EMs Need to Take a Timeout

As some of you have probably noticed, I have not blogged much during the COVID-19 pandemic. In the midst of a major response is not necessarily a good time to get reflective about the overall trajectory of EM program development. Rather, it has been a time to save lives, livelihoods, the economy, and our cherished ways of life. Now that we’re starting to see light at the end of the COVID tunnel, however, it’s becoming increasingly clear that serious introspection and thoughtful action within our profession may not only be prudent but imperative.

First and most prominently on our list of considerations is whether the National Incident Management System (NIMS) has been worthy of so much emphasis since its inception in 2005. I understand that, to some, making such a statement is akin to heresy, but bear with me. The points I’m about to make cry out for attention and have so for over 10 years.

1.   If NIMS was indeed intended to facilitate better interagency coordination among county, state and federal response elements, it appears to have failed. In January 2021, my team at Complete EM conducted a nationwide, simple random sample survey of all county emergency management programs in the U.S. The results of the survey clearly indicate that only 56% of emergency management programs had activated their emergency operations centers during the COVID incident and that none of the activated EOCs were led by a public health professional (CL=80%, MoE=+/-10%). That outcome earns a solid "F" on delivering a 15-year, multi-billion dollar national course of instruction. Moreover, our survey found that only a small minority (~10%) of active EOCs have regularly developed action plans and SitReps or even understood the difference between incident priorities and objectives (i.e. save lives versus evacuate Knob Hill by 0600 hrs.). Any emergency management program now thinking about priority investment in NIMS training above the field level in order to explain, promote, implement, evolve... interagency coordination in their emergency management program needs to understand that clear evidence now and probably has always suggested an almost 50/50 chance of failure. Indeed, I cannot recall seeing any credible evidence that demonstrated NIMS facilitates better interagency coordination above the field level, so any apparent correlation or success using this strategy may be entirely coincidental and hardly sufficient to support major national doctrine. 

2.   NIMS training has sucked much of the oxygen out of several vital rooms. When my team surveys emergency managers about their activity, we seldom hear about program stakeholder forums (i.e. meetings of disaster councils), contingency planning (i.e. severe weather plan), program authorities (i.e. City Code 1.101- County Emergency), Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment, or community preparedness. So as to not ask you to infer too much, I will state it without equivocation. The majority of emergency management programs no longer do what, for years, was essential to EM program success. Why? It seems that staff, time and other resources are being redirected to accomplish NIMS training. Emergency managers who conduct NIMS training above the field level without a codified program, a HIRA/HVA, good stakeholder engagement in program management, executive support, an emergency plan, an EOC, and SOPs are literally burning money, time and goodwill on something that has little chance of returning appreciable value. If you don’t believe me, go ask one of the 1000s of city or county administration staff who endured over 40 hours of IS 100, IS 700, ICS 300 and ICS 400 to explain what they took away from those courses and applied in an EOC. I have. Their answers are depressing.    

3.   The over-emphasis on NIMS training has spawned a number new related endeavors that offer relatively little value to address chronic and acute problems in EM. Consider the development of over 200 Type-III All-Hazard Incident Management Teams designed to land in EOCs in the midst of crisis and save the day. Now consider how successful these teams can be and have been when there is no program, plans, procedures, assessments, relationships, and other vital program outcomes in place when they arrive. So, what have we actually bought with this massive investment in Type-III AHIMTs? Insurance that largely predictable but poorly planned events won’t get too much worse after they become disasters, because professionals have arrived to stop the bleeding and take the heat off a failed program. And don’t just believe my assessment, listen to the guy who has probably trained more of these teams than anyone else: https://complete-em.com/ShowPodCast/38/. As another example, look at the over 200 post-secondary credentialing, undergraduate, graduate, and post graduate programs in the U.S. that turn out thousands of emergency managers each year who are largely armed with NIMS doctrine insights into a profession with a paltry 6% growth rate and in positions where NIMS really has no documented positive effect. Indeed the EM professional landscape has become replete with experts and expertise we don’t need, at least at this point. 

4.   NIMS is really a single tree masquerading or being confused as an EM forest. Today, across the country, we have EMs who possess IPAWS credentials but neither intend or are prepared to issue vital, non-opt-in, alert messaging, because they don’t want to draw criticism. About 50% of jurisdictions have no mass care agreement with the American Red Cross and far fewer have alternative plans for sheltering. Few EM programs have operable evacuation plans and routine evacuation practice with law and transportation agencies. We have some huge challenges to overcome like these that have absolutely nothing to do with NIMS, but they are manageable if we focus on problems, root-cause analysis and simply do what we know works.   

I’m not trying to bury the lede, but something happened today that has really pushed me to blog about this today. It's part of a story of my profession and I fear my profession has lost its way. I visited the FEMA website to review the latest on NIMS integration and the state of national preparedness – arguably our biggest national priorities in this space. Both units at FEMA are under the Resilience Division (or maybe directorate, FEMA no longer specifies) which is currently without a leader. Moreover, neither Resilience, National Preparedness nor NIMS Integration provide a contact telephone number, an email address or even a comment form at FEMA.gov with which to engage. Hang on though, it got worse. When I called the FEMA operator, she couldn’t offer ANY connection to these units. When I said I wanted to speak with a FEMA administrative representative to offer some constructive criticism about program contact, my call was dropped twice en-route to FEMA Public Affairs. When I called a third time and then asked the operator if anyone at FEMA could discuss the current state of national preparedness, I was transferred to the employee voicemail retrieval number. It is clear that FEMA is not prepared to answer any of these questions, yet, less than 30 days ago, FEMA released almost $1,500,000,000 in NOFOs intended to fund much the same thing as we have been funding since 2003 and did so with almost no mention, let alone emphasis, of fundamental EM program activities known to work for over 50 years.

In 1988, I participated in a U.S Air Force ROTC summer encampment. We drilled, learned about U.S. air power, learned to shoot, survive the elements and got to do a little flying and mock missile launching. One of the most memorable experiences for me was going through aircraft egress training – learning to eject or otherwise exit a plane that is no longer operable and safe. My instructor taught me to exit as quickly and safely as possible, get to safety, take a drink of water and calm down, because the latter made for better decision making. Since 2001, emergency management has not calmed down. We have not been introspective. We have almost impulsively responded in an all-too-familiar pattern of prioritizing, investment and activity. Indeed both the impulsivity and dangerous routine inherent in our latest work has become so engrained few programs even develop and execute strategic plans. They simply check off EMPG requirements, distribute HSGP funding to the most influential agencies, revise HMPs every 5 years to secure extra funding during disaster (sadly, not to reduce risk), and nurture PA Disaster Worksheets. We are capable of so much more.

Before the next set of major disasters hit, emergency managers need to call a timeout, maybe two or three, and consider what really needs to be done and the best way to do it. When we do, I’m certain getting everyone in an EOC to recite the Planning P, wear the proper color vest or fill out ICS 214s like a journalist won’t necessarily be the outcome. Answering the phone for constituents and partners, and being able to both explain and demonstrate what EMs need to accomplish will again be hallmarks of this profession. Then and only then, we will re-earn the trust of the people we serve and garner the support we need.  

George Whitney is a former local, state and federal emergency manager who founded Complete EM, a Software as a Service (SaaS) and consultancy helping emergency managers achieve program success. Click here to join Complete EM's email list where you'll receive free emergency management program tips. You may also feel free to join him as a connection on LinkedIn.