ERCOT February 2021
It has been a month and our industry is still coming to terms with the impacts of the events in Texas this February. As more date becomes available we are able to understand better what occurred. ERCOT released a list of outages during the events. https://www.ercot.com/content/wcm/lists/226521/ERCOT_Letter_Re_Feb_2021_Generator_Outages.pdf.
With a little effort it is possible to convert this data to an hour by hour outage rate by fuel capacity.
It is clear that Wind and Gas represented a majority of the outage in the ERCOT dataset. We can use EIA Form 860 data to understand the asset mix on the ground in Texas at the end of 2020. https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia860m/
The November 2020 EIA data was used to generate this figure of Texas capacity by technology by install date.
It is possible then to look at these two different datasets to try and understand a little better what occurred in ERCOT. In the following graph the gas generation capacity is normalized as a percent of the 2020 total by year and the total amount of gas capacity outage (from the ERCOT data) is also normalized by year of install of the units. Orange dots are the normalized outage data, blue are normalized capacity data.
If age of the unit was not a factor in terms of capacity loss these two trends should track each other pretty closely. We see in the graph a bit of a difference, but it doesn't necessarily look too significant. This is where human brains can fool us. So on the next graph this is just a straight up ratio of the outage normalized data to the install normalized data. If age was not a factor we should expect a random distribution around the 100% or 1.00 number.
Which is exactly what we see for the newer plants. But for the older plants it is clear they disproportionately had more outages versus installed capacity. So older plants failed during the ERCOT event at a noticeable higher rate than newer gas plants.
Now for the purists out there they would note that there is a bit of a cheat in the above graph due to using cumulative numbers, and they are right!
So for legitimacy this is a straight ratio of the percent outage per install year over percent capacity per install year (not cumulative). The same conclusion (older assets failed at higher rates) is reached in this graph - it was normalized around a 0% value by subtracting 1.
It is also possible through data mining to figure out previous year capacity factors on the gas plants that resulted in outages. Not surprisingly the older gas plants that failed at a higher rate had lower capacity factors.
So rarely run, older gas units failed at appreciably higher rates on average than newer assets.
As we look to build resilience and improve our planning going forward this type of analysis can be relevant.
When the question of improving resilience is brought forward, how is it justified for a rarely run power plant that is 40+ years old? How is resilience improvements paid for?
As our grid transforms and dispatchable assets are increasingly called upon only on extreme days, how can we be sure that these plants can be ready and available?
These are not simple questions. There are not simple answers.
At EPRI we are working collaboratively to understand these issues and develop solutions.
Husband, Father, Electrical Power Professional
1 年Nice analysis and read Mike. Seems to be just a continuation or a variation on a theme I keep coming back to: Mid- and Late-life power plants are going to have a critical role to dependable grid service across North America as we transition to what the generation mix and grid build will look like for the next 20-40 years.. It's going to be interesting times in our industry for sure!
Sr. Account Executive - United Commercial Energy Partners (UCEP)
4 年Mike: Thanks very much for the analysis on the ERCOT events of February 2021. Having personally lived thru it myself here in Dallas, it was quite the challenge. Based on my work experience with Luminant (plant O&M) and with EPRI in reviewing plant performance across the U.S., I have some thoughts based on your comments: 1) So older plants failed during the ERCOT event at a noticeable higher rate than newer gas plants. 2) So rarely run, older gas units failed at appreciably higher rates on average than newer assets. Here are a few reasons for the above: A) Deferred and limited capital expenditures on older units. B) Deferred and limited O&M expenditures on older units. C) Older units sitting off-line for long periods of time with many systems shutdown. D) Older units called on to run at the most critical times, i.e., "cold winter" and "hot summer" peaks. E) Deferred or canceled "freeze protection plans" on older units. Also, insulation on critical systems may be insufficient due to degradation and aging of materials. To me, the reliability of older gas-fired units is similar to the spare tire on your car. If you have a flat (outage) on one of your regular tires (large, efficient units), your spare tire (older gas-fired unit) had better be ready to go (run), or you will be walking (rotating blackouts or worse). John
Program Leader at Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
4 年Thanks for sharing this analysis. After reading, I was curious if the older power stations were less likely to have firm natural gas supply. As best as I could tell, EIA data shows the older units were somewhat more likely to have firm NG supply.
Mechanical Engineer; 41 years experience
4 年Nice work Mike. I enjoy your insight into the Texas event