In the end, did ASEAN matter?
Sharon Seah
I care about the climate. I also care about ASEAN. Senior Fellow & Coordinator, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute
#Indonesia, as chair of #ASEAN this year, intended to deliver on two main objectives: one, to make sure that #ASEAN mattered both internally and externally; and two, to make #ASEAN an epicentre of economic growth.
On the latter, Indonesia has done well with several key takeaways, namely the launch of negotiations of an ASEAN Digital Economy Framework two years earlier than expected, the upgrade of the ASEAN Trade-in-Goods (ATIGA), AANZFTA upgrade, ACFTA version 3.0, ASEAN single #QR code, the adoption of an ASEAN Blue Economy Framework and an expansion to include the Plus Three Partners (China, Japan, ROK) in its Electric Vehicle Ecosystem plans. These are all wonderfully laid plans and if executed well, could lead ASEAN well onto the path of tremendous recovery and growth in the next decade.
On the former, in typical Indonesian fashion, Indonesia pushed forward with the ASEAN Concord IV (similar to the Bali Concords I, II, and III which were also adopted during Indonesia’s past 3 Chairmanship years) to add strategic heft to the grouping, and ensuring that ASEAN counted in the lives of its own people. #Indonesia has always been the only member state that played a key role in institution-building. No other member seems to have the same gumption to do it. The promotion and protection of human rights in ASEAN was placed front and centre in the ASEAN Concord IV. This indicates that Indonesia understood that ASEAN needed to do more for its own people in order to remain relevant. Indonesia also sought to improve the decision-making processes within ASEAN with the adoption of a set of non-legally binding rules to give clarity to issues that concern a breach of the ASEAN Charter, emergency situations, and where consensus can’t be reached. Indonesia also tried to improve the standing of the ASEAN Secretariat by renaming its premises to “ASEAN Headquarters” to signal the key diplomatic role of the Secretariat. The ASEAN Concord IV, in years to come, may become one of the cornerstone ASEAN documents that historians will refer to when discussing the evolution and development of ASEAN. It will take many years for us to assess whether the Concord IV will really count. The spirit is willing but the flesh may be weak.
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Intractable issues like Myanmar and the South China Sea (SCS)remained on the table. There was no progress on the Five-Point Consensus. However, ASEAN managed to do two things: (1) place the blame on the Myanmar military armed forces for the ongoing violence; and (2) refute Myanmar’s unilateral decision to skip chairing ASEAN in 2026 by deciding that the Philippines will chair in 2026 and the usual rotational schedule will be followed until such time “a different decision is made”. With regard to the SCS, despite China’s latest move to publish a new 2023 map that prompted swift reactions from at least 5 regional countries, there was no mention of this matter. ASEAN then went on to issue statements with China on deepening agricultural cooperation, to ensure food security in the region and to cooperate in the four mainstream areas of the AOIP.
On the AOIP, I suppose #Indonesia can be proud of its efforts to operationalize the concept and add meat to bones by pulling off an impressive IP forum. Now all that remains is whether we will indeed see greater #connectivity, infrastructural projects, and concrete projects to facilitate the #greentransition in the region.
Notwithstanding the many statements and declarations, ASEAN’s key challenge remains navigating the increasingly hostile geopolitical environment. As President Jokowi rightly pointed out, @ASEAN needs to ensure that it does not become a proxy arena for major powers and that it should chart its own course.