Due process and Personal Data Compliance Law: same rules, one Goal (GCEU, Order, October 29, 2020, Facebook Ireland Ltd v/ E.C.)

When situations become too complicated, go to the basic rules.

For instance in the case Facebook , some of them.

Because American tech firms may include trials and administrative pursuits in their costs and strategy (what Regulators, Courts and States must also do).

But it is not because some internalize this perspective, using the sort of inefficiency which are the procedural rules (- procedure is by nature so long, so protecting for the person accused, with proves so difficult to articulate -) that it is admissible to throw away Law to go directly to the punishment.

Because Law is made for everyone. For the small and big ones, for the weak and strong ones. For example for Facebook.

As the Order, released on the 29th October 2020 by the President of the General Court of Justice of the European Union, Facebook Ireland Ltd v/European Commission, shows it, in a balance between the European Commission and Facebook, issuing a very concrete solution satisfying both.

THE PROCEDURAL CASE FACEBOOK IRELAND LTD V/E.U.

During a procedure opened for allegation of antitrust violation, on 13 March 2019 the European Commission sent a request to Facebook Ireland Ltd, for information comprised of more than 100 unique questions, concerning various aspects of the applicant’s business and product offering, then on 30 August 2019 a request for information comprised of 83 unique questions regarding Facebook Marketplace, social networking and online classified advertisement providers, then on 11 November 2019 a request to provide , inter alia, a number of internal documents meeting certain cumulative criteria, namely documents that were prepared by or for, or received by, certain custodians; were dated from 1 January 2013 until the date of the decision on 11 November 2019 and contained certain search terms or search query syntaxes, those that Facebook had itself used to select the document previously for satisfying the precedent E.U.'s demands.

Immediately, Facebook has contested this demand, regarding the principles of necessity, of proportionality and justification. Further on by a new decision on 4 May 2020, the European Commission restrained the scope but provided a potential penalty payment of 8 million per day for non-compliance if its request wouldn't be executed, while the E.C. Director General sent a letter to Facebook, proposing a separate procedure for the production of documents containing sensitive data (which would be examined in a virtual data room and only after this filter put in the file or not) and the others.

After discussion between both on how this virtual data room could function, on 12 June 2020 the European Commission agreed to extend the delay for Facebook to communicate information until 27 July 2020 but on July 15 Facebook contested the 4 May 2020 decision before the General Court of the European Union, asking its annulment and asking the Court's President an interim measure to suspend its effects or to organize differently the examination of documents in an alternative procedure. Everyone agreed for the suspension of the operation decided by the contested E.U. decision until the President Court's decision.

During this procedure, Facebook informed the Court that 645 459 documents of the 729 417 documents requested under the contested decision would be provided to the Commission, the contestation remaining about 83 958 documents.

In its Order, referring to articles of TFUE and case law, the Court President says, first of all, that he has the power to "if he considers that circumstances so require, order that the operation of an act contested before the General Court be suspended or prescribe any necessary interim measures" but he underlies "the principle that actions do not have suspensory effect, since acts adopted by the institutions of the European Union are presumed to be lawful", the suspension being in consequence adopted "only exceptionally". The judge does it "if it is established that such an order is justified, prima facie, in fact and in law, and that it is urgent in so far as, in order to avoid serious and irreparable harm to the applicant’s interests, it must be made and produce its effects before a decision is reached in the main action. Those conditions are cumulative, and consequently an application for interim measures must be dismissed if any one of them is not satisfied".

By method, the decision clarifies the scope of the contestation : it is only the remaining 83 958 documents, which "may be divided into the following categories: – documents containing purely personal information: the applicant cites, by way of example, exchanges between natural persons and their partners and children, documents containing personal security arrangements, documents relating to the guardianship of children, documents relating to personal wills, correspondence at a times of great personal distress, correspondence with doctors and other medical professionals and documents relating to human resources management, such as documents relating to personal time off, workplace complaints and compensation; – documents containing personal opinions and political engagement: the applicant cites, by way of example, documents which describe the personal political opinions of its employees and senior executives, documents relating to its role in supporting the integrity of democratic elections, personal correspondence of natural persons or correspondence with Heads of State, government officials, regulators, philanthropic organisations and public figures on matters such as combating terrorism, combating crime, law enforcement and cybersecurity; – documents engaging the applicant’s right to privacy: it cites, by way of example, documents relating to the security assessments of its premises and documents concerning disputes between its employees; – documents relating to the applicant’s business activities: it cites, by way of example, documents relating to its efforts as regards diversity issues, documents relating to its website content moderation activities, commercially sensitive documents regarding its tax affairs, stock market announcements, or the licensing of sports content". The Court noticed "the delimitation of the four categories and the classification of the documents is a difficult exercise, since certain documents may fall within several categories".

Secondly, the Court examines the prima facie requirement. Facebook has alleged the violation of the principles of legal certainty, state reasons and rights of defence, the principles of necessity, the privacy rights, the principle of proportionality.

The Court refers to the case law to affirm "the Commission is entitled to require the disclosure only of information which may enable it to investigate the presumed infringements which justify the conduct of the investigation and are set out in the request for information" ; this is why the necessity is controlled through the judicial review thanks to the precision given by the Commission. As the Court says : "Since the necessity of the information must be judged in relation to the purpose stated in the request for information, that purpose must be indicated with sufficient precision, otherwise it will be impossible to determine whether the information is necessary and the EU judicature will be prevented from exercising judicial review.

Under these consideration, the Court continues: "As regards the Court’s power of review over that assessment by the Commission, it should be noted that, according to the case-law, the concept of ‘necessary information’ must be interpreted by reference to the objectives for the achievement of which the powers of investigation in question have been conferred upon the Commission. Thus, the requirement that a correlation must exist between the request for information and the presumed infringement will be satisfied as long as, at that stage in the procedure, the request may legitimately be regarded as having a connection with the presumed infringement, in the sense that the Commission may reasonably suppose that the information will help it to determine whether the alleged infringement has taken place".

But in this case, the Court notices "the documents requested under the contested decision were identified on the basis of wideranging search terms, some of which consist of frequently used or very common words, such as ‘big question’, ‘for free’, ‘shut down’ and ‘not good for us’. It is therefore hardly surprising that the application of those search terms would lead to the obligation to produce documents unrelated to the subject matter of the request for information".

The allegation articulated by the European Commission, as "it is inevitable that they may capture some documents that actually prove not to be directly relevant to the investigation" is not sufficient, because for the court it is important to keep in mind that the grief of disproportionality is based on the fact of the contested decision is not accompanied by a method which allows irrelevant documents to be excluded, the dispute between the parties being related "in particular to the appropriate method and the modalities of verifying the relevance of the documents requested and therefore to the question whether, in the absence of such a method, the request for information would be contrary to the principles of necessity and proportionality".

The Court says "it must be borne in mind" that the communication demand is not the sole legal way for the European Commission to obtain information: it may use the way of inspection, As the Court notices: "In the course of inspections, the Commission may make copies of potentially relevant electronic documents for the purposes of the investigation in order to examine them subsequently with a view to their actual relevance for the investigation.".

The Court insists on the fact that "the rules applicable to inspections should necessarily be at least as strict as those applicable to responses to requests for information and that those rules do not preclude its officials from taking a cursory look at documents potentially containing private data.", because in these "invasive" procedure, the undertaking must have "certain procedural guarantees".

For instance, "those guarantees provide, inter alia, that documents of a nonbusiness nature, that is to say, documents not relating to the market activities of the undertaking are excluded from the scope of the Commission’s investigatory powers".

Referring to the similar case Nexans France and Nexans v Commission case, to which the Commission refers itself, the Commission must respect the rights of defence of the undertaking concerned when it assesses whether the data is relevant to the subject matter of the inspection, before placing the documents found to be relevant in the file and deleting the remainder of the copied data.

The Court appreciates the present request made to Facebook for information as "very similar to such an inspection, since the applicant must produce a large number of documents collected on its servers on the basis of search terms, the relevance of which will be assessed by the Commission only at a later stage. No additional specific measures are provided for to ensure respect for the rights of the undertaking concerned in view of the number of documents requested and the strong likelihood that many of those documents will not be necessary for the purposes of the Commission’s investigation. ".

The Court concludes : "it is not unreasonable to consider that, in the light of the format and scope of the request for information, a level of protection similar to that guaranteed" for an inspection, this respect no stopping the Commission in its ability " to identify, among the large number of documents which correspond to the search terms, the documents which are relevant for the purposes of the Commission’s investigation". In the same way of reasoning, the Court estimates that the principles of necessity and proportionality do not "cease to apply to request for information".

Applying these considerations in the concrete situation, the Court concludes the non-compliance of the E.C. contested decision, based on: "in view of the wide-ranging nature of the search terms and taking into account the likelihood that those terms will capture a large number of documents which are not necessarily relevant to the Commission’s investigation, it cannot be ruled out at this stage that, in the absence of a method of verification accompanied by appropriate and specific guarantees designed to safeguard the rights of the persons concerned".

After that, the Court examines the compliance with the fundamental right to privacy, based on person's rights and freedoms, any limitation respecting "the essence of those rights and freedoms". These limitations are "subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations" and" may be imposed only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others".

The Court insists on the scope and the force of rights contained in the European Union Charter and the European Convention of Human Rights which are the same. As the case law has said, the privacy right is concerned by the exercice power of inspection and "That reasoning appears to be transposable to the present case in the context of the powers" exercised by a communication request.

The Court continues: "it should be noted that the exercise of the powers conferred on the Commission by Regulation No 1/2003 contributes to the maintenance of the system of competition intended by the Treaties, with which undertakings are absolutely bound to comply. The contested decision, which was adopted on the basis of Regulation No 1/2003, therefore meets objectives of general interest recognised by the European Union.".

But under the condition of Necessity, the Court examines in particular some very sensitive personal data (such medical data, or stories of personal great distress), estimating that "it should be noted that, in view of the extremely personal and sensitive nature of medical data, the treatment of that data requires a particularly rigorous examination". Citing among several regulations the GDPR, the Court insists on these European legal provisions "for a higher level of protection for data in special categories, namely personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership, genetic data, biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, data concerning health or data concerning a natural person’s sex life or sexual orientation".

In "that context", the Commission has insisted on the EU institutions may lawfully process personal data where it ‘is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the Union institution or body’ and has produced a letter of October 22, 2018 from the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) saying that ‘processing such personal data is necessary to fulfill the tasks assigned to the Commission as public authority enforcing EU competition rules’, the European Commission concluding that the GDPR does not prevent the submission of information personal data to E.U. institutions. But for the Court, if the GDPR does not prevent that, the Commission "must respect the limits to its powers", the collect of information must respect the necessity and proportionality principles and the concerned persons' rights,which is not in the present case.

After that, the Court examines the urgency requirement. It reminds the "objective": "it should be borne in mind that the purpose of the procedure for interim relief is to guarantee the full effectiveness of the future final decision, in order to prevent a lacuna in the legal protection afforded by the EU judicature.".

As the Court says, the applicant "must demonstrate that it cannot await the outcome of the main proceedings without suffering serious and irreparable damage.", even if it is sufficient to show the "sufficient degree of probability" of the foreseeable damage. In this case, Facebook alleged the damage would be the violation of fundamental rights to privacy made by the disclosure itself, by the use of irrelevant documents by the Commission for opening new investigations or proposing new sectorial regulations, by the privation of effective judicial protection. In response the Commission said it is not possible to give the same scope to the violation of fundamental rights and the existence of harm, and the Court affirms the requirement of "the likelihood of such harm occurring in his or her particular case", leading "to analyse, first, whether serious and irreparable harm results from the breach of the applicant’s right to privacy and, secondly, whether such harm results from the breach of individuals’ right to privacy"

Facebook alleged these damages are "impossible to assess" but the Court notes "the argument that harm is, by definition, serious and irreparable because it comes within the scope of fundamental freedoms cannot be accepted since it is not sufficient to allege infringement of fundamental rights in the abstract for the purpose of establishing that the harm which could result would necessarily be serious and irreparable. It remains for the party seeking the adoption of interim measures to set out and establish the likelihood of such harm occurring in his or her particular case".

The Court must " first, whether serious and irreparable harm results from the breach of the applicant’s right to privacy and, secondly, whether such harm results from the breach of individuals’ right to privacy". After having analysed some previous judgments and showing their solution must not be retaken in the present case, the Court concludes that "the applicant has not shown that it would suffer serious and irreparable harm as a result of the disclosure to the Commission of the documents".

But about the allegation of a "serious and irreparable harm as a result of the fact that personal data will be placed on the file and examined by any person having access", the Court underlies that the Commission officials are bound by confidentiality obligations preventing them to use information for other purposes unless the information has been already gone public and the verification of documents by the Commission cannot cause harm in itself. But these documents contain sensitive personal data. The Court notices: "Since that data is shared only in the most private sphere, any undue extension of the circle of third parties who have knowledge of it may cause serious and irreparable harm to the persons concerned.". European Union Law "provide for increased protection for data falling within certain specific categories, in particular data revealing political opinions or data concerning an individual’s health.".... It stated in particular that, regardless of the confidentiality rules under which those data had been processed, taking into account the extremely intimate and sensitive nature of the medical data, the applicant could legitimately have felt injured.".

The Court concludes: "... enlargement of the circle of persons with knowledge of sensitive personal data risks causing serious harm to the persons concerned by that data. ... As regards the irreversible nature of the harm, it should be noted that the annulment of the contested decision could not reverse the effects of the disclosure of the data, since awareness of that information by the persons who read it is immediate and irreversible. ".

European Commission having alleged that Facebook must prove the damage not only for its employees but also for itself, the Court responses that "It is true that, according to settled case-law, the applicant must show that the suspension of operation sought is necessary for the protection of its own interests and it cannot, for the purpose of establishing urgency, plead damage which is not personal to it, such as, for example, damage to the rights of third parties." but for the Court," the present case is particular in that the contested decision imposes on the applicant a positive obligation to search for all of its electronic files on the basis of broad search terms and to communicate to the Commission the documents responding to those search terms, even if those documents contain sensitive personal data. Moreover, this is an obligation addressed by name to the applicant and not to the natural persons concerned, an obligation which the applicant must discharge within a strict time period and on pain of a periodic penalty payment".

Moreover, the Court insists that the Commission requires Facebook "to process sensitive personal data.". For the Court, the EDPS's letter "does not address the problem in the present case. First, it states that the EDPS has no supervisory powers over economic operators which are supervised by the national data protection authorities in the Member States as regards data protection compliance. Secondly, the documents at issue in the present case may be characterised as special categories of personal data within the meaning of Article 9 of the GDPR to which increased protection is granted. However, the processing of those special categories of data was not addressed in the EDPS’s letter".

The Court concludes the urgency requirement is satisfied as regards to the disclosure of documents containing sensitive personal data, "the alleged harm resulting from the disclosure of information to third parties" such as competitors, Facebook affirming that the communication to the Commission transforms the information as "disclosable in other jurisdictions, in particular to individuals who have instituted proceedings in the United States". But the Court notices that "the applicant is the only party which could have full access to the file if the Commission were to open a formal investigation and issue a statement of objections. In the event that complainants were to make a request for access, it should be noted that they could request access only to the non-confidential version of the documents. Where the Commission intends to disclose information, the applicant must be able to provide a non-confidential version of the documents. Moreover, the contested decision expressly invites the applicant to provide non-confidential versions of its responses to the contested decision.".

"In the event that the Commission receives a request ...for disclosure of documents collected pursuant to the contested decision, it should be noted, first, that it is unlikely that the documents and information gathered by the Commission pursuant to the contested decision would be communicated to third parties immediately, or even before the Court rules on the application for annulment of the contested decision in the main action.

The Court insists on the possibility to communicate the non-confidential version, in these terms: "it should be pointed out that, even if the documents and information gathered by the Commission pursuant to the contested decision could be disclosed to third parties or to other undertakings which are the subject of the Commission’s investigation, such disclosure would relate only to the non-confidential parts of those documents, since the business secrets and commercial interests of the applicant would remain protected by the provisions of European Regulations and case law". Moreover, "the Commission is required to inform the applicant of a request made by a third party. In such a situation, if the applicant were to consider that disclosure of those documents was likely to cause it serious and irreparable harm, it could apply for an interim measure suspending the operation of the Commission’s decision to disclose the documents in question".

Concerning the alleged harm possibly caused by the communication to other jurisdictions and especially the United States, through the disclosability of the documents, the Court estimates that "the applicant’s allegation is in no way substantiated such as to demonstrate with a sufficient degree of probability the occurrence of imminent serious and irreparable harm."

Concerning the alleged harm resulting from the Commission’s use of the documents at issue in the context of investigations into potential infringements of competition law which have not yet been identified by the Commission or notified to the applicant, or for proposing new sectorial regulations, the Court notes that if the contested decision were annulled, the use by the Commission would not be possible, as evidence or basis for anything, the description by the applicant of an unlawfully use by the Commission being " purely theoretical, and in any event improbable", as the use for a future adoption of sectorial new rules is "purely speculative and hypothetical". The privation alleged by Facebook of the judicial protection by the production of documents, which are proofs, is - for the Court - not demonstrated as a distinct harm from the harm resulting form the violation of the privacy right.

The Court concludes that the urgency requirement is only established "only as regards the purely personal documents containing sensitive personal data".

After that, the Court examines the balancing of interest, e.i. "whether or not the interest of the party seeking interim measures in obtaining suspension of the operation of the contested act outweighs the interest in its immediate implementation.".

For that, the Court examines "whether the possible annulment of that act by the judgment on the substance would make it possible to reverse the situation that would have been brought about by its immediate implementation and, conversely, whether suspension of its operation would be such as to impede the objectives pursued by the contested act in the event of the main action being dismissed".

In this case, the balance is between "the interest in preventing serious and irreparable harm being caused by the enlargement of the circle of persons with knowledge of sensitive personal data" and "the public interest in preserving the effectiveness of EU competition rules".

The Court reminds that " it is for the Commission to decide whether a particular item of information is necessary in order to enable it to bring to light an infringement of the competition rules". If the legal rule was not in this sense, the Court approves the Commission remark, according "the undertaking under investigation or its lawyers could themselves establish which documents were, in their view, relevant for the purposes of its investigation, that would seriously undermine its powers of investigation, with the risk that documents that it might regard as relevant for the purposes of its investigation would be omitted and never presented to it, in the absence of any possibility of verification".

But the Court noticed "the harm caused to the applicant because it is obliged to communicate documents containing sensitive personal data in breach of the right to privacy of individuals", that " would entail the undue extension of the circle of persons with knowledge of that data in the absence of specific measures to protect the persons concerned.".

This is why the Court concludes : "In those circumstances, and taking into account the state of play of the discussions between the parties concerning the means of verifying the documents at issue, as reflected in the applicant’s letter of 8 September 2020 and in the Commission’s observations lodged on 17 September 2020, it is appropriate to provide for an ad hoc procedure for the examination of documents likely to contain sensitive personal data. ".

This alternative procedure will be :

• "... first, it is for the applicant to identify the documents containing sensitive personal data and to communicate them to the Commission on a separate electronic medium.
• Secondly, those documents will be placed in a virtual data room which will be accessible to as limited a number as possible of members of the team responsible for the investigation, in the presence (virtual or physical) of an equivalent number of the applicant’s lawyers.
• Thirdly, the members of the team responsible for the investigation will examine and select the documents in question, while giving the applicant’s lawyers the opportunity to comment on them before placing the documents considered relevant on the file. In the event of disagreement as to the classification of a document, the contested document will not be added to the investigation file and the applicant’s lawyers will have the right to explain the reasons for their disagreement. In the event of continuing disagreement, the applicant’s lawyers may ask the Director for Information, Communication and Media at DG Competition to resolve the disagreement. ".

In conclusion, the operation of Article 1 of the contested decision must be suspended in so far as that provision relates to documents containing sensitive personal data and for as long as this procedure has not been put in place.

THREE LESSONS FROM THE PROCEDURAL CASE FACEBOOK

In this Order, many sentences begin by "It must be borne in mind..." to obtain the respect of basis rules. Because Competition Law, Regulatory Law and Compliance Law are often so "complex" that basis rules risk to be forgotten. If this happens, the risk is to take solution case by case, while general rules are required, simple and clear. This Order imposes the return to them.

First lesson from the procedural case Facebook (President CJUE Order, 29 October 2020): Compliance Law and Processual Law give the same solutions, because they have the same goal

It is so frequent to place in opposition the Economic Law (for instance Competition Law) and the Procedural Law (for instance the rights of defence). The respect of procedure would be a sort of price to be paid for a democratic legal system, harming the efficiency of the substantial Economic Law... For instance, it would be so efficient to obtain every document for proving the fact of behaviors harming Competition but it is not possible because protecting the procedural guarantees is required...

It would work like communicating vases. And it works often like communicating vases. The temptation is strong to increase the vase of efficiency and decrease the vase of procedural guarantees. In this move, Compliance Law, which is centralized on the captation of Information and its transmission, would fill the vase of economic efficiency and empties the vase of procedural guarantees.... (in this sort of battle between Law and Economics, Economics should gain, and Law would just become "regulation"..., this simple formal instrument, under Economics, a simple tool..).

But this Order shows this presentation is not correct. "Processual Law" - which is the branch of Law containing commun procedural rules in all particular procedures - is not only efficient, thanks to the discussion between parties enlightening the judge, but is also required for the economic prosperity, as many recent official reports have repeated it.

Moreover, Compliance Law is defined by its goal. The European Compliance Law has taken the protection of human beings, notably through the personal data protection, as the President of the General Court writes in the book "Pour une Europe de la Compliance" (2019).

In this Order, the two justifications to suspend the European Commission's decision are the same: violation of procedural rights (- principles of necessity and proportionality ; assimilation between legal rules for inspection procedure and communication injonction -) and violation of right of privacy, with a very precise distinction between the situation of the firm itself and the situation of the natural persons concerned by the cercle of who can know Information, cercle which must not be enlarged.

Its is remarkable to obtain the same result by application of Compliance Law and by application of Processual Law. The two branchs of Law in the European conception have so much in common. Because both are centralized on Information and both protect persons.

In this quite short Order, the Court takes the time to explain why it does not follow the EDPS's opinion, because the Court considers the European data protection body is right in general but not in this very particular case and only about the very sensible personal data and only concerning natural persons.

Articulating by this way the compatibility between the EDPS's letter and its own decision, the Court prevents an opposition in Europe concerning the protection of persons, which is the goal of the European Compliance Law (see another articulation between EDPS and European Banking Authority).

Second lesson from the procedural case Facebook (President GCUE Order, 29 October 2020): finding an immediate solution

It is never a good solution to sanction, for instance suspend the European Commission injonction to communicate (obliging it to begin an inspection), without concrete immediate solution.

This is why the Court organizes this "alternative procedure", the work of an effective communication (what the European Commission wanted) in the respect of Facebook and its employees rights (what the applicant wanted).

By this way, this is a sort of trial which is organized, with a sort of application of the contradictory principle : discussion of the documents by Facebook's lawyers, right to protest (the rights of defence are the extension of the contradictory principle), right to a sort of appeal).

In this sense, the applicant's argument about the due process violation has been taken indirectly in consideration.

Third lesson from the procedural case Facebook (President CJUE Order, 29 October 2020): everyone being equal before Law and Justice, the burden of proof must organize the behavior of everyone

The Court insists on the presumption of European Commission's lawfully behavior, and more generally for the action of Public Bodies. As the contract is supposed to be valid, as the action of a person is supposed to be licit, the action of the European Commission is supposed to be conform to the Law.

This is to the one who contests this "conformity" to bring the proof of the violation.

But this general rule is modified if someone can claim a right (here a right provided by Compliance Law, the right to the privacy, notably organized by the GDPR).

In this case, the margins of the public body, for instance the European Commission, change, framed by the principles of necessity and proportionality. And after that, balance must be made between these rights protection and the effectivity of public order (in this case Competition Law), with the specific protection for the very sensible personal data.

This Order demonstrates the necessity for everyone to preconstitute the proof of the lawfully of the action, for public bodies and for enterprises, because Compliance Law protects the efficiency of public action (information) but also the efficiency of rights it had given (secret).

The best Ex Ante is the one which anticipates the Ex Post, by the preconstitution of proofs and the design of proof burdens.

The future of Compliance will be for entreprises and public bodies :

• the anticipation of proofs mechanism
• obtaining rights

Because in this "pulverization" as Carbonnier said, of the objective system of Competition, Regulatory and Compliance Law in a multitude of subjective rights (given by Courts or regulations - for example the "right to be forgotten"- ), the future will be the detention of rights and the preconstitution of proofs.

This future is already here.

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