Exploring Diplomatic Relations between Somalia and Ethiopia: A Path to Sustainable Peace Talks

1. Introduction

From time immemorial, as part and parcel of their long-standing historical, cultural, and religious ties, Somalia and Ethiopia continue to establish official diplomatic relations for a considerable number of years. During these periods, several studies and documents produced on those intergovernmental cooperation terms showed how the two East African countries have extensively been engaged in bilateral and multilateral cooperation by concluding different sectoral agreements on trade and investment, power interconnection, regional security, and economic integration. However, most of the articles and theses produced so far on the relationship between the two countries have failed to revisit on what realms the official diplomatic relations were initiated, increased, and decreased over time. Such kind of sophisticated interstate relations needs to be analyzed from the diplomatic innovative uniqueness points of view. If Somalia and Ethiopia go for different diplomatic approaches to combat the radical ideologies as preached by the organized and dismantling local armed groups, the peace and security issues in the Horn of Africa shall be endurably addressed.

Therefore, this paper addresses the following questions: Under what underlying reasons have Somalia and Ethiopia publicly decided to establish official diplomatic relations? What changed either within the Somali states or between Ethiopia and the rest of Somalia? In other ways, what overtime perception change has been observed in Ethiopian and Somali diplomatic policies toward states' recognition or perceptions on the statehood concept? The main driving hypothesis of the paper is: though Ethiopia has had several reasons to recognize and maintain official diplomatic relations regarding the federal Mogadishu-based institutions and the periphery Somali states, the precursor, catalyst, and driver behind why Somalia want to have the then recognized official relations have not been put on the center stage. I considered ultimately the real Somalia: the Federal Member States (FMSs) and the local Mogadishu-based administrations' people's opinion have to be respected. Most importantly is the put values and the hardcore demanded concerns resonated from those who are in the control and power positions at last could be realized into the sensitive negotiation stages. Since they have a direct stake or what to be a single sovereign government point, any durable and inclusive diplomats should consider addressing the precursor grievances of the Somali internal stakeholders.

2. Historical Context of Somalia-Ethiopia Relations

This section examines the historical context of bilateral relations between Somalia and Ethiopia, then delves into the relationship during Siad Barre's rule of Somalia (in a separate section) and the period after the fall from Siad Barre era. It is crucial to understand the dynamics that underpinned these relationships as they significantly informed and conditioned the growth and direction of bilateral diplomacy and international relations in Africa and the rest of the world. Additionally, this will help us to better analyze the reasons why rifts developed and to which consequences conducive for creating strong and effective peacebuilding models. By 1855, the Somali, Oromo, and several other regional power centers had been defeated by the Merecha clan and their Amhara and Tigrayan allies. The Ethiopian emperor, however, approved the establishment of the Adal-caliphate.

In the 1880s, the Scramble for Africa by European powers saw Ethiopia, apart from Liberia, remaining as an independent African nation. During the first half of the 20th century, Somalia consisted of regions controlled externally by Italy, the United Kingdom, and France. Ethiopia was surrounded by Somalia in the south and east. The Somali irredentist movement is divided into three umbrellas: clan loyal Mukar - an extremist group. Initially, the two countries could have lived in peace by way of the establishment of a border among the present borders and work for peace and developmental partners, but Somalia backslid for the creation of a frondeur event of the current exchange of European and Ethiopian related Analo historical transfer heritage and hiyaa cultural interaction between the markets of Harar and Italian and British brought Khat into the Somali sacrosanct.

3. Key Events and Agreements in Somalia-Ethiopia Relations

Today, the relations between the Federal Republic of Ethiopia and the Federal Government of the Republic of Somalia are based on friendly and neighborly ties. The key events leading to the signing of important agreements of mutual interest were rooted in the historical diplomatic relations, the respect for each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence.

To begin with, the birth and the founding of the Somali state came to being as a result of the unification of the territories that were Somali inhabited in the Horn of Africa. Present-day Somalia is actually the amalgamation of the peoples of the territories of the former Italian colony of Somalia, the former British colony of Somaliland, and the former French administered territory commonly known as the former French Somali Coast or simply referred to as French Somaliland.

During the 1960s, the foreign policy of the Somali Republic was mainly shaped in the big power rivalry of the superpowers. The Somali government sought and found a great deal of support from the former Soviet Union, other socialist countries, and non-aligned countries, while the Ethiopian government found a formidable ally in the Western countries such as the United States of America. It is remarkable that the stance that the Somali Republic maintained a very strong anti-imperialist foreign policy and continued to present a very strong case for the liberation and the decolonization of the peoples of Africa and other territories.

The foreign policy of the Somali government was also guided by the ideas of African Unity, Pan Africanism, collective security, international cooperation, peaceful coexistence, disarmament, demobilization, and development. The Somali government was very much interested in getting the right to self-determination and independence for Eritrea through a popular referendum.

3.1. Colonial Legacy and Independence Movements

Diplomatic relations between Somalia and Ethiopia, two neighboring states with a combined population of over 130 million people, equipped with strategic coastline ports and bordered by the Oromo people, are largely characterized by conflict and, worse, by proxy wars on other states. However, since the collapse of Siad Barre’s regime in 1991, conflict has dominated the relations between the two states. The most daring diplomatic relations between the two states were during Siad Barre’s regime (1969-1991), where on one hand Somalia manipulated and played the role of the big brother, and at the same time, Ethiopia became too hostile and a clear enemy of Somalia. The animosity between the two countries emanates from both colonial competition between European powers at the end of the 19th century and the different perceptions and interests in sharing territorial resources, including nation-building concepts of a sense of one state sharing a common identity and interest.

The history of the Horn of Africa, including Somalia’s and Ethiopia’s colonial experiences, influences their relationship. Somalia had been partly colonized by Italy, France, and Great Britain, while Ethiopia was only colonized by Italy. Thus, the whole notion of Somalis, had the Italians failed to flee in 1941 and use their local allies, including Tedoros II's Wollo agamee's, to divide Somalia into five colonial enclaves for the Anglo-French, might have their nation-state identity. These colonial experiences influenced the emergence of Somali nationalism, or irredentist ideas of restoring Greater Somalia. Although Somalis share a similar identity and ethnic ties and strive for a strong and independent Somalia, due to a Western colonial agreement negotiated between France and the United Kingdom in 1884, the Somali people found themselves in the fold of two colonial enclaves and consequently divided between the French, the Italians, the British, and Emperor Yohannis III's regime in Ethiopia.

3.2. Ogaden Conflict

The majority of Somali politicians and clans vigorously support the claims that the region, and the Horn of Africa, should welcome Ethiopia into the clan's family bed. If creators had appeared as angels of reconciliation, it was not long. On July 23, Somalia has recognized the Ogadenis' rights, but not that self-determination must be denied by law. Renewed contradiction has been perceived by the majority of Somali societies when most of its losses have been inflicted on itself. The majority of Somalia sees a deep benefit in Ethiopia's peaceful existence and territorial intactness. Tolerance of clan solutions has been created as a facilitator of sectional conflict resolution, rather than the final approach. United States policy seems to have been successful in conflict resolution as it might be useful.

Ogaden represents a trigger for the revolution in Ethiopia 1974, Ethiopia's army rebellion and People's government formation, and Somali government's determination that in 1977, the "National Border Treatment" would be addressed at a later date. Absalomid Haate-garin had been a leading ONLF official who turned to the Ethiopian side during the ongoing Ethiopia-ONLF battle. A resolution of the Ogaden problem is not the most crucial issue in the Somali-Ethiopian conflict. A lasting method for securing the two ethnic groups' peaceful living relations was the debate. Great powers, like the colonialists, are the negatives. Higher powers have much less importance than the subject of the current disagreement and in the determination of whether and how the people can carry them to an acceptable reservation in the New World Ministries. The outcome of the war will affect the interests of other countries and the maintenance of these powers will require tactics.

3.3. Ethiopian Intervention in Somalia Civil War

This section briefly looks at the onset of Ethiopian intervention in Somalia's civil war that marked a turning point in the conflict resulting in the defeat of the UIC forces. At the beginning of 2006, the UIC was pursuing its evident strategy of unifying Somalia under its rule. Addis Ababa, which considered the UIC as a threat to its peace and security in the Horn, started preparing to intervene. It quickly became clear that if it were left to its own devices, the UIC posed a real danger to Ethiopia. Addis Ababa was also under pressure from the United States of America to prevent what it saw as a dangerous group from further marginalizing the transitional government as it unified the whole Somalia and ran the risk of falling under the influence of 'terrorist' elements. The invasion proper took place from 24 December 2006 and led to the complete disintegration of the UIC over the period of less than a fortnight. With the victory of Ethiopian forces and their allies, Somalia entered a new phase of its civil war which is more dangerous than before.

With the defeat of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) having no political as well as military support from Ethiopia began to experience how shallow this new wind was. The TFG government found itself trapped – it could not enter into a dialogue with the leaders of the UIC as these were placed based on the policy of American exceptionalism on its back. This realization led to various problems including the setting up of UIC by the Ethiopian government, formation of new alliances that began causing the weakening of the TFG as well as the birth of a new powerful adversary, and so on. This dissertation is about the pathway to sustainable peace talks between these two countries. It is about a new attempt to ease the myriad problems the TFG government is facing. It is about a new, sustainable process based on practical and workable ideas, which is extremely important and needed to ensure that the peace talks are successful. A successful peace process will also contribute to the challenges Ethiopia is facing in connection with the Somali crisis, challenges relating to Ethiopia's policy and commitment to Horn peace and regional political and economic security.

4. Current Status of Relations

Somalia is located at the Horn of Africa, neighboring Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti. It is strategically important because of its location. After the end of the democratic government, which collapsed in 1969, and the socialist government in 1977, the democratic government collapsed again in 1990, which started a civil war. Since then, the Civil Society has tried to become a civil state, which has led to the transition to a Federal Government. The reformation of the federal government was completed in the 2012 election, and the government took full control in 2013.

As it is known, Ethiopia is found in the Horn of Africa. It is the only country that was not colonized by the colonial powers from the 16th century to 1991. It used to be difficult for Ethiopia to have relations and work with the international community. A few years ago, the few people who had power used self-interested diplomatic relations in their foreign policy. There are four important roles of foreign policy: the use of tools to solve foreign policy crises and problems, the expansion of trade ties and investments between nations, alliance and negotiations with all foreign countries, and maintaining a good relationship and making great efforts to avoid potential conflicts during discussions and meetings. Based on this model, Ethiopian foreign policy had shape and used it as a state's diplomacy. Today, Ethiopia's balance of power foreign policy is part of its relations with Africa and the Horn of Africa. Throughout the four foreign policy implements, Ethiopia has succeeded in foreign relations with the world and the Horn of Africa. As part of the region, the Ethiopian Somali Republic must have strong trade and economic ties with Abyssinia (the current Ethiopian Federal Republic), and they need to re-establish themselves completely as people who are sympathetic to Abyssinia. This status will develop much communication and peaceful relations between the two regions.

4.1. Economic Ties

This section discusses how the quest for economic growth and investment opportunities is a key factor in the new era of Somalia and Ethiopia bilateral relations, which is a step toward the ideals of a regional integration theory on economic integration. According to Frankell (1997), the economic integration of a group of countries brings more cooperation, investment opportunities, and economic growth among neighboring countries. Increased trade between countries, particularly between developing and neighboring countries, has acted as a new era of cooperation and engagement at a time of growing trade-oriented interaction among nations.

At the core, economic development is the primary goal of each on the list of formal sector and sub-sector goals (Shaeffer, 1996). Increased trade with low and middle-income countries can strengthen the peace dove effects of trade by promoting prosperity and social stability through access to economic opportunities, which could result in the prevention or mitigation of tension and unrest. Prosperity and peace are more likely to be long-lasting benefits that facilitate peace stability when victims of poverty are recognized for their potential to foster economic stability, investment opportunities, and cooperative bilateral and multilateral partnership agreements, let the gross national product (GNP) continue and negotiate a better economic development reform and infrastructure (Paul, 2008). High levels of human life, such as human needs for social equality, identity, dignity, environmental respect, communication, and respect for human rights, are necessary for the economy. As an equal foundation for the person, the more progress in economic development, the greater the fight against poverty and social recovery and the desire of states and citizens to contribute to global negotiation strategy.

4.2. Security Cooperation

When it comes to the relationship between the two countries from the security cooperation aspect, the beginning of the security-related bilateral relations between Ethiopia and Somalia is difficult to determine. War and conflict between the two nations from ancient times have given an opportunity to exchange experience. The Second World War provided an opportunity for two Somali armies to contribute in the course of the overall war on the Allied side. After the end of the war, Somalia opted to build a national army and sought military assistance from the United States, Italy, and the United Kingdom. Being aware of Somalia's desire for Western assistance in the form of military buildup, Ethiopia was able to arrange technical cooperation with Somalia after formation of its modern day police forces and set up of a military academy.

However, serious security cooperation started on December 30th, 1962, when the two countries Soviet Union and its European satellite states and the socialist People's Republic of Yemen. Military assistance also was strengthened and increased. The Somali government started backing the rebel groups agitating for a separate Western Somalia in Ethiopia and war between the two countries broke out on July 13th, 1977. Following the outbreak of the war, the USSR, Eastern European communist states, and the socialist Democratic Republic of Yemen, in a bid to defend their friend Somalia against their arch enemies, joined the war. The Somali government, however, made a mistake and the Soviet and Progressive Yemen missile systems coordinator who could have assisted the rebel groups in capturing positions in Ogaden and help Somalis to unite with their ethnic Somali brothers. At the time, Ethiopia was led by President Mohammed Siad Barre as the Somalia relief agency coordinator, the Eastern European Military counsellors left Somalia in the middle of the war and no efforts to relieve the Somalis or to fight on their side make an easy victory for the Ethiopian army. After a few months of battle, the Ethiopian army claimed control over all corners of Ogaden.

4.3. Diplomatic Engagements

Diplomatic relations between Somalia and Ethiopia date back centuries and have contributed to the fostering of brotherly ties, commonalities, and shared geopolitical, economic, and security interests. The two countries have also been negotiating a number of issues, including ports and the use of regional connectivity.

The Somali-Ethiopian border question emanates from well-rooted factors in the historical feast of territorial imbalances - colonial relocations of borders, a series of invasions/wars/wagons (tectonic shifts) that changed territorial configurations, diplomatic negotiations, treaties, protocols, peace agreements, international and regional institutions, and international standard-setting regimes systems in diplomacy.

Aware of the tension-led repercussions emanating from managing border disputes, the study argues a number of specific diplomatic spells should be institutionalized to continuously engage and fence the evolving border question. A good number of scholars have been forecasting diplomatic spells in mitigating the potentials of violence and abandonment of hard-won national-level achievements, and the study is the latest examination in this intellectual area.

Both countries have observed, signed, and ratified a number of treaties and protocols defining zones of territorial peace. The obstacles of territorial disputes are through a number of diplomatic steps. This paper conclusively finds that the politics of border and border making in Somali-Ethiopian territories is not among rather the only priorities the two countries have in maintaining a trajectory of sustainable peace exchanges.

With a careful diplomatic instinct, the two countries may secure a peaceful future by pushing close to their gains, making new ambassadorial paces, thinking out of the heritage boxes, and evaluating future developments.

5. Challenges and Opportunities for Peace Talks

In the wake of the collapse of the dictatorship regime in Somalia in 1991, the transitional period in 2000 and 2020, standard-setting has been produced at international and national levels. This includes the United Nations (UN), the New Deal, Somali Compact, National Development Plan (NDP), Somalia National Indicator Reporting Matrix (SNIRM), and Somalia Ending the Impunity. But, these peacebuilding processes have faced continuous challenges including a lack of political will, minimal institutional capacity, high rates of re-offending, minimal judicial capacity, and more of an absence of peace talks between federated bodies and Federal institutions or at least low achievement process with significant concerns as ongoing or future risk, no monitoring, evaluation, and learning.

It is very important that Somalia's federated members need to have a collective voice in the federal parliament when there are significant national decisions that should be addressed by a profound policy or legal path and pursued duly. That includes peace talks where a significant member or these deciders are excluded and universal decisions are taken by the federal member representing the will of the federal people's voices. For sustainable peacebuilding planning and programming to be successful, it is essential to systematically integrate gender equality and women and girls' rights in the process. Programs must implement a gender lens across all aspects of the peacebuilding agenda from inception to analysis and implementation, working to shift the power dynamics that often leave women, girls, and other vulnerable populations marginalized. It is the most vulnerable who often bear the brunt of conflict and violence. A gender lens shifts the personal, professional, and political perspectives while addressing the needs and priorities of women and girls struggling to achieve sustainable peace.

5.1. Territorial Disputes

Territorial disputes are the most common source of wars, especially in the Horn of Africa, where natural resources are scarce. The contentious issues surrounding the delimitation of interstate boundaries can often lead to descent and longstanding issues between both states. Interstate boundary disputes are common in the Horn of Africa, where they are often a cause of violence or even war between neighboring states. Since Ethiopia's empire began to shrink in the 1960s, when Somalia's new rulers tried to incorporate the southern and handling regions of Ethiopia into a greater Somalia state. Fighting took place between Somalia and Ethiopia, which was known as the Ogaden War. There have been several rounds of Ethiopia-Somalia wars for centuries, culminating tensions in the Ogaden region.

The diplomatic border conflict between Somalia, by then under its civilian government, and Ethiopia took more than two decades. It was only the regime change of Colonel Mengistu rather than the National Recovery Freedom Front (NRFNP) 30 with the dismemberment of the country in vogue today by the Ethiopian government through negotiations with various Somali entities. The long-standing border conflict originally flamed up when Somalia, committed to the "Pan Somali" ideology (Greater Somalia) by various Somali groups in Kenya and Ethiopia in the post-World War period, tried with the help of the Soviet Union in the early 1960s to obtain rights beyond the indicated Abessa and Omod settlements. The Ethiopian government under imperial rule was so weakened by internal and security political restraint, especially with the additions of Somalia for a "Greater Somalia", rather with numerous support from outside, and after all the United States of America.

5.2. Internal Political Dynamics

Internal political dynamics shape the way the two states interact with one another. The two countries' domestic structures and the kind of government in place help explain how the dynamics of interstate relations are stylized. The domestic structures of both countries are very intricate and lend to a foreign policy that sometimes does not take into account the foreign country's stability and other interests. The impact of internal political structures on foreign policy is that leaders are sometimes prone to play into global power games and prioritize their perceived national interests. The strongman syndrome is showcased when internal structure informs international behavior. Political security is crucial in understanding interstate relations. Even though it is internal, the politics in both states have implications for their relations.

The role of pro-nationalist politics helps in understanding political relations. Pro-nationalist politics that promotes sovereignty or respect for international law has helped improve Somalia-Ethiopia relations. Sovereignty and non-intervention in the domestic politics of either Somalia or Ethiopia are crucial to long-term peace and stability between the two countries. Peace can only be achieved if there is mutual recognition of non-interference. The existence of a genuine nationalist movement that can genuinely reflect the values and ideals of the people works toward detaching the government from its narrow interest and narrow focus on foreign policy. Ethnic differences are interesting for analysis. The Middle East African ethnicity is important. Tensions are present and have implications for the relations between the two countries. Somali refugees are also a bone of contention. The existence of opposition politics and civil society also sheds light on the foreign policy of both states. The presence of an opposition and a civil society for Ethiopia has an impact on its diplomatic relations with Somalia. Additionally, Somali politics and preparations for democratic elections have implications for the foreign policy of both states. The southerners may harbor border territorial claims. Middle Eastern politics are also important and help explain international relations. The politics of both states can impact the political stances of both countries. This is because Middle East politics and relations between some countries in the region have a local dimension, which informs and is also influenced by the domestic political landscape. This can shape and influence the development of relations between Ethiopia and Somalia. The presence and role of diaspora groups in international relations also have an impact on relations. The politics within the Horn of Africa is important, and the existence of other regional actors also shape international relations between states in the region. The rise and decline of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the role of the African Union (AU) also impact the diplomacy of both states. The attainment of statehood by Somaliland, the piracy off the Somali Waters, and IGAD relations also impact the international relations of both states. The politics of Islamism (Somali and Ethiopia) and the impact on diplomacy and state formation and steam of nationalism also have an effect. There is an implication for the future of bilateral relations. Although this research finds that international relations can manipulate internal politics, it concludes that internal politics have implications for state policy and behavior.

5.3. Regional and International Influences

After the Cold War, the new era has paved the way for a hectic era of regionalism. Particularly in the Horn of Africa states, which created different political, social, and economic linkages and cooperation. Although it is seen that conflicts within the same races, it is possible that one of the strategies in overcoming these conflicts can only be solved by regional linkages and active cooperation.

For example, Djibouti, Somaliland, and Kenya tried to help Somalia politics in the form of resistance to play the role of the Transition National Government-IN-EXILE and its protector. Somalia has not been informed until today; countries are also known to hardly hide their suspicions that Ethiopia uses Somali territory. In the light of these suspicions, there has been a state of mutual suspicion that exchanges harm for a long time as a rule.

It should not be forgotten that disputes occur in many countries since they have contiguity. To remove this calamity, countries have to establish peaceful relations, and to establish peaceful relations, it is necessary to understand the sensitivities of neighbors. On the other hand, it is necessary for the countries to express their own interests within the framework of regional/international institutions. And on the third hand, countries need to desire to use peaceful methods for the solution, mediation for disputes. If states are to ban international institutions and refuse to legalize the treaty, peace cannot be achieved in the international order.

6. Sustainable Peacebuilding Strategies

After having a broad overview of the various alternatives for building integrative institutions within Somalia and broadening official and unofficial channels of communication between the Somali officials and Ethiopia, it is easier to speculate that the two countries are delivering a conducive environment for a peaceful transition within Somalia. Nevertheless, in this concluding section, we explore whether the main actors involved in the process of governance of Somalia are more likely to move into integrative institutions and prefer peaceful negotiations to solve their differences in case of conflict.

The following section is divided into two parts. In the first part, we discuss possible alternatives for designing sustainable peacebuilding strategies within Somalia. In the second part of the section, we argue again that Somali elite members building integrative institutions are necessary to give talks a chance.

Sustainable peace-building strategies Building integrative institutions within a failing country like Somalia is a long and time-taking process. They might take an extended time and become very expensive during the first years, but they may gain all their substantial benefits only several decades later. The alternative, moving into segmented institutions, might cost in terms of peace and governance. However, such institutions are less efficient but less costly to organize in the short run. It is up to the Somali key players to make it happen. However, it is possible for various interventions and diplomatic efforts to help the shift toward institutions oriented to the long term in an uncertain short term, to roughly draw the parallels from the confiscation of international projects that nowadays are available.

6.1. Track I Diplomacy

Theoretically, diplomacy consists of two tracks. The leading track, consisting of high-ranking officials such as government officials, party leaders, and representatives of dominant interest groups such as the business sector and religious leaders, is known as Track I diplomacy. The lesser track, which is characterized by low-level officials such as fellow-level officials, non-governmental organizations, and professional organizations, is introduced as Track II diplomacy. In this study, both tracks were assessed.

The results of the study demonstrate that Track I diplomacy is well-exercised and that both countries have diplomatic representatives in place, while Track II diplomacy is under-exercised. The relationship between Somali and Ethiopian leaders, including cooperation and travel of political leaders in Ethiopia, and the travel of the Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, including some of the attributes of the relationship between the two countries, as well as the nature of the two countries' diplomats, are accurate indicators of the basis of Track I diplomacy between the two countries. According to the interview data, the interest of the Somali land and the support which the Ethiopian government pledged to help Somalia are the key areas in which the two countries' collaboration efforts are mainly based.

6.2. Track II Diplomacy

In diplomatic terms, the TTI is known as a mixture of official foreign relations with the unofficial or behind-the-scenes relationship of high-ranking former policymakers. The use of this type of diplomacy is related to the fact in international relations that both actions and words of leaders may increase or decrease the process of policy crystallization. To avoid any potential grievances and negative consequences, it is best if high-ranking officials maintain a high level of "plausibility." By doing so, uncertainties and potential threats facing policy-oriented actions will be minimized. Therefore, it is expected the role or intervention of the unofficial component of Track I officials that, without a formal hat, can unofficially engage in the process of "talks about talks." According to David Lumsdaine and George Kelso, getting former policymakers to meet on a regular basis and discuss public issues, 'can provide and... did provide a vital link between the foreign and defense ministries of the United States and the Soviet Union during some very strained times in international relations'.

The dangers of informality contradict the presence associated with public diplomacy when an ambassador recklessly uses his or her critical judgment. To mitigate potential adverse effects, mediators or facilitators advocate either an interventionist or a bridging role. The former includes the mediation of the selection of substantive issues and the corresponding negotiation agents, various activities used to move negotiations from meetings that are ripe for resolution to those arrangements that are widely regarded as premature, and the exploration for possible settlements, both during and outside of discrete negotiating sessions. A neutral, a form of an impartial third party, is particularly well-suited for advocacy and education. A neutral is a person with no direct interest in a conflict who provides assistance, 'which is used to clarify problems, suggest settlement plans, and/or provide formulae for the solution of disputes'. The expertise and advice of the facilitator can also include how the parties negotiate, what would be an acceptable course of concessions and agreements, and when questions between the parties may be ripe to be resolved.

6.3. Conflict Resolution Mechanisms

The provisions offered by the CP for the resolution of conflicts should be based on the principles of justice and respect for international law. The means include prevention, mediation, conciliation, involvement of and response of non-parties to disputes under consideration, the establishment of fact-finding commissions, expert commissions to analyze the dispute, or the judicial body through judicial means. The CP also provides for the establishment of neutral protection missions for a peaceful resolution of disputes, and the President of the Mogadishu Conference was invited to play an appropriate role in the implementation of these actions. A standing OAU Security Mechanism for the promotion conflict of Africa and establishment and sustainable pre-peace is established through the consultation and establishment of experts to combat the continent against the new threat of context.

The IGAD, also in its organizational launch treaty describes the framework for comprehensive, direct-to-talk negotiations between heads of state in the event of a serious dispute, and recently initiated "This specific real demand," so that the support of the full implementation of the six Somaliland Agreement. The Charter and the relationship between IGAD and OAU were established with the signing of the complex solution of the relationship between the two organizations. However, Somalia did not participate in the IGAD structure of major conflict resolution processes, despite being a member. This was mainly due to what was characterized by "Siad Barre's aggressive policies against other Somaliites. Part of Somalia was particularly militarized to defend the local issue of Somalia to defend the invasion. In the absence of diplomatic missions, the Somali executive process is mainly used to communicate internationally.

7. Conclusion and Recommendations

In conclusion, both Somalia and Ethiopia have long been considered as a result of covert and overt historical forces, as it is demonstrated in this study. Despite the presence of non-Somali speaking communities with shared religious and cultural traits on the one hand, the two countries have their dominant national groups. The Amhara in the case of Ethiopia and the Hawiye and Isaaq in Somalia have a deep-felt sense of exclusivity. Thus, the establishment of relations between the two countries has to create a positive bond between the Federal government of Ethiopia and the state moguls in their respective regions. Otherwise, it creates a sour relationship between the two groups. Ethiopia's task regarding the diplomatic channel option is enormous, and the awaited membership in IGAD must be based on creating relations with others besides Ethiopia.

Perhaps the current needs could encourage the international community to consider a more pragmatic approach regarding the re-establishment of a base between the Somali region of Ethiopia and Somalia. But perhaps it would be easier today for Somalia and Ethiopia to come to terms in an increasingly homogenized world community than for the various Somali factions. In which case, the international system could work with some success if its members could motivate the Somali factions. If the various Somali factions, at least in some common projects, cooperate, it could serve as a step-by-step introduction to a situation in which the existing complicated relationships between the two territories and countries could be solved. Conversely, the diplomatic relationship is without question a prudent one and should not be disregarded too easily by the international community.