The Empire of Influence: Where Might Putin REALLY Strike Next and Where Will He Likely Leave Alone?
Russia's ongoing invasion of Ukraine has led to widespread speculation amongst geopolitics and military analysts over where Putin may choose to militarily strike next.
A lot of the analysis which has come off the back of this has been aligned with the common misconception that 'Putin wants to recreate the Soviet Union'. This statement is not only counteracted by many aspects of Russia's foreign policy and previous military intervention, but is one that has been calculated from just one event within the Russian Federation's 24 year period of de facto control under Putin. It's a statement which is easily counteracted by showing that Putin has never made any attempt to territorially expand Russia by annexing areas of the post-Soviet central Asian states. An area which would be relatively easy for the Russians to invade, given the inferior military opposition that they would face.
So why hasn't Putin done this? Simply because he is not genuinely invested in recreating the territorial entity which was the USSR under the guise of the Russian Federation. Instead what Putin is invested in is creating an Empire of Influence. Such an empire does not require the complete territorial annexation of pre-existing states, but instead requires their submission to Russian power in relation to geopolitics.
The ambition of Putin is to make his Empire of Influence as great as possible with its reach extending beyond the borders of what was the USSR. Outside the confines of the former Soviet Union (FSU) the expansion of the Empire is based primarily on opportunism. In years gone by, we have seen Russia's influence in Syria through its military intervention on the side of the Assad regime, its growing presence in Africa through the Wagner Group PMC and the Kremlin's increasing involvement in the Balkans. All of these scenarios have come as a result of an opportunity for the Kremlin to pit itself against the West.
Within the confines of the FSU, the rules of expansion are different. Putin's ideal for all of these states is for them to be not occupied by, but strongly influenced by Russia. Putin's minimum requirement of states within this space is neutrality. The idea that if Russia can't have them, then neither can the West. This policy has been visualised at various times throughout Putin's tenure as Russia's de facto leader.
Evident attempts by the Kremlin to prevent FSU states from joining Western alliances have been obvious, in no cases more so than those of Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova. A key component in all of these cases has been military intervention by forces either loyal to or controlled by the Kremlin. These interventions have then led to the creation of pro-Kremlin para states within these different territories (Lugansk and Donetsk People's Republics in Ukraine, South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia, and Transnistria in Moldova).
Without elaborating too much, these para states have then forced the wider states in question into neutralisation, with Moscow then hoping to pull them back towards the Russian sphere of influence on a permanent basis. This tactic was standard Kremlin practice and proved to be a successful tactic in securing neutralisation until February 2021, when it became clear that despite Moscow's warnings and previous military interventions within the state, Ukraine was still going to pursue NATO membership. Long story short, this is why Putin ended up pursuing an all out invasion of Ukraine. Not because he wants to recreate the Soviet Union or that he is classically expansionist in his approach to foreign policy, but because he had to default from original Russian interventionist doctrine if he wanted to keep Ukraine from joining NATO.
Russia's ongoing invasion of Ukraine is an anomaly in its foreign policy approach to states within the FSU. The line that 'Putin wants to recreate the Soviet Union' is frankly ill informed and has influenced the aforementioned speculation of where Putin might militarily target next.
So with that in mind let's look at some of the rumoured but actually very unlikely areas which have been thrown out there by analysts as potential targets for a future Putin attack...
The Suwalki Gap
The Why
There has long been rife speculation that Putin would make a move to occupy this slither of territory between Belarus and the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, which actually constitutes the territory of both Lithuania and Poland. The supposed aim of such an operation would be two-fold. Firstly, It would create a continuous Kremlin controlled land bridge between Moscow and Kaliningrad. Secondly (and more significantly), it would cut off the FSU Baltic states from the rest of the EU, allowing for a potential annexation by Russia of the respective territories.
The Why It Won't Happen
Moldova
The Why
This suggestion is entirely based around the theory that Putin wants to recreate the USSR. The base argument is that Russia would use Transnistria, the de facto independent pro-Russian para state within Moldova to invade the rest of the territory and claim the whole state for the Russian Federation.
The Why It Won't Happen
Kyrgyzstan and/or Kazakhstan
The Why
No reason provided by the Latvian President when making such a suggestion only three days ago.
The Why It Won't Happen
Belarus
The Why
Again the only explanation that could be provided for why Putin would invade Belarus is because of his desires to territorially expand the Russian Federation.
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The Why It Won't Happen
So if Putin isn't likely to be targeting any of the previously suggested targets as outlined above, then where is REALLY likely to be Putin's next military target, if of course there is to be one. Well as I've outlined above, the Kremlin's usual strategy under Putin within the bounds of the former FSU has been to perform smaller scale military interventions with the aim of capturing parts of another state and utilising them as geopolitical bargaining chips. I would suggest that this is still the preferential strategy for Moscow.
With regards to the expansion of influence outside the former FSU, it is all about opportunism for Russia. If an opportunity was to present itself where the Kremlin could see the enforcement of a loss to the West and a gain for wider Russian power then it might well get involved in some capacity on the ground, either via its conventional forces or via the Wagner Group.
So here are 3 areas where Putin might REALLY target next...
The Baltics (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania)
This may seem slightly hypocritical given my statement on the likelihood of an attempted annexation of the Suwalki Gap, however what I am suggesting is not that Russia would try and annex all of the Baltic states, but that instead it would target specific areas within them.
The playbook for such a scenario is widely known, but in brief Russia would launch an information war against the state in question, trying to create hysteria amongst ethnic Russian communities within. The Kremlin would then paint the picture that tensions would require for a military intervention, or something akin to such a scenario. The strike would then take place and the desired territory would be secured rapidly, allowing for little to no response time. The most susceptible areas to such an operation are those which border either Russia itself or its client state Belarus. Possible targets are as follows...
It is largely known that the loss of the Baltics to the West has greatly agitated Putin over time. Their existence within NATO has made them seem somewhat bulletproof to Russian intervention operations, however as time has gone on speculation has grown as to whether Putin might just go for them anyway. A small-scale operation would be the ultimate test of NATO's mettle and ultimately whether it sticks to its word. Would NATO risk World War III over small corners of post-Soviet states? If the answer is yes, then Putin risks humiliation. If the answer is no, then the payoff for Putin would be monumental.
Georgia
Russia under the guise of the Russian Federation has already militarily intervened in Georgia twice since 1992. There already exist two pro-Kremlin para states within the borders of Georgia helping the Kremlin to in some way neutralise Tbilisi and preventing it from pursuing both EU and NATO membership. So why might they intervene again? Well the current government of Georgia has found itself falling out with the Georgian people recently for installing what has been labelled 'the Russian law'. This law hasn't actually been enforced by Moscow, but is a carbon copy of one used by the Kremlin to silence foreign media outlets and NGOs within its state. As a result of 'the Russian law', Georgians have been protesting en masse in Tbilisi in scenes not dissimilar to those witnessed in Kyiv in 2013. If protests continue and escalate to a state of violence we might see a Russian intervention yet again in the state, but this time in cooperation with the government.
Such a scenario would be exceptionally desirable for the Kremlin, allowing it to fully pull Tbilisi back into Moscow's orbit and cement its place within the Empire of Influence.
We are at present a long way off such a scenario, but if the opportunity were to appear, there is no doubt that Putin would seize it.
Western Balkans
The final possible area for Putin's next strike is one that sits outside of the post-Soviet space, but is one that Russia has a cemented interest in as far as the expansion of its influence is concerned.
Following the collapse of Yugoslavia, Putin pounced on the opportunity to create strong ties between Russia and Serbia, drawing parallels between the two states' shared historical and ethnic grievances, along with their coherent anti-Western positions. Over the years, Russia has become one of Serbia's main donors both economically and militarily. In return for its investment in Serbia, the Kremlin gets to ensure that the region of the Western Balkans remains unstable, allowing for its own influence to grow.
Over the past year, tensions within the region have escalated yet again, bringing new speculation of a return to direct conflict, with the two likely territories behind such an escalation being Northern Kosovo and Republika Srpska (Bosnia). Both of these areas are predominantly inhabited by ethnic Serbs who desire for greater alignment to their perceived motherland in Serbia, whilst the states they find themselves within are trying to gravitate increasingly towards the West.
These two cases have fuelled the new speculation of a war in the Balkans, be it either a Serbian annexation of Northern Kosovo or a Belgrade backed proxy war within Bosnia. Both of which are reminiscent of previous interventions staged by Moscow, see the annexation of Crimea or the war in the Donbass as primary examples. It is known that Belgrade is in regular contact with Putin and that if either scenario was to play out Moscow would throw its weight behind Serbia.
In fact Russia has already started laying some potential foundations for conflict in the Balkans. In 2018, it was reported that Moscow had started training a Serb paramilitary group within Serbia known as 'Serbian Honour'. Now in 2024, it appears that Russia is running training for Bosnian Serb paramilitary groups within Republika Srpska.
A potential conflict or disruption of the status quo in the Balkans plays into Moscow's hands, as they can take the fight to the West by proxy rather than through the use of their conventional forces. This isn't to say that the Kremlin would have no military involvement should conflict break out in the region. It is highly likely that Moscow would deploy members of the Wagner Group to the territory, or even repeat the 'little green men' stunt performed in the annexation of Crimea, allowing for some plausible deniability on the part of Putin.
Russia is currently key to heightening and stirring ethnic tensions to its geopolitical benefit within the Western Balkans, pedalling in tandem with the increasingly nationalistic rhetoric coming from Belgrade. It is not hard to envisage a scenario in which Moscow capitialises on a Serbian escalation within the region.
Ultimately, it cannot be known who, when, where or even if Putin will have a new target for military intervention following Ukraine, with the outcome of the conflict in Ukraine being critical to Putin's power and capability moving forward.
However, if there are to be cases of future Kremlin backed military intervention it is likely that they will come in the shape of smaller scale operations or proxy conflicts.
Despite it making a great line, the idea that 'Putin wants to recreate the Soviet Union' just isn't true. The evidence isn't indicative of this and so talks of the Russian advance continuing after the complete fall of Ukraine (should this happen) into Europe hold very little footing. This does not make Putin's plans for the FSU or the world order any less concerning for the West. In fact, by creating his Empire of Influence, Putin will maximise his geopolitical reach. His main focus will still be the FSU and pulling it as closely as possible towards Moscow, but should the opportunity to destabilise the West show elsewhere, don't be surprised if the Russian bear pounces.