An estimate on the scale of ground forces of PLA and its sealift capability in the hypothetical invasion of Taiwan

Dongyang Zhang

Defense is a stronger form of fighting than attack. ——Carl von Clausewitz, On War?

??? The geopolitical tension surrounding the relationship between China and Taiwan has been a subject of international concern for decades. As the People's Liberation Army (PLA) continues to modernize and expand its military capabilities, the possibility of a hypothetical invasion of Taiwan has become a topic of intense speculation. Understanding the potential scale of invading ground forces that is necessary for PLA to deploy and land, as well as its sealift capability, is crucial in assessing the feasibility and potential outcomes of such a scenario.

An estimate on the scale of invading ground forces of PLA

The ROC Army

??? The ROC Army, or Republic of China Army, unofficially the Taiwanese Army, is the largest branch of the ROC Armed Forces. An estimated 80% of the ROC Army is located on Taiwan, while the remainder are stationed on the Penghu, Kinmen, Matsu, Dongsha and Taiping Islands[1].

?? ?The troop deployment of ROC Army shows the characteristics of being light on the south and heavy on the north, and light on the outside and heavy on the inside[2] . Heavy troops are gathered in the northern Third Operations Zone (9 brigades), followed by the central Fifth Operations Zone (7 brigades), with the southern Fourth Operations Zone as the army reserve (5 brigades). The Huadong Defense Command has only 7 battalions of mobile troops, confined by geography[3].

??? The ROC Army has abolished all divisions and completed the division-to-brigade transformation. It currently has 4 types of brigades[4]: 4 armored brigades and 3 mechanized infantry brigades, called “strike brigades”, which are the main heavy-armed forces; 6 infantry brigades equipped with only light wheeled vehicles such as Humvees and little heavy weapons (essentially recruit training brigades); 3 army aviation brigades as air assault and transportation forces, with no airborne light infantry force. Consequently, the actual mobile combat force is only 7 strike brigades.

??? The reformed combined arms battalion has 2 different configurations:

(1) Armored brigade

Two battalions with 2 tank companies + 1 mechanized infantry company, and the other battalion with 1 tank company + 2 mechanized infantry companies. The whole brigade has a total of 5 tank companies + 4 mechanized infantry companies.

(2) Mechanized infantry brigade

Two battalions with 1 tank company + 2 mechanized infantry companies, and the other battalion with 2 tank companies + 1 mechanized infantry company. The brigade has a total of 4 tank companies + 5 mechanized infantry companies.

??? Besides, each battalion is attached with 1 fire support company + 1 combat support company, and each brigade is also equipped with a 3-company artillery battalion armed with 24 M109A5 self-propelled guns[5].

??? Each tank company has three 4-car tank platoons, plus the company headquarters platoon and deputy company commander’s vehicles, a total of 14 tanks; each mechanized infantry company also has 14 APCs (armoured personnel carriers) or “Clouded Leopard” wheeled infantry fighting vehicles; the fire support company consists of a mortar platoon (4 CM-22/23 tracked mortars), an anti-armour platoon (4 Humvee TOW missile launchers), and an anti-aircraft missile platoon (4 Humvee Avenger missile launch vehicle), reconnaissance platoon and sniper team; the battalion headquarters company was reorganized into a combat support company, adding sea, air and land aviation liaison officers and UAV intelligence analysis officers.

??? The new combined arms battalion has up to 28 tanks and 28 infantry fighting vehicles. It also has its own anti-armor and anti-aircraft units, able to independently enter combat within 12 hours[6].

??? A large part of active-duty equipment (MBTs, artillery pieces, etc.) of the ROCA is archaic, the battalion’s main combat equipment and support firepower can only be regarded as “better than none”, far behind the advanced equipment of its PLA counterpart on the other side of the strait. In terms of its procurement and build-up, the arrival of M1A2T MBTs (all of 108 by 2026) and over 700 CM-32 Clouded Leopard (till 2023) wheeled armored vehicles dramatically modernize its aging armored forces.

??? After the structural reform, the logistics, maintenance, and support units also need to expand accordingly to support the greatly increased needs. Small and densely populated, Taiwan seriously lacks large-scale comprehensive training grounds. In the past, different professional arms went to their own dedicated training grounds for training. Now that different types of companies and units are combined, a new training mode and facilities are demanded. There is a long way ahead before these joint combat forces reach the expected combat effectiveness.

??? Artillery is of outstanding usefulness for beachhead anti-landing operations, but ROCA’s artillery unit is in urgent need of updating. There are 75 M110A2 and 250 M109A2/A5 (only 28 A5 variant) self-propelled artillery pieces in active service in ROCA (“A preliminary analysis of” 2020). The Thunder-2000 mobile rocket launchers is one of the few that meets modern standard. The abandoned M109A6 procurement was converted to 29 sets of M142 HIMARS multiple launch rocket systems (delivery to be accomplished by 2027), with 84 MGM-140 ATACMS and 864 precision-guided rockets.

??? ROCA has operated the Avenger system for more than 20 years. This field air defence system is not incorporated to Taiwan’s air situation awareness network. Despite many units, they operate in isolation, resulting in low combat effectiveness.

??? As for those infantry brigades playing with new recruits, they can somewhat be treated as non-existent, as ascertained by their organization and armament: (1) nearly no brigade support firepower (2) nearly no anti-tank firepower (3) nearly no brigade-level support units (4) poor rifles and infantry weapons.

??? The ROCA personnel are generally well educated, but much of their training is regarded as not rigorous or combat-realistic, especially for the ground forces[7]. Lasting recruitment and retention difficulties leave the armed forces unable to sustain sufficient numbers of capable, motivated, and devoted personnel. In addition, the non-commissioned officers corps is “universally described by officers of all the services as weak and inadequate”[8] because of their short term of service. And because there is a shortage of experienced and trained personnel, junior officers must perform tasks that should be done by non-commissioned officers. Overall, the quality of personnel compares unfavourably with that of PLA’s. What’s more, ROC Army currently implements a flawed recruitment system that quoting a survey report by Foreign Policy in February 2020, the staffing ratio of the ROCA standing forces is only 60%-80%.

??? Worse, under the current reserve mobilization system, the dozens of reserve infantry brigades that only exist on the books are almost completely mere formalities without combat effectiveness. The ROC Army claims to have more than 2 million reserve troops and can mobilize 215,000 reserve troops into the battlefield within 24 hours[9]. However, the training of Taiwan’s reservists is not solid, giving people the impression of “sweeping floors, mowing grass, and doing nothing” in the camp[10]. Therefore, the ROC Ministry of Defence launched the New Training System that increased the intensity of training, in addition to extending the original seven-day training period to 14 days. However, problems such as insufficient weapons and lack of live-fire training have not been solved. As one former Taiwanese serviceman commented, “From firepower, training to their organization, they could perform little more than ‘cannon fodders’ in case of battle… Almost no anti-tank weapons and attached fire support at all.”

??? After several reorganizations that dismantled all motorized infantry brigades, three strike brigades with about 15,000 men are used to defend a 50-kilometer-wide front line, and one brigade from the Guandu Defence Command was used to defend the two gaps east and north of Taipei, which are quite insufficient.

??? All the above makes the past mode of infantry defending the beachhead and armoured forces counterattacking from the sides and rear unfounded. Instead, the only mobile forces stick to the beachhead, supplemented by artillery and aviation fire support. The infantry, marines and special operations forces will act as reserves on the second line.

??? In recent years, the ROC Army has carried out urban warfare training[11]. If the gap cannot be filled, it may even forfeit the fight for beachheads and lure the enemy deep into the country like the Japanese army did in the Philippines and Okinawa in World War II, and wait for international intervention.

The strength of PLA Ground Force

??? After the military reform, PLA Army establishes a new brigade structure, that is, combined arms brigade (heavy/medium/light). The organization of a heavy combined arms brigade is shown below[12]:

(1) Combined arms battalions (*4)

2 tank companies, 2 armored infantry companies, self-propelled mortar battery, support company for each battalion

(2) Artillery battalion

3 howitzer batteries (9 122mm self-propelled howitzers each),

rocket artillery battery (6 122mm MLRS), anti-tank battery (6 AFT-10 ATGMs)

(3) Air defense battalion

Anti-air missile battery (4 HQ-17s), 3 AA gun batteries (4 PGZ-09s each)

(4) Reconnaissance battalion

Armored reconnaissance, reconnaissance (foot mobile scouts?), UAV, electronic countermeasure, support company

(5) Combat support battalion

Combat engineering: rocket mine clearing line charge, pontoon bridges, fortification builders, chemical defense

(6) Combat service battalion

Supply, transport, maintenance, medical, guard company (“China’s new armored brigades” 2021)

* Note: Not all brigades are equipped with such latest armament.

??? Aside from the heavy, PLA also has the medium, light combined arms brigades, as well as 6 amphibious ones (independent from Marine Corps), which have no equivalent in the U.S. Army.

??? The six new amphibious combined arms brigades are structured similar to heavy combined arms brigades (as introduced above) but have been issued amphibious assault guns capable of swimming in the ocean rather than MBTs (“China Maritime Report” 2022), and amphibious IFVs/APCs, also capable of swimming. The 6 amphibious combined arms brigades command a total of twenty-four amphibious combined arms battalions and six reconnaissance battalions, which are units committed to serving as the lead assault force assisted by supporting brigades in the group army an over-the-beach amphibious assault[13].

??? Nonetheless, PLA lacks the amphibious lift capacity for the approximately 30,000 personnel and more than 2,400 vehicles of the six amphibious combined arms brigades. Their Type-271 landing ships (displacement 600~800 tons) is capable of shore-to-shore amphibious assault across the strait.

The invading ground force of PLA

??? As introduced above, ROCA has a standing army of 7 heavy strike brigades (4 armored and 3 mechanized infantry brigades), 6 infantry brigades (poor), 3 army aviation brigades and: 3 area defense commands (brigade-level) on the main island, 3 army artillery commands (brigade-level), 1 SF (special forces) brigade. In terms of reserves, poorly trained and equipped, ROC has a total of 2 million men and can mobilize 215,000 reserve troops into the battlefield within the first 24 hours.

??? The ROCA is indeed not a competent adversary. But if anyone despises it after the contrast of strength to PLA, then he seems to misunderstand how the most difficult form of warfare, the amphibious landing operation, could bolster the defender, let alone the urban environment for PLA to overcome in later phrase.

??? In spite of the position of strength owned by a PLAA brigade to a ROCA one, again, the demanding nature of the offensive and the convenience of defensive cannot be ignored or underestimated. This estimate acknowledges the classical offensive-defensive ratio of 3:1, leading to PLAA (PLANMC troops will be calculated separately) to prepare the following minimal necessary ground forces (as much as 69 brigades) for its campaign in Taiwan:

Heavy combined arms brigades 21

Light/amphibious combined arms brigades 18

Medium combined arms brigades 9

Army aviation brigades 9

Army artillery brigades 9

SF brigades 3

??? Note that the heavy brigade must be lifted to the shore of Taiwan first, which can hardly be done without relying on ports. Ports are not only limited, but also could be destroyed by its defending troops. Repair time is measured in months.

PLAN Marine Corps

??? In the context of an invasion of Taiwan, PLAN Marine Corps’ full involvement is destined. PLANMC is one of five major branches of the PLAN, currently consisting of 7 combined armed brigades (6,000 men each) and 4 other supporting brigades including aviation, engineering & chemical defense, artillery and service-support brigades for a total of 40,000 men (“How Chinese Marines Would” 2021). It further includes a brigade-level SF unit. Except ZBD-05 and wheeled IFVs, at least one heavy battalion is equipped with ZTQ-15 light tank. Light battalions can be taken ashore via helicopters (vertical landing)[15].

??? Given the existing PLAN capabilities, at any rate, PLANMC can deploy 8 amphibious ready groups at once, a sum of 32 MC battalions. Every two such groups will entail 4 Type-071 amphibious transport docks (LPDs), or 1 Type-075 plus 2 Type-071, or 1 Type-075 plus 1 Type-071 plus 1 Type-072[16].

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Battleground handover

??? In the implementation of the campaign, PLANMC (PLA Navy Marine Corps) will first capture the beach. PLAGF amphibious brigades will come ashore second. After capturing the port, PLAA heavy brigades will disembark in the port and join the land battle. Accordingly, positions will be handed over in sequence.

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Selection of assembly points

Where will the PLA ground force get on board? If it is Fujian, close distance is conducive to speed, but is directly within the ASM range on the other side of the strait, forcing PLAN to rely on air defense and anti-missile protection umbrellas.

One likely plan is: The first batch is in Hangzhou, and the second batch is in Fujian. They will alternate in the future. If it is the other way around, the first batch of landing troops will have to hold the beachheads and last longer, increasing the possibility of being pushed back into the sea.

Hangzhou’s problem is that the entire voyage is exposed to the military threat of Japan’s southwestern islands. However, Japan cannot actively intervene in the conflict due to regulatory factors (Peace Constitution). The advantage of Hangzhou is that it is close to Shanghai, which makes it convenient to requisition supplies. It is the station of the East China Sea Fleet, which will increase the difficulty of intelligence judgement. It is difficult to determine whether, for example, the temporary detention of 1-2 oil tankers is used to supply military operations or for other needs, which will increase the possibility of intelligence misjudgment.

??? Alike to Russian invasion of Ukraine, PLAGF troops movement and assembly at this scale and week/month-long time could hardly evade the surveillance of U.S. satellite or other means of intelligence. At this stage, Taiwan may become alert and initiate its prewar defensive preparations.

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An estimate on PLA Navy’s sealift capability

??? Due to the existence of over 100-kilometer wide strait, the armored divisions cannot gallop on the Great Plains like Russia invaded Ukraine, one of the biggest challenges to overcome in the preparation of the invasion of Taiwan. Given the existing PLAN capabilities, at any rate, it can deploy 8 amphibious ready groups at once, a sum of only 32 MC battalions (about 4 MC brigades), while the rest still waiting on Chinese mainland.

??? To sealift unprecedented number of troops and supplies across the strait will require PLAN to mobilize civilian ships, as what the British had done in the Falklands War. Though PLAN’s amphibious transportation capacity is large, it is only a drop in the bucket of what is needed to realize the ground invasion.

Amphibious warfare ships of PLA Navy

Type-075............................................................Class

LHD (landing helicopter dock)...........................Type

40,000 t..............................................................Displacement

3..........................................................................Quantity

Type-071

LPD (landing platform dock)

25,000 t

8

Type-072A

Landing ship

4,800 t

15

Type-072III

Landing ship

4,800 t

10

Type-072II

Landing ship

4,170 t

3

Type-073A/III

Landing ship

2,000 t

10/1

Type-074(A)

Landing ship

700 t

23

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Minor amphibious warfare crafts of PLA Navy

Type-726(A)

LCAC (landing craft air cushion)

>15

Type 958/

Zubr Class

LCAC (landing craft air cushion)

6

Type 068/069

LCM (landing craft mechanized)

20-30

Type 271/067

LCU (landing craft utility)

80-200

Type 067

Landing craft

140-230

??? The list of landing and ground combat troops (PLANMC & PLA Army) to be transported is:

PLA Army

Heavy combined arms brigades

21

Light/amphibious combined arms brigades

18

Medium combined arms brigades

9

Army aviation brigades

9

Army artillery brigades

9

SF brigades

3

PLANMC

Combined armed brigades

7 (-4**)

Supporting brigades

4

SF brigade

1

Since 2012, all shipping companies in PRC have been integrated into the Strategic Projection Support Ship Fleets, giving PLAN a second navy[18]. Larger and more spacious, the problem for commercial ferries (e.g., roll-on/roll-off ships) is that they need large ports. To overcome this restraint, many later ferries are built to meet specific military standards, making them more suitable for landing operations. These ships must be able to transport mechanized units, load and unload in unprepared or minimal berthing conditions and maintain a high cruising speed. Most importantly, modified ramps (reinforced, fixed against waves and currents) are designed to support the launch and recovery of amphibious vehicles. This makes the ramp capable of launching and recovering amphibious vessels at sea, but also makes it capable of operating with relatively unprepared berthing facilities, floatable pontoons, or even at sea[19]. Although RoRo vessels are commonly used for sealift purposes by militaries around the world, the Chinese have taken their potential to the next level by utilizing these ships in amphibious operations. This capability is not to be underestimated. A Taiwanese military publication estimated that there are around 40 vessels with this capability, adding the overall sealift capacity by fourfold[20].

Military-civilian integrated sealift capacity

Bo Sea Pearl class..............................................Class

RoRo....................................................................Type

36,000 t..............................................................Displacement

4..........................................................................Quantity

Donghai Island

Float-on/float-off ship

20,000 t

1

China Revival

RoRo

45,000 t

1

Chang Da Long

RoRo

20,000 t

1

China Railway Bo Sea III

RoRo

25,000 t

1

China Revitalize 33

Float-on/float-off ship

50,000 t

1

…[21]

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Conclusion

??? In conclusion, the potential invasion of Taiwan by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) presents a complex and challenging scenario for both sides involved. It is evident that a successful PLA invasion is neither technically impossible, as believed by many Taiwanese, nor exceedingly easy, as thought by the mainstream Chinese population. As the People's Liberation Army's maritime capabilities increase, a full-scale invasion becomes increasingly possible.

??? And, without a doubt, the balance is constantly changing.

??? The acquisition of newly commissioned conventional submarines has significantly enhanced the Republic of China's (ROC) combat capabilities, providing a lethal deterrent against any potential future invasion. These submarines will pose a considerable threat to the PLA's naval forces, adding an additional layer of defence for Taiwan.

??? One critical factor that causes distress for PLA commanders is the need for a swift invasion. However, the constraints of time mean that certain processes cannot be thoroughly executed. This results in disruptions to the PLA's progress, such as runways not being fully paralyzed, missile boats launching supersonic anti-ship missiles (ASMs) not being effectively neutralized, and the air defense system impeding PLA Air Force air support remaining intact. These shortcomings not only impede the PLA's advancement but also put their ground forces at stake.

??? While reserve troops and the presence of dense cities could potentially intimidate attackers, Taiwan's reserves have been deemed ineffective. It is evident that a well-led and socially cohesive Taiwan may be able to mount a determined resistance for a considerable period. However, without robust military intervention from the United States, China's significant advantage in military resources likely gives them the potential to eventually subjugate the island.

??? The expansion of the People's Liberation Army Navy's (PLAN) amphibious fleets, including vessels like the Type-071 and Type-075, coupled with the enhancement of military-civilian sealift capacity, has greatly increased the PLAN's ability to meet the necessary transport capacity for an invasion. This development significantly strengthens China's overall capability to carry out a potential operation against Taiwan.

??? Taiwan, aware of the potential threat, has been accumulating anti-ship missile (ASM) stockpiles. The optimal solution for Taiwan would be to directly annihilate the Chinese landing fleet, as a skilled fleet and marines cannot be rebuilt in a short time. By successfully neutralizing the amphibious fleet, Taiwan would achieve a decisive victory.

??? In summary, the situation surrounding a possible PLA invasion of Taiwan is multifaceted and uncertain. While Taiwan possesses certain deterrent capabilities, such as lethal submarines and ASM stockpiles, the ultimate outcome would depend on various factors, including the effectiveness of Taiwan's reserves, the level of social cohesion, and the extent of military intervention from external powers. The expansion of China's naval capabilities and its military resources pose significant challenges for Taiwan's defence, making a robust response crucial to deter any potential invasion.

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NOTES

[1]“Republic of China Army.” Wikipedia. December 17, 2023. Retrieved January 2, 2024, from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_China_Army ?

[2] “Republic of China Army.” Wikipedia. December 17, 2023. Retrieved January 2, 2024, from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_China_Army?

[3] “A preliminary analysis of Taiwan’s military power - Army (Part 1).” A Fish from Vancouver: WeChat Official Account. May 15, 2020. Retrieved January 2, 2024, from https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/x4n3C6TDPpxobtjcErrQ4A

[4] “A preliminary analysis of Taiwan’s military power - Army (Part 2).” A Fish from Vancouver: WeChat Official Account. May 22, 2020. Retrieved January 2, 2024, from https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/OXXgcdNsv0Crfa6iOl5cAA

[5] “Republic of China Army.” Wikipedia. December 17, 2023. Retrieved January 2, 2024, from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_China_Army

[6] “Republic of China Army.” Wikipedia. December 17, 2023. Retrieved January 2, 2024, from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_China_Army

[7] Shih, Jocelyn. “Taiwan’s catch-22: An analysis of the Republic of China’s Conscription.” Journal of International Relations. February 26, 2016. Retrieved January 2, 2024, from https://www.sirjournal.org/research/2016/2/26/taiwans-catch-22

[8] Shih, Jocelyn. “Taiwan’s catch-22: An analysis of the Republic of China’s Conscription.” Journal of International Relations. February 26, 2016. Retrieved January 2, 2024, from https://www.sirjournal.org/research/2016/2/26/taiwans-catch-22

[9] “Could Chinese military really invade Taiwan if US was neutral? Part 1/2.” Binkov’s Battlegrounds: YouTube. December 21, 2018. Retrieved January 2, 2024, from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DmKwd7-CjLk

[10] “The toughest training camp in history is about to run: Where will Taiwan’s reserve combat force reform go?” The Reporter. May 24, 2022. Retrieved January 2, 2024, from https://www.twreporter.org/a/national-defense-reform-refresher-training

[11] “Republic of China Armed Forces.” Wikipedia. January 28, 2024. Retrieved January 2, 2024, from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_China_Armed_Forces

[12] “China’s new armoured brigades [Explained].” Battle Order: YouTube. February 28, 2021. Retrieved January 2, 2024, from https://youtu.be/5d5_65NM1tY?si=PQAkKgAn13ieDuN6

[13] Blasko, Dennis J. “China Maritime Report No. 20: The PLA Army Amphibious Force.” 2022. CMSI China Maritime Reports. 20. Retrieved January 2, 2024, from https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports/20

[14] Blasko, Dennis J. “China Maritime Report No. 20: The PLA Army Amphibious Force.” 2022. CMSI China Maritime Reports. 20. Retrieved January 2, 2024, from https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports/20

[15] “How Chinese Marines Would Invade Taiwan.” Battle Order: YouTube. September 5, 2021. Retrieved January 2, 2024, from https://youtu.be/ulPO_PRtqj8?si=nHQ82m9xWQ-n30aq

[16] “How Chinese Marines Would Invade Taiwan.” Battle Order: YouTube. September 5, 2021. Retrieved January 2, 2024, from https://youtu.be/ulPO_PRtqj8?si=nHQ82m9xWQ-n30aq

[17] “List of ships of the People’s Liberation Army Navy.” Wikipedia. December 16, 2023. Retrieved January 2, 2024, from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_ships_of_the_People%27s_Liberation_Army_Navy

[18] Kennedy, C. Ro-Ro ferries and the expansion of the PLA’s landing ship fleet. CIMSEC. March 27, 2023. Retrieved January 2, 2024, from https://cimsec.org/ro-ro-ferries-and-the-expansion-of-the-plas-landing-ship-fleet/

[19] Kennedy, C. Ro-Ro ferries and the expansion of the PLA’s landing ship fleet. CIMSEC. March 27, 2023. Retrieved January 2, 2024, from https://cimsec.org/ro-ro-ferries-and-the-expansion-of-the-plas-landing-ship-fleet/

[20] “China’s Secret Weapon in the Invasion of Taiwan: RoRo Ferries.” Kamome: YouTube. June 12, 2023. Retrieved January 2, 2024, from https://youtu.be/BGQJLl54Bqw?si=utmPMGEdHoDn_aEY

[21] “List of ships of the People’s Liberation Army Navy.” Wikipedia. December 16, 2023. Retrieved January 2, 2024, from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_ships_of_the_People%27s_Liberation_Army_Navy?

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BIO

??? Dongyang Zhang is neither a formal military scholar, researcher, nor a practitioner. With humility and faithfulness, however, his keenness and dedication to political and military affairs since childhood are the primary sources of impetus to his thinking and writing on this arduous and challenging contemporary issue. He nourishes his mind through numerous readings, and the favourite includes On War by Clausewitz, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order by Huntington and World Order by Kissinger. He has been tracking the evolution of global military technology since secondary school. He is an amateur of international politics and military history. He visited Taiwan in winter, 2023.

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