"Ever Given" - A Precedent? (Part 1)

"Ever Given" - A Precedent? (Part 1)

1. Introduction to a special case

Like many interested parties professionally connected with seafaring, I dealt very intensively with the "Ever Given" incident in the Suez Canal.

In addition to numerous interesting nautical, technical and meteorological questions that were raised in the media as the cause of this accident and unfortunately also gave rise to speculations, in addition to the numerous more or less expert comments, some of which made the most daring assumptions, of course also the by myself upcoming questions too about possible causes of this incident. I thought extensively about the possible causes of such an accident from the point of view of a captain of large container ships, who knows the Suez Canal from personal experience and has passed through numerous passages.

Possible causes therefore, because to date no really clear statements have been made about the causes of this accident. Which is quite understandable when we think of the enormous effort were involved in getting the ship afloat again and the subsequent demands of the Suez Canal Authority, the Egyptian government and the salvage specialists. And of course, the downtimes and waiting times associated with the blockade of the Suez Canal, of shipping traffic in both directions, which led to an enormous traffic jam and thus to massive delivery delays in the logistics chains, which are reflected in?enormous additional costs, which are must taken into account.

For all variants that could be the cause of this accident, nautical, technical, meteorological, communicative problems between the pilot and the captain / bridge team on the bridge, I of course have my personally view. Which consider the nautical point of view and which are based on the in media published known circumstances and on Evergreen's statements.

There must be set a clear limitation in understanding. The following conclusions are afflicted with some uncertainties that are not suitable to use as a helpful element of causal investigation. That is also not my intention to may anticipate a final investigation report and the task of the investigation commission. However, they allow recommendations to be drawn up.

What worries me a lot more is the question, which is asked again and again of: What role the pilots could have played in this accident. To anticipate the answer: I don't know. This question can only be answered by the evaluation of the voice data recorder and, of course, interviews with those involved.

Yes, even if a reference to incorrect actions or incorrect recommendations for the ship's command was found in the data of the VDR and in the interviews. It would have NO impact on the canal pilots, who according to the Suez Canal Authority (SCA) are senior pilots with decades of experience. Which, by the way, doesn't avoid that they may make possible mistakes. That should be pointed out.

2. The role of pilots in seafaring

In the world wide seafaring, we have to differentiate between leading pilots and advisory pilots.

Leading pilots

are pilots who intervene directly in the ship's leading and take over the leading of the ship. The most striking example of this is the Panama Canal. However, it must be made clear here that the pilot is indeed responsible for the ship leading, but the overall responsibility for the ship is reserved only for the master.

?Advisory pilots

?are all pilots who give advises to the master on their pilotage areas. They don't intervene in the ship's command. The captain is solely responsible for everything what my happen. Even if the captain allows the pilot to carry out orders for engine manoeuvres, bow/stern thruster maneuvers or orders for rudder commands, the captain is always solely responsible. There is no goodwill bonus for the captain. He has the overall command without any limitations

And we absolutely have to take into account the respective national regulations for sea pilots and port pilots, which either completely exclude pilots' liability, reduce it to a minimum or limit it to a level that excludes an economic fiasco for pilots.

And this is where the "Ever Given" case comes in.

?3. The role and liability of the pilots in Suez Canal

?The pilots in the Suez Canal are advisory pilots.

They are not allowed to intervene in the ship's command. They give recommendations to the Bridge team under the Captains leadership The procedures for the pilot boarding and departure is specified in the SCA - Navigation Rules and corresponds to the internationally valid standard

4. BTM/ BRM and cooperation/ communication between pilots and bridge teams

?A good and successful cooperation between the captain, the bridge team and the pilot requires a functioning and well-organized bridge team and well bridge resource management (BTM/BRM). Everyone who has sailed as a captain and bridge officer knows this international valid regulations and has participated in ship simulator courses for BTM and BRM in accordance with the requirements of STCW 95 Convention/ as amended in 1997/ Amendment Manila 2010.

(Section A-II/2, IMO Modell Course 1.22 and STCW 95 Part A, Chapter II, Section A-II/1, A-II/2, A-VIII/2, A-V/2, A-V/3, Part B, Section B-VIII/2)

For pilots is the key element of there training and work the IMO Resolution A 960(23).

Furthermore are there following IMO resolutions on this:

????????????Resolution A.960 (23) / Annex 2 - RECOMMENDATION ON OPERATIONAL ??????????????????????PROCEDURES FOR MARITIME?PILOTS OTHER THAN DEEP-SEA PILOTS

?????????????Resolution A.893 (21) / Annex 25 - GUIDELINE FOR VOYAGE PLANNING

?????????????Intern safety management systems for ship companies and ships which includes Bridge ????????Operation?Manual, which are based on ISM Code (IMO Resolution MSC 104(73) and ??????????implemented amends)

further extensive documentation / recommendations for action by:

??????????????Maritime societies/ associations such as ICS, BIMCO, OCIMF

?????????????Nautical Institute,

?????????????Maritime Insurers (P & I / Guard and others),

?????????????Maritime Education Provider

who devote themselves intensively and extensively to the topic of the relationship between the pilot and the bridge team. All of this can be read and / or verified based on one's own professional experience.

5. The canal/ sea/ harbor pilot in Egyptian jurisdiction

This is the really interesting part of answering the question of the accountability and liability of Egyptian pilots.

?Here we have to go back to 1990, when the Egyptian Maritime Code No. 8, also known as Law 8, came into force.

?There is in Article 279, and this jurisprudence was confirmed by the Supreme Court of Egypt:

"... the responsibility for pilotage operation in port and in the Suez Canal lies entirely with the Master of the guided vessel even in case of the pilot’s error."

What nothing less means that no matter what mistake the pilot makes the associated consequences are solely the responsibility and liability of the captain.

This legal position is also clearly formulated in the SCA - Navigation Rules for the canal pilots who work on behalf of the SCA. Why should it be any different, if the high court confirmed the legality of Article 279 of the Egyptian Maritime Code No. 8. Without any exception.

In the SCA - Navigation Regulations (Edition 2015) is this laid down it reads as follows:

??Part 1 – Navigation

Generalities

Art., 4 – Responsibilities:

(1) When on Canal or at its Ports or Roads: owners, operators, and/or charterers of any vessel or floating unit of any description, category and nationality are responsible for any damage and consequential loss caused either directly or indirectly by a vessel, floating unit or SCA personnel and cause losses to herself or to SCA properties or personnel or to obstruct navigation in the Canal. Hereby, the vessel or floating unit is wholly responsible for that damage unless otherwise proved by evidence that this damage was not made on purpose or by mistake or negligence. This responsibility prevails as well on environmental damages if any.

(2) The vessels or floating unit's owners and/or operators are responsible without option to release themselves from responsibility by limited liability.

(3) The words (Owners and/or Operators) for the purpose of the present article, shall be considered to mean person/persons or corporate body responsible for the vessel at the time of navigational accident or incident.

?(4) Moreover, the vessel guarantees to indemnify the SCA in respect of any claim against the latter by reason of any damage, whatsoever she may cause either directly or indirectly to third party.

(5) The vessel waives the right to claim on the SCA for any damages caused by third party that she may sustain while on Canal.

(6) Ship owners, operators and/or charterers must treat SC pilot and personnel on equal foot with crew members during Canal transit, towage and salvage operation.

(7) Owners, mobilizers, charterers and/or operators bind themselves responsible for any mistakes resulting from pilot's advice or arise by SCA personnel.”

and furthermore we find in SCA - Navigation Rules, Section II

“Section II – Pilotage

Art., 11 – Pilotage: (1)

A – General :

All vessels entering or leaving the Canal, must take a pilot (Pilotage is compulsory). However, the SCA reserves the right to assign a tug master on board vessels under 1500 SC.G.T, and a coxswain on board vessels under 800 SC.G.T instead of a pilot.

Navy ships and vessels carrying dangerous cargo must have a pilot regardless of their tonnage. Road’s pilots on board vessels arriving from sea shall hand over the Declaration of State of Navigability and the Pilotage Form to the Master.

The pilot must inform the Movement Control Office or the Port Office immediately by Inmarsat and tetra or V.H.F. if his advice regarding the safety of navigation is not accepted or not respected by the vessel.

Masters are held solely responsible for all damages or accidents of whatever kind resulting from the navigation or handling of their vessels directly or indirectly by day or night.

?The pilot is not held responsible for any damages sustained during transit owing to his advices since the master or his deputy is the sole responsible for the ship.”

Exactly here we find the in Article 279 of the Egyptian Maritime Code No. 8 stipulated passage again.

Regardless of what happens by whom, the captain is ALWAYS responsible and the canal pilots are exempt.

But that shouldn't come as a surprise. Because Egypt is by no means an isolated case in this type of interpretation. And as a captain, you should always be aware that you are the first port of call for port state authorities in the event of problems of any kind.

I don't think I'm going too far in my assumption that very few Captains know what role the canal pilots play in terms of responsibility and liability. Personally, I very much wish that the captains who passes through the Suez Canal take the time to read the SCA - Navigation Rules carefully in advance of the passage. Then they will be aware of what is going on in an event of an accident/ incident have to be expected within the canal, his approaches in Port Said and Suez or in Egyptian ports .

Despite all the serious situation and all the problems that weigh on the crew, the owner, and the charterer of "Ever Given", which are currently immense, the accident of the "Ever Given" has something good. It sensitizes us as the ship command to look very carefully at what we are getting into in our work on board. It doesn't will become easier for the crews, bridge teams and Captains.

After this clarification about the role and liability of Suez Canal pilots I want loose some words to the incident himself.

6. Personal answers to the in media discussed causes of accidents - a factual analysis and specialist contemplation

6.1 Fundamental Remarks

I took a lot of time to deal with the Ever Given case. What struck me, as with so many events, was the immense media coverage and the sometimes completely insane speculations that arose. I keep wondering how self-appointed experts who have absolutely no specialist knowledge and experience as captains and who come from completely alien areas to belief to have the licence to built a hasty judgment about the crew. Although nothing more was really known about the circumstances of this incident. Please do me a favor, just pause and kep you silent. You are not helping anyone. All the wild speculation about the collapse of the world economy just because the Suez Canal is blocked are for me ridiculous. Because there are alternatives, such as to sail around Africa. Yes, it will of course cause delays, it will also increase fuel costs and additional logistical challenges, but the world will not end.

This public hysteria, provoked by the media at even the smallest of events, is abnormal, because there is philosophizing about the economic decline.?But nobody asks at this moment how the hundreds of thousands of seafarers on board are doing, who are stranded on board because of a perverse Covid policy of politics and the port states and who are doing their duty on board far beyond the tolerable level without knowing when they will be replaced even though they have already exceeded their duration of the employment contracts for months.

But I would like to come to the scenarios mentioned in the media about the causes of accidents, which were primarily mentioned:

·???????Excessive speed during passage through the canal

·???????Weather influences / wind effects

·???????Technical failures such as failure of the power supply

·???????Human errors / pilot errors

·???????Crew incompetence

6.2 Excessive speed during passage through the canal

The fact is that the convoy of?"Ever Given" in the canal in the run-up to the accident was recorded in AIS recording at a speed of> 13 kt. Which was significantly higher than the speed of 8.5 to 9 kt set in the SCA -?Navigation Rules. This fact cannot be discussed away. This is a speed that ships of this size which can get serious bank effect and squat problems in the canal and what significantly affect its maneuverability.

It is also a fact that such a speed recommendation had to be given to the ships by SCA Control and the pilots. For whatever reason. No experienced captain would come up alone with the idea of running 13 kt in the Suez Canal and under normal circumstance the pilots would also immediately intervene, with the advice to reduce the speed.

Another fact is that every captain of a ship has the right to refuse such a speed recommendation within the channel.

I would have rejected such a proposal without hesitation, precisely because I know that with the narrowness of the canal, the canal profile, the draft of the ship and the depth of the canal, such speed is irresponsible as it can cause huge problems. Which aren't able to be safe controlled.

And of course in the knowledge that I have sole full responsibility in the event of problems or related accidents. The SCA will make any related claims for compensation against the captain, the ship owner / the charterer / the operational management. "Ever Given" is a serious example.

But before it will be decided too early on that excessive speed is stated as the cause of the accident, it is advisable to ask yourself why a speed of> 13 kt was recorded in AIS recordings. So it makes sense to ask what could have been the reason for running at this speed. Because it is important to shed light on connections in order to be able to draw possible conclusions from them.

That's why it is necessary to take a view to weather and wind condition.

6.3 Weather influences/ Wind effects

Some comments on possible weather effects, as reports on meteorological influences can also be found in notes on sandstorms which had been registered in this time period.

Sandstorms in the Suez Canal area are by no means a rare natural event. Their effects on the ship leading can be controlled. But only up to a certain limit. If this limit is exceeded, then accidents can't be ruled out. Because the possibilities of maneuvering in the canal are very limited. In the statements of the SCA it can be found that, from their point of view, the weather and wind conditions are only of marginal importance and they rather point to a human error.

6.3.1 Is that really the case?

Sandstorms occur especially when prolonged periods of extreme heat occur. That was exactly what happened in the days and weeks leading up to the March 23, 2021 incident, as confirmed by weather records.

I spent a lot of time to find official information about the wind and weather conditions that preceded the accident or prevailed at the time of the accident. Egyptian sources are silent about this.

The homepage of the Egypt Meteorological Authority (EMA) does not allow access.

Unfortunately, to this day I have not been able to find any official weather and wind information from the official Egyptian authorities at the time of the accident or shortly before, despite an intensive search.

The Weather Channel, TWA reported on its website on March 29, 2021:

Shortly before the accident, during a sandstorm, winds of 30 kt to 40 kt prevailed in the region with massive visual impairments. However, TWA is not a meteorological service, but this are journalists, in this case the TWA's Indian office. So these messages should be treated with caution.

(https://weather.com/en-IN/india/news/news/2021-03-29-all-about-dust-storms-that-led-to-suez-canal-crisis),

Fortunately, there are other sources, such as the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), of the US Department of Commerce, that can provide information on this. In the NOAA GFS it can be seen that on the morning of March 23, 2021 in the southern region of the Suez Canal and in the Gulf of Suez, winds from SW to W were prevailing with average winds between 25 and 32 kt. (see the graphic left). In gusts it is quite possible that a wind speed of 40 kt could have been reached. Unfortunately, there is no information on the visibility conditions, but anyone who knows the Suez Canal and its sandstorms can assume with great certainty that at these wind speeds there is a strong visual impairment due to sand and that they can come along with strong gusts.

If effects of sandstorms with wind speeds of 30 knots and more occur, it is a serious problem to keep the ship under control, depending on the wind direction, especially with sudden winds from abeam and aft abeam. West and SW winds meet this requirement in this canal section.

VLCC / ULCC with a high deck cargo, with their immense wind exposed area, which can easily be up to 16,000 m2 and sometimes more, are predestined, to turn with the bow into the wind . There is a risk of lying diagonal to the fairway and to drift at high wind speeds and being pushed onto the opposite side of the canal.

6.3.2.Wind pressure and wind load examples

?A small sample of calculation shall describe the effects of a sudden wind of 6 Bft (14 m / s) / 7 Bft (17 m / s) / 8 Bft (20 m / s) from abeam on an area exposed to wind of 16,000 m2:

?Wind pressure (N / m2)

?14 m / s: wind pressure: 118 N / m2 = 12 kg / m2

17 m / s: wind pressure: 174 N / m2 = 17 kg / m2

20 m / s: wind pressure: 240 N / m2 = 24 kg / m2

14 m / s: Wind load: 1,888,000 N = 1888 t

17 m / s: Wind load: 2,784,000 N = 2784 t

20 m / s: Wind load: 3,840,000 N = 3840 t

6.3.3 What has to be done to avoid groundings in such situation?

It becomes clear that these unexpected forces can mean serious hazards, which can be compensated with a sure instinct and a good deal of experience in hydrodynamics and ship dynamics and a good knowledge of the maneuvering properties of the ship. But there is no 100% guarantee of success.

?A resolute increase in speed in such cases is usually successful in shallower, laterally unbounded waters, but in canals with their lateral boundaries and due to their channel profiles, it is not the first choice to prevent the ship from breaking out of the course, because Squat and bank effects may be provoked, which then producing the exact opposite effect and destabilize the ship in its position even more and lead to a high probability of running into the canal embankment due to lost manoeuvring capability.

The graphic above is intended to clarify the dimensions of the ship,??in section at km 151 of the Suez Canal, the location of grounding of the ship. In comparisation in relation to the canal profile, in order to give readers who are not familiar with the Suez Canal and dimensions of the "Ever Given" a visual image

?The graphic below shows how little space is available for maneuvers of such a large ship like the "Ever Given" when it gets problems due to wind drift and it impressively shows that increases in speed can create conditions that are very difficult to control .

Especially since it is known that in maneuver operation for the control of the propulsion system it takes some time before the ship reacts to an initiated machine maneuver, i.e. to increase / decrease speed.

We are talking about a mass of 200,000 tons, which is in motion, which means that maneuver delay times are significant. Which, especially in the case of a critical situations or emergency, plays an important role.

The following graphic is intended to illustrate what the result is when a ship drifts in the Suez Canal due to the action of wind. In such situations, drift angles of more than 5 °, which subsequently require corresponding correction angles, can't be ruled out. This means that the ship's longitudinal axis deviates from the centerline of the canal and there is an increased risk of coming into contact with the embankment due to its length. With all the associated logical consequences. And what it means for the restriction of the maneuverability of a ship to prevent grounding or run aground on the embankment. It becomes evident in this graphic that rapid increases in speed in order to keep clear of the embankment have exactly the opposite effect, since both the squat and the bank effect are fully effective. You will lose control of the ship and you will be exposed to this situation quite hopelessly.

The Bernoulli effect, which is known in physics, then takes full effect. In this case, you have to use speed as a factor that stabilizes course and maneuvers, and you have to deal with it in an extremely dosed manner. An increase in speed from 8.5 or 9 kt to 13 or 13.5 kt, i.e. an increase of approx. 50%, is, in my opinion, an invitation to run into problems.

Short speed pushs increases the support the rudder and thus achieve course stabilization and are in my opinion, the better option and reduce the squat and bank effect. They cannot be ruled out entirely. I would even go so far if it becomes clear that it is almost impossible to control the ship, to reduce the speed drastically, which would then allow the bow/ stern thrusters to be used even at low speeds and to achieve a stabilization of the position in the canal. If grounding were to occur nonetheless, the majority of the kinetic energy would be enormously reduced in advance and the damage that occurs would be minimized. And it would allow itself to be freed from the predicament with the help of a tug and if possible with the use of the bow/ stern thrusters.

Bow / stern thrusters on these large ships are equipped with an output of 3000 kW (4500 hp).

The propulsion systems of this large ships are designed in such a way that the dead slow ahead speed is between 6 and 9 kt, depending on the size of the ship.

The speed of "Ever Given" of > 13 kt stated in the AIS recordings are, in my opinion, due to such a situation, because previously the ship was underway at 8 kt in the canal.

In my understanding it indicates, that after strong winds / gusts, the ship came in diagonal position in the canal and there was a risk of running aground. But the opposite happened because the ship was probably drifting from the western edge of the fairway to the east, to the other side of the canal. At least it corresponds to the wind direction confirmed by NOAA. An attempt was made to stop this trend by increasing the speed, possibly on the recommendation of the pilots, to improve the maneuverability of the ship and to stabilize its position in the canal. Unfortunately, the increased speed continued to be used without possibly being fully aware of the consequences. After that, caused by the squat and bank effect described above the control over ship was lost. With the now familiar consequences. According to AIS information, “Ever Given” did run against the embankment at 12 kt, so almost unbraked.?The SCA has stated that weather and wind influences played only a minor role while this incident and should not have been the cause, but I take the liberty of expressing my doubts.

6.4 Technical failures/ Power supply failure

I did read in numerous reports in the media that technical problems have also been addressed. Here, in a special case, the complete failure of the power supply, i.e. a blackout.

On a very in-depth look, I don't see it as improbable, but I have doubts about this representation.

Why?

If there really was a complete failure of the power supply, the probability that only one diesel generator was used for the power supply would be a possible explanation. There can be several reasons why the failure could then occur. About which it does not make sense to rant excessively here.

However, one cause should be considered and addressed. Poor heavy oil quality can, despite the use of separators, block the oil filter with Oil Mist, this interrupts the fuel supply and the safety devices switch off the diesel generator and thus interrupt the power supply.

For me, however, it is very difficult to imagine that a container ship only passes through the Suez Canal with one diesel generator in operation. Technically it is possible, no question about it, to ensure the power supply on board with a diesel generator. But then no additional systems may be put into operation.

Reefer containers and transverse thrusters are immense energy consumers, which in any case require at least a second diesel generator to ensure a reliable power supply. And, given the number of containers loaded, reefer containers were definitely on board.

Another aspect are safety rules. It is of fundamental importance to ensure a safe power supply under all conditions. This also means being able to immediately compensate for the failure of a diesel generator and guarantee that the bow/ stern thrusters are immediately ready for use when required. For this reason, I as Captain gave always the clear order that three diesel generators had to be in?operation for the passage through the canal. That was also strictly followed. Under normal conditions, thereby I'm always able to compensate for the failure of one diesel generator immediately without problems and additional effort, and thus get the full functionality of all technical systems without restriction of use.

Of course, I already hear the arguments that at least one of the diesel generators was used in the underload range so that unnecessary fuel was consumed, which resulted in additional costs. That may seem true at first glance, but we should realize that safety can’t be negotiable. Because accidents in the Suez Canal are many times more expensive than an additional diesel generator in operation for the duration of the canal passage.

The "Ever Given" case made this very clear.

It can be ruled out with a very high probability that three diesel generators fail at the same time. Then the complete fuel supply system of the daily consumption tank must fail. I've never seen this case in all the years, but you can never rule out such a thing.

If the entire energy supply fails while a canal passage, then the alternatives to prevent an accident in the canal are actually almost zero, because no technical systems that would allow influencing the maneuverability of the ship can't be used. This inevitably means that the propulsion system also fails because the fuel supply is interrupted. The ship runs onto the embankment. And there is no way to do anything about it, except drop the anchor, let the chain running out and try to slow down motion of the ship, but that will not prevent it from to run aground on the embankment.

The use of escort tugs for large ships (1 or 2 tugs according to SC N.T.) as practiced, but in such emergency situations as described above it is ineffective. Then there must be a tug connection and with a single or 2 tugs you are not able to stop a ship with a mass of 200,000 tons and a speed of 9 kt in a canal. This is an illusion because of the maneuver delay times.

The failure of the helm system is not a problem as long as only one helm machine is affected.

However, if both helm machines fail at the same time, then we are faced with an almost insoluble problem. Because switching to emergency operation from the steering gear room takes too much time to be able to prevent contact with embankments.

If you succeed in stopping the ship with a resolute astern maneuver without touching the embankment, you have the option of trying to keep it in the middle of the canal with the bow/ stern thrusters and with dosed machine maneuvers. With the aim to avoid or reduce/ minimize damages on the ship and canal facilities if any contact with the embankment will happen.?

6.5 Human Error

It is in the nature of things that where people act, human errors can't be ruled out. The often preached zero-error culture is the ideal case, and wishful thinking that has nothing in common with real life. This applies to both pilots and the ship's command with years of experience.

In the “Ever Given” case, of course, wrong human decisions by pilots and ship's command can't be ruled out, but given the geographic location, the canal dimensions and profile, the ship size and the resulting drastic limitation of the ship's maneuverability are limits existing. The smallest detail may be considered as human error and it will be medial cannibalized. If we look at the situation factually and objectively, from the point of view of those who act on board on the bridge, then there can only be one logical conclusion. Serious technical problems, such as failure of the propulsion system or a complete steering system failure, failure of the entire energy supply, make it almost impossible to have a wide range of opportunities for maneuver to deal with such a situation. So it can only be about minimizing damages to the ship and canal.

Everyone who likes to discuss about Risk Assessment now, probably has no idea what it means to want to control a ship with 200,000 tons in a narrow canal in such a situation. That is an illusion. A speed at 9 kt means 4.6 m/s or such as?a speed at 13 kt means 6.7 m/s in ship motion ahead. If you only base this on a maneuver delay time of 30 seconds, that means a forward movement of 138 meters respectively 201 m. And now I would like to see all the clever so-called experts, who of course absolutely no knowledge about the channel profile have, what kind of reaction options they have to prevent contact with an embankment. It should always be remembered that bow /stern?thruster at 9 kt or 13 kt have no or almost no effect, i.e. that it can't be used effectively. And if the wind factor is added, then you are helpless in this situation. You can't train something like that in any ship simulator. Then even the last know-it-alls will recognize that helpless 30 seconds can be very long.

The only thing that really helps there is to keep calm, to keep any unmotivated activity and hectic scenes away from the bridge, to do everything together with the pilots, to warn the following shipping traffic to prevent collisions. It must become focused in actions which the risk for crew injuries, ship and canal facilities damages and?environment pollutions are minimizing. To be concentrate to all subsequent necessary courses of action in order to be able to carry out an objectively well-founded and professionally qualified damage control analysis. With all included conclusions and steps, with extern support to get the best alternatives to afloat again.

If someone now argues: He's good to talk, how does he want to know? Then I can answer with great serenity that I have had several critical situations as a captain, also under pilot assistance, including in the Suez Canal, what could only solved within a very narrow time window which required quick decisions to avoid dangers and accidents.?With the aim to minimize their effects. To prevent fatalities or serious injuries, even with the knowledge of facing further a new danger, which, however, had could be assessed many times lower. Who in fully understanding of a situation has ever deliberately brought about a purposeful controlled grounding in order to successfully prevent the worst case and opts for the lesser evil, which demonstrably neither caused damage to the environment and the ship, nor put people at risk, can understand and put himself in the situation of the "Ever Given" captain's. Keeping calm and keeping a cool head was always the best advisor. It is very hard to execute. This requires a lot of practical experience.

7. Short Summary

So I'm not ready to blame in anyone. It would be inadequate and unfair against the decision makers and advisors on the bridge.

If there could be point against the captain, it would be the question of why he followed the recommended speed of 13 kt, as can be seen at least from AIS recordings. It are data that was sent from the ship. But that has to be assessed and evaluated by the investigation commission.

I am very much in favor of this accident being investigated by an international, independent group of specialists made up of nautical and technical practitioners and theorists. This is also in the interests of the SCA, in order to prevent it from being accused of a one-sided view. It would be extremely important for the shipping industry that the final investigation report is made available to it in full.

And another question must be raised, which is not new and is already known from the problem of port infrastructure. Is gigantism in container shipping really the only way to go, especially when the transport infrastructure is clearly reaching its limits? The Suez Canal has been expanded by the SCA in the past few years with immense effort and financial resources in order to adapt it to the steadily increasing ship sizes and drafts, especially in container and tanker shipping. However, there are technical, geographical, geological and physical boundaries that cannot be ignored.

The discussion that has now arisen about submitting the Suez Canal to an international consortium is nonsense. What for?

And what I am currently also concerned with is the question of what the USD 916 million claims for damages by SCA and the Egyptian government against the owner of "Ever Given" are based on. At the moment it gives the impression that a dirty game is being played here, which is reminiscent of a kind of modern state piracy in order to make maximum profit from this disaster. Because even in such a case there are clear rules that also apply to Egypt.

But I will deal with this in more detail in the second part.

? Copyright April 2021, M. Eng. Capt. Gunter Schütze. Replication or redistribution in whole or in part is expressly prohibited without the prior written consent by M. Eng. Captain Gunter Schütze?