Examining the Rohingya Crisis in Myanmar

Note: The analysis of the ideas presented in the essay was written in 2019, and any events or developments that have occurred since then are not reflected in the essay. With that said, it is always important to consider the context and timeliness of information when evaluating and interpreting it.

“We will surely get to our destination if we join hands.” The once-celebrated Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi once uttered these words within the dark perils of national change, leading Myanmar’s young opposition against the tyranny of an authoritarian military dictatorship in the summer of 1988. Her tenacity to restore the blessings of liberty to the destitute country kept her under squalid years of house arrest, which only managed to bolster her image as the nation’s symbol of freedom and democracy internationally. With the cessation of the junta’s leadership in 2011, her enduring message of human rights and non-violence brought her into the upper echelons of political power, where her sacred ideals, however, fell on deaf ears when it came to the endless plight of the Rohingyan people as they suffer decades of the unrelenting force of institutionalized discrimination. As such, the dream of establishing a legitimate democratic republic in the eyes of other sovereign nations withers slowly as the mounting crisis of mass exodus and persecution rages on. Therefore, in order to fulfill the goal of national democratization, Myanmar’s government must terminate all operations dedicated to the indiscriminate and inhumane killings of the Rohingya and begin to engage in real efforts to foster mutual recognition, reconciliation, and social integration into Burmese society by adopting a gradual and inclusive approach to national healing. To unpack the contents behind the complexity of the crisis, careful elucidation of the causes of the atrocities dealt with by the Rohingya minority and their ramifications through critical historical analysis is needed.?

Before we dissect the deplorable factors that catalyzed the crisis, we will need to delineate the demography and history of the Rohingya to ascertain insights into the origins of the conflict. The Rohingya are a Muslim ethnic minority group with an estimated population of 1.1 million people. The term “Rohingya” is defined as “those of Rohang,” which was an early Muslim name of Arakan, which is now presently known as the Rakhine State in Western Myanmar with ancestry traced back to the 15th century (Al Jazeera Media Network, 2017). Despite indisputable historical evidence that suggests the existence of the Rohingya community within the boundaries of Myanmar, the majority of Buddhist inhabitants refuse to identify the Rohingya as natives, “referring to them instead as Bengali and considering the community to be largely composed of illegal immigrants from present-day Bangladesh” (Chan, 2015). Although such bigotry based along ethnic and religious identities stretches before British Colonization in 1824, it has consistently been the driving influence behind various policies adopted by the Burmese government, which has manifested into greater Rohingyan suffering. For instance, after gaining independence from colonial rule in 1948, the Burmese Constitution instituted an exclusionary definition of citizenship; clearly stating that people of “indigenous races” are considered and entitled to full citizenship (Al Jazeera Media Network, 2017) in the Union of Burma, where 135 assortments of ethnicities are legally recognized except for the Rohingya.

With the military coup d'etat in 1962, the army abolished the constitution and ferociously endorsed nationalism centered around distorted Buddhist philosophies (Vox, 2017), as well as implementing a Burmanization policy that intertwined social and economic mobility with assimilation to Burmese culture during the era of the Burmese Way to Socialism, effectively restricting the Rohingya from conducting commerce and attaining an education in Burma (Blomquist, 2016). To strengthen this stance, the military government instituted the 1982 Myanmar Nationality Act (also known as the 1982 Citizenship Law), specifically designed to deny the Rohingya from obtaining Burmese citizenship (Al Jazeera Media Network, 2017). In other words, if residents cannot prove that they had two ancestors living in Myanmar prior to 1823, they can be denied full citizenship (The New Nation, 2017). In order to reinforce the enforcement of the law, robust draconian methods via military intervention were executed to displace thousands of Rohingyans from Burma’s western territory. According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), a series of large-scale military crackdowns were carried out against the Rohingyas in 1978, 1991, 1992, 2012, 2015, 2016, and 2017 (Usmani, 2017). Notable armed campaigns to eliminate the minority group include Operation Dragon King and Operation Clean and Beautiful Nation, which forced approximately 200,000 and 250,000 Rohingyans to flee neighboring Bangladesh in 1978 and 1991, respectively (Vox, 2017).

As seen from a historical standpoint, the development of the crisis stems from the incessant breeding of false narratives and misinformation about the Rohingya, which has tragically seeped into the general social consciousness of Burmese society. Thus, the social construction of such skewed notions combined with fervent and robust national propaganda against the Rohingya has cultivated and transpired the issue into a deeply-entrenched problem, solidifying the durability and prevalence of racial intolerance by stimulating xenophobic and islamophobic rhetoric into the attitudes of the predominantly Buddhist Burmese population, generating mass paranoia that the social order was under threat by the “alien” Rohingya minority. Consequently, prejudice of this particular nature metamorphosed into the realms of unchecked military dominance and power; officials taking advantage of governmental instruments and utilizing public fear to enact national legislation that advocates aggressive sectarian policies against the Rohingya, effectively rendering the minority group as scapegoats to the country’s problems.

With the “return” of civilian democracy in 2011, the emancipation of the Rohingya still remains a fallacy in contemporary Myanmar. The situation, as Cameron Hudson, the director of the Simon-Skjodt Centre for the Prevention of Genocide at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, states: “the [Burmese] government efforts to deny Rohingya citizenship rights, restrict their freedom of movement and the practice of their faith, and deny their basic human rights, have all been identified as leading precursors to additional mass atrocities and even genocide.” (Usmani, 2017). To exacerbate the matter, ultra-nationalist extremist Buddhist organizations such as the Patriotic Association of Myanmar (abbreviated as Ma Ba Tha in Burmese) and the 969 Movement led by Buddhist fundamentalist monk Ashin Wirathu have emerged after four Muslim men were accused of raping and killing a Buddhist woman in Rakhine state in 2012, inciting greater anti-muslim sentiments and violence towards the Rohingya (Marshall, 2013). Despite the reprehensible altercations that have occurred, there have been significant actions undertaken by respective non-governmental organizations to address and ease the Rohingya Crisis. For instance, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has provided valuable aid to the Rohingya refugees. By coordinating efforts with the Bangladeshi government, the UNHCR airlifted more than 1,500 metric tons of emergency life-saving aid to Bangladesh, including blankets, plastic sheets, sleeping mats, family tents, plastic rolls, kitchen sets, jerry cans, and buckets. In addition, with the support of increased Bangladeshi and foreign personnel, the UNHCR has expanded its presence within the conflicted region via emergency deployments by establishing accommodations and necessary facilities for the refugees; funding roads to facilitate construction and refugee access, supporting site planning, building latrines and wells, improving the water and sanitation facilities, and distributing shelter materials for the displaced Rohingyans (United Nations).?

On the 16th of March 2018, the United Nations and its partners launched a Joint Response Plan (JRP) for the Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis. It called for USD $951 million to continue delivering lifesaving assistance from March to December 2018 (United Nations). Despite the successes, the JRP currently faces numerous manpower, logistical and medical obstacles. Namely, problems such as population congestion, outbreaks of contagious diseases (e.g., measles and diphtheria), malnutrition, limited healthcare services, susceptibility to extreme tropical weather conditions (e.g., monsoon and cyclone), and high levels of criminality are some of the rampant issues that have been plaguing humanitarian efforts in the region (Global Focus, 2018).?

Although the United Nations have proven to be an efficacious force in delivering appropriate aid to the refugees, the imperative assistance provided does not seem to address the nucleus of the calamitous circumstance—the intransigent attitudes of the Burmese political force. Yes, the measures taken by UNHCR in support of succoring the general welfare of the refugees are undeniably worthwhile, but their sustainability for the long haul comes into question: if the Burmese government refuses to compromise to a gradual humanistic alternative of mass social integration of the Rohingya, how long will the services last? As such, the intervention by the United Nations and the Bangladeshi government can only be seen as a temporary, short-term initiative to mitigate the suffering of the Rohingyas. It is not the solution. To reiterate the realities of the situation, the increased involvement of such organizations and local partners has attracted unwanted sinister forces; vices of human and narcotics trafficking (mainly methamphetamine) have been on the rise in refugee settlements as well-connected underground criminal networks exploit the vulnerabilities of overstretched, constrained resources. To aggravate the situation, limited funding for relief actions has made operations detrimental; as of early August 2018, the JRP remains just 32 percent funded. In response, UNHCR has appealed for USD $238.8 million as part of its Supplementary Appeal for 2018 to continue to respond to the needs of hundreds of thousands of refugees (United Nations), revealing double standards of international cooperation and solidarity to the man-made crisis. The evidence has illustrated clearly that the crisis has escalated alarmingly over time, evolving from the crux of national stigmatization into a dire regional catastrophe where greater predicaments materialize as supply and capital deplete. Therefore, with the grave reality of the crisis taken into consideration, it seems that the plausibility of further assistance to the Rohingya does not confront the grim aspects of the dilemma’s causation, effectively exacerbating Myanmar’s diabolical strategy of ethnic extermination and constant negation of the Rohingya as part of its national history and culture. As Myanmar’s surging engagement in annihilation goes unrestrained, international non-governmental and support agencies find it more difficult to act. As Joseph Fisher, a spokesperson for the British embassy in Rangoon (Yangon), mentioned, he “called on the Burmese government to urgently restore humanitarian access to all communities in need and to ensure the security of aid workers and all communities in Rakhine state.” (Asia News Monitor, 2014).

As we have seen so far, the fundamental derivation of this lamentable disarray boils down to the institutional structures upon which Myanmar was founded. As agents of change, international human rights organizations deemed that the best way forward to solving the crisis is to abolish biased laws dictating the cruel marginalization and alienation of the Rohingya, specifically the 1982 Citizenship Law, the centerpiece of the horrors of the holocaust of the “stateless” minority. They claim that the law not only failed to acknowledge the Rohingya as rightful citizens, but it deliberately stipulated Burmese citizenship into three tiers: full citizens, associate citizens (associate citizens are typically ethnic minorities such as the Rohingya who face discrimination from public officials and, subsequently, limited social and political freedoms), and naturalized citizens (The New Nation, 2017). As such, history has demonstrated prudently that the root of the crisis lies in the ‘legal’ positionings of the government, which have paved the flourishment of military savagery. However, these groups that have hopped on the “justice bandwagon” have failed to evaluate the immediate consequences of the instant abolishment of the law. Even if the law is abolished and citizenship is included as a condition for the Rohingya’s return to the motherland, it is most unlikely that it may serve as a credible solution to the intricate, multifaceted crisis as anti-Rohingya attitudes are heavily implanted in the social composition of Myanmar’s society. Also, proponents of this argument assert that citizenship is unlikely to ease the burden of this liability, partially because legal issues intensify the social stigma within the country. With this in mind, there may be a real possibility that as the humanitarian crisis in Bangladesh ends, another one will soon reappear in Myanmar (The New Nation, 2017).

With reference to Hyuk Kim’s publication of his insights on possible resolutions to the crisis, the Myanmar government might not be able to control all national affairs given the military’s power and influence. However, they can play a facilitatory role as a constructive initiator by enhancing social acceptance of “Rohingya” with a long-term perspective; highly recommended that these processes begin with an education that encompasses the cultural and social values of the Rohingya and Burmese communities, respectively. In so doing, the Buddhist community in Rakhine can learn about the meaning and value of diversification, while the Rohingya can understand the social norms, culture, and values of Myanmar, including the Burmese language, as preparation for becoming full members of Myanmar society. When it is necessary, interfaith dialogue can be promoted to bridge religious gaps and achieve mutual recognition (Kim, 2017).?

With regard to citizenship, the unassailable political will of the National League of Democracy (NLD) can also lead to fruitful amendments to the Citizenship Law of 1982 (although this option may take time to gain enough support and approval). Nonetheless, a modification of the partially descendent-based citizenship system to a birth-based one has significant implications. For instance, granting full citizenship to newborns will be a robust signal to the international community that Myanmar is fully abiding by Article 7 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, to which they have subscribed since 1991. By bestowing full citizenship on such grounds, it can assure the Rohingya of basic human rights that might have been subjected to deprivation in the case of associate and naturalized citizens as dictated in the law. Hence, a transition to a birth-based citizenship system indicates a concrete and sincere commitment by the Myanmar government toward reciprocated reconciliation and rehabilitation between the conflicted groups (Kim, 2017).?

Although the dubiety of the Rohingyas obtaining citizenship looms over the debate over potential resolutions to the crisis, one thing is certain: Myanmar’s rule of law is premeditatedly deleterious. The insubstantial and weak elements of citizenship, encompassing nationality and ethnicity, promulgate a complex system that strictly depends on the verification of ancestral lineage as a progenitor to full rights. As such, due to the innately prejudicial nature of governance, Myanmar's ethnocracy has systematically elevated the nuances of Buddhist ideas and values, resulting in the diminishing of the political principles behind democracy, which have gone on to become evasive. Hence, rather than using citizenship as an apparatus for inclusivity, Myanmar has triumphantly passed laws that have manipulated it into an assimilation barrier for non-Buddhists (The New Nation, 2017).

Ultimately, if Myanmar longs to heal the painful wounds of miserable despotism, structural alterations must be made urgently to avoid further human rights violations. By welcoming an environment that embraces and celebrates cultural differences instead of perpetuating their destruction, the stage can be set for peace to become a real prospect. There is no doubt that decades of civil strife have scarred the “Goldenland” with conflicts fought along the lines of ethnicity and religion, narrowing the Rohingyans into the crossfires of warmongering generals. Therefore, without patience, prudence, productive public pressure, as well as international support, any political decision on the Rohingya issue in Rakhine would generate greater social, economic, and political problems and violence. Although the destination to freedom and forgiveness is long and arduous, the first step to palliate the damage begins if Myanmar joins hands—not with trigger-happy politicians and ‘radicalized monks’ hooked on gory confrontations, but with ardent, conciliatory visionaries who earnestly desire to salvage what has been left in the debris of fogged hate and accomplish their sacred duties to recover from the toilsome years of bloodshed to fully realize Myanmar’s destiny; towards the fulfillment of national unity and the auspiciousness of democracy.

Forget everything, not humanity.