An Examination of Al-Shabaab's Evolution, the Westgate Mall Attack & Takfirist Jihadism in Africa
Dr. T.X. Montenegro
Ph.D., M.A.A.S., M.A., B.A., A.A., | OSAC | USBTA | Hostile Environment Penetration | Asian & African Studies | Counter-Terrorism & Counter-Intel | OSINT | UAVs | SALWs | ITAR Consultant
Intro
I began to write this article in the Fall of 2013, while I was still living in Tanzania, and flew out of Jomo Kenyatta International Airport on September 12th, 2013. Nine days later the Westgate Mall was attacked in Nairobi, with claims that "Al-Shabaab was responsible for the attack."
This article is still timely in that it examines the evolution of Al-Shabaab, in addition to aspects of Wahhabism, Salafism, and Takfirist ideology, which have rapidly taken hold in Muslim communities across Africa.
Who was the Al-Shabaab of 2013 and were they really responsible for the attack on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya???
Al-Shabaab as a terrorist organization has been naturally dynamic, however over the past several years, the group seems to have morphed from executing relatively simple tactical operations to planning and executing more complex, strategic and geographically long-reaching operational maneuvers.?
What is the composition of today’s Al-Shabaab??Who comprises this extremely dynamic group with its slick media presentations and its shape-shifting ability??How can we use the knowledge of its different aspects to disrupt its planning and combat its soft-target terror operations???
Are Al-Shabaab’s members adhering to a Sunni interpretation of Islam, or have the Islamic-based principles to which they have adhered changed during the past decade or more??Are Al-Shabaab members Salafists, jihadists, Wahhabists, fundamentalists, Takfiris, or Islamofacists??
Understanding the group’s composition will in turn allow terrorism experts and counter-insurgency operatives to make more informed decisions and more accurate predictions.?This paper examines the ideological components of Al-Shabaab, in addition to identifying the reasons for its recent metamorphosis.
?Al-Shabaab is comprised of several different sub-groups and factions.?And even the basic organizational components can have rapidly oscillating divisions based on clan, sub-clan, village and family.?It is important to recognize that the “classic Al-Shabaab” has by now been eclipsed by more powerful and organized forces which hail from beyond the Horn of Africa, in the Gulf Arab States.
I am of the strong belief that we are no longer dealing with "Al-Shabaab" per se anymore.?What we are seeing are the remnants of the original Al-Shabaab group being injected with Gulf-Arab Saudi Salafist Ideology.??Al-Shabaab has "morphed" into a group of Gulf-sponsored Takfiri Salafist Radicals who readily integrate with non-Somalis, whom often have more extensive training than pure Mogadishu Al-Shabaab.
It is too simplistic to refer to Somalis as Wahhabis as they do not adhere to the teachings of Muhammed bin Abd al-Wahhab.?Secondly - in layman's religious parlance - Wahhabis are usually Gulf Arabs - not Horn of Africa Cushites as the Somalis are.
?The HOA Cushites have always been hit and run marauders - stealing livestock, women and cattle.?Their battle tactics were most often reactionary and tactical - fully lacking any strategic goals.
Foreign Sponsorship of Al-Shabaab
?The Westgate Mall Terrorist attack did not reflect HOA Cushitic-style battle tactics - that operation showed a huge amount of forethought and a large number of skilled people - with even more skilled instructors.?Al-Shabaab of Somalia and Kenya did not switch out their rough tactical operational methodology so quickly for such a smooth tactical and strategic assault.?There is a foreign influence with respect to the Westgate attack, which has not yet been discovered.?There is an ideological puppet-master pulling invisible strings.
?I believe that several Gulf Arab states (which may in some cases have religious adherents referred to as Wahhabis) are sponsoring multi-cultural terrorist operatives in several parts of Africa.?Most of these operatives have adopted a Takfiri Salafist interpretation of Sunni Islam.?In East Africa and the Horn of Africa some of these radicals may be Somali, and some may have been Al-Shabaab - however they have been indoctrinated with Gulf Arab Islamic Ideology.
?Now, you have the deep-pocketed backers of Al Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), financing the same type of ideological campaigning that heralded the arrival of Bin Ladin and the Taliban.?The aforementioned terror entities - and now Al-Shabaab in Somalia - were in part forged, modified and customized by Puritanical Gulf Arab Salafists.
?All of these terror groups ride in on the cusp of an ideological wave which hails from the same geopolitical region.?They all begin to behave like arms attached to the same octopus. What began as Al-Shabaab may now be referred to as AQHOA - as it certainly appears to have adopted an AQAP ideology.?Al Shabaab + AQAP?=?al Qaeda in Horn of Africa (AQHOA).
?Instead of battling the individual arms of this violent ideological octopus, should not the hunters focus on the head - or the nerve center??What are we (the Westerners and our affiliated allies - U.S.A. + AMISOM, Kenya, and Ethiopia) fighting - what is the nature of the latest beast - and which localities does it frequent?
There are many ways in which Al-Shabaab and its members could be ideologically categorized.?But what Islamic-ideological precepts do they adhere to, or rather - what interpretation of Islam are they following - what is the ideological motivation for their behavior and activities?
Wahhabism, Salafism and Takfirist Ideology
?In Brief: Al-Shabaab is the tip of the Wahhabi-sponsored jihadist spear which projects an (totalitarian) ideology based on Takfiri-Salafism from the Arabian Peninsula.?The extremist ideology which motivated al Qaida had its roots based in puritanical Salafism, which was (and still is) practiced across the Arabian Peninsula - by those referred to generally as "Wahhabis."
While there are distinct differences between Salafism and Wahhabism, the further one moves away from the Arabian peninsula (with respect to Africa), the more blurred that distinction becomes.
So this austere, rigid and Salafist interpretation of Islam, referred to as Wahhabism, is actually a miscategorization.??
A more appropriate rendering of the present-day dynamics of Horn of Africa Islamic Ideology would read as follows: Puritanical Salafist Ideology promogulated and sponsored by Gulf Arabs.?The recent violence in East Africa (and H.O.A.) is a result of a jihadist-Salafist belief system which has been sponsored and encouraged by Gulf Arabs or “Wahhabis.”
Salifism is a Sunni interpretation of the Koran and Islamic law based on the Sharia, which is considered to be very puritanical and austere.
So now it should be apparent that in the Horn of Africa there is a type of Salifist ideological movement, sponsored by Gulf-Arabs (or Wahhabis).?However, these emerging dynamics in the Horn of Africa and East Africa do not reflect the ideology of non-revolutionary Salafists.?
These Gulf-sponsored radicals are engaging in a violent jihadi Salifism, against any individuals or groups which do not follow their puritanical and extreme interpretation of Sunni Islam. Their comportment in Somalia and East Africa reveals that they are in the process of adopting a Takfirist view of jihad.
Within a Takfiri interpretation of Islam, violence may be utilized to secure religious goals.?In this era, the phrase “religious goals” is often synonymous with power or political control.
?Salafism gained ground in Somali during and subsequent to Siyad Barre’s departure.?The fall of Barre’s Government in the early 1990’s created a power-vacuum in which clan leaders and warlords vied with Arab-promogulated religious ideologies for control of the populace.?While the relative power of any one warlord or clan was not constant, the permeation of all aspects of Somali society by a Sharia-based Gulf Arab Islamic ideology was.
Sectarian warfare has assumed a partnership with jihad, over which it often takes precedence. Takfirism is messianic – the sole leadership of Muslims against apostates and the infidel West.
The present ideological interpretation of Islam in the Horn of Africa, is Takfiri Salafist: “Takfiri Salafist” references the licensing of violence via a subjective Salifist litmus test of apostates and infidels. (Sayed Shahzad. .?Takfirism: a Messianic Ideology.?Le Monde Diplomatique.)
?Salafist refers to the puritanical Gulf-Arab interpretation of Sunni Islam, while Takfirist indicates a Sharia-Street Justice hybrid where Gulf-sponsored Radicals cum executioners pass judgment and punish the populace, incorporating their personal interpretation of Sharia, usually in the presence of armed militia members toting AK-47’s, RPG’s and machetes.
Tertiary Actors & Grass Roots Fundamentalism
There are several groups and organizations which I refer to as Third Party Actors or Al Shabaab “Facilitation Organizations.”?These are groups which are not Al Shabaab offshoots.?Their conception and genesis occurred independent of any al Shabaab associations.?However due to shared territory, shared religious beliefs and a Salafist-tendency for rejecting non-Muslim authority, they have a lot more in common now than they did previously.?Their level of cooperation can be expected to increase.?
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The Muslim Youth Center (MYC) and the Mombasa Republic Council (MRC) are two organizations which can act as grass-roots al Shabaab facilitators on Kenyan soil.?They have the capacity to recruit, radicalize and mobilize young Moslem males from Nairobi’s Kibera Slums to Kisauni or Bombolulu Village in Mombasa.
?The Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) is a coastal-based secessionist movement which operates out of Mombasa - on Kenya’s North Coast.
Kenya is unfortunately very prone to a grass-roots radicalization of urban-based and rural Muslims.?The tribalism and violence stemming from corruption and election violence has disenfranchised many of the Kenyan Youth - Moslem and Christian alike.?The central-Kenyan youth, like their coastal cousins are mostly unemployed and looking for an opportunity in life or an ideological explanation which can dull the pain of their socio-economic position.?That explanation is usually provided by local Sheiks or Imams who put their own spin on already volatile Salafist ideological precepts.??
A lot of the community tension which often surfaces is towards the establishment; however religious leaders have a surreptitious way of forging that anger into an ideological weapon - based on their interpretation of Islam.?On the coast, there is a movement for the coastal region to cede from the rest of Kenya.?It has economic and political aims; however one of the tools to leverage the group into action seems to be religious ideology.
Internal Ideological Issues with al-Shabaab Members and Ethnic Somalis
Somali’s are Cushitic and have their own form of traditional laws referred to as xeer.?Gulf Arab Salifism and Wahhabism both promote usage of the Sharia for problem resolution.?From an ethno-linguistic perspective, this may create issues as the Cushites have millenia old tribal traditions which do not coincide with Arabic-interpreted Islamic Law (Sharia).
Political Islam or a Fundamentalist of Islam based on a Gulf Arab interpretation of Sharia (could it be Wahhabi based) within the all-Cushitic Somali society has never trumped clannism.?While the Somalis do have a great respect and belief for Islam, their sense of group (clan) identity in many cases will trump their religious belief.?Suicide bombings in Somalia are due to a Gulf Arab influence, and were previously not condoned within Somali society.
From a tactical point of view, Al-Shabaab has borrowed heavily from the Taliban?and al Qaeda. Suicide bombings, which were unknown in Somalia prior to 2006 and even alien to Somali culture, have become commonplace with Al-Shabaab. (?The Foreign Fighter Problem: Recent Trends and Case Studies,?Shinn, David.?September 2010).
There is [now] an acceptance of death worshipping among … [Al-Shabaab’s] leaders. Al-Shabaab's rhetoric increasingly resembles that of al Qaeda. It avoids Somali nationalist slogans and refuses to use the traditional Somali flag, which it replaced with a black flag emblazoned with the Shahaada (declaration of the faith) in white text.?(Shinn)
It often holds press conferences in Arabic rather than the more common Somali language. Al-Shabaab militia members are known as the "masked men" because they obscure their faces with red scarves. As in the case of al Qaeda, it has developed an effective communications and media effort to get its message out for recruitment purposes. Al-Shabaab is looking more and more like the Taliban of the 1990s.?(Shinn)
Somalis and their Cushitic cousins - the Ogaden of Eastern Ethiopia are extremely xenophobic and naturally suspicious of any outside customs which do not align with their clan beliefs.?While this manner of thinking began to erode with the influx of Islam, and the Sharia - it still does influence the rationalization process of the Cushite Groups in the region.
The Somali population may take only so much of the Sharia, before a movement starts in which the application of “xeer” customary law is applied.?The same rationale applies to suicide missions.?That mechanism of terrorism was never a Cushitic-Islamic tactic; it came with the permeation of a Gulf-Arab sponsored Salafism.
The Cushitic belief-system of the Somali people, is almost as integral as their clan ties.?On a philosophical and spiritual level, they must already be questioning themselves as a population about the adoption of Sharia punishments, suicide missions and death worshipping - as these are not components of the classical Islamic lifestyle to which they had been accustomed to.
Gulf-sponsored Takfirist Salafi Jihadism in Africa
If one takes a broad look at Africa from a security perspective - an alarming trend may be noted.?The modus operandi and fundamental ideologies of the different Moslem terrorist groups across Africa are beginning to very similar.?All of them are displaying Takfirist Salafi behavior.?Boko Haram is anti-establishment and xenophobic; especially with all things Western.?I have already demonstrated that Al-Shabaab 2013 is displaying Takirist Salifi behavior.?Al Qaeda in Maghreb has destroyed the graves of Moslems and Christians alike.??In 2001 the Taliban destroyed two statues in Afghanistan called the Buddhas of Bamiyan.
?All of these groups are showing the behavior of Salafi Jihadists operating according to a Takfirist interpretation of Islam.?Al Qaeda utilized similar operating principles as did the Taliban.?My point is this:?These diverse terror groups in Africa are not as diverse as they may still appear.?These people are being funded, trained, indoctrinated and weaponized by the same ideological force emanating from the Arabian Peninsula.
It is time to focus on the head of the octopus instead of trying to figure out a name (or exact ideology) of one of its many arms.?We can expect that the arms will behave in a relatively like manner, as they are attached to the same head.
?Therefore we must anticipate that these groups are going to be demonstrating similar operating styles in the near future.?It is quite feasible that the “marauding hit and run” operational style of these different terrorist organizations will be eclipsed by more strategic operations with higher casualty levels.
?Al-Shabaab, once known for its hit-and-run tactics, just switched out its modus operandi for one which requires huge amounts of strategic forethought.?African terror groups have been penetrated by hardline Gulf Arab jihadists who are financing and indoctrinating these groups.?That is why we are now seeing such radical shifts in how terror attacks are mounted.?The same deep pockets which financed Bin Laden, the Taliban, AQAP, and AQIM are now financing Al-Shabaab and most likely Boko Haram.
?The Westgate Mall attack in Nairobi demonstrates the utilization of Takfirist Operational Planning.?Al-Shabaab 2013 is an arm of Gulf-Arab Salafism which extends from the Arabian Peninsula to the Horn of Africa.?They are the tips of ideological spears held by the same hands in the Gulf Arab States.
Conclusion
On the Horn of Africa and now in East Africa we are witnessing the emergence of a hybridized pan-jihadist movement which is using the Al-Shabaab moniker and Somalia from which to launch its growing African terror network.??
At this point in time the Somalia-based Al Shabaab is an organization comprised of various Somali clan members, indigenous Somali fighters, non-indigenous fighters using the name of Al-Shabaab and a Martial-Ideological Phalanx of Salafist pan-Jihadists whose power can be traced back to the Gulf Arab States.?Their ranks are further augmented by East African and Western youth, many of whom have at least partial Somali lineage.
The original “Old School” Mogadishu-based Al-Shabaab group has been eclipsed or infiltrated by Salafist Gulf-Arab ideologues.?Initially Al-Shabaab was comprised of ethnic-Somalis from Somali-proper, and was often divided along clan lines versus differences in religious ideology.?
The International Crisis Group has concluded that "the hardliners, led by the foreign jihadis, wield enormous influence and have access to resources and the means to dictate their wishes to the less powerful factions. (Shinn)
The Afghan-trained Somalis and the foreign veterans from Afghanistan and Iraq play an important role as Al-Shabaab field commanders because of their military experience. They brought specialized skills with them to Somalia….They teach the techniques of suicide attacks, remote-controlled roadside bombings, kidnappings and assassinations of TFG officials, journalists, humanitarian workers and civil society workers. (Shinn)
The foreigners are the principal link to al Qaeda and by most accounts are exerting growing influence on the organization. The foreign element of Al-Shabaab is not only behind the planning of suicide bombings, but it has provided several of the suicide bombers including at least two from the Somali diaspora in the United States. (Shinn)
The attack at the Westgate Mall in Nairobi indicates a change in modus operandi of Al-Shabaab.?Their strategic planning capacity appears to have rapidly matured.?The Westgate Mall operation required a large intellectual reservoir, input from battle-hardened mujahedeen and extensive, well-thought out strategic planning.??
It is important to remember that inter-clan fighting, which the Cushites have at least two millennia of experience - is relatively tactical by nature.?Camels and women were stolen and there were relatively hurried retributions - without highly developed strategic thought.?Westgate did not appear to be an operation which is Cushitic in origin.?It resembles a carefully-backed Gulf-Arab terror operation reminiscent of an al Qaida or Taliban Asymmetric operation.
Al-Shabaab's reliance on foreigners and its draconian tactics such as suicide bombings, occasional beheadings, forced marriages between Somali women and foreign fighters, among other actions, may eventually alienate a critical mass of Somalis. (Shinn)
This pattern of violent extremist behavior came on the cusp of a Gulf-sponsored wave of Salafist ideology which crashed on the shores of Somali soon after the fall of Said Barre.?The Somali culture with its deeply ingrained Cushitic belief-systems may over time begin to reject the influence of Sharia and a Salafist interpretation of Islam.?But the Gulf-sponsored ideology is spreading across Africa like a wildfire, and Somalia is already subject to the heat of the Salafist-fanned flames of Jihadism.
Since the early 2000s, it became evident that diverse terror groups located in Africa had begun to display similar operational patterns and strategies.?Their ideologies are also become - alarmingly - more aligned.?It is now evident that the same deep pockets in the Arabian Peninsula which financed al Qaeda, Bin Laden and the Taliban have been busy sponsoring terror organizations in Africa.
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