ECM & SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
Abstract
Time factor is fundamental
against new missile threats since the latter benefits from hypersonic speed;
therefore, the process of recognition, decision, and reaction requires a short
time.
The process of recognizing,
deciding, and reacting to the threat for the conflict itself, given the
limiting factor in the time to assess, confirm and decide. The Electromagnetic
environment analysis is essential to determine the Electronic Attack and
Electronic Protection, which are related to each other but inseparable from
Electronic Support. However, the amount of information to be evaluated has
increased exponentially, making the "man-in-the-loop" inadequate.
The electromagnetic environment
is exacerbated by the introduction of dynamically changing threats that adapt
to spectrum availability and / or RF defensive measures. In addition to
evolving threats such as hypersonic flight profiles, these technologies require
defensive and offensive systems to collect, evaluate, and deliver changes in
selected effects in a millionth of a second, which is now pushing the limits of
processing speeds. It is essential that the merging of information and
automatic comparison take place with highly reliable databases.
Most air forces use ECM to
protect their aircraft from attack. Military ships also deploy ECM, while some
advanced tanks recently began leveraging them to fool laser/IR guided missiles.
Frequently, an ECM is coupled with stealth advances to simplify the work of the
ECM systems. Offensive ECM often takes the form of jamming. Self-protecting
(defensive) ECM includes using blip enhancement and jamming of missile terminal
homers.
The sinking of the Moskva is back
in vogue in naval anti-missile defence, I don't go into the specifics of naval
tactics, or Command and Control in naval operations. The scenario that Moskva
offers us is a series of problems related to situation awareness, information
awareness, Emission Control, use of Hard Kill and Soft kill.
Anti-Ship Missile Defence (ASMD)
covers all aspects of defending a ship or group of ship against missile attack.
The defensive measures involved range from counter targeting or defeating the
missile search and homing techniques, to engaging the threat with missile and gun systems Hard Kill (HK) and electronic countermeasure Soft Kill (SK) A co-ordinated ASMD response to a given threat or range of threats is a vital component in ensuring the
survivability of either an individual unit or a Naval Force. Evidence of thefact suggest that ASMD planning was not afforded the effort that such a complexarea of warfare deserves.
A lack of attention in this area will result in the production and promulgation of ASMD reaction related instructions which fail to consider all force system capabilities/ limitations
and ultimately may deny an effective force co-ordinated response.
?A thorough understanding of both the threat, own and consort capabilities/ limitations forms the key to successfully producing a coordinated force response. The importance of prior ASMD planning cannot be over-emphasised. Planner staff must be undertaken at the earliest
possible opportunity and thereafter remain under constant review situations develop.
Finally, the speed required for evaluating the information collected in the EME against new adaptive or non-adaptive threats requires advanced defensive systems to respond in advance
and evolve according to the reference situation to offer a range of responses appropriate to the threat.
I quote my friend and colleague Pete Livet “AI is the future of EW results from deciding which RF signals are important, what is needed to respond to those targeted signals with the ability to anticipate" What if "and pre-emptively adapt to the predicted threat"
All information contained in this document can be found on open sources. And some of them are the result of my experience as an Electronic Warfare specialist.
SCENARIO
In a state of conflict stated where the missile threat is known, the Task Force Commander must use one of the ships of the Naval Force in Goalkeeper or Escort Unit (EU) Role. Unit should be chosen in according to the state of efficiency of the "Softkills" and "Hardkill” (HK/SK) systems embarked on protecting the unit considered High-Value Target (HVT) or Mission Essential Unit (MEU).
Given that ECM techniques are subject to continuous verification and study. Implementing tactics is successful if a certain amount of information must be collected, like characteristics of Radiofrequency (RF) missile threat and "HardKill/Softkill" own capability
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TECHNICAL INFORMATION
To prepare the Escort Unit (EU) or Goalkeeper (GK) in the most suitable way to protect the HVU from an RF-type missile threat, in the planning stage technical information relating to the type of missile and relating to its Naval Units with the ability to perform the task must be collected EU Technical characteristics of the Active RF type threat
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领英推荐
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?BASIC CMS ARCHITECTURE
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In simplest terms, a naval combat management system is the computer and software that integrates all a ship’s weapons, data, sensors, and other equipment into a single system. Basically, it allows the crew to counter threats faster and more efficiently, especially during combat or security operations.
Combat management systems perform six key functions:
?BASIC ELECTRONIC WARFARE SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
The Electronic Warfare System is an advanced battle resource to maximize the performance of EW missions. The system optimizes the utilization of EW-related assets, such as electronic support measures (ESM) and EA systems.?
An EW System is an additional layer of Command and Control that provides crucial recommendations and insights that enable decision-makers to plan and monitor assets, anticipate events, and take actions in real-time.?
EW SYSTEM BASIC FEATURES
Electronic Attack?– Quick Overwiev
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Action taken do detect, intercept, identify, locate, record and analyse sources of radiate electromagnetic energy for the purpose of threat recognition (such as Radar lock-on on to a combat vehicle, ship or aircraft) and Operational
Electronic Jamming – The deliberate radiating, re-radiation or reflection of EM energy with the object of impairing the effectiveness of hostile electronic device, equipment or system.
Electronic Deception-The deliberate rad/re-radiation, alteration absorption or reflection of EM energy in a manner intended to confuse, distract or seduce an enemy or his electronic systems.
·??????Imitation
·??????Manipulation
·??????Simulation
Electronic neutralization- The deliberate use of EM energy to either temporarily or permanently damage enemy devises which rely exclusively on the EM spectrum
Electronic Deception may be sub-divided into:
???Imitation: The intro of EM energy into enemy system that imitates or alter enemy emissions with the intention of misleading hostile forces.
??Manipulation: the alteration of friendly EM emission to avoid revealing, or to convey false indication with the intention of misleading hostile forces.
??Simulation: the creation of EM emissions to represent assumed or actual friendly capabilities with the intention of misleading hostile forces.
Radar Jamming
?????????Radar jamming
??Noise
??False Target
????????Radar ECM strategies include:
??Radar Interference – Jamming & Deception
??Target modification
??Changing the electrical properties of the atmosphere
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Jamming is accomplished by a friendly platform transmitting signal on the RADAR frequency to produce a noise level sufficient to hide echoes. The jammer continuous transmissions will provide a clear direction to the hostile RADAR but no range information. Deception may use a transponder to mimic the RADAR echo with delay to indicate incorrect range. Transponder may alternatively increase return echo strength to make a small decoy appear to be a larger target. Target modification include RADAR absorbing coating and modification of the surface ship to either ?stealth? a High Value Target?(HVT) or enhance reflections from a decoy.
Dispersal of small aluminium strips called chaff is a method of changing the electromagnetic properties of air to provide confusing RADAR echoes.
GENERIC ECM SYSTEM
The generic Jamming Architecture shows a receive antenna that connect to either CW or pulse repeating capabilities, which in turn can be selected or have a synthesiser source for the downstream modulators, which in turn are beam formed for transmission.
A number of jamming channels can be used and are combined before beam forming which allows the received signal or the synthesised sources to be modulated in different ways and then combined providing a very flexible signal source generation architecture. The modulators and sources selected can be controlled using the selection, iteration, sequence, and concurrency execution paradigms (AOC EW Saudi Arabia (3rd), 2013, p13).
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Richard-Rudd-Orthner
METHOD OF PROCESSING TECHNICAL INFORMATION
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The technical information should calculate into a jammer equation (JSRn), which increases from the ratio of the jammer powers involved and the seeker.
Some of the technical information collected falls within the function mentioned above. Therefore, the values of the parameters defined are listed below
·??????Missile speed, maximum acquisition distance.
·??????ERPs.
·??????Seeker beamwidth.
·??????Distance of the missile from the HVU at the time of the seeker goes into "lock-on" on the HVU.
·??????Distance between the HVU and the EU.
·??????ERPj.
·??????BWj / BWs = 1; the ratio between the bandwidth in which the jammer works and the one in which the seeker works.
·??????RCS (HVU).
The JSRn jammer equation is therefore simplified and traced back to the relationship between the effective power radiated by the jammer (ERPj) and that radiated by the missile seeker
(ERPs), expressed in dB into a function jammer equation (JSRn) increased from the ratio of the jammer powers involved and the seeker.
TRHEAT ENGAGEMENT WORKFLOW
Once this technical information has been acquired, we can program the automatic Electronic Counter Measure techniques against the missile threat, which in coordination with?Hard Kill systems, we will know when and where to place the decoy, when and if to activate any electronic contrasts in coordination with the Decoy. Launch System (DLS) we will be able to indicate the best route to offer less RCS to the threat
THREAT ENGAGEMENT PLAN