Egyptian president El-Sisi's visit to India represents a revival of Delhi-Cairo axis: Mohammed Soliman

West Asia is the world’s most rapidly transforming strategic theatre and Egypt — straddling a key geoeconomic and geostrategic region — is staking claim to become one of the most consequential players in the region under the ambitious leadership of Abdel Fattah El-Sisi. As India’s economic and strategic interests grow in Africa and West Asia, this makes a compelling case for the revival of an old friendship and an alignment based on mutual interests.

To comment and make sense of the shifting sands in the region,?Firstpost?caught up with Mohammed Soliman, director of the Strategic Technologies and Cyber Security Program at the Middle East Institute in Washington, DC. Mohammed, the strategist who conceptualized the ‘Indo-Abrahamic’ alignment between India, Israel, and Sunni Arab states — that laid the groundwork for the I2U2 framework — took questions on factors that are driving India-Egypt’s strategic and economic alignment, the volatile balance of power in West Asia, the consequences of great power competition, how Egypt plans to navigate Sino-Indian friction and more. The interview has been reproduced in full with light editing for grammar and style.

Egypt is the largest country in the Arab world. How significant is Abdel Fattah El Sisi’s impending visit to India that has been described as ‘groundbreaking’?

Egypt’s vital role in four key theaters—the Mediterranean Sea, the Red Sea, Africa, and West Asia—highlights the value of a potential partnership with India. Cairo maintains an irrefutable seat in the dynamics of the Red Sea and, by extension, the western side of the Indian Ocean, owing to the highly strategic Suez Canal. Cairo’s stature in the Mediterranean Sea is also expanding as it finds itself moving closer to the heart of gas geopolitics. As India looks to expand its strategic reach in West Asia and Africa- and considering Egypt’s demography, geography, and civilization, as well as its military capabilities and geopolitical ambitions — the Cairo-Delhi alignment seems like a partnership that is destined for fruition.

The term ‘groundbreaking’ implies charting a new path. Ties between India and Egypt — civilizational states with a shared colonial history — are anything but ‘new’. As leaders of the non-aligned movement, both nations under Nehru and Nasser shared a unique, close bond. Why did the two drift apart?

I don’t believe there was a drift, but rather a lack of strategic clarity on what the objectives of India-Egypt bilateral relations in the post-Cold War era were. Sisi’s visit to India represents a revival of what I call the Delhi-Cairo axis, which means further close coordination on issues beyond those of a bilateral nature, such as regional security, responses to global crises, and alignment on matters of mutual interest in Africa, West Asia and Eastern Mediterranean. The potential alignment between India and Egypt changes the game plan in West Asia and Africa.

What is now piloting the current trajectory in bilateral ties? Is it strategic convergence, shared concern over a globalization that has little space for Global South, commodity crisis, food and energy security, great power aspirations or a combination of all these factors?

The recent trends I am seeing indicate that the nature of global ties is shifting away from bilateral dynamics towards minilateral systems. This shift is very much driven by the consequences of great power competition and the inability of bilateral relations on their own to preserve the self-interests of middle powers as well as regional powers. As middle powers and regional powers seek to establish themselves on the global stage and maintain strategic advantages in key geopolitical and economic domains, there is an interest within both camps to collaborate through agile and narrow-focused frameworks.

In my view, great powers are no longer the sole guarantors of security or drivers of development, and resilient middle and regional powers should be respected for their displays of sovereignty when addressing issues on global and regional agendas. Minilateral architectures, such as the I2U2, the QUAD, and AUKUS accommodate this trend by promoting the role of middle powers in global efforts while expanding the ability of great powers– mainly Washington– to invest in alternative mechanisms. This is not to say that bilateral ties will become a thing of the past: minilateralism inherently requires compatible bilateral relations as the foundation for multi-state cooperation.

You are one of the strongest opponents of the Middle East as a concept and always advocate for West Asia as the rightful strategic map of the region, why?

As a strategist, I see chaos as a strategic opportunity. Absent such a clear strategic blueprint, I had to grapple with the obvious question: What are the borders of the Middle East? Does the Middle East boundaries end with Tehran? Why not New Delhi? I zoomed out to see that any Middle East strategy would fail because this region doesn’t exist. In my Indo-Abrahamic thesis, there is a West Asian system that encompasses all the states between India and Egypt. My role here as a national security strategist is to delve into how to put forward an intellectual framework that brings these nations together. This is the main impetus behind the Indo-Abrahamic framework that was adopted by the I2U2 group (Israel, India, the UAE, and the United States) and the India-France-UAE Trilateral.

Egypt straddles one of the world’s most important geostrategic locations. As we transition from a unipolar moment in history to an era of multipolarity, how may the ‘Indo-Abrahamic framework’ — a term coined by you — serve the cause of Cairo, New Delhi and the larger West Asian security architecture?

I believe that the agenda of the West Asian region will continue to be heavily characterized by security issues. Although West Asian security has long been tied to America’s role as a security guarantor, this reality no longer remains true. Further, it is clear that mutual cooperation in defense holds the key to filling security gaps previously occupied by the United States. The Indo-Abrahamic framework adequately addresses regional security by establishing an architecture that is centered around regional balance of power. The Indo-Abrahamic framework changes the status of the US from a security guarantor to a security and defense partner. An agile forum for security cooperation acts as the glue holding together West Asian partners who should be adamant in their inclusion of Indian and Israeli defense capabilities.

You have been vocal about the need for I2U2 — the West Asian quadrilateral forum of India, Israel, UAE, and the US — to transition from a geoeconomic to a security mechanism through the addition of Egypt and Saudi Arabia. If Iran feel threatened, will that help, or hinder the maintenance of regional balance of power?

Firstly, I need to mention that the regional balance of power has always been and will continue to be volatile — a product of the intrinsically complicated nature of West Asia. This reality only stresses the need for a comprehensive multilateral security mechanism. Taking this into account, any effective multilateral security architecture must be built on a number of compatible security and geopolitical alignments, but the aim is that of collaboration towards prosperity and not that of advancing in rivalries with actors that fall outside of the shared purview.

India, by some estimates, has already surpassed China in population and it is poised to remain as the fastest-growing major economy for some time. How does Egypt hope to harness the Indian growth story to boost its economy? What are the focus areas?

India surpassing China in terms of population is not just symbolic. Of course, China is still a more robust economic and geopolitical challenger to the United States’ superpower status. However, as the demographic gap between India and China continues to widen quickly, it will cast doubt on China’s relentless rise in the twenty-first century. Egypt and other regional and middle powers should start thinking about the impact of a weak China scenario. A partnership with India is the right policy choice for Cairo in preparation for a weaker China scenario in the next few decades.

A main area in which an Egypt-India partnership propels both economies is defense production. Egypt’s role in the four key theaters makes it a force multiplier for India. Delhi is positioned to establish defense production and manufacturing facilities in Egypt, which provides India’s defence sector access to new markets in Africa and West Asia. In return, Cairo can harness Indian industrial capabilities to secure more advanced defense technologies. An area of interest to India’s global strategy, and one that I predict will sit high on Delhi’s West Asia and Africa agenda is Egypt’s plan to develop a global manufacturing centre: the Suez Canal Economic Zone (SCZONE). Adding to this, the ambitions of India’s global and regional rivals, namely China, to secure their stakes in the Suez Canal project will only increase the urgency of Indian-Egyptian cooperation in the SCZONE.

Considering India’s growing strategic interests in Africa, how may Egypt complement New Delhi’s objectives? And how may India serve Egypt’s interests?

Egypt and India have indicated a shared eagerness towards coordinated responses to international and regional issues, collaboration in capacity-building, and investments in development projects. As mentioned, defense production is a mutually beneficial partnership between the two countries, one that stands to transform Egypt’s stature in West Asian security. India’s targets of investing in developing Egyptian sectors will also provide Egypt with much-needed foreign capital inflows.

In bolstering Egypt’s defence capabilities, Delhi is strengthening their strategic reach in key waterways —the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Suez Canal — that impact pivotal flows to and from India. Maintenance of these waterways establishes India as a major collaborator for African countries, who are looking to benefit from joint operations and better connectivity with India, and advances India’s mission of manifesting an India-driven third pole on the world stage.

Qin Gang, China’s new foreign minister, recently ended his five-nation Africa tour in Egypt where he met President Sisi. China has invested billions through BRI projects. It is the heaviest user of the Suez canal for trade with Europe. Egypt wants to woo Chinese tourists and investors. Is this economic symbiosis resulting in a deeper strategic partnership?

China was the first partner to venture into Egypt’s SCZONE plans. Cairo’s welcoming of a series of Chinese investments in the Suez is indicative of an Egyptian willingness to integrate its own strategic and economic interests into the Belt and Road Initiative.

Despite this, I am reluctant to say that this example of economic cooperation is an indication of a deeper strategic partnership. After all, Egypt has consistently put forward a policy of ambiguity when it comes to polarizing geopolitical issues. Deepening the relationship with China beyond symbiotic cooperation stands in contrast to the political identity that Cairo has been building since its independence in the 1950s.

In the context mentioned in the question above, how does Egypt hope to avoid geopolitical friction as it simultaneously pursues its interests and ties with India and China?

With a large part of India’s strategic interests in West Asia focused on the same trade channels targeted by the BRI, Egypt will ultimately be placed firmly between Indian and Chinese bids for collaboration and will have to carefully navigate this Sino-Indian friction. Although Cairo’s agenda is exhausted with economic, geopolitical, and security items, Egypt’s geographic positioning makes security a foremost concern. As the potential for an introduction into a West Asian security architecture grows, the pursuit of strategic relationships with less contentious partners that can both serve their security interests and support the Egyptian economy will take precedence. Cairo recognizes the strategic compatibilities held with their similarly non-aligned partners in Delhi. I believe that this recognition will continue to dictate Egypt’s decisions regarding which partnerships to prioritize. While Egypt has found an agreeable strategic partner in India, I also believe drawing lines to check the extent of their association with China will define Sino-Egyptian relations moving forward.