Exploring the Dual Approach to Pandemic Preparedness: Civil and Military Efforts in the Face of Evolving Biological Threats Including Non-State Actors

Context

Humanity faces a looming threat of a pandemic potentially more devastating than COVID-19. Graciela Andrei, Associate Professor at KU Leuven, Belgium, describes this as the “perpetual challenge of viral infections” (Andrei, 2021).

Recent examples highlight the urgent need to address emerging and re-emerging viral threats.

• In Massachusetts, concerns about the mosquito-borne virus Eastern equine encephalitis (EEE) have led to temporary closures of parks and playgrounds from dusk to dawn. EEE is a rare but serious disease with no known treatment. Approximately half of those infected in Massachusetts have died, and survivors often face permanent disabilities (Schneid, 2024). The Massachusetts Department of Health (DPH) reports that few people recover completely from EEE.
• Simultaneously, a new strain of mpox (clade Ib) originating from the Democratic Republic of Congo has shown an unexpected acceleration in mutation rates. This poses significant challenges, particularly in regions lacking the necessary resources to monitor and track the virus effectively (Rigby & Steenhuysen, 2024). The virus has spread to previously unaffected countries, with recent cases reported in Sweden and Thailand (ECDC).

This article explores the critical role of emerging technologies in enabling the creation of novel pathogens, and the current landscape of pandemic preparedness, focusing on the dual approach taken by civil and military sectors in the United States. We'll examine the rationale behind maintaining separate efforts, the challenges faced by each sector, the implications for global biosecurity including non-state actors, and the “potential investment opportunities” that arise from these initiatives. It will also compare the secrecy surrounding technological advancements during the Cold War and contemporary military research efforts to mitigate the effects of novel viruses, potentially through the application of artificial intelligence.

We believe that the dual-purpose nature of emerging AI technologies is the driving force behind maintaining a civil and military dual approach. While the civilian aspect would be open to the public, certain elements of the military aspect will remain classified, similar to what went on with the technological developments made during the Cold War.?

Experts Observations

Several experts in the fields of science, defense, and artificial intelligence have raised concerns about the potential pandemic danger:

• Molecular biologist and Nobel laureate Joshua Lederberg lamented complacency about the threat of global epidemics and warned that viruses and other microbes are formidable foes in a never-ending competition for planetary domination. “In that natural evolutionary competition,” Lederberg wrote, “there is no guarantee that we will find ourselves the survivor.” (Lederberg J., 1988).?
• Martin Rees, Past President of the Royal Society and Emeritus Professor of Cosmology and Astrophysics at the University of Cambridge, warned about genetic manipulation of the enabling artificial intelligence (Rees, M., 2022).
• Former Google CEO: Eric Schmidt has highlighted AI-powered biological warfare as one of the most significant emerging threats. He warns that AI's ability to design new pathogens could surpass existing biosecurity measures, making it crucial to develop new strategies to mitigate these risks.
• According to Dr. Igor Rubinic the rapid advancements in AI capabilities, particularly in data analysis and predictive modeling, could enable the creation of sophisticated bioweapons that are difficult to detect and counteract (Rubinic, 2023).
• In War for Biological Dominance, Guo Jiwei, a professor at the Third Military Medical University, China, emphasizes the impact of biology on future warfare. Furthermore, in Bio-cross Technology Deduction author: Lu Beibei He, argued that biotechnology will become the new “strategic commanding heights” of national defense, from biomaterials to “brain control” weapons.
• Mustafa Suleyman, Co-founder of Deepmind and Inflection and now the CEO of Microsoft AI, “AI could potentially get good at teaching somebody how to make a bomb, or how to manufacture a biological weapon, for example. And we’ve already seen evidence of this among some of the big labs, and have obviously reported it directly to the agencies, and we’ve put together a working group to be able to red-team or investigate these models, adversarial attack them to try to demonstrate their weaknesses.” (Suleyman, M., & Bhaskar, M., 2023).
• RAND Corporation Report: The Operational Risks of AI in Large-Scale Biological Attacks Results of a Red-Team Study, explored the operational risks of AI in large-scale biological attacks. The authors discuss how AI could potentially be used to design biological agents that might evade existing detection mechanisms, complicating efforts to prevent and respond to such threats.

Several Factors Contribute to this Concern

First, the interconnectedness of the modern world means that diseases can spread rapidly across borders. This was evident with COVID-19, which quickly spread from its initial outbreak in China to countries around the globe. A more contagious or deadly virus could spread even faster, making it difficult to contain.

Second, viruses are constantly evolving and adapting. This means that new viruses can emerge that are more virulent or resistant to existing treatments. This is a particular concern for viruses that originate in animals, as they can sometimes mutate and become capable of infecting humans.

Third, climate change is creating new opportunities for viruses to spread. As the planet warms, mosquitoes and other disease-carrying insects can survive in new areas. This could lead to the spread of diseases that are currently confined to tropical regions.

Fourth, the capabilities of the artificial intelligence revolution.

The potential consequences of a pandemic more severe than COVID-19 are potentially catastrophic. Such a pandemic could cause widespread illness and death, disrupt economies, and lead to social unrest. It could also overwhelm healthcare systems, making it difficult to provide care for those who are sick.

Recognizing the threat posed by pandemics, governments, and international organizations are taking some steps to prepare for and prevent future outbreaks. This includes investing in research and development of vaccines and treatments, strengthening healthcare systems, and improving global surveillance and early warning systems.

“The Landscape of Pandemic Threats”

The National Institutes of Health (NIH) has identified several viral families with pandemic potential. As of May 2023, no drugs for many of these families have been approved or are in clinical trials funded by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)). Technologies like artificial intelligence (AI) offer promise in speeding antiviral drug development by identifying potential drug candidates.

However, the prospect of a forthcoming pandemic, which may be fueled by bioweapons developed by non-state actors, is causing heightened concern among civil and military organizations with programs that are independently funded. This raises critical questions:

1. Why do civilian and military branches of the federal government operate separately in preparing for a potential pandemic?
2. How might non-state actors acquire bioweapon capabilities, and what measures are in place to prevent this?
3. Would consolidating resources lead to a more effective response to a shared threat?

The Role of Civil and Military Organizations in Pandemic Preparedness

Emerging technologies are central to both the creation of novel pathogens and the response to such crises. This article compares the secrecy surrounding Cold War technological advancements with contemporary military research efforts aimed at mitigating the effects of novel viruses, particularly through AI applications. The dual-purpose nature of AI technologies is a driving force behind the continued separation of civil and military approaches.

Historical Context: Cold War Secrecy vs. Modern AI and Virus Research

During the Cold War, technological developments were often shrouded in secrecy to maintain a strategic advantage. This was evident in projects like the Arecibo Ionosphere Observatory, which played a role in countering intercontinental ballistic missiles and gathering intelligence on the Soviet Union (Raytheon & Dowe, 2014). Today, similar secrecy surrounds AI and biotechnology research, particularly in military contexts, to prevent these technologies from falling into the wrong hands.

Dual Approaches: Civilian and Military Pandemic Preparedness

The separation of civil and military efforts allows each sector to focus on its core mission—national defense for the military and public health for civilian agencies. Civilian programs like the Antiviral Program for Pandemics (APP) prioritize transparency and collaboration, aiming to develop broad-spectrum antiviral drugs and improve diagnostic tools. In contrast, military programs typically involve classified research, focusing on biodefense and the development of countermeasures against bioweapons.

Challenges in Antiviral Drug Development

Despite the APP's significant $3.2 billion investment, the program faces numerous challenges:

• Scientific Challenges: Developing effective antivirals is complex, with many candidates failing in clinical trials (Li & Peng, 2021).
• Viral Resistance: Viruses can quickly evolve to resist treatment, necessitating novel approaches (Komarasamy et al., 2022).
• Economic Challenges: Limited commercial potential and investor interest hinder the development of antivirals for acute infections.
• Regulatory and Logistical Challenges: Safety concerns, funding constraints, and shifting priorities further complicate efforts.

The Military's Role in Pandemic Preparedness

The Department of Defense (DoD) employs a multifaceted approach to counter biological threats, focusing on biodefense strategy, threat assessment, and international cooperation. Agencies like the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) play crucial roles in developing medical countermeasures and innovative technologies for pandemic response.

However, regarding the DoD, there is funding and information not released to the public. For example, The Pentagon's Inspector General in his Report No. DODIG-2024-099 has informed that it is uncertain how much research about the enhancement of potential pandemic pathogens, also known as gain-of-function research, is being conducted in China or other nations, despite the department's expenditure of more than $1 billion on research abroad between 2014 and 2023.?

He also reported: “This report contains information that has been redacted because it was identified by the Department of Defense as Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) that is not releasable to the public. CUI is Government?created or owned unclassified information that allows for, or requires, safeguarding and dissemination controls in accordance with laws, regulations, or Government?wide policies.”

The statement from the DoD Inspector General suggests that there is information in the report that has been redacted because it falls under the category of Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI). CUI is a designation for unclassified information that still requires protection due to laws, regulations, or government-wide policies.?

Implications of the Statement:

The fact that the DoD Inspector General's report contains CUI that is not made available to the public suggests that there is sensitive information within the report that is being deliberately withheld. This might include details about defense operations, security vulnerabilities, or other sensitive matters that, while not classified, could still compromise security or operations if disclosed.

The practice is common in government reports, where certain information must be protected to balance transparency with the need to safeguard sensitive data. Furthermore, the report details how DoD funds were awarded directly or indirectly through grants, contracts, sub-grants, subcontracts, or other forms of collaboration. This includes funding provided to various organizations, some of which were located in foreign countries, for research activities related to pathogens of pandemic potential. Further implies that some details about these research activities are sensitive and not disclosed publicly, which could include specifics about the nature of the research, the entities involved, and the exact use of the funds.

Ethical and Policy Considerations

The separation of civil and military efforts raises important ethical and policy questions, particularly regarding the use of AI and biotechnology in biosecurity. Just as the Cold War era grappled with the governance of nuclear weapons, today's world faces challenges in regulating AI-driven biological research. Ensuring these technologies are used responsibly is crucial to preventing an arms race in AI-driven biological warfare.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Biological Weapons

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) of 1972 prohibits the development, production, and stockpiling of biological weapons. However, the dual-use nature of many biotechnologies complicates compliance, as research for peaceful purposes can also be misused for military ends. The BWC's lack of a robust verification mechanism contributes to global mistrust, particularly in the context of rapid technological advancements.

Non-State Actors and the Threat of Bioweapons

Should non-state actors develop bioweapons, both civil and military organizations would be involved in the response. Agencies like the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) would coordinate the national response, while the DoD would provide specialized resources and potentially lead direct action if necessary.

Training AI to Predict Future Pandemic-Capable Viruses

Predicting future pandemic-capable viruses requires extensive computational resources, sophisticated algorithms, and diverse datasets. A collaborative approach involving the federal government, military, universities, and private corporations would be the most effective strategy. Each sector brings unique strengths that, when combined, could address one of the most complex global challenges.

Investment Opportunities in the Civil Sector

Despite the challenges, the civil sector's approach to pandemic preparedness presents several potential investment opportunities:

1. Antiviral Drug Development
2. Biotechnology and AI
3. Public Health Infrastructure
4. Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

These investment opportunities reflect the need for innovative solutions to address the challenges in pandemic preparedness and response.

Investment Opportunities in the Military Sector?

The military's approach to biological threats also presents unique investment opportunities:

1. Biodefense Technologies
2. AI and Machine Learning
3. Secure Communication Systems
4. Dual-Use Research Facilities
5. Synthetic Biology and Genomics
6. Simulation and Training

These investment opportunities in the military sector often have potential dual-use applications, which could yield returns in both military and civilian markets.

The Role of Artificial Intelligence?

Both sectors are exploring the potential of AI in predicting and combating future pandemic-capable viruses.

An AI system would need extensive computational resources, sophisticated algorithms, vast and diverse datasets, and substantial economic investment to predict future pandemic-capable viruses. Here’s a breakdown of what would be required:

Computational Power:

• ?Supercomputers and GPUs: Predicting future pandemics would require high-performance computing (HPC) systems capable of processing massive amounts of data quickly. Supercomputers with thousands of GPUs (Graphics Processing Units) or TPUs (Tensor Processing Units) are often used in large-scale biological simulations, such as predicting virus mutations or interactions with human cells.
• ?Distributed Computing: In some cases, distributed computing frameworks like cloud-based platforms (e.g., Amazon Web Services, Google Cloud) or dedicated research grids could be employed to manage the computational load.

Algorithms:

• ?Machine Learning (ML) and Deep Learning (DL): These would be the primary tools. Specifically, convolutional neural networks (CNNs), recurrent neural networks (RNNs), and transformers could be used to analyze genetic sequences, predict mutations, and model virus-host interactions.
• ??Natural Language Processing (NLP): NLP algorithms can analyze vast amounts of biomedical literature to identify emerging threats or new patterns in virus behavior.
• ??Bayesian Networks and Probabilistic Modeling: These would be used to model uncertainty in predictions, allowing for better forecasting of potential pandemics.
• ??Evolutionary Algorithms: These algorithms could simulate how viruses might evolve under different conditions, helping predict new strains.

Data Requirements:

• ??Genomic Data: Comprehensive databases containing genomic sequences of viruses, human populations, and other potential hosts (e.g., animals) would be essential.
• ??Epidemiological Data: Historical and real-time data on virus transmission, infection rates, and population mobility would be necessary for training and testing predictive models.
• ??Environmental and Climate Data: Since environmental factors can influence virus spread, data from meteorological sources, global climate models, and ecological datasets would be required.
• ?Healthcare Data: Information on healthcare infrastructure, patient outcomes, and public health interventions would help in assessing the potential impact and mitigation strategies for new pandemics.
• ?Socioeconomic Data: Data on global trade, travel patterns, and economic activities would be crucial for modeling how a virus might spread and its economic impact.

Economic Resources:

• ??Initial Investment: Setting up the necessary infrastructure, including computing resources, data acquisition, and personnel, could require hundreds of millions to billions of dollars, depending on the scope.
• ??Ongoing Costs: Continuous data collection, model refinement, and the operation of HPC systems would incur significant ongoing costs. Sustained funding would be needed for research, maintenance, and updates.

Who is Best Prepared to Achieve This Objective?

Civil Federal Government:

• ??Strengths: The federal government, particularly through agencies like the National Institutes of Health (NIH), Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and the Department of Defense (DoD), has the resources and mandate to undertake large-scale public health initiatives. Government agencies can coordinate across states and internationally, and they have access to extensive datasets.
• ??Limitations: Bureaucratic processes and slower adoption of cutting-edge technologies could limit responsiveness and innovation compared to private corporations or universities.

Military:

• ??Strengths: The military has experience with biodefense and has access to significant resources and classified data. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and other military research bodies are well-equipped to handle high-risk scenarios, including bioweapon threats.
• ??Limitations: Military involvement is often focused on defense and may not always prioritize public health beyond national security concerns. Additionally, the need for secrecy can limit collaboration with civilian researchers.

Universities:

• ? Strengths: Universities are hubs of innovation and research, with access to cutting-edge technologies and expertise in genomics, bioinformatics, and machine learning. Academic institutions can foster interdisciplinary collaboration and are often more flexible in exploring new ideas.
• ??Limitations: Universities often rely on grant funding, which may limit the scale of their projects. They may also lack the infrastructure and resources for large-scale implementation compared to government agencies or large corporations.

Private Corporations:

• ??Strengths: Private tech companies, especially those specializing in AI and biotechnology (e.g., Google DeepMind, IBM Watson, Moderna), have the resources, agility, and innovative capabilities to lead in this area. They can attract top talent and rapidly deploy new technologies.
• ??Limitations: Corporate efforts may be driven by profit motives, which could influence the prioritization of certain projects. There is also the risk of proprietary data and technology limiting broader public access.

Investment Considerations and Ethical Implications:?

While the dual approach to pandemic preparedness creates numerous investment opportunities, it's crucial to consider the ethical implications and regulatory challenges associated with these investments:

1. Dual-Use Technologies: Many of the technologies developed for pandemic preparedness, especially in the military sector, have potential dual-use applications. Investors must carefully consider the ethical implications of their investments and ensure compliance with international agreements like the Biological Weapons Convention.
2. Public-Private Partnerships: Given the critical nature of pandemic preparedness, there may be opportunities for public-private partnerships or government contracts that could provide more stable funding streams. These arrangements can help mitigate risk for investors while contributing to public health and national security.
3. Long-Term Nature of Investments: Many of the investment opportunities in both sectors require a long-term perspective. The development of new drugs, advanced AI systems, or biodefense technologies can take years or even decades to yield returns.
4. Regulatory Landscape: Investors should be aware of the complex regulatory environment surrounding pandemic preparedness technologies, particularly in areas like drug development, AI, and biodefense. Navigating these regulations will be crucial for the success of any investment in this space.
5. Global Health Equity: As investors consider opportunities in pandemic preparedness, there's an ethical imperative to consider how these investments can contribute to global health equity, ensuring that innovations and technologies are accessible to all populations, not just those in wealthy nations.

Finally, the dual approach to pandemic preparedness, leveraging both civil and military efforts, reflects the complex nature of biological threats in the 21st century. This approach not only aims to protect public health and national security but also creates a landscape rich with investment opportunities. However, these opportunities come with significant responsibilities and ethical considerations.

Moving forward, policymakers, researchers, and investors must grapple with several key questions:

1. How can we ensure effective coordination between civil and military pandemic preparedness efforts while maintaining necessary separations?
2. What role should international cooperation play in developing and deploying new technologies for pandemic prediction and response?
3. How can we address the ethical and security concerns raised by dual-use technologies in biotechnology and AI?
4. What measures can be taken to revitalize and sustain funding for crucial programs like the Antiviral Program for Pandemics?
5. How can we balance the profit motive of private investment with the need for equitable access to pandemic preparedness technologies?

By addressing these questions and fostering a collaborative approach that leverages the strengths of both civil and military sectors, we can work towards a more robust and effective global pandemic preparedness strategy. This strategy, supported by ethical and responsible investment, has the potential to not only safeguard public health and national security but also drive innovation and economic growth in the biotech and health technology sectors.

As we move through the complex landscape of pandemic preparedness, it's clear that the intersection of public health, national security, and technological innovation will continue to shape our approach to global biological threats. The dual approach, while presenting challenges, offers a comprehensive framework for addressing these threats. It's incumbent upon all stakeholders – from government agencies and military strategists to private investors and researchers – to work collaboratively toward a future where we are better prepared to predict, prevent, and respond to pandemic threats. This includes upholding ethical standards and prom

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Final Remarks

A group of friends from “Organizational DNA Labs” (A private group) compiled references and notes from various of our thesis, authors, and academics for the article and analysis. We also utilized AI platforms such as Claude, Gemini, Copilot, Open-Source ChatGPT, and Grammarly as a research assistant to conserve time and to check for the structural logical coherence of expressions. The reason for using various platforms is to verify information from multiple sources and validate it through academic databases and equity firm analysts with whom we have collaborated. The references and notes in this work provide a comprehensive list of the sources utilized. I, as the editor, have taken great care to ensure all sources are appropriately cited, and the authors are duly acknowledged for their contributions. The content is based primarily on our analysis and synthesis of the sources. The compilation, summaries, and inferences are the product of using both our time with the motivation to expand my knowledge and share it. While we have drawn from quality sources to inform our perspective, the conclusion reflects our views and understanding of the topics covered as they continue to develop through constant learning and review of the literature in this business field.