Essay for NCH Essay Competition 2018

I wrote this essay on Utilitarianism for the NCH essay competition in 2018. There were about 1800 applicants of which I won the runner-up award in Philosophy. I hope you enjoy this short essay.

What is Utilitarianism, Can it be defended?

Classical Utilitarianism is an empirical, consequentialist, and hedonic ethical theory that seeks to produce the greatest utility for the greatest number of people. The ‘Moral Good’ is predicated on the consequences of actions, and thus, there are no objective right and wrong action, but all actions are relative to the principle of utility.

Both Bentham and Mill’s models are plagued with incoherencies and ethical problems and it seems insurmountable to defend them. Though, my own version of Value-Utilitarianism resolves both the problems of ethics and incoherencies within those versions of utilitarianism.

The hedonic calculus was a tool that Bentham invented for calculating pain and pleasure so that on the basis of the principle of utility, we can discover the right moral decision for a particular action. For Bentham, this ethical model was to be used by the government as a basis for legislation and law enforcement because they are deemed as the most suitable judge of individual interest. Whereas for Mill, it was more of a principle that guides an individual’s moral decisions. Bentham is seen as an act utilitarian because he cared about the application of the principle of utility to each particular action and its likely consequence in order to find the best moral decision. Whereas for Mill, actions are “morally right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness and morally wrong as they tend to produce pain.” Therefore, there is no requirement for the calculation of each action’s consequence but rather determines the morally right and wrong action by their general performance.

Both Bentham and Mill’s model has serious incoherencies that significantly shakes the foundation of classical utilitarianism. On one hand Bentham values security over liberty as a means of satisfying the criteria of utilitarianism, and on the other hand, he emphasises that “individuals should be taken to be the best judge of their own interests” and thus free from interference. The incoherency for Mill’s model is also highly problematic because he seems to value moral obligation over the utilitarian principle by adding certain moral rules to the equation. As Moore explains, the reason that Mill called for the certain moral law was not a utilitarian reason but simply to assure “men’s survival amongst each other in a way they can achieve anything worthwhile.”

Although Mill’s rule utilitarianism prevents heinous actions that are justified under act utilitarianism such as sacrificing an innocent man for saving a hundred people, its ideological incoherencies break the fabric of his ethical model. It’s mainly his strong commitment to the moral obligation that stands against the principle of utility but the ‘chief exception’ that he refers to also contradicts his moral law. An example that J.D. Mabbott used was Mill’s imperative that if a lie serves to save an individual from ‘great and unmerited evil’, then the moral law no longer applies. However, Professor Urmson rightly objects to another incoherency, that it may be morally good to do an action which is in accord with a moral rule, even if that specific action produces less utility than some other action. This is also another major contradiction as Mill’s claim is that the secondary principle (the moral law) is corollaries of the first principle (utility).

For Bentham’s model, it isn’t only the problem of “mythology of coherence”, but Bentham’s utilitarianism would invite a despotic and oppressive tyrant that would intervene in every aspect of people’s lives for maximising utility. Bentham envisaged a society based on ‘Panopticism’ or the idea that without the constant surveillance and intervention by an external force, people can’t be truly happy. Bentham famously said that “call them machines, if they were happy ones, I should not care.” Bentham constantly re-defines happiness, at times attributing it to security but at other times to liberty of the individual. Despite this, it is clear that Bentham was a strong believer in substantially interventionist policies. However, it is absurd to claim that people are happy if they obey the state to the full extent. This model of utilitarianism only causes indications of happiness as people would not commit anything against the Utilitarian policies, though it is out of fear and intimidation, which in turn would cause an underlying progressive resentment towards the state that could erupt in a revolution. Therefore, neither of the Classical versions of utilitarianism can provide a coherent and ethical system for our moral behaviour and legislation.

From my perspective, in order to defend utilitarianism on both theoretical and practical level, the principle of utilitarianism must not simply be defined as the minimisation of pain and the maximisation of happiness for the greatest number without any precise definition of the terms. Such a definition is too broad and elastic because people define happiness and pain in their own terms.

Also, by locating the ‘Moral Good’ in this principle, people can justify their heinous actions arguing that they were following the principle of utility. Instead, we have to narrow down the semantics of the main principle of utilitarianism without changing the nature of this ethical model, which is to achieve the greatest happiness for the greatest number. Throughout history, people were mostly happy (physically, psychologically and spiritually) due to the existence of some values mostly predicated on their culture, tradition and religion, which in turn had provided them social cohesion, purpose and meaning for their lives. Those values such as love, dignity and social harmony are the foundational basis for human’s happiness. If people are to base their ethical decisions on those shared values, it seems highly likely that we can satisfy the criteria of utilitarianism. Perhaps, some people within a society don’t share the exact values, but it is certainly the case that many of those values are axiomatic and deeply rooted in our biology and nature. Some other examples are honesty, love, co-operation and fair treatment. Therefore, we can achieve the greatest happiness of the greatest number, if people are to make their ethical decisions based on those shared and collective values.

However, in order to prevent wrong interpretations of this version of utilitarianism, which I have labelled as value-utilitarianism, we have to add a secondary criterion. This criterion is found in Luke 6:31, which says “Do to others as you would have them do to you.” The sole purpose of this secondary criterion is again to satisfy the principle of utility. The second criterion functions as a preventer to societies with despicable shared values to justify their pernicious actions based on value-utilitarianism. This secondary principle would ensure that the shared values would produce the greatest happiness for the greatest number. For if people treated others the same way they want to be treated, which I presume would be in a loving and respectful manner, they produce the greatest happiness to whomever they come into contact with. If everyone adopts this principle to his or her ethical decisions, then we would have the most plausible ethical model of utilitarianism, with a surplus of happiness produced as a result.

Ultimately, it is clear that the incoherencies within both main versions of utilitarianism invalidate their key claim that their sole intention is to maximise happiness for the greatest number. Bentham’s model is not only incoherent for his contrary claims in regard to liberty and security, but his model can also be used for committing truly despicable acts according to the fixed principle of utility. Although Mill resolves the ethical side of Bentham’s model, the contradictions and incoherencies in regards to the moral law and the principle of utility pose extreme difficulties for his claims to be taken as logically consistent. However, value-utilitarianism with the secondary principle of the Golden Rule seems to be ethical and coherent since history has passed its test.

Link to NCH page: https://www.nchlondon.ac.uk/2018/07/09/essay-summer-2018/

Bibliography

Stewart, Noel, an Introduction to Moral Philosophy, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2009

Dimmock, Mark, and Andrew Fisher. "Utilitarianism." In Ethics for A-Level, 11-29. Cambridge, UK: Open Book Publishers, 2017. https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1wc7r6j.5.

Crimmins, James E. "Contending Interpretations of Bentham's Utilitarianism." Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue Canadienne De Science Politique 29, no. 4 (1996): 751-77. https://www.jstor.org/stable/3232049

Himma, Kenneth Einar. "The Interpretation of Mill's Utilitarianism." History of Philosophy Quarterly 15, no. 4 (1998): 455-73. https://www.jstor.org/stable/27744797

Mabbott, J. D. "Interpretations of Mill's `Utilitarianism'." The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-) 6, no. 23 (1956): 115-20. doi:10.2307/2217218.

Dryer, D. P. "Utilitarianism, For and Against." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4, no. 3 (1975): 549-59. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40230529.

Rosen, Frederick (1990) "The Origin of Liberal Utilitarianism: Jeremy Bentham and Liberty," in Bellamy (ed.) (1990): 60-62

Peterson, Jordan, 12 Rules for life, an antidote to chaos, Penguin Random House, 2018

https://www.iep.utm.edu/util-a-r/

[1] Stewart, Noel, an Introduction to Moral Philosophy, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2009, P. 15-16

[2] Dryer, D. P. "Utilitarianism, For and Against." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4, no. 3 (1975): P. 551

[3] Himma, Kenneth Einar. "The Interpretation of Mill's Utilitarianism." History of Philosophy Quarterly 15, no. 4 (1998): P. 455

[4] Crimmins, James E. "Contending Interpretations of Bentham's Utilitarianism." Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue Canadienne De Science Politique 29, no. 4 (1996): 752-758

[5] Dryer, D. P. "Utilitarianism, For and Against." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4, no. 3 (1975): P. 551

[6] Mabbott, J. D. "Interpretations of Mill's `Utilitarianism'." The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-) 6, no. 23 (1956): P. 115-117

[7] Quentin Skinner’s view on Bentham’s incoherent and changing ideas about liberty and security (interventionist policies)

[8] Crimmins, James E. "Contending Interpretations of Bentham's Utilitarianism." Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue Canadienne De Science Politique 29, no. 4 (1996) : P. 753-759