Election news memo - 3 June 2024

State of coalition discussions

Judging by comments from President Cyril Ramaphosa and ANC Secretary-General Fikile Mbalula over the weekend, who both emphasised the supremacy of the Constitution and the need for unity and renewal, the ANC’s current preferred choice is for an arrangement with the DA – whether a coalition or a supply and confidence agreement. Mbalula made it clear that calls for Ramaphosa’s removal as a pre-condition for coalition talks – a key MK demand – were a non-starter.

On the other hand, ANC Chairman Gwede Mantashe has expressed distaste for a DA partnership and there have been unattributed suggestions from within the ANC that Ramaphosa should go, which would open the door for an agreement with the EFF, or even MK.

The ANC’s coalition task team will be led by Mbalula, and is said to include former Gauteng Premier David Makhura, who has done a detailed technical study on coalition arrangements. The party’s National Working Committee is meeting today, with the National Executive Committee set to agree on a framework for coalition negotiations tomorrow.

The DA's coalition team includes former leaders Helen Zille and Tony Leon, Western Cape Premier Allan Winde, chief whip Siviwe Gwarube and former strategist Ryan Coetzee.

The DA has vowed to do everything possible to prevent the “doomsday” scenario of an ANC-EFF coalition from coming about, a strong indication that it is open to talks with the ANC. However, Zille has made it clear that the DA will also protect itself from ANC contamination. This makes a formal coalition with joint accountability for government performance less likely.

The EFF, meanwhile, has indicated that it will not insist on Ramaphosa going, after all, nor on Floyd Shivambu becoming Finance Minister, but, according to leader Julius Malema, it will not compromise on the land issue.

On balance, a supply and confidence agreement between the ANC and DA, in which the former controls the executive and the DA takes up key positions in Parliament, possibly along with a set of policy and governance conditions, is emerging as the most likely outcome.

The ANC’s shocking election performance has increased the level of compromise it will need to make to entice a coalition partner to risk a formal agreement. The EFF has also suffered a poor result, and may settle for a limited set of policy demands and/or government positions. It is not able to deliver a majority for the ANC in either Gauteng or at national level without the inclusion of a third party, making it a less desirable partner than anticipated ahead of the poll. The DA, meanwhile, has held steady at national level and in its Western Cape stronghold, and could comfortably give the ANC a majority in Gauteng and nationally.

Implications of an ANC-DA formal coalition

For the DA to agree to such an arrangement it would have to be able to show its voters significant benefits and protect itself from being trapped in a partnership that could make it appear complicit in ANC dysfunction. One option would be to carve out a few cabinet portfolios for which the DA would take full responsibility and leave the rest to the ANC. If successful in these clearly defined areas, it would then be able to differentiate itself from the ANC’s performance. However, this is easier said than done. The DA would inherit an ANC-aligned bureaucracy and associated inertia, with limited ability to turn around a whole sector within five years. Any portfolio involving other spheres of government – health or education for example – would leave it unable to directly manage performance. The risks of failure – and an electoral backlash- would be extreme.

For the ANC, on the other hand, a formal coalition in which it handed policy direction in certain areas to the DA would run counter to its long-held narrative that the DA is anti-transformation. It, too, would potentially face an electoral backlash should the experiment not yield tangible results. On the other hand, if the DA did manage to improve government performance in the areas under its control, this could make the ANC look bad by comparison.

These considerations make a formal power-sharing arrangement less likely.

An alternative could be for the parties to negotiate a core set of policy reforms that would satisfy the DA’s base without alienating that of the ANC. These could be around transparent appointment processes in the public service, trade, labour regulation, health (NHI) and education policy, and some reforms to BEE, for example. The DA would then not take up any executive roles, but could demand key oversight positions in Parliament – Speaker and committee chairs among them. Having the ability to interrogate departmental performance plans, annual reports and budgets would, in such an arrangement, give the DA significant leverage to ensure the ANC kept its side of the bargain, without the DA taking full accountability for actual performance.

Implications of an ANC-EFF coalition

It is unlikely Ramaphosa would go along with this scenario, suggesting it could only come about if he were not the President. This is a fairly remote proposition as Ramaphosa was the face of the ANC’s campaign and it would likely shed significantly more votes in subsequent elections, consigning it to opposition party status. The economic consequences would be severe and immediate, and any hope of averting a fiscal crisis would be lost. Even if the EFF influence were limited to minor policy concessions and largely inconsequential government roles, public trust in government would collapse altogether and civil society resistance would increase. Since such a coalition would appeal only to voters on the right of the spectrum, where MK and the EFF have their base, the ANC and EFF would cannibalise each other’s support, while other parties would seize the centre ground. Unless the population could be radicalised en-masse within 5 years or democracy suspended, this would probably be a short-lived arrangement.

Implications of a supply and confidence agreement

This would involve the DA supporting the ANC to elect a president, pass budgets and in motions of no confidence in exchange for either a set of policy concessions, or key roles in Parliament, or a combination of the two.

The DA could get the role of Speaker and the chair of key committees, which would empower it to hold the ANC government to account far more effectively than has been possible until now. Although the DA would not have an absolute veto over policies and budgets, the ANC would have a strong interest in keeping the DA onside and it would have to make at least some compromises. Given the power of Parliament to institute investigations and summon officials, the DA would be able to use Parliament to subject the ANC government to close scrutiny.

While the ANC-dominated Parliament has in the past tended to shield the executive and government from inquiry and largely rubber-stamped legislation, an opposition-run Parliament could demand answers in full and improve the depth and quality of the legislative process. It could refuse to process legislation without proper regulatory impact assessments and public consultation. Even if the ANC did not relent on every point, it would be forced to compromise on every measure.

This would extend to the appointment of public officials in which Parliament has a role, such as the Public Protector, boards of certain SOEs and other public institutions.

On the whole, this seems to be the lowest-risk option for both the ANC and DA, while holding out the possibility of improved Parliamentary and government performance and closer co-operation over time. In the longer term, a stable and effective centrist coalition could enjoy an extended period of electoral dominance.

Provincial scenarios

In Gauteng the ANC received 34.76% of the vote, the DA 27.44%, EFF 12.93% and MK 9.79%. Either an ANC-EFF+one other or ANC-DA coalition is possible, or a supply and confidence agreement with an ANC minority government as outlined above. It is possible that discussions at national level will result in a package deal incorporating Gauteng.

In KwaZulu-Natal MK got 45.35%, the IFP 18.07%, ANC 16.99%, the DA 13.36%, EFF 2.26% and NFP 0.56%. Neither MK-EFF-NFP nor the IFP-ANC-DA have a majority (40 seats each). The most likely outcome is therefore that MK will form a minority government – a result it probably didn’t expect or plan for. This leaves an interesting quandary for Zuma, who is a formidable politician but whose policy framework, as expressed in the party’s manifesto, is unimplementable, while the province has experienced a governance crisis for a long time. He will no doubt attempt to pin any failures on the ANC at national level, but this can only work for a limited period. However, his imminent corruption trial now poses an even greater test for the rule of law. He will use every court appearance as a campaign platform – a la Donald Trump – and a successful prosecution could ignite unrest similar in scale to that of July 2021.