Enforcement Policy Stresses Effective Compliance Programs Must Be Follow-throurgh and Prevent Circumvention

Executive Summary 概要

US Department of Justice (DOJ) released critical policy change on corporate crime enforcement on September 15, 2022.?This policy stresses voluntary self-disclosure (along with full cooperation and remediation) as the “clearest path” to avoid a guilty plea or an indictment against historical misconducts unaddressed.?Moreover, it intends to assist committed business executives and corporate counsels to make both boardroom business case for investing in compliance culture, and genuinely informed choices in procurement, supply chain, partnerships, M&As and restructurings.

美国司法部（DOJ）于2022年9月15日发布了企业犯罪执法的重要政策变化。该执法政策强调自愿自我披露（以及充分合作和补救）是避免对既往未决的不当行为进行认罪或起诉的“最明确的途径”。 该政策致力于协助经理人和合规人士不仅推动董事会层面加强合规投入的商业决策，并在运营层面作出真正知悉的选择（采购、供应链、业务合作、并购和重组等）。

Our briefing is as follows, with unofficial translaction of the guidelines as reference.

我们简要概括如下；其双语非正式译本作为附件，以资参考。

2. Actionable Insights 执行参考

DOJ announced Memorandum Regarding Further Revisions to Corporate Criminal Enforcement Policies from the Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco (“Monaco Memo”) on September 15, 2022.[1]?Overall, Monaco Memo consolidates these existing practice with nuances and clarity:

司法部于2022年9月15日颁布了副总检察长丽莎?摩纳哥《对公司刑事执法政策的进一步修订》（“《摩纳哥备忘录》”）。总体而言，《摩纳哥备忘录》就如下执法中已形成的若干实践细节予以提炼和明确：

??Individual Accountability: DOJ prioritizes investigations against culpable individuals, “regardless of their position, status, or seniority.”?DOJ requires prosecutors“strive to complete investigations into individuals”“prior to or simultaneously with” a resolution with the corporation.?Prerequisites to greenlight a resolution within DOJ must include an investigative plan and timelines addressing responsible individuals;

追究个人责任：（在公司犯罪执法中）司法部优先调查并追究违法者的责任，无论他们的职位、地位或资历如何。司法部要求检察官“致力在与公司达成解决安排之前或与此并行”完成针对违法个人的调查。在司法部内部就裁决批准的先决条件必须包括针对个人的调查计划与进度。

??Voluntary Self-disclosure, Cooperation & Remediation: DOJ expects that an effective compliance program must help the company “deter and prevent criminal conduct in the first place, and “position it to self-disclose if misconduct occurs nonetheless,”with full cooperation and thorough remediation;

自愿自我披露、合作与补救：对合规体系的有效性标准，司法部期待企业达到如下门槛：合规体系应协助企业能够“首先阻止、防范犯罪行为”，并且“即便在不当行为发生时仍能促使所在组织能够自我披露”，同时能够后续与监管部门充分合作并就问题采取彻底补救；

??Cross-border Enforcement: DOJ’s collaboration with parallel investigations overseas has become norm, e.g., in Goldman Sachs, and DOJ credits proportionately its penalty against fines paid to its foreign counterparts;

跨境执法：迄今，司法部调查与海外反腐败调查平行的监管合作已成常态，例如，在高盛案中司法部将企业已支付给外国对口监管部门的罚款（从收缴罚款中）予以抵消；

??Corporate Culture: evaluation of the effectiveness of a compliance program includes compensation systems as well as severance agreements, in the context of “the full criminal, civil and regulatory record”[2] of a company, before resolution;

企业文化：做出裁决前司法部对合规体系有效与否的评估包括薪酬体系及离职协议，并置其于“既往完整的刑/民事和监管记录”的全局考察下；

??M&As & Integration: DOJ reiterates historical misconduct at the target side is neither necessarily a deal killer nor violation triggering enforcement.?Rather, “[p]rior misconduct committed by an acquired entity should receive less weight if the acquired entity has been integrated into an effective, well-designed compliance program at the acquiring corporation and if the acquiring corporation addressed the root cause of the prior misconduct before the conduct currently under investigation occurred, and full and timely remediation occurred within the acquired entity before the conduct currently under investigation;”

并购与整合：司法部重申其对于并购标（收购前）既往不当行为的态度：此类问题并非必然阻碍合法交易或导致收购方遭受监管执法。 相反，“如果被收购实体以前的不当行为已被纳入收购方有效的、精心设计的合规体系，并且收购方在目前正在调查的行为发生之前已针对既往不当行为的根本原因予以解决，并且在目前正在调查的行为发生之前在被收购实体内部实施了充分和及时的补救，那么被收购实体以前的不当行为应该得到较少的重视；”

??Monitorship: DOJ may refrain from imposing a monitor for a cooperating corporation, if at the time of resolution, the company can demonstrate that it has implemented and tested an effective compliance program; aggregating factors, however, could override such potential leniency, such as “grave threat to national security” or “deeply pervasive” misconducts; factual factors impacting determination of the pervasiveness include ignorance by senior management or corporate culture that does not encourage open discussion & reporting);

监察员措施：对于合作的企业，司法部可以不指派监察员，如果在裁决做出时，该企业能够证明其已实施了有效合规体系并予以检验；然而，加重情节的出现仍可导致丧失原本可争取的宽大处理：例如，摩纳哥备忘录提示“对国家安全的严重威胁”或不当行为在组织中“非常普遍”（司法部明确，影响“普遍性”定性的事实因素包括高管对长期存在的不当行为的忽视，或者不鼓励公开讨论和报告合规风险的企业文化）；

??DOJ-wide Unity & Transparency: these enforcement policy revisions apply department-wide including antitrust, environmental, and national security fronts.

司法部全部门执法统一性与透明度：上述执法政策修订不仅适用于刑事司打击公司刑事犯罪，也适用于司法部反垄断、环保和国家安全司局单位。

The Monaco Memo also signals more granularity to come to tackle more subtle tactics to frustrate compliance:

摩纳哥备忘录还就即将出台的进一步指南提供了原则性的前瞻阐述，尤其针对某些更隐晦的阻挠合规伎俩：

??Compensation Systems: DOJ will evaluate a corporation's compensation arrangements contains clawback provisions with retroactive discipline, i.e., human resource metrics that reward pro-compliance behavior and penalizes unethical actors with direct or supervisory roles in criminal conduct surface to regulators;

薪酬体系：司法部将评估企业的薪酬体系是否包含具有追溯力的惩戒条款，即对促进合规的行为列入人事奖励指标，同时惩戒对犯罪行为负有直接参与或监督责任的不仁者；

??Off-system Circumvention and the Use of Personal Devices and Apps: DOJ will inquire the availability and execution of cellphone and App policies of a company under investigation.?DOJ will focus on the level of record retention and address off-system circumvention by reducing visibility of critical business discussion from compliance and management.[3]

体外运作与规避以及个人通讯设备和App的使用：司法部将针对被调查企业相关移动设备使用和应用程序政策是否存在以及如何落实的情况予以考察。司法部将重点关注企业维护商业记录的严谨与否，并侧重考察不当行为者是否通过减少合规和管理部门对关键业务讨论的能见度，实现体外运作和规避。

Circumvention Through Confidentiality Agreement Faces Heightened Enforcement Exposure

通过保密协议进行规避面临更高的执法风险

DOJ singles out certain compliance deficiencies as disguised retaliation or silencing whistleblowers and avoid detection.?For example, DOJ highlights restrictive terms in confidentiality / severance agreements stifling whistleblowing to authorities.

司法部备忘录单列了若干合规缺陷，尤其是变相的报复或压制举报人并予以掩饰从而避开监察。例如，司法部指出保密/离职协议中的限制性条款可能会扼杀企业员工作为举报人向监管部门提供线索。

Such “cost-effective” practices (using confidentiality agreements as a means to chill or prevent communication with authorities) have invited significant regulatory challenges and hefty penalties in recent Security Exchange Commission (SEC) enforcement in e.g., Brinks Company[4], Sandridge[5], and AB InBev[6].

在美国证券交易委员会（SEC）对布林克斯（Brinks）、桑德里奇能源（Sandridge）以及百威英博等的案件中，该等“廉价”做法（通过保密协议遏制员工与监管部门沟通）使得企业遭受了严峻的监管挑战并被课以巨额处罚。

Under the Monaco Memo, in the context of evaluating financial incentives and compensation, prosecutors should consider whether “a corporation uses or has used nondisclosure or non-disparagement provisions in compensation agreements, severance agreements, or other financial arrangements so as to inhibit the public disclosure of criminal misconduct by a corporation or its employees.”

根据《摩纳哥备忘录》，在评估企业的薪酬激励方面，检察官应考察“企业是否在薪酬协议、离职协议或其他财务安排中使用或曾经使用过不披露或不诋毁条款，以阻止公司或其员工公开披露犯罪的不当行为。”

Future enforcement will focus more on whether and “how incentive compensation systems can promote — rather than inhibit — compliance,” according to Principal Associate Deputy Attorney General Miller.[7]

司法部首席助理总检察长米勒表示，公司刑事犯罪执法将更多地侧重“薪酬制度是否以及如何促进而不是压制合规”。

Consequence of Delays and Weak Compliance

迟延以及合规薄弱环节对应的后果

When a company's compliance program is inadequate, remediation is not complete, and the criminal conduct was serious and pervasive, the consequences are obviously serious from enforcement perspective.?Yet it often takes considerable time, cability, and willingness to reach internal alignment and informed determination about whether, when, to whom and how upon discovery of serious misconducts.

如果企业的合规体系不充分、亡羊补牢的补救措施不彻底，而且犯罪行为严重而普遍，从执法角度来看其后果显然是严重的。 然而，在发现严重的不当行为时，企业内部往往需要相当多的时间、能力和意愿来达成内部一致，并就是否、何时、向谁和如何进行调查处理作出知悉的决策。

Nevertheless, “timeliness” to come forward is critical to secure cooperation credits and leniency, and DOJ aspires to “gain access to all relevant, non-privileged facts about individual misconduct swiftly and without delay.”

尽管如此，企业对违规行为响应的“及时性”对于确保企业获得监管部门的合作加分与宽大处理至关重要，因为司法部期待企业使得监管部门“迅速和毫不拖延地获得关于个人不当行为的所有相关的、非特权的事实”。

Undue or intentional delay in evidential disclosure relating to individual culpability will result in reduction or denial of cooperation credit.?In recent enforcement against Glencore with $1.1 Billion and imposition of a monitor for three years, DOJ highlights delay as driving factor for losing full cooperation credits:[8]

不当或故意拖延与追究个人罪责相关的证据披露将导致企业获得合作加分机会窗口减损乃至丧失。 在最近对嘉能可（Glencore）11亿美元的定罪与执法中，司法部强调企业拖延是失去完整的合作加分的驱动因素。

When a historical misconduct is surfaced, full cooperation, timely remediation and voluntary self-disclosure, is the “clearest path for a company – even a recidivist – to avoid a guilty plea or an indictment” (and secure leniency, e.g., declination letter in CDM Smith[9]).

当既往不当行为浮出水面时，充分合作、及时补救和自愿自我披露，是 “企业——甚至是重复犯罪者——避免认罪或被提起公诉的最清晰的路径选择”（并由此确保获得宽大处理，例如不予起诉）。

Avoiding delay to come forward timely with a proper resolution as outcome presents the best defense to address significant compliance challenges.?Post-resolution remediation helps companies self-cure and regain profitability, because “failing to take compliance seriously – will, in the long-run, be far more painful.”

对于违规行为避免拖延、适时披露并争取适当的裁决作为商业结果是解决重大合规监管挑战的最佳防御措施。 裁决后的后续补救措施有助于企业自愈并重获盈利能力，因为“不严肃对待合规——从长远来看，将更加痛苦”。

Role and Accountability of Compliance Officers if Resolution Takes Place

如获得裁决，合规岗的作用和责任

DOJ officials highlight that the policy goal is “not just to hold people accountable after crime has been committed, but to disrupt and deter the threat before crime takes place.”?“[A] company that decides to white-knuckle it through is taking on a lot of downside risk.”?Such downside risks include not only penalties and reputational harms, but also “risk of collateral consequences like suspension and debarment in relevant industries.”[10]

司法部官员强调其执法政策目标是“不仅仅是犯罪事后追究责任，而且预防犯罪，即阻却犯罪发生并阻止其威胁”。 “大量负面风险持续累积是一家企业做出如下选择所要接受的后果，即怀揣不报而内心惴惴不安”。该等负面风险不仅包括监管惩罚与声誉毁损，还包括其意料之外的间接损失，例如在相关行业中被暂停甚至剥夺经营资格。

Recent resolutions (e.g., GOL Airlines[11], ABB[12]) have required certifications by Chief Executive Officers and Chief Compliance Officers in settlement agreements.

最近的执法实例（巴西戈尔航空公司（GOL Airlines）与 ABB案件）要求首席执行官和首席合规官对与监管部门达成的协议进行签字保证。

Such certification commands CEOs and CCOs to affirm that, at the conclusion of the term of a resolution, the company’s compliance program is reasonably designed to detect, and prevent, and remediate violation.

该签字保证要求首席执行官和首席合规官确认企业在裁决的履行期限结束时，公司的合规体系仍然是合理设计并对违规行为能够预防与补救。

DOJ deems this measure to “empower, not punish, compliance teams and help ensure that compliance officers have an important voice in the business organization.”

司法部认为该措施对合规团队赋权而不是惩罚，并帮助确保合规岗在企业组织中持有重要的发言权”。

Outlook / Why Care ？ 展望 / 为何关切？

“Adversity spurs vitality, while comfort breeds sloth.?Always take a long view, be vigilant in peace time.” (citing Chinese proverb)

“生于忧患、死于安乐，常怀远虑、居安思危。”

A recurring question for compliance in China is “why I (we) (in China) should care about DOJ policies.”?Geopolitical conflicts have proliferated blocking statutes and data protection laws against the so-called “long arm jurisdiction.”?Moreover, codes of conducts of S&P 500s often command compliance “with all applicable laws” (including local laws).

在国内合规岗常被问的问题是：“为什么（在中国）应该关心美国司法部的政策？” 地缘政治冲突导致了针对域外“长臂管辖”的阻断法律和数据保护法规的普遍化。 此外，众多500强企业的的行为准则要求遵守“所有适用的法律”（包括中国当地法律）。

That said, both the reach of DOJ jurisdiction and realistic consequence of violation are clear for multinational companies either publicly traded in US or having overseas headquarters / subsidiaries and assets in US or Western markets.

尽管如此，对于在美上市或发行证券的国际企业或在美/西方市场拥有海外总部/子公司和资产的跨国公司而言，司法部管辖权及实际违规后果毋庸置疑。

Moreover, regulators share anti-corruption enforcement interests despite of ideological difference.?For example, PCAOB (Public Company Accounting Oversight Board) secured “complete access to inspect and investigate audit firms in China for the first time in history” on December 15 2022.

不仅如此，尽管意识形态存在分歧，监管机构之间在反腐败执法合作方面有着共同的利益。 例如美国上市公司会计监督委员会（PCAOB）已于2022年12月15日获得了“史无前例的对中国审计机构核查与调查的完全权限”。

Takeaways 要点回顾

??Invest in Effectiveness of Compliance Programs: Monaco Memo empowers committed businesspeople and compliance officers with strong legal basis and incentives to deter misconduct through effective compliance programs—a top focus in DOJ's corporate crime enforcement.

对有效合规体系建设加强投入：对致力于通过建设有效合规体系的企业家、经理人和合规岗而言，摩纳哥备忘录赋予了强有力的法律依据与后盾应对并震慑违规行为——这是司法部公司犯罪执法的首要重点。

??Don’t White-knuckle It Through: DOJ will apply “adverse inference” for those who “capitalize” data protection laws or blocking statutes to “shield misconduct inappropriately from” detection and enforcement.?DOJ expects and provides credits to cooperating corporation who “find ways to navigate such issues of foreign law and produce such records” “expeditiously.”

莫惴惴不安却企图瞒天过海：对于那些通过“榨取”数据保护或阻断法律从而“隐匿不当行为”并规避监督的不法者，司法部将适用“不利推定”。司法部希望企业 “迅速、积极设法解决法律冲突问题并提供记录”，并为合作企业提供合作加分。

??Don't Destruct Data / Evidence or Retaliate: in terms of cooperation and remediation anticipating regulatory exposure, DOJ directs that efforts must be in place “prohibiting the improper destruction or deletion of business records.”

莫毁灭数据/证据或报复：在应对潜在监管敞口的合作和补救，司法部要求企业必须努力“禁止不当破坏或删除业务记录”。

??Review, Eliminate Deficiency & Identify Wrongdoers in Compensation Systems and Confidentiality / Severance Agreement: Monaco Memo bright to light subtle schemes, with varying forms but same substance is to “inhibit the public disclosure of criminal misconduct by a corporation or its employees.”?Such schemes could constitute systematic misconducts that Monaco Memo crystalizes as enforcement focus.

审查并消除薪酬制度和保密/离职协议中的缺陷并查明违规者：摩纳哥备忘录将管理实务中一些较隐晦的伎俩置于监管阳光之下：这些伎俩形式各不相同，但实质是为了“阻止公司或其员工公开披露犯罪的不当行为”。 这些伎俩可能构成系统性的不当行为，而摩纳哥备忘录将其作为执法重点。

??Follow-through: Experienced compliance counsels and professionals must be vigilant on signals from ground, recommend corrective actions and follow through.

贯彻执行：经验丰富的合规律师和专业人士必须对来自基层的信号保持警惕，对应采取的纠正措施提出建议并对落实到位进行跟踪。

??Consider Voluntary Self-disclosure: voluntary self-disclosure, cooperation and remediation saves companies from corporate liabilities and penalties in millions and billions of dollars often vicariously borne by shareholders instead of wrongdoers, hold culpable individuals accountable, with transparency and beefed-up compliance program as solid closure of historical misconducts.

考虑自愿自我披露：自愿自我披露、合作与补救可以使公司免于遭受不法分子造成的成百上亿美元的公司责任与处罚（该等罚金往往由股东而非责任人员直接承担）、追究不法分子个人责任，以透明度和加强的合规体系作为历史遗留问题扎实的收尾。

Exhibit 1 contains the courtesy bilingual transaction of the Monaco Memo for ease of reference by committed business and legal professionals.

附录1包含摩纳哥备忘录非正式中文译本（双语），以便商业和法律人士参考。

Exhibit 1 - Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco Regarding Further Revisions to Corporate Criminal Enforcement Policies Following Discussions with Corporate Crime Advisory Group （September 15, 2022)

附录1 - 副总检察长丽莎?摩纳哥关于根据公司犯罪问题咨询小组的讨论对公司刑事执法政策的进一步修订的备忘录

Note: The contents of this newsletter are the author(s)’ individual responsibility, and do not necessarily represent the views of any company / organization or any of its members. Due to the general nature of its contents, this newsletter is not and should not be regarded as legal advice. No specific action is to be taken on the information provided without prior consultation with your trustworthy counsel(s).        

[1] U.S. Dep't of Justice, “Deputy Attorney General Lisa O. Monaco Delivers Remarks on Corporate Criminal Enforcement” (Sept. 15, 2022), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-lisa-o-monaco-delivers-remarks-corporate-criminal-enforcement; Memo from the Deputy Attorney General (Lisa O. Monaco), “Further Revisions to Corporate Criminal Enforcement Policies Follow Discussions with Corporate Crime Advisory Group” (Sept. 15, 2022), https://www.justice.gov/dag/page/file/1535286/download (“Monaco Memo”)

[2] U.S. Dep't of Justice, Deputy Attorney General Lisa O. Monaco Gives Keynote Address at ABA's 36th National Institute on White Collar Crime” (Oct. 28, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-lisa-o-monaco-gives-keynote-address-abas-36th-national-institute

[3] U.S. Dep't of Justice, “Principal Associate Deputy Attorney General Marshall Miller Delivers Live Keynote Address at Global Investigations Review” (Sept. 20, 2022), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/principal-associate-deputy-attorney-general-marshall-miller-delivers-live-keynote-address

[4] Order, In re The Brink’s Company, Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 95138 (June 22, 2022), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2022/34-95138.pdf

[5] Order, In re Sandridge, Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 79607 (Dec. 20, 2016).

[6] Order, In re Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV, Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 78957 (Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2016/34-78957.pdf

[7] U.S. Dep't of Justice, “Principal Associate Deputy Attorney General Marshall Miller Delivers Live Keynote Address at Global Investigations Review” (Sept. 20, 2022), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/principal-associate-deputy-attorney-general-marshall-miller-delivers-live-keynote-address

[8] Plea Agreement, United States v. Glencore International A.G. (May 24, 2022), https://www.justice.gov/criminal/file/1508266/download

[9] Declination Letter, In Re CDM Smith, Inc (Jun. 21, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/page/file/976976/download

[10] U.S. Dep't of Justice, “Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Nicole M. Argentieri Delivers Remarks at the 39th International Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act” (Dec. 1, 2022), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/acting-principal-deputy-assistant-attorney-general-nicole-m-argentieri-delivers-remarks

[11] Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Gol Linhas Aereas Inteligentes S.A., No. Case 8:22-cr-00325-PJM (Sept. 16, 2022), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/1535366/download

[12] Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. ABB Ltd., No. 1:22-cr-00220-MSN (Dec. 2, 2022), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1556131/download