Evolution or revolution: How will Iran’s social movement come to an end?

What do Iran’s protests tell us about how social movements? Why is this social movement so significant? What can we expect to happen next?

When Iran’s morality police first arrested 22-year old Mahsa Amini, they had no idea that it would trigger several weeks of widespread anti-government demonstrations. What started off as protests against the forced wearing of the hijab in Mashhad, have rapidly evolved into a national rally against the government and potentially a full blown revolution.

A country built on protests

Iran has a long history of protest. The 1979 Islamic Revolution, on which current-day Iran was built, produced profound change at great speed and was at the time, massively popular in standing against imperialism and Western culture. However, over time opposition groups began to form. Beginning with the Iranian protests of 1981 and followed by several decades of demonstrations against corruption, religious conservatism and women’s rights abuses, expression of resistance and discontent are a continuous narrative in the Islamic Republic’s short history.

Many of these movements have been unable to rival the brutal hand of the state. The Iranian government is known for its resolute approach to quashing demonstrations. During previous uprisings, hundreds - if not thousands - of protesters have been arrested, killed or ‘disappeared’ as a result of their actions. In the most recent protests over fuel prices (in 2019) 1,500 people were killed in what was labelled the bloodiest confrontation in the Islamic Republic’s history.

When social movements collide

What we are currently seeing in Iran is several movements collide. After decades advocating for change, activists from a diversity of campaigns - the Kurdish emancipatory movement, the anti-hijab movement and the Green Path of Hope Movement - have identified a common grievance. The current status quo is just not working for anyone. All agree, the government must go.

Four decades of economic crisis, political isolation, poor treatment of ethnic and religious minorities and control of women’s bodily autonomy have left the majority of the population feeling angry and frustrated. Traditionally, the Iranian government has blamed foreign governments, particularly the US and Israel, for its problems. However, with the mean age in Iran at 31, and with 65% of the population under 39 years old, this rhetoric will no longer fly. Two thirds of the population do not know any government other than the ayatollahs, and are no longer willing to accept foreign scapegoating as justification for human rights abuses.

At the same time, the ‘Burnt Generation’ - those who knew Iran before the Ayatollah took power - remember an alternative Iran, one in which women were free to dress how they wanted and the economy was resilient. The common discontent experienced by so many has resulted in an amalgamation of interests on the ground. Actors from all corners of society - men, women, religious conservatives and the Iranian diaspora - are flooding to the streets in protest of the regime and Iranians abroad are burning their passports in a symbolic display of support for those protesting on the ground.

Where does it go from here?

The question is, where does it go from here? According to Blumer (1969), social movements generally go through a life cycle marked by four stages.

• Emergence: For social movements to arise, certain political, economic, or other problems must first exist that prompt people to be dissatisfied enough to begin and join a social movement. This is known as structural strain.
• Coalescence: After a while, individuals participating in the movement become aware of each other and begin to organise. At this point, leadership emergence and ‘ownership’ of the problem is identified or blame is assigned.
• Bureaucratisation: As a movement grows, it tends to become bureaucratised. Fundraising commences and clear lines of authority develop. Momentum is sustained by leaders who are compensated for their time.
• Decline: Social movements eventually decline for one or more of many reasons. Sometimes they achieve their goals and naturally cease because there is no more reason to continue. More often, however, they decline because they fail as a result of repression or lack of resources required to sustain the movement.

Moving to the next stage

Iran’s movement is stuck in the coalescence stage. Despite successful mobilisation, the current movement has no leadership. This is not necessarily a bad thing. The previous Green Movement came to an end when the regime placed its leaders under house arrest. Without anyone to directly blame, it has been very difficult for security forces to suppress the movement. The fact that this is a bottom-up movement with no clear leader also potentially makes it that much more powerful.

At the same time, a lack of coherence in the voice of the movement means that there is no clear agenda, political programme or objective. If the movement is to evolve towards bureaucratisation, clear lines of authority would help interest groups to better define success and a path to achieving it.

As in the past, there is also the risk that this movement will fail because it doesn’t have the resources required to sustain social action. This is particularly challenging when up against the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps - the primary enforcers of the Iranian regime. In order to keep going over the long term, Iran’s revolutionary movement will require access to technology, money and a means to communicate.

With that said, there are a number of factors that suggest that this time may be different for Iran.

• Fragility of the existing regime: Many are aware of the fact that Ayatollah Khamenei has been experiencing serious health issues for quite some time. In recent years, he has been treated for prostate cancer and earlier this year he was forced to cancel all meeting and public appearances after falling gravely ill. His state of ill health has caused many to question whether now might be the right opportunity to change the entire regime altogether.
• The movement is intersectionalist: The fascinating thing about the current protests is how inclusive they are. Individuals from all generations, genders, ethnicities and professions are taking to the streets to have their say. Many of the things they are demanding are not new. Parallels can be drawn between the current #no2hijab movement and the Girls of Enghelab protests that took place between 2017-2022. Likewise, discontent with the current regime are consistent with frustrations experienced during the Green Movement in 2009. With the current Ayatollah potentially on his way out, could another election be what it takes to tip this regime over the edge?
• A unified call to action: Despite the diverse interests of these groups, the call to action is unified and coherent. In the previous uprising, many felt that reform was still possible and change could be managed under the existing regime. While the main slogan of previous campaigns were ‘Give back my vote’ or ‘Where is she?’, participants of the current demonstration are carrying signs saying #FreeIran and ‘No to Dictator!’ People are no longer content with the prospect of compromise, they want change.
• The use of technology to mobilise: The use of social media to amplify the demands of activists is not new. We saw it during the Arab Springs and in several movements since. Social media is a powerful tool in movements because it demonstrates a broader base of support for change and can provide much needed moral support during difficult periods of campaigning. What we are seeing in Iran is activists moving beyond social media to identify other tools. This includes using video games such as the Sims to communicate, the map app Waze to convene, and hacking of government-owned TV channels and websites to regain the narrative. These new forums for information sharing allow the movement to perpetuate despite government efforts to crack down.

Evolution or revolution?

So, how will Iran’s movement end? An epistemic shift has happened in Iran’s society. There is a clear partition between the ideology and intentions of the nation and the state. By continuing to uphold a mandatory hijab policy, the current regime has painted themselves into a corner in which the veil and the authorities go hand in hand. When one goes, so will the other.

Even if the hijab law is relaxed under the current or future regimes, Iranians are likely to face a generational fight for economic and political justice. While social movements can feel like a race to the finish line, the reality is that cultural change is far from automatic. Even with a new government in place, women, Kurds and other minority groups are likely to face a long-term battle for equality.

Social movement theory teaches us that a sustained political movement requires discipline, leadership and time. In the case of the past revolution, external influence in the form of Western intervention was also critical in toppling the existing regime. The current demonstrations present an interesting case study as to whether a a movement in such a suppressive environment needs external support to achieve its ultimate objectives. Or whether Iranian’s fight for human rights and socioeconomic justice can be achieved from a bottom-up movement alone.

Journalist Borzou Daragahi wrote in a post for the Atlantic Council’s IranSource:

“Iranians would do well to realize that they are playing a long game, and that unseating or transforming a dictatorship as entrenched as the Islamic Republic is a chess match far more than a bout of arm wrestling… In Iran, the momentum is there. It just needs direction and a helping hand.”

Even if the current demonstrations do not result in a revolution, they continue to undermine the crumbling edifice of Iran’s increasingly unpopular theocracy. Change is inevitable, the question is when.