Emerging Threats in South-East Turkey

Since the end of the two year cease-fire between the Turkish Government and the PKK in July 2015 there has been a significant increase in violence in the south eastern provinces. Casualties have been estimated at over 2300, including nearly a thousand PKK militants, over 800 members of the security forces and nearly 400 civilians 1. The intense urban combat seen during the re-commencement of hostilities which destroyed large parts of cities such as Diyarbakir, Nusaybin, Silopi and Cizre has more recently been replaced by the previous tactics of attacks targeting security forces patrols or bases. The most common tactic has been the use of roadside IEDs targeting police or military vehicles, however large vehicle-borne IEDs are being increasingly employed against security forces bases or checkpoints, as seen in the Elazi? (18.08.16), Semdinli (09.10.2016) and Diyarbakir (04.11.2016) attacks in which vans loaded with several tons of explosives were used. There have been a number of complex attacks on Police or Jandarma posts where IEDs were followed up with small arms fire, though these have been comparatively rare. More recently a trend is emerging of attacks specifically targeting government officials such as the assassination of a senior AKP official at his home in Van province on the 9th October, the head of the Diyarbakir AKP branch at a filling station near his office a day later, a co-ordinated attack on the AKP offices in Kiziltepe using IEDs and small arms fire which injured 3 police officers guarding the building on the 30th October and the attack on the District Governor’s office in Derik on the 10th November, which is believed to have been a parcel bomb or an IED in a bag. The Governor died of his injuries and several members of his staff were injured.  This targeting of government officials follows the removal and arrest of officials from the predominantly Kurdish HDP and DGP parties in the region, continuing the crackdown against any opposition since the July 15th coup attempt. The main areas of risk for organisations operating in the region are related to transit activities where they could be exposed to indirect threats targeting security forces’ vehicles or checkpoints and accommodation located near security forces’ posts or government buildings. Robust travel security procedures should be implemented and accommodation selected in order to minimise the possibility of collateral damage from an incident. In some remote areas medical response times can be significant, therefore a medical incident response plan should be put in place with sufficient first-line treatment capabilities.  Communications can be affected following incidents as was seen recently with the blocking of mobile internet services and social media. The region is likely to remain volatile for the foreseeable future as the PKK and its affiliate groups are far from defeated and the potential for increasing activity from elements of IS (ISIS/ISIL/Daesh), either those already embedded in certain Turkish border towns or retreating from Syria and Iraq, has been threatened and is likely. The wall being constructed along the border with Syria will still take several months to complete and therefore cannot improve the situation in the short term.

1 -  https://www.crisisgroup.be/interactives/turkey/ 18 Nov 2016