THE EXPENDABLE SOLDIER

By?

Brig PS Gothra (Retd)

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I had the opportunity to serve as part of the IPKF in 1988- 89. For some good reason, I was tasked to command a unique X Ray Company. I had less than a year's service.?This company was an ad hoc company made out of personnel who had come to my unit in lieu of the interpreters given to other units in the Division.?Another component of the company was the soldiers from regimental units in the peace station. Naturally these soldiers were not the best their parent units had to offer. After a quick organization into sections and platoons the company was sent out under command of a neighbouring unit. Notwithstanding the constraints, I was able to learn a lot in that one year in Sri Lanka. Some of my lessons/ experiences I am sharing in the succeeding paragraphs.?

For gathering intelligence, it was very difficult to cultivate sources. All one had to rely on was the EPRLF and EROS cadres. Military intelligence fund was not available. Whatever little information one generated was by giving out the spare rations or talking extensively to the locals or by using force against people caught under suspicious circumstances in jungles or during night time patrols. In fact, I didn't much understand the difference between information and intelligence.

The LTTE on the other hand had full information about the activities of the Army through the locals. A number of times one could see children running ahead to inform their cadres about the sudden arrival of the Army.

The disadvantage was overcome by extensive patrolling and laying of ambushes both during night and day. This of course led to extensive fatigue on the troops and wear and tear of the gear. Extra jungle shoes were authorized and the life of the gear was reduced to facilitate faster replacement. The condition was the same with other companies and units in the area as I was able to talk in detail with my peers during the Part B Examination in Batticaloa.?

The extensive patrolling and ambushes also had the other drawbacks. One generally got into a tendency to make a pattern. The pattern when discerned by LTTE was used to lay ambush. The LTTE ambushes could be best broken by the fire of 2-inch mortar depending on the local conditions. Some people who suffered badly in those ambushes. In order to cover up their mistakes some of us used to place fired cases of AK 47 ammunition at a number of places to convey to the inquiry team that the situation was really hopeless as the LTTE teams were present all over and nothing could be done to retaliate.?

This had an effect on the overall learning process. The Infantry School started teaching different configurations of ambushes like 'M' type and so on. Probably the mistake was realized and such configurations were dropped from the curriculum later. In addition, the problem with long ambushes was that complacency was setting in. So, there were a few cases of self-inflicted injuries or fratricides.

An immature tendency I had was to chase the Tamil Tigers whenever spotted. I never got them on the run but I almost got myself and my men killed when I ran into a Tamil Tigers’ camp. Fortunately, the occupants of the camp had abandoned the camp after hearing the gunshots a few minutes earlier. Later in my experience as Company Commander in Rashtriya Rifles, I realized that it is better to get results by keeping the area under surveillance than to impromptu run after the militants. That way one is able to make his team aware of the situation and one tends to fight at the ground of own choosing. In Sri Lanka we had very few night surveillance devices.?

The junior officers displayed extreme will to excel, even at the peril of their life. There were cases when these officers were heli-dropped deep into jungles with small teams with unreliable communication and scant fire support. Thus, I personally was carrying a very dim opinion of the formation commanders and the formation headquarters. Maybe because I lost some soldiers due to the foolishness of an officer in the formation or the formation commanders not able to give clear directions. For example, a senior formation commander directed us to go all out, whereas his immediate junior formation commander came after fifteen minutes and said that we should exercise all caution and restrain.?

Motivating soldiers was another challenge for the junior leaders. Firstly, they were not convinced of the cause of our fight with LTTE on behalf of Sri Lanka whose army was restricted to their barracks. Soldiers often asked whose fight are we fighting anyway. We had Tamilian troops, who sometimes felt that we were unnecessarily fighting against Tamilians who were oppressed for years by Sinhala. But we carried on because our troops are worth their weight in gold they take the word of officers as just cause and junior leaders spill their sweat and blood with them.

The threat of IED was ever potent and hence the precaution had to be taken. This added to the uncanny stress on the minds of the soldiers, while entering a house or walking on a trail or moving by road. The IEDs used by the Tamil Tigers had liberal content of the explosives. Thus, the most difficult task in Op Pawan was collecting shreds of the body parts of the fellow soldiers killed in the IED blasts and the next difficulty was to sort those and give a name. We had to face a smart enemy who planted an IED under an anti IPKF poster or a flag knowing that we will approach it to pull it down or they will select a place which we frequented or place the IED in a dead body etc.?

Some other poignant moments were like sitting guard with the mortal remains of our soldiers, listening to mother of an LTTE cadre killed by us to say that we are not to be blamed, witnessing villagers avoiding participation in last rites of a boy killed by LTTE, mother desperately wanting the bicycle of her son an LTTE courier killed by us because that was the only fortune she had to meet expenses for the last prayers for her son. In some remote places we were the executive, judiciary, legislature and everything for the population but with no means to fulfil their expectations. Overall, it was a lot of exposure to misery and poverty for a young man like me just 23 years of age.

It was rare to catch an LTTE cadre alive because they used to bite the cyanide capsule in case of imminent threat of arrest. My unit caught one and for some reason he was kept with me. During informal chat with him I learnt that the cadres are trained through a very tough routine. And of course, they had to undergo a high degree of brainwashing to reach the level to ingest cyanide capsules on imminent arrest or on the orders of their leader. Any interrogation of their cadres or supporters rarely gave any worthwhile information.?

We just had to be happy with some small achievements like raiding LTTE hideouts or killing their cadres or reopening rail traffic or ensuring voting in our area of responsibility. Eating prawns, drinking coca cola (it was banned in India at that time) or watching VCR while in the post, having dates imported from Saudi Arabia while on long patrols were small little incentives in life to move on.?

Helicopter was a harbinger of happiness as we looked forward to personal mail, fresh vegetables and meat on hoof. It also took away our sick and injured. Some were fortunate to go on leave on it's way back.?

When we left the country, our overall achievement was Zero but our Army carried a number of lessons for operating with persistence, calm and determination against the terrorists sent by Pakistan in Jammu & Kashmir without least collateral damage.?

While leaving we could only feel sad for our soldiers who had lost their lives. The nation didn’t realize the value of their sacrifice because the bodies were cremated there itself and only the ashes along with dog tags were sent home. The worst was when we landed in Chennai locals were shouting slogans against the IPKF.??

Sometimes I feel these lines aptly describe our predicament?

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