Evaluating the performance of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (R

From the perspective of the greatest military strategist in history, evaluating the performance of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) requires a precise analysis that includes real details from the current battlefields while drawing on past and present tactical patterns. This allows for predictions based on similar historical events.

1. Command and Control – Centralized vs. Decentralized Power:

The Sudanese Armed Forces represent a conventional force, resembling traditional armies that rely on a strict, organized chain of command. Historically, conventional armies, such as the Prussian army in the 19th century, were highly effective in regular wars. However, they struggled when facing irregular forces, as seen in the Vietnam War, when the U.S. military faced the Viet Cong.

In recent battles in Khartoum and Omdurman, the Sudanese Armed Forces have used their air and artillery power to strike RSF positions. However, much like in Vietnam, the RSF (Rapid Support Forces) benefits from decentralization, much like the guerrilla tactics used by Mao Zedong during the Chinese Civil War. Irregular forces take advantage of rapid movement and dispersion to destabilize conventional armies.

2. Urban Tactics – Lessons from Stalingrad to Khartoum:

The Sudanese Armed Forces find themselves in a position similar to what the German forces faced in Stalingrad during World War II. The large, densely populated city has become a trap for conventional forces. The RSF controls strategic areas in the capital and uses buildings and urban terrain as cover, just as the Soviet troops did in Stalingrad. Reports from the battlefield suggest that RSF forces quickly move between residential neighborhoods, making it difficult for the SAF to use their air power effectively.

As happened in Fallujah in Iraq, using heavy air and artillery power in urban areas results in widespread destruction, but does not guarantee military victory. On the contrary, it may even strengthen local resistance. The Sudanese Armed Forces face a similar dilemma, as airstrikes risk civilian casualties, complicating the political and military situation.

3. Logistics and Supply – Lessons from Napoleon in Russia:

Since Napoleon's campaign in Russia in 1812, conventional armies have learned the importance of supply chains. The Sudanese Armed Forces rely heavily on their logistical bases in Khartoum, Omdurman, and other cities. However, the RSF tried to isolate these supply lines by frequently attacking roads and logistical facilities, much like the Red Army targeted German infrastructure during World War II.

Reports indicate that the SAF is beginning to suffer from difficulties in delivering supplies to the frontlines, similar to the "cutting supply lines" tactic successfully used by the Vietnamese in the Vietnam War.

4. Air Superiority – A Potential Victory or a Strategic Trap:

The Sudanese Armed Forces enjoy air superiority, much like the U.S. Army in Iraq. However, as learned in Afghanistan, air superiority alone may not be enough to win in an irregular conflict. RSF forces benefit from urban areas and rough terrain to avoid airstrikes and neutralize their effect.

Reports indicate that RSF forces continually move in small groups to avoid airstrikes, using local terrain knowledge to blend in with civilians. This tactic is similar to what the Taliban used against coalition air forces in Afghanistan.

5. Morale – A Battle of Wills:

As seen in many irregular wars, the current conflict in Sudan is turning into a battle of wills between the SAF and the RSF. In the Spanish Civil War, irregular forces exploited popular support and internal discontent to undermine the conventional army. Similarly, reports from the battlefield suggest that the RSF is capitalizing on popular discontent with the SAF due to the destruction caused by airstrikes and artillery.

6. External Influence – The Game of Regional and International Influence:

As in the Syrian Civil War, external interventions can be decisive in determining the course of the war. RSF may receive indirect support from external parties, whether through the provision of weapons or funding. Meanwhile, the SAF may receive support from neighboring countries or international powers that recognize it as the legitimate military.

This external support will largely depend on how the field situation develops, as foreign powers may be cautious about direct intervention until it becomes clear who has the upper hand.

Strategic Predictions:

Based on what we have seen on the battlefields, and similar historical patterns, it can be predicted that the conflict between the SAF and RSF will turn into a long-term war of attrition. The SAF may attempt to achieve a decisive victory using its air and artillery power, but this may lead to significant infrastructure and civilian losses, undermining its legitimacy and increasing RSF's popularity in some areas.

If the SAF cannot break the RSF’s tactics and regain full control of urban areas, the war could transform into a long-term conflict similar to the Vietnam War or the conflict in Afghanistan, where conventional forces have military superiority, but irregular forces continue to drain them over time.

The end result may depend on external and international support, but at this moment, predicting a definitive victor is difficult.