Ethiopia and the African Union
By: Mehari Taddele Maru
Th full version of this article is published by Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala 2013 in a paper titled "
Ethiopia’s role in the OAU and its transformation into the AU
The end of the Cold War offered African leaders an opportunity to seek African solutions to various African problems. In the early 1990s, Africa experienced civil wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi, Central African Republic and Guinea-Bissau. Genocide in Rwanda; state failure in Somalia; and secessionist movements in Sudan also became real challenges to the African leadership, new and old, demanding urgent attention and action. African conflicts became more intra-state and less inter-state with localised manifestation and coverage, rather than civil wars that engulfed an entire country. As a result, Africa witnessed three times as many internally displaced persons (IDPs) as refugees. The humanitarian crises in Somalia5 and Darfur6 were the worst, with more than 300,000 deaths and 4.7 million IDPs and refugees.7 To meet these challenges, the institutional transformation of the OAU into the AU began with the declaration of the OAU extraordinary summit of heads of state and government in September 1999 in Sirte, Libya. Indicative of its purpose was the title and theme of the summit, “Strengthening OAU Capacity to enable it to meet the Challenges of the New Millennium,” specifically by amending the OAU Charter to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the body.8 This extraordinary summit, and the later AU Constitutive Act, shifted the mission and vision of the OAU from being mainly an organization for anti-colonial solidarity to becoming more interventionist and integrationist in the form of the AU. The conspicuous interventionist and integrationist normative and institutional frameworks of the AU mark its differences from the OAU.
Ethiopia’s Influence in IGAD and AU
Generally speaking, countries impact the peace and security, economy and trade as well as social and political life of their immediately neighbouring countries and region. Practically, such influence varies from one country to another. Some countries influence their region more markedly than others. Countries such as Nigeria (in ECOWAS) and South Africa (in SADC) exercise an ominously hegemonic role, while others such as Ethiopia, Kenya, Ghana and Algeria have key and influential roles in their respective regions and beyond.
A country with a troubled internal political history and located in a region plagued by violent internal and external conflicts, historically Ethiopia has faced serious foreign aggression against its independence from Italy, Egypt and Britain. Arising from this history, Ethiopia tends to use multilateral solutions and institutions to pursue its interests and address its concerns. This has contributed to the fact that the Horn of Africa, unlike the other regions, remains free of the fear of being dominated by a single country. Consequently, with the exception of some glitches related either to support provided to rebel or terrorist groups, Ethiopia enjoys peaceful relations with Kenya, Djibouti, South Sudan and the Republic of Sudan. Ethiopia has experienced security threats from its neighbours, particularly Somalia, Egypt and its former northern region, Eritrea. Since the time of Siad Barre’s regime and the border war of 1977, Ethiopia has been the victim of terrorist attacks and Jihad declarations from the violently extremist Somalian movements Al Itihad Al Islamyia and the Union of Islamic Courts as well as Al Shabaab. Ethiopia has been in a state of war with Eritrea since the 1998 border conflict. The rivalry with Egypt over the Nile has also destabilized Ethiopia for a long time and has increased the threats to its peace and development. Thus, Ethiopia understands that peace and security in the region are best achieved through collective regional and international mechanisms.
Ethiopia’s contributions to Peace and Security in Africa and Beyond
Since the establishment of the UN and later the OAU and AU, Ethiopia has successfully participated in ten peacekeeping missions at continental and global level. As discussed above, Ethiopia is one of the staunchest supporters of the AU’s new intervention and integration agenda. It currently has close to 7,000 troops in various UN peacekeeping missions, including with the United Nations Interim Security Force in Abyei (UNISFA). This makes Ethiopia one of the top five troop-contributing countries at both African and global levels. In the 1950s and 1960s, Ethiopia successfully participated in the UN peacekeeping missions in Korea and the Congo. More recently, Ethiopia also successfully participated in missions in Rwanda, Burundi and Liberia and Darfur, Sudan as well as Abyei. Ethiopia’s peacekeepers have a good continental and global reputation.9
The country’s engagement in peace mediation under the OAU began in 1972 with the Addis Ababa agreement signed under the auspices of Emperor Haile Selassie between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and rebel groups in South Sudan. Ethiopia, through IGAD and bilaterally, contributed significantly to the signing and implementation of the comprehensive peace agreement. This agreement was the result of exhausting and lengthy dispute settlement efforts by the AU, IGAD, the UN, the US and the European Union (EU). In continuation of its role in the IGAD region, Ethiopia had an influence on the peaceful referendum and independence of South Sudan.
Currently, it has a crucial part in maintaining peace in the region. It serves as a trusted peacekeeping partner in the border areas of South Sudan and Sudan and is playing a vital role in the process to build a viable state in South Sudan. Facilitated by Thabo Mbeki, chief of AU’s high-level implementation panel and a close friend of Meles Zenawi, the Addis agreement on Abyei was signed by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) forces and the government of Sudan in Addis Ababa on 20 June 2011. The main objective of the agreement is to ensure that this border area remains demilitarised until proper demarcation is undertaken. The same agreement provides for the deployment of UNISFA under UN Security Council Resolution 1990.10
UNISFA is composed of 4,250 Ethiopian troops, includes civilian police and is unique for many reasons. Unlike most peacekeeping missions, UNISFA is a mono-troop contingent of Ethiopian peacekeeping troops. The force commander, Ethiopian Lieutenant-General Taddesse Worede, and now Major General Yohannes Gebre Meskel, is also head of the mission. The deployment was swift compared to other peacekeeping missions. Under normal circumstances, troop deployment takes a long time, as potential troop-contributing countries need to be persuaded, and resources mobilised before the force can be deployed. UNISFA was deployed on 22 July 2011, a month after the authorisation of the mission by the United Nations Security Council through Resolution 1990 of 25 June 2011. Resolution 1990 was also passed swiftly, three days after the conclusion of the Addis agreement on Abyei on 20 June 2011, in terms of which the contending parties, the governments of Sudan and South Sudan, requested the deployment of Ethiopian peacekeeping troops. The request by the AU and UN as well as IGAD to Ethiopia to send troops to Abyei indicates the confidence of the international community in Ethiopia.
The main challenges to UNISFA and indirectly Ethiopia are keeping the balance between the two parties while maintaining their confidence. While this peacekeeping duty is undertaken on behalf of the international community and the UN, UNISFA could be deployed solely because of the trust both parties have in Ethiopia. Thus, for Ethiopia UNISFA is not a usual peacekeeping mission, but also an extra burden on its foreign policy relations with both neighbouring countries. Falling out of favour with either party will adversely affect UNISFA and Ethiopia’s foreign relations. As time goes without determination of the status of Abyei and the fundamental political changes on the ground, Ethiopia may face more challenges in maintaining this balanced relations with both parties.
Ethiopia and African Integration
Since the inception of the OAU and later the AU, Ethiopia has been cautiously optimistic and supportive of the integrationist project.12 Ethiopia currently prioritises integration within regional economic communities, specifically IGAD, as a first step towards continent-wide integration. It pursues a gradualist, practical integration, beginning with the development of these regional communities and with a focus on the economic and market integration of the continent.13 In recent years, Ethiopia has better infrastructural links with Sudan and Djibouti and similar links are being constructed with Kenya, South Sudan and Somalia. Ethiopia has also begun exporting electricity to Djibouti and Sudan, and intends to do so with Kenya, Somaliland, South Sudan and Egypt. Ethiopia, Africa’s second-most populous country and already the preeminent player in peace and security in IGAD, appears poised to become a regional economic engine.14 It is placing more emphasis on infrastructural linkages among these countries and complementary trade among the economies of the countries undergoing integration.
Ethiopia’s position on integration is in direct contradiction of the position of the late Colonel Muammar Qaddafi and his supporters on the immediate establishment of the United States of Africa.15 The sudden metamorphosis of Colonel Qaddafi from lead promoter of Arab unity to advocate and financier of the United States of Africa can only be explained by his frustration with the League of Arab States and his personal ambition to become a leader of the United States of Africa. To use African affairs in the service of his private interests, he flooded the AU and some leaders with cash. Colonel Qaddafi widely introduced what a former permanent representative of Nigeria to the AU dubbed “envelope diplomacy.”16 He also built gas stations, mosques and hotels in many African countries. Libya, like South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt and Algeria, not only contributed annually 15 per cent (around US$ 16 million) of the AU’s budget, but also covered the expenses of many smaller and poorer African countries and funded many AU events, including ordinary and extraordinary AU summits. Accordingly, Ethiopia took a strong stand against Colonel Qaddafi’s urge to integrate Africa from the top down, which Ethiopia and other African countries believed was unrealistic. Colonel Qaddafi began his futile and again impracticable efforts to move the headquarters of the AU from Addis Ababa to Sirte at the early inception of the AU early in 1999. When this failed, Colonel Qaddafi strove to host most of the summits in Libya. In doing so, he tried to make his hometown Sirte the de facto seat of the AU by building brand new facilities.
The AU rules governing the hosting of summits stipulates Addis Ababa, the headquarters of the AU, hosts the January/February summit every year. However, individual member states can request the AU to allow them to host the June/July summit. This regional rotation and having two summits per year was originally devised in response to pressure from Colonel Qaddafi and as a compromise.17 Because of his destructive interventions in many African countries, including his support for Idi Amin of Uganda, 1980 intervention in Chad, support for rebel groups in Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan, Niger, Mali, Sierra Leone and Liberia18 and his unrealistic integration agenda as well as his limitless personal interests, Qaddafi’s “conversion” from Pan-Arab to Pan African leader was not taken at face value. His immediate integrationist agenda was propagated without Libya ratifying the AU treaties that required minimal action towards integration and strictly limiting mobility of people to Libya from other African countries. When his grand plan of making Sirte the AU capital and of establishing a United States of Africa under his leadership failed, Colonel Qaddafi established and funded the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), which grew into a bloc of 28 African states. Designed to serve as an alternative means of achieving his grand plan, CEN-SAD, like his other initiatives, was used as a tool to “blackmail.” Even though he invited Ethiopia and Uganda several times, they were the only two IGAD member states that refused to join CEN-SAD. Since the establishment of the AU in 2002, Ethiopia along with Nigeria, South Africa and Uganda formed a bulwark against Qaddafi’s unrealistic plans and ambitions. In most of the AU summits, former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo acted as diplomatic intermediary, as did the former South African President Thabo Mbeki and late Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni also strongly opposed the ambitions of Colonel Qaddafi. Dancing to the tune of Libyan dinars, some leaders such as Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal voted in support of proposals of Colonel Qaddafi. Prime Minister Meles and President Museveni remained at the forefront of the bloc against Qaddafi when Obasanjo and Mbeki left office.
During the uprisings in Libya, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Sudan took the most progressive positions against Colonel Qaddafi. Based on national and personal interests, they supported the legitimate aspirations of the Libyan people.19 Ethiopia aggressively advocated the end of Colonel Qaddafi’s regime.20 Sudan exhibited even more aggression than others by sending its troops and military support to the National Transitional Council (NTC). This was considered as revenge for Colonel Qaddafi’s support for many rebel groups in Darfur and elsewhere in the Sudan.21 In a long debate at the AU summit in Malabo in July 2011, Ethiopia’s position was vehemently opposed by South Africa and other countries, mainly on the basis of a common voice against external intervention by NATO in Libya.22 The AU, led by South Africa and its President Jacob Zuma, decided not to recognise the NTC even after Tripoli fell under its control. Ethiopia and Nigeria issued a joint communiqué in support of recognizing the NTC. This was a significant contribution by Ethiopia to facilitate AU support to end the Libyan uprisings. Currently, there is an opportunity for sombre and realistic leadership in delivering the promises of the AU. As I have argued elsewhere:
[W]ithout a doubt, the foreign policy and relations of the NTC and the future elected Libyan government will be different from that of Gaddafi. Firstly, Gaddafi’s foreign policy in Africa stems from his individualistic interest to lead a United States of Africa – a project in which he has heavily, but unsuccessfully, invested for the last decade. Libya was too small a territory and population for “the Brother Leader”. He needed a much bigger territory and population to lead. For the NTC, and presumably for the next elected government, Libya will still be a challenge to govern, given that some of the clans may think of establishing their own “emirates”. That is the reason why the AU is concerned about the territorial integrity of Libya.23
Libya’s current internal situation and disposition reduce the likelihood of its playing the role it did during Colonel Qaddafi’s rule. This reflects the incongruity between the priorities of the Libyan people and those of its former leader. At the same time, the AU should consider the implications of the possible withdrawal of Libya’s 15 per cent budget contribution. Moreover, with the absence of Colonel Qaddafi from AU summits, proponents of the gradual integration favoured by the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi have gained the upper hand in the debate.24
Given current economic determinants and the lack of complementary trade and economic linkages among countries, integration remains an excellent aspiration but lacks the elements required for implementation. Indeed, without the mobilisation of the trade and economic drivers of integration, such as free mobility of goods, services, capital and people, integration is unthinkable. The vital steps towards integration should be creating an enabling policy environment in Africa through free movement protocols, fewer tariffs and the implementation of most of the common market treaties such as the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the East African Community (EAC).
Role of Leaders
Notwithstanding the size of a country, leaders can and have achieved for their countries regional power status out of proportion to the material power, economy, military or other kinds of power those countries actually have. Personal motivation and the competence of the leader and his/her pan-African inclinations and ambitions are driving factors in the contribution a country can make to and the influence it can have on the AU. Former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, former South African President Thabo Mbeki, John Kufuor, Emperor Haile Selassie and Meles Zenawi played more prominent roles than most of their immediate predecessors or successors on account of their individual leadership skills, their intellectual competence and their pan-African commitment. Their long-term incumbency also allowed them to shape the AU agenda. As mentioned above, Rwanda and Burundi have contributed significantly to peace and security in Sudan and Somalia, while Colonel Qaddafi of Libya, a small but economically strong country, was prominent on African platforms. He was the man behind the United States of Africa agenda. Regardless of the size of the country, personal capacity and the pan-African inclinations of a leader are critical in the securing of peace and security. Olusegun Obasanjo in Nigeria is another example in the whole gamut of leadership. Of course, Nigeria is a large country, but, in regard to the AU and ECOWAS, his personal stand and vision for the AU was more important, since he is a committed pan-Africanist whose policy was to treat African issues as a national priority. Under his leadership, Nigeria led many mediation and peacekeeping efforts in Africa. By contrast, for various reasons his successor Umaru Yar’Adua was nowhere evident in regional dynamics. In the same vein, Thabo Mbeki was more popular in AU circles than in South Africa and showed more pan-African leadership and engagement than Jacob Zuma. The latter was and remains at odds with many African leaders and the policies of the AU, ranging from the issue of C?te d’Ivoire to Somalia. Likewise, John Kufuor of Ghana was a more active pan-African leader than the late John Atta Mills.
Ethiopia’s direct financial contribution to the AU is only US$ 1.5 million per annum, less than one-tenth of each of the biggest five contributing countries, Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt, Algeria and Libya. Ethiopia’s unmatched contributions to the OAU/AU are rooted not only in Ethiopia’s historical role as a seedbed for pan-African movements, but also the unwavering commitment of its leaders to pan-African causes. Despite the serious resistance and challenges they faced in their governance at home, the leaders of Ethiopia, particularly Emperor Haile Selassie and Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, amplified the influence of Ethiopia beyond its economic and military strength. While there is congruity between general domestic public opinion and Ethiopia’s active role in the AU, nonetheless tensions remain between Ethiopia’s internal governance issues and its leading role in the AU. How did Ethiopian leaders like the Prime Minister Zenawi managed to play such a key role on the international platform while facing stiff resistance at home on account of weak human rights records and for failing to ensure access to the sea during the secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia? This has to do more with their ability to exude influence and enjoy the confidence of global actors such as the AU/OAU and UN, and dominant powers such as the US, the EU and China.
The late Meles Zenawi increased the role and influence of Ethiopia in IGAD, the AU and even at a global level as a result of three main factors. First, he stayed in power for two decades as president and prime minister and was influential in politics for almost four decades. Second, the AU, IGAD and the international community found him to be intelligent in proposing solutions for complicated issues and persuasive and competent in advocating African positions at global forums such as the G20 and G8, climate change forums, New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) sessions, and so on. One significant contribution to the AU was Ethiopia’s chairing of NEPAD for almost a decade since January
2007. Similarly, the late prime minister was the voice of Africa on the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and in partnerships with India and South Korea. Ethiopia’s involvement in these various forums is strongly rooted in the philosophy of its internal policy, which prioritises eradication of poverty and the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). As a result of these engagements, the prime minister acted as de facto chairperson of the AU. His influence in diplomatic circles also helped him in the successful diplomatic pursuit of Ethiopia’s interests and the maintenance of his government in power. Excellent examples in this regard are Ethiopia’s diplomatic victory against Eritrea and its position on Somalia and the Sudan that are supported by the AU and the international community.
Conclusion
Ethiopia’s place in the AU is entrenched in its historical role as seedbed of African history, its support to the anti-colonial and apartheid struggle and its critical role in the establishment of the OAU and AU. Signifying the country’s genuine commitment to the cause of the OAU and AU, successive rulers of Ethiopia have continued to pursue the same foreign policy towards both bodies. Rooted in its history and heavily dependent on the pan-African disposition and calibre of its leaders, Ethiopia’s current meaningful influence in the AU, however, flows from its leading role in IGAD and in diplomatic successes in international forums. Nonetheless, Ethiopia’s commitment to the AU’s ideals and values as expressed in the various AU and OAU normative instruments, falters when it comes to its own internal governance. Ethiopia has yet to ratify and implement more than 15 conventions (35 per cent) of the total of 43 binding AU instruments. To its credit, Ethiopia ratified the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance within a year of its adoption. The treaties awaiting ratification include the Protocol of the African Court of Justice, the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, the African Youth Charter, the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (the Kampala Convention), the African Charter on Values and Principles of Public Service and Administration, the Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources and the Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact. These instruments are vital for ensuing human security in Ethiopia and in enabling the state to deliver and democratise more.
Currently, African countries, including Ethiopia, have progressive legislative and institutional frameworks but anachronistically regressive, oppressive and manipulative practices. These treaties are like the clothes that are hanging in a closet, but which need to be worn and integrated into the real life of African states and African people. Ratification is meaningless if treaties are not domesticated and implemented. Once ratified, implementation remains a challenge.31 Ethiopia, Africa’s second-most populous country and the region’s key political player, with a long history of Pan-African solidarity and contributions to international and African peace and security, has significant influence on the AU. Nonetheless, Ethiopia will enjoy more influence by first ratifying the 15 instruments it is expected to implement. And, as the seat of the AU headquarters, Ethiopia should offer an enabling environment and platforms for pan African state and non-state actors to enter the country without cumbersome visa requirements so as to create a space for pan-African debate on the AU agenda and pan-African monitoring of AU activities. In a nutshell, Ethiopia should be an example on all these counts.