA vs industry authority & accountability. That decision applies to operators as well, which reflects the famous 3-legged stool of FAA, operators & manufacturers. I am convinced that the SCOTUS decision should be required reading for any person or company that wants to get involved in aviation. Some salient SCOTUS quotes are presented in c) through e) below. This is very important:

a)????? The OIG report does get credit for stating “…Boeing is ultimately responsible for ensuring its aircraft conform to the FAA-approved design …” from Page 11 of the Report.

b)????? The report also states “…Although manufacturers are ultimately responsible for the quality of parts used on their aircraft…” also Page 11 bottom

c)??? From the first paragraph of the SCOTUS decision: “…the duty to ensure that an aircraft conforms to FAA safety regulations lies with the manufacturer and operator, while the FAA retains responsibility for policing compliance.

d)??? With that, the FAA is able to exercise discretion in their oversight of any certificate holder. SCOTUS: “The FAA's implementation of a mechanism for compliance review is plainly discretionary activity of the "nature and quality" protected by § 2680(a). When an agency determines the extent to which it will supervise the safety procedures of private individuals, it is exercising discretionary regulatory authority of the most basic kind.”

e)????? This is critical. SCOTUS: “In the exercise of this discretion, the FAA, as the Secretary's designee, has devised a system of compliance review that involves certification of aircraft design and manufacture at several stages of production.?See supra?at?467 U. S. 804-806. The FAA certification process is founded upon a relatively simple notion: the duty to ensure that an aircraft conforms to FAA safety regulations lies with the manufacturer and operator, while the FAA retains the responsibility for policing compliance. [Footnote 13] Thus, the manufacturer is required to develop the plans and specifications and perform the inspections and tests necessary to establish that an aircraft design comports with the applicable regulations; the FAA then reviews the data for conformity purposes by conducting a "spot check" of the manufacturer's work.”

1. The production environment for complex systems such as transport category airplanes is ripe for undue pressure. There are always parts that have to be “helped” to fit, wires that are too long or too short, mis-drilled holes, etc. Engineering will be called in if the folks on the floor think they’ve found a significant problem that requires analysis. In many cases that becomes a judgement call that can be pushed in one direction or the other, and a person with authority may “pull rank.” ?In Engineering a drawing or test report is reviewed/approved once, then it goes to the next step to the person who follows and who may have no idea what errors may be lurking, but a design flaw follows every plane?from that point forward as?a hidden?failure,?which can be significant. In quality it’s?the same but different, a person has an opportunity every day to make the same mistake on the same part or assembly unintentionally or under pressure. Boeing delivers about 38 737's a month, and around 500 per year of all models combined, 737, 777 & 787 and a few 767s.?

NOTE: the?FAA?PC oversight is PROCESS oriented - how a manufacturer knows & observes everything fits, functions, etc. The Type Certificate (TC) is the design approval, all dimensions, processes, functionality, etc are defined by the TC. You might call it the fixed & stable definition of an aircraft, more of a THING than a PROCESS. I like to say PC is a VERB and TC is a NOUN

1997-2000 I was senior manager of Boeing's Group Quality, we were accountable for the single Production Certificate, PC 700, that covered everything produced & delivered by Boeing, including the multi(multi)-tiered supply chain,?every nut & bolt, every windshield, Boeing spares distribution, etc. I was also involved in the McDonnell Douglas/Boeing PC's merger, which involved as much of a cultural challenge as the technical integration. Every main Boeing organizational segment (narrow body, wide body, spares, etc) was accountable to that PC but Group?Quality didn't necessarily have direct authority over them. So we were more or less solely accountable to the FAA but more of a facilitator among the various Quality organizations. But it worked. It was educational to say the least.

I can’t say the FAA is blameless but in closing I’ll add a few personal thoughts:

1.????? Back to the SCOTUS decision. The ultimate accountability in this case resides with Boeing. I’m glad the DOT OIG acknowledged that but in my mind that information should have been front & center.

2.????? I’ve said this too many times but it’s important enough that it bears repeating. “The FAA is a technical organization in a political world.” I honestly don’t think I invented that phrase but the truth of it cannot be understated. In the upper reaches of the FAA you will find many, many people with technical backgrounds who worked their way up from the trenches and must now make decisions based on politics and the public perception of safety. It’s exceedingly difficult sometimes, but completely unavoidable.

3.????? Boeing (and several other mega-corporations) is so very critical to national security and our balance of trade that they have (near) infinite leverage inside the DC beltway. They can make things happen, they can lobby and drive changes in the laws and regulations. After the two 737 MAX crashes and loss of a fuselage plug in Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 on January 5, 2024, the Boeing voice was quieted to a whisper, and even their staunchest supporters went quiet. As Boeing fights their way back to the status they’ve enjoyed for decades, the pendulum will swing back. Count on it.

a.????? AND, by the way, there’s nothing bad about Boeing or any corporation having a strong political voice. But please, please remember the pain of the last 5 years and recognize early signs or complacency or arrogance. Please do that.

4.????? Directly related, the FAA’s oversight stance is affected by politics. When things are going well, they’re “encouraged” to loosen the reins a bit, move delegation a bit further relax on the oversight. That is not an absolute truth, but take a look at the testimony from ex-FAA engineers who became whistleblowers after leaving the FAA.

5.????? When there is a safety concern or a bad accident(s), the FAA becomes the great monolith. The executives are called into Congressional investigations and pilloried in public because in a sense that’s their job. The press attacks and points at the FAA “lax oversight” of industry.

6.????? A few years ago I was fortunate to be on a team that was helping the FAA Aircraft Certification Service (My old organization, aircraft design and production approvals & oversight) upgrade their administrative systems. At that time they had 1285 people on their rolls. That is a truly puny number when we consider they are accountable for the design & safety of everything that flies. There is no reasonable way to expect the Aircraft Certification Service to be the cop on the block. Just can’t happen.

The FAA may be able to make lemonade from the DOT OIG report, maybe just a little. They may be able to put a plan together and make an argument for taking on more engineers and inspectors. And there are some comments & suggestions in the report that may be workable. But we must be realistic and accept the fundamental truth that the FAA can only spot check industry, and industry is ultimately accountable for their actions.

?

Humbly presented,

Mike Borfitz, CEO

[email protected] ?

[1] https://www.oig.dot.gov/library-item/46466

[2] https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/467/797