Drafting decisions – getting to consensus
Paul Watkinson
Négociateur et facilitateur international expérimenté, expert de haut niveau sur les changements climatiques, ouvert aux options pour contribuer davantage à l'action internationale face aux changements climatiques
The way by which decisions of the Conference of the Parties (COP) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, the Convention) are prepared is complex.[1] From the outside, it may sometimes look as if the final decisions are just proposed by the president, no doubt with help from the secretariat, and then gavelled to the applause – or complaints – of parties in the closing plenary. In practice, drafting is a collective, iterative process that involves many players, at the technical and the political level, and the preparation of decisions runs throughout the conference. Getting to that final success can be a long, twisting, tiring and sometimes painful path.
Parties regularly insist that work in the UNFCCC process should be “party-driven,” that they expect their proposals to be the basis for negotiations, and for outcomes to be based on those proposals. This is closely linked to the need for negotiations to be inclusive, transparent and open. When those conditions are not met, the necessary trust and confidence, both in the process and in the president, the chairs and their facilitators, may break down and make it hard, if not impossible, to get to consensus.[2] Parties rarely welcome it when they are presented with draft outcomes that are not rooted in their own proposals.[3]
On the other hand, a process that is driven only by the parties may fail to reach agreement. Getting results requires leadership and active management of the negotiating process. The president, with the support of the secretariat, and in close cooperation with the chairs of the subsidiary bodies, has the task of making a successful outcome possible and guiding parties to that conclusion. The wording of the final decisions will largely be drawn from proposals made by parties themselves in successive iterations of the text, but to turn that language into an agreed decision the president has to play the role of an active arbiter, fine-tuning drafts, bringing in compromise language at the right moment, helping parties to take, and assume, the choices that are necessary to overcome the final differences among them.
The decisions that constitute the outcomes of the work of the COP, the CMP and the CMA aim to capture or provide an overview of progress on each item on their agendas and give guidance on next steps to ensure the full implementation of the Convention, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement. A successful conference is one where on the last day parties can agree to adopt those decisions, feeling that the final versions belong to them all, even if none can say they are entirely theirs. No-one will be totally happy with the results, but no-one should feel they have been the losers from the deal. It may not always be easy to get to the end of that path, but that is the challenge of getting to consensus.
This note aims to describe how decisions are prepared, with a focus on how the presidency can prepare and organise the second week to get to consensus on all items:
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1. Work under the subsidiary bodies and technical work under the governing bodies
The development of a decision of the COP is an iterative process that most often begins under the subsidiary bodies – often in their first session of the year in May or June, but sometimes only in their second session held during the first week of the COP. The subsidiary bodies also develop substantive conclusions on certain of their agenda items. Some issues such as finance are addressed in negotiator-level consultations directly under the COP, CMP or CMA, but the broad approach to developing the text is the same as that under the subsidiary bodies. The aim is for all the negotiated outcomes of the COP to be finalised under the subsidiary bodies or in technical work directly under the COP.
1.1. Getting going – developing the basis for work
The starting point for any negotiation is the mandate. This will usually have been given by a past decision of one of the governing bodies which will, inter alia, have defined the issue to address, specified which body (usually one or both of the subsidiary bodies) should undertake the preparatory work, the timeline to prepare a draft for consideration and approval by a future session of the governing body, and any invitations for parties to make inputs, such as submissions, or the organisation of workshops.
At the opening of the session, the subsidiary bodies will first adopt their agendas, including all mandated items, then each chair will set out how they propose to organise work during the session. For most items, the chair will set up a negotiating group (a contact group or informal consultations) and invite two negotiators, usually one from a developing country and one from a developed country, to facilitate the work on that item.[5],[6] The president of the COP will likewise propose setting up negotiating groups, and invite facilitators to run them, on certain technical issues that are handled directly under the governing bodies.
Unlike some other multilateral processes, there is no generalised practice of charging the secretariat or chairs to prepare a first draft of a decision ahead of the session. As a result, when parties meet for the first time to address an item during the session, there is usually no draft on the table. Instead, a draft text has to be constructed during the first few meetings. There are some exceptions, for example where the previous session prepared a first, unfinished draft and forwarded it for further consideration so that parties could continue where they left off. Another possibility is that the previous session gave a mandate to the chair or chairs to prepare a draft text, but this has been used sparingly, and usually with reservations and restrictions on the status of the document so produced.[7]
There may be information on the table that can help get the preparation of a text off to a good start. A previous decision or conclusion may have invited parties to submit their views ahead of the meeting where work is due to begin on an item, and in some cases may also have called on the secretariat to produce a synthesis of parties’ views. If there are submissions from parties, they can provide a valuable input to work and a basis for assembling options for an initial text: that does depend, however, on there being submissions from a representative range of parties and groups to reflect the overall balance of positions. If there have been workshops ahead of the session, they may also provide a helpful input since parties will have had exchanges before arriving at the session, a chance to start clarifying the issues, setting out their positions, bringing out the areas and issues of divergence, and identifying possible ways forward. There may be a report from the workshop. Other inputs might include a technical paper or analysis produced by the secretariat in response to a past request, or a report from a constituted body.[8]
The first task of most negotiating groups is therefore to agree the basis for work and to develop a draft text. Facilitators may start their consultations by inviting parties and groups to present the ideas that figure in their submissions (if they have made them), and to reflect on the outcomes of any intersessional work such as a workshop or any other inputs that had been requested.
If the discussion goes well, the facilitators may be able to get a mandate to prepare a text after the first meeting, drawing on the inputs they have received or heard from parties. However, it may take longer to get to that point, especially if there had been no intersessional work to build on.
In many cases, the first text that the facilitators present to parties at the following meeting will take the form of an outline, or list of bullets, rather than a fully worked up draft conclusion or decision – identifying the key issues to be addressed, indicating the possible structure of a decision, and starting to sketch out the range of options and areas of disagreement that need to be resolved based on the interventions, submissions and other contributions made by parties.
As they prepare such a text, the facilitators will benefit from the invaluable support of the secretariat which will usually have undertaken preparatory work ahead of the session, drawing on the work of previous sessions, on any submissions or other inputs, and their knowledge of parties’ positions. The facilitators need to pay particular attention to ensuring that the draft is well-balanced and reflects accurately the positions and the range of views that parties have expressed, both in any submissions and in the meeting room.
The iterative approach, starting from a draft produced by the facilitators with a mandate from parties, is often the most effective way to proceed, but it is not always what happens. Parties may be reticent to give a mandate to facilitators, especially when positions are highly polarised – indeed, this reluctance to give mandates to facilitators has been a complicating factor in managing the UNFCCC process over the years. On occasions, a party or group of parties may submit a draft text of their own at the start of the negotiations. They may request this to be issued as a conference room paper (CRP). There may even be several proposals from different groups. Meanwhile, some parties may indicate that they are not ready to engage on a draft proposed by another group of parties as the sole basis for negotiations. This could lead to a situation where there are several competing bases for negotiation. That would be undesirable, so effective facilitators will seek ways to encourage parties to bring all of their proposals into a single document. At the very least, the secretariat may be requested to make a compilation of all the proposals. But the facilitators may try again to get a mandate from parties to produce a consolidated text which places different proposals as options side-by-side in a common structure, or at least to help the parties ensure that the positions of all groups and parties are reflected in just one of the draft proposals. If they fail to get agreement on this, then trying to work on multiple proposals in parallel could lead to a blockage.
1.2. Iterating the text – identifying convergence, clarifying divergence, seeking consensus
The first draft will serve as the basis for a further discussion among parties who will react to the proposal and indicate in more detail what they wish to include in the decision, as well as what they do not think should be included. They may provide oral proposals during the meeting, offer to submit further proposals in writing, or draw attention to specific elements in their earlier submissions.
The facilitators may encourage parties to work on areas of possible convergence, seeking agreement on paragraphs or sections of the draft where positions are relatively close. They may seek to ensure that options on the critical areas of disagreement accurately reflect the range of views of parties on the key outstanding issues in as clear and simple a manner as possible. They may try to get agreement on the overall structure.
If the process is moving smoothly, the facilitators may seek a mandate to prepare a second, more elaborated draft, drawing on the further inputs they have received from parties. A second draft would start to flesh out the bullets into something that looks more like draft text, may include options in some paragraphs and on the structure, as appropriate. If the proposals from parties are detailed, these may be presented as alternatives in some sections of the draft.
Parties may work in this way through two or more drafts prepared by the facilitators that progressively bring them closer to an agreed language. As they progress, an initial outline, or a compilation of party proposals, will be more and more filled out, the structure will emerge, and options will become clearer, taking the form of alternatives, bracketed language, or a mix of both, and then start to be resolved. The structure will also be clarified to identify what elements properly belong in a draft decision going to the COP, and what elements might be appropriate to include in conclusions adopted by the subsidiary bodies, including provisions to forward the draft decision to the COP for consideration and adoption (there is standard language on this).
1.3. Breaking into smaller formats
Working through successive iterations from the facilitators followed by exchanges in the room between parties on each iteration may be enough to resolve all issues and reach agreement. But there may come a point when parties are not willing to let the facilitators make a further iteration, discussions are getting stuck, options are multiplying rather than getting fewer, and there is a growing risk of failure. It may be a good idea in such a situation to break and to encourage parties to try working in different formats, in particular to provide space and time to focus on the most contentious sections of the text.
One option is to offer parties the chance to use a meeting room to hold an “informal-informal” discussion and give them extra time to work on their own. Parties usually self-organise in such meetings, choosing a facilitator from among them, although they may request the facilitators and/or the secretariat to be present, especially to ensure that any progress is captured. For particularly complex topics, the facilitators may suggest that parties break into several spin-offs or break-outs to work on different pieces of the draft, asking other negotiators to take the lead in facilitating that work.
Formats such as “friends of the chair” have also been used where the facilitators invite a restricted group of representatives of the most active groups and parties to try to bash out a way forward. This format has been criticised for its lack of transparency and inclusion and is less common in recent years.
Another approach is for parties to talk informally among themselves in the room. This may happen spontaneously as parties form a “huddle,” assembling around the negotiators of the most actively engaged groups in the room for an unstructured, sometimes rather chaotic, but very direct exchange. Individual negotiating groups may begin by forming their own huddles to coordinate and confirm their room for manoeuvre before moving within the room to engage with other groups in a larger huddle. Indeed, the process may go back and forth between group coordination huddles and negotiation huddles across parties and groups. Sometimes individuals emerge as informal facilitators within the process, playing the role of go-between, testing ideas with different groups – this may even happen around the desk of one or several of the key negotiators who try to capture the results directly on the screens of their computers. The facilitators of the negotiating group may choose to stay out of the huddles to give parties time to work on their own, but then join them to see what progress they have made and whether to allow more time or whether to restart the meeting.
Huddles are not without problems – not everyone can participate, it can be hard to hear, and to be heard, and they can drag on too long. They can give an advantage to tall delegates, those with loud voices and good hearing, there may be a gender bias, and it may be harder to participate for those whose native language is not English. Parties sometimes complain, when work is reported back, that they had faced problems in taking part in the huddle. Parties do, however, usually try to make space and ensure that delegates speaking on behalf of groups and the individual parties most engaged in the negotiations can make their way to the centre and that their proposals can be heard. Despite these challenges, huddles can play a vital role, especially during the final meeting of a negotiating group when there is little time left to resolve the outstanding issues.
If work in a smaller setting makes progress, then those results need to be reported back to the main room at the next meeting of the full negotiating group since the smaller setting cannot formally revise the text. That may require participants who had taken part in in the smaller format to brief any members of their own negotiating groups who had not been able to participate. Likewise, if solutions are found in a huddle, the meeting will resume, and the output will be presented by one of the participants. If there is agreement in the full meeting, the compromise can be incorporated into the text. That reporting back, whether from an informal-informal, a huddle, or some other format, is a vital part of the process to ensure full inclusion and transparency. Sometimes what seems like agreement on a solution in a small group setting may fall apart when presented to the full group, requiring further work – possibly a return to a smaller setting.
Another approach is for facilitators to meet negotiating groups, and active individual parties, separately for short bilateral meetings to check positions and test options. In such a format, parties are sometimes more open about their flexibility and their conditions for accepting compromise language. Using this process can be time-consuming, but it can be an effective way to identify the possible landing ground, especially after several rounds of negotiation have taken place and views are well-known. Any results could then be brought back into an open meeting and presented to all parties as a proposal from the facilitators to see if it can unlock the deadlock.
1.4. Working on the screen
Parties making proposals for amendments from the floor may at some point ask the secretariat to project the draft text on a screen and capture their proposals as they go. Working “on the screen” can be valuable when the negotiation is well-advanced, the number of issues to resolve is limited and parties are committed to finding solutions. It can ensure that parties’ proposals are clearly captured. If parties have been discussing among themselves and are close to agreement, putting the text on the screen and trying to clean it up may be what is needed to enable everyone to take it over the final line, perhaps combined with some final huddles in the room.
However, when parties are still far apart, working on the screen can prove counter-productive and lead to the multiplication of options, with a risk that the process gets out of hand. Many facilitators understandably prefer to avoid such a phase, or to keep it as short as possible and work on the screen only when other options have been exhausted, preferring to continue working by listening to interventions and proposals, then capturing them in a full revision of the text that they prepare with the help of the secretariat. The facilitators are, of course, in the hands of the parties, but there are valid reasons for restricting the use of drafting on the screen to the final stretch of the process.
1.5. Closing the subsidiary bodies – finalising work, forwarding to the governing bodies
At some point during the conference, the work of the subsidiary bodies will be brought to a close.[9] All the negotiating groups that had been set up (contact groups, informal consultations) have to close – if possible, the day before the closing plenaries of the subsidiary bodies to allow good time for the secretariat to put the texts in the right format as “L-documents” and get them translated into all six UN languages. In practice, work on some items often continues until the last minute – creating challenges for good document management, but making use of all the time available to try to reach consensus.[10] If things have gone well, the final meetings of each negotiating group will agree the text of draft conclusions for the subsidiary bodies, as well as the text of any draft decisions that are to be forwarded to the COP, CMP or CMA for adoption. The L-documents will then be presented to the closing plenaries of the subsidiary bodies for approval.
In an optimal scenario, parties will have fully concluded their work, and the subsidiary bodies will be in the position to adopt conclusions on all issues. Many of these will take the form of procedural conclusions to forward draft decisions to the COP, CMP or CMA for approval. If the draft decision is clean, there will usually be no need for any further work under the governing bodies and the draft decision can subsequently be presented for adoption in a plenary session of the COP, CMP or CMA during the second week. The subsidiary bodies may also adopt substantive conclusions on some issues that do not involve further action by the governing bodies.[11]
However, it is not always be possible to wrap things up so neatly and negotiations under the subsidiary bodies may fail to reach agreement on all agenda items.
If during the subsidiary body session held during the first week of the COP parties have made progress on a draft decision, but have not reached full consensus, they may prepare procedural conclusions for the subsidiary bodies to forward the draft to the COP, CMP or CMA for further consideration. That approach is sometimes appropriate for some of the more politically contentious issues that were unlikely to be fully resolved at a technical level.[12] It will then be at the discretion of the president to propose whether, and if so how, to organise work on that issue under the governing bodies with a view to finding agreement before the closing of the conference. Although there will regularly be a small number of such issues that do require further work under the governing bodies, it is important that the president and the chairs maintain pressure during the first week on parties, that are sometimes relaxed about “sending the issue to ministers,” to make clear that unfinished issues under the subsidiary bodies will not automatically be taken up by the governing bodies and that by default they should be sent to the next meeting of the subsidiary bodies for further work, in the way that is set out in the following paragraphs.
If parties have not found consensus on an item, the subsidiary body will have to conclude that there was no outcome on that item. By default, such items will be included on the agenda of the following session of the subsidiary body in line with rule 16 of the draft rules of procedure.[13] In such cases, any draft text worked on during the session would be lost and parties would have to start afresh at the following session.
Even where there is no agreement on the substance of an item at the session, parties may nonetheless prefer to agree procedural conclusions to note that they failed to complete the work, and that work would continue at the following session. Whilst the effect is much the same, this is often seen as a more constructive outcome than just relying on rule 16. One advantage is that parties can, if they wish, agree to include a reference in those conclusions to the unfinished text they have been working on – for example by putting a link in a footnote to the informal note from the facilitators containing the latest draft. They may be able to agree that the draft text, although unfinished, will be considered further at the next session, even if they may also choose to underline that it does not represent a consensus. That would provide a better starting point for continued consideration of the item at the following session than having to start again from scratch. That approach may be particularly valuable for work begun, but not concluded, during the June session, offering a better chance of reaching agreement during the first week of the COP.
1.6. Technical items dealt with directly under the governing bodies
A number of items, especially on finance, are handled directly under the COP, CMP or CMA and are not referred to the subsidiary bodies. Work is organised, however, in a very similar way with negotiating groups set up by the governing bodies with pairs of negotiators invited to act as facilitators to help parties reach agreement. Work on these items is not, however, affected by the cut-off date of the closing of the subsidiary bodies and can continue into the second week. In some cases, the negotiating groups may continue to work until the final days to complete their work and then report back directly to the governing bodies with draft texts ready for adoption.
However, especially where the issues are linked politically to other outstanding items, or form part of a possible package, the president may decide at some point in the second week to end the technical work on those items and address the remaining open issues directly, in a similar way to the treatment of open items sent forward by the subsidiary bodies.
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1.7. The role of the subsidiary body chairs
The chairs of the subsidiary bodies remain responsible for the work of their bodies throughout the session, and they track progress closely across the different work streams. They hold daily meetings of their facilitators throughout the Bonn session and the first week of the COP, taking stock of progress, identifying where further action may be needed to speed things up or to overcome blockages, and giving guidance to their facilitators – including to address any tensions that may arise between them.
The chairs in turn ensure that work is coordinated between the two subsidiary bodies and the governing bodies. During the June session, there are meetings several evenings a week between the chairs, the secretariat, the current and the incoming presidencies. Those meetings enable them to build a collective analysis of progress, to share information from their bilateral meetings, and to agree any common steps. During the first week of the COP, these meetings are chaired by the COP president, or their representative, and usually take place every evening to ensure that maximum progress can be made under the subsidiary bodies and to contribute to the preparation of the transition to the governing bodies at the end of the first week. In addition, presidencies often appoint a liaison officer for each subsidiary body who will take part in meetings organised by the chairs and ensure a direct line of contact between the presidency and the subsidiary body chairs. Whilst the governing bodies can give instructions to the subsidiary bodies, that is not the case for their presiding officers. So, although the COP president has the clear political leadership over the conference, they cannot give instructions to the subsidiary body chairs since they exercise their own mandates and are responsible to their subsidiary bodies and to the COP, not to the president. Mutual respect and close collaboration between the COP president and the chairs, are important for getting successful outcomes, especially as the first week of the COP draws to its close.
The chairs report on progress to meetings of the bureau, including on their plans to complete work.
Facilitators under the subsidiary bodies can ask for the support of the chair (or chairs for joint items) when they feel it is necessary. In some cases, the chair may consider it appropriate to join their facilitators in the room during a meeting to back them up and help parties to overcome some of the blockages that arise (for example by giving mandates for further iterations of text).
The chairs meet many groups and parties throughout the session and will raise problems with heads of delegation as appropriate. Where necessary, especially towards the end of the session, the chairs may hold targeted meetings with some groups and parties to help overcome blockages in specific workstreams. One option is for the chair to convene a meeting of heads of delegation on a specific issue, with the support of their facilitators, to try to overcome remaining blockages. If necessary, where the negotiations have not produced a satisfactory result, the chair may decide to present a compromise text under their own authority to try to break the deadlock ahead of the closing plenary.
The chairs will face similar challenges to the COP president when holding their closing plenaries (see the relevant paragraphs in section 2.7 below). For example, they will need to consult to avoid blockages in plenary, prepare for different outcomes if some items are not finalised before the plenary, be ready to deal with points of order, and to pause if needed to allow consultations and to propose amendments from the chair. Parties also take the floor during the closing plenary meeting of the subsidiary bodies to express their views on the results.
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2. Preparation by the presidency and managing the second week of the conference
In an optimal scenario, the subsidiary bodies would conclude all issues on their agendas and forward completed draft texts to the governing bodies that are ready for adoption with no need for further consideration. Meanwhile, technical work directly under the governing bodies would move smoothly to conclusion without needing the political intervention of the president. In such a case, the presidency would be able to focus on activities directly under its control such as its action agenda.
That scenario is, however, rare and all presidencies need to prepare to oversee the finalisation of negotiations on at least a few items in the final days of the conference. The presidency will, therefore, want to use the year ahead of the opening of the conference (sometimes two if they are designated far in advance) to prepare their team and the president for their tasks, and begin work with the secretariat and the subsidiary body chairs, to plan for the transition to the second week and for the management of the final stages of the conference.
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2.1. Presidency preparations ahead of the COP
Incoming presidencies use the months preceding the opening of the COP for intensive outreach to parties and groups of parties, as well as with many observer organisations. Many parties will visit the host country to meet the president and their team in person, and the president and their senior team will in turn travel to take part in meetings and conferences at the invitation of negotiating groups, parties and many other organisations. The presidency will also ensure a presence at any preparatory consultations that are held ahead of the conference and follow meetings of constituted bodies. The incoming presidency will also participate as an observer in meetings of the bureau in the year ahead of the conference – in particular to address logistical and organisation concerns that parties may raise, but also to set out the presidency’s vision of the conference and to get advice from the bureau.
The presidency usually holds consultations during the session of the subsidiary bodies, in June, both bilaterally with groups and parties, and at least once in a plenary setting to hear parties’ and observers’ expectations for the COP, as well as organising with the secretariat a meeting on logistical arrangements. The incoming president will usually be present for part of that session and take part directly in a number of bilateral meetings. In addition to gaining familiarity with the issues, such meetings in Bonn provide an opportunity for the president and the presidency team to get to know the negotiators, in particular the coordinators of the negotiating groups, who will be key partners in the following months. The presidency will also take advantage of other occasions where many parties are present to undertake outreach, such as in the margins of the opening of the General Assembly in New York. The diplomatic network may be mobilised, undertaking démarches in capitals to present the vision of the incoming presidency and seek to improve their understanding of the underlying concerns and goals of their host countries for the upcoming conference, as well as to gather the views of parliamentarians, civil society and other actors such as business and local government.
The incoming presidency may itself organise consultations with parties in the months preceding the conference. The pre-COP is a traditional feature of the UNFCCC calendar, an informal ministerial meeting hosted by the incoming presidency, usually about a month before the opening of the conference. Some presidencies organise further meetings on key topics, at the level of heads of delegation, or with ministers.[14] Since the pandemic, the use of virtual meetings has been generalised, enabling regular exchanges to take place, in collaboration with the subsidiary body chairs, some involving heads of delegation, others at a ministerial level.[15]
2.2. Presidency consultations during the first week of the COP
If the subsidiary bodies are in the front-line of work during the first week of the COP, the presidency will be playing an active role in parallel. In particular, the president and senior members of the presidency team will hold bilateral meetings with all negotiating groups and many parties throughout the week, above all to listen to parties, to learn about their concerns, priorities and expectations for the overall results of the conference. This is important to ensure that the presidency has a good understanding of where all parties are coming from. But it is also key for strengthening trust and confidence in the presidency, and even more importantly in the COP president, hence building some of the political capital that the presidency will need for the second week.
In its consultations during the first week, the presidency will want to support the subsidiary body chairs in completing their work and maintain pressure on parties to ensure that work is finalised during the first week of the conference on all items, making clear that the governing bodies will not automatically take up unfinished items. The presidency will, therefore, usually refrain from getting into the detail of issues that are being negotiated actively under the subsidiary bodies, taking care to leave space for the subsidiary bodies to complete their work whilst nonetheless getting a good understanding of items that are likely to require further work in the second week.
The presidency may hold consultations during the first week on the organisation of work during the second week and on the possible overarching results of the conference.[16] This may be done through purely bilateral consultations, but some presidencies have found it helpful to convene an open consultation towards the end of the first week to hear from heads of delegation on their expectations and proposals for the conclusion of the conference. This can be an important input into finalising the presidency’s plans for the transition from week one to week two.
Some presidencies have used consultations before the end of the first week not only to hear expectations and to consult on the process, but also to start building some of the products that will be developed directly under the guidance of the presidency – for example, to begin work and get initial input on the content of a possible cover decision. However, holding such open presidency consultations before the end of the first week on substantive outcomes may hold risks for the conclusion of technical negotiations: they may take up the time and focus of lead negotiators at a critical moment; they may interfere with ongoing technical negotiations on related issues, and signal the intention of the presidency to take up certain issues and hence influence the willingness of parties to finalise work on related items under the subsidiary bodies. As a result, presidencies may prefer to delay holding open consultations on these issues until after the subsidiary bodies have closed.
The presidency will hold daily meetings with the subsidiary body chairs and the secretariat throughout the first week to take stock of progress and challenges, to give advice and to provide support to the chairs as they move to wrap up their work, and to identify where the presidency might need to speak to parties to facilitate agreement. The daily meetings also inform the presidency’s preparations for the second week and provide an opportunity for the chairs to feed into that preparation. The presidency will also ensure a regular overview of progress in negotiating groups working directly under the governing bodies.
The COP bureau will meet several times during the first week and its meetings are chaired by the president.[17] The bureau does not usually get involved in the substance of the negotiations, and many exchanges are on organisational issues and process issues.[18] The bureau does, however, provide a forum to share updates from the chairs and the presidency and information on their plans, and to hear concerns of parties. The president is expected to provide information to the bureau as the first week draws to a close on their plans for organising work after the closing of the subsidiary bodies, providing the opportunity for the bureau to give the president feedback and advice.
Recent presidencies have followed the initiative of the COP21 presidency by inviting heads of state and government to a summit during the opening days of the conference. These meetings of leaders often focus on high-level calls for strengthened climate action and specific initiatives on different aspects of mitigation, adaptation, loss and damage and support, sometimes linking climate action with other development challenges. Many leaders will make their national statements during the summit. Whilst meetings of leaders are separate from the formal negotiating process, they do have an impact by setting expectations for results.
At the opening of the governing bodies, the president may propose that the presidency undertake consultations with parties during the conference on certain issues, for example, on the adoption of the draft rules of procedure (a long-standing unresolved item), or on any issues that may have arisen from consultations on the adoption of the agendas. Such consultations are usually led by a senior member of the presidency team, but the presidency may also invite senior negotiators from other parties to assist them on some topics. Such consultations may be launched during the first week of the conference and, if necessary, continue during the second week. The presidency will report back on the outcomes, if any, of those consultations to the closing plenaries.
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2.3. Moving to the COP, CMP and CMA – a change of rhythm and process
The mid-point of the COP, when the subsidiary bodies close, is when the presidency takes direct control of the outstanding negotiation process. It is one of the crunch points for the success of the conference and needs to be well prepared.[19]
The presidency will have begun working with the secretariat ahead of the conference on scenarios for this transfer and options for management of the second week. It will get inputs that help it update its plans, including from consultations with parties during the first week on how best to organise work in the second week, feedback from members of the bureau, and inputs from its many bilateral meetings. Drawing on all of its outreach and the other inputs it receives during the first week, the presidency will keep under review its plans and scenarios for managing the second week to reflect how work progresses, and the way that the political dynamics of the conference develop.
The presidency needs to be ready to take over as soon as the subsidiary bodies close. The transition is the moment when the scenarios it has been developing must be transformed into concrete plans for the final days, reflecting the state of play and the issues that remain open. Of course, plans should not be rigid, they will need to keep some flexibility, but as it takes control of the outstanding negotiations the presidency needs clarity internally about how it intends to proceed and to be in the position to communicate clearly to parties on its plans.
The presidency will take advice from many sources. It will work closely with the secretariat which has the structural memory of the negotiating process. It will take the advice of the subsidiary body chairs to draw on their knowledge of the issues and judgement on the dynamics after the first week and will cooperate with them to ensure coherence between work in the first and second week and a smooth transition. It may find it helpful to debrief the facilitators who had been handling the key issues that remain outstanding, to get their assessment of what underlies parties’ positions and the scope to resolve those open questions. It will be given advice by all the parties that it meets.
The presidency has options and does not need to treat all issues in the same way. In particular, it does not have to manage all issues directly – it can ask ministers, the chairs of the subsidiary bodies, and technical negotiators to assist it. Likewise, the approach may evolve during the week. The first few days may see ministerial consultations launched straight away on some issues, on other issues, the presidency may ask for technical work, before perhaps raising it to a ministerial after a day if necessary. But the organisation may change again in the final couple of days when the presidency takes the remaining strands of work directly in hand.
There are several types of outcomes from the first week that the presidency may need to address, and which need not be addressed in the same way:
The president will inform parties at the start of the second week how they intend to organise work on the remaining open issues. This can be through a written notification, but presidents often also make use of a short plenary to explain how they plan to move forward. If the timing is reasonable, this may be held directly after the closing of the subsidiary bodies. Alternatively, it may be held the following morning (or on Monday morning if the subsidiary bodies close on Saturday and there is a day of rest).
It is good practice for the president to hold daily stocktaking meetings during the rest of the second week, open to all parties and observers to provide an update on progress on all remaining open agenda items, with short reports from ministerial facilitators on their consultations, and updates on any other work underway. Such stocktaking meetings help keep the process transparent, inclusive and open, and provide the opportunity to make any announcements on changes to the organisation of work as the week progresses. They do not need to provide a space for discussion and presidencies often take no interventions so that parties can get straight back to work.
Parties welcome a “no surprises” approach by the president, announcing in advance how work will be organised and sticking to those plans, and then when plans do have to change, providing prompt and clear updates. In return, the president can also request parties to follow a “no surprises” approach. That will become especially important as the conference draws to its close, as rumours fly, and parties worry that things are happening without their being informed. Reacting promptly to correct false information (ex. “the presidency is preparing a text with a few parties in a closed room …”) is also important. The daily stocktaking meetings can be one way to allay concerns, but other opportunities may need to be used, with the president and their senior team reaching out actively to all groups and parties to ensure there is no misunderstanding.
The presidency will have spent the first week meeting all groups, and many individual parties, listening to them to learn about their concerns and priorities. The presidency will continue those bilateral meetings throughout the second week – indeed, targeted outreach to parties will become more important to try to find ways forward. Many groups and parties will specifically ask to meet the president during the second week to ensure that their concerns have been fully considered. Although the president will have to delegate some meetings to senior members of their team, it is important not to give the impression that the president is only willing to meet in person “important” parties and not others.
2.4. Working with ministerial pairs
During the second week, the president often calls on ministers to undertake consultations on outstanding questions. This usually entails an invitation to a pair of ministers, one from a developing country, one from a developed country, to undertake consultations on each outstanding item.[22] They are supported by the presidency team, with at least one presidency expert available to join all their consultations, and the secretariat. The ministers undertaking the consultations may often decide to focus on a limited number of key political points in the text that need to be resolved, assuming that other issues will fall into place once the key issues have been resolved (see section 2.5 on the possible need for coordination with ongoing technical consultations on some points). They may meet negotiating groups and parties one-on-one or bring them all together in an open consultation – and may well alternate between these approaches.
Following their initial consultations, the ministers may make a first proposal to unblock the discussion, then reconvene parties to get their reactions and inputs. They can then consider how to adjust their approach, for example by holding a further round of consultations before making a second proposal. If all goes well, after a few iterations they may have found a compromise, or at least identified clearly the remaining issues and possible solutions. They may also get clarity on the linkages between issues and how the resolution of other items may enable their issues also to be resolved.
The ministerial pairs report to the COP president, who usually convenes all the consulting ministers and any other facilitators at least once a day from the start of the second week, to get an update from them on progress, and to provide them with any guidance that may be needed on how to proceed, including when it might be necessary to change the mode of work. That meeting also offers the opportunity to look at linkages and issues that cut across different workstreams and to decide how to handle those linkages, including any joint work involving ministers consulting on different items. The ministers will report briefly on the progress of their consultations to the informal stocktaking plenaries.
Recent presidencies (a practice begun by the United Kingdom ahead of COP26) have several times identified pairs of ministers and invited them to begin consultations with parties on specific topics ahead of the conference. This practice has the advantage of giving ministers the chance to get used to working together, and time to familiarise themselves with the details of the topics, to meet the parties most engaged in the negotiations, and to start to map out where solutions may be found. They may be called on to facilitate discussions on their topics during the pre-COP and possibly other consultations organised by the incoming presidency ahead of the conference.
There are, however, some risks with this approach. For one, it sends a signal that the presidency does not expect those issues to be resolved at a technical level – that may be obvious for some issues (such as article 6 of the Paris Agreement ahead of Glasgow, or the global stocktake and its key themes at CMA5), but there is also a risk of holding parties back from making progress under the subsidiary bodies because they already know that ministers are lined up to take over outstanding work in the second week. Another risk is that the ministers chosen, and their teams, may find it difficult to commit the time needed, or may find it hard to work together over such a long period of time. Indeed, the presidency may find it needs to change one or other of the ministerial pair (including should there be a change of government in national capitals) and this may be a politically delicate exercise to handle.
2.5. Continuing work on some items at a technical level
There may be issues that the presidency judges do not require political level engagement from ministers, and which may not have the same political profile. In such cases, the president may invite the subsidiary body chairs, or senior negotiators from other parties, to undertake consultations on their behalf. These consultations may be given less visibility than the political consultations undertaken by ministers. Sometimes, these continuing consultations at a technical level may need to be “raised” to a political level after a day or two, and ministers invited to help find solutions if the situation requires it. But it may be that if an issue is not closely linked to the main political package, the absence of an outcome on that item may not jeopardise the overall outcome and there is no need to involve ministers if the technical negotiations cannot deliver.
As already noted, technical work on some items directly under the governing bodies will continue into the second week. The presidency will want to keep that work under close review and keep open the option of raising some of those items to a political level and involving ministers, if necessary.
There may be technical issues in some decisions that need to be “tidied up” by negotiators in parallel to consultations run by ministers that aim to unblock the key political issues. If that is the case, there is a need for close coordination between ministers and technical facilitators to ensure there is no overlap or confusion on the political points to be resolved by the ministers, and the technical issues left for negotiators. One way this may be done is for consulting ministers to “spin off” some technical work to negotiator-led consultations which will then report back to them, thereby ensuring the coherence of the process.
2.6. Stand-alone cover decisions
Presidencies have several times in recent years developed stand-alone “cover decisions” that have taken an important place in the results of the conference. This was important in Madrid, and even more so in Glasgow and Sharm el-Sheikh.
There are mixed assessments of the desirability and merits of stand-alone cover decisions. They are not a requirement of the process, and their generalised use is a recent development. Indeed, whilst most past conferences had one “big decision” that was seen as the most important outcome of the conference, with some of the characteristics of a cover decision, those decisions had always been developed under specific negotiating mandates – like decision 1/CP.21 in Paris which adopted the Paris Agreement and set out the work programme to implement it, along with elements on the role of the champions and the action agenda, or decision 3/CMA.1 in Katowice that adopted the rulebook for the Paris Agreement. When strong overarching outcomes of the conference are already under preparation the added value of a separate cover decision may be limited – for example there was no need for a stand-alone cover decision in Dubai since it would have been redundant alongside the outcome of the global stocktake. When the set of decisions under negotiation provide sufficient space for all groups and parties to see that their concerns are adequately addressed in the overall outcome, there may be little benefit from introducing an additional text.
Stand-alone cover decisions have nonetheless proved a useful tool to bring in elements that might otherwise have had no home in the formal results of the conference, especially if they were priorities for the COP presidency – like the just transition work programme in Sharm el-Sheikh, mitigation ambition in Glasgow, or the launch of an ocean dialogue in Madrid (something further developed in the Sharm el-Sheikh COP cover decision). By providing an overview of the results of the conference across many topics, cover decisions have helped to ensure a balance between key issues that might have been harder to achieve with just the set of decisions emerging from mandated agenda items, enabling all parties to accept the overall outcome and raising the ambition of the results of the conference. And a stand-alone cover decision may perhaps provide a more easily digestible way for the media and the public to understand the overall results of a conference and the key political issues that have been addressed than a series of separate decisions.
There are risks with cover decisions. They may encourage the multiplication of issues to be addressed – the risk of developing a “Christmas tree” as parties propose the inclusion of more and more issues that would not otherwise need to be addressed in the final outcome.[23] This may include the proliferation of non-mandated items being brought to the table, circumventing established procedures and overburdening the process. There may also be challenges in managing work in parallel between the cover decision and other negotiating tracks. This can be become a serious problem since the cover decision often picks up key points negotiated in other decisions – as in Sharm el-Sheikh where some parties found it difficult to follow work on the cover decision and work underway in parallel on the mitigation work programme and several other work strands. Managing this overlap is vital to avoid frustration, and the risk of blockages, especially in the final hours of the conference.
Cover decisions remain normal decisions that must be negotiated and adopted by consensus. The main difference is that they do not stem from a specific mandate and therefore cannot build on consultations during the first week under the subsidiary bodies. It is therefore necessary to develop a textual basis on which to work directly under the relevant governing bodies. Some presidencies have made use of consultations even before the end of the first week, whilst others have waited until the closure of the subsidiary bodies to begin a collective reflection on how to pull together the overarching results of the conference and starting to prepare bullets then a series of iterations of the text of a possible cover decision.
2.7. The final days – the presidency weaves the different threads of a package together
The president may leave two or three days at the start of the second week to let ministerial, and any remaining technical-level consultations run their course. At that point, some consultations may have concluded, or at least delivered the main elements of a possible solution, leaving few points still unresolved. However, simply pursuing consultations by ministers may no longer suffice to get to an agreement on all issues. That will require political heavy-lifting in the final 24 or 48 hours.
Getting final agreement will require a mix of all the approaches used until then, as well as some new ones. There may be scope for ministerial consultations to continue in support of the president to hammer out final text on some items. But the president will have to engage fully their responsibility in the final days and use the political capital that they have accumulated throughout the conference.
Presidency outreach
Bilateral meetings of the president and the presidency team become ever more important in the final days – to build their understanding of what solutions may be possible, to hear from all groups and parties about their concerns and the potential for progress, and to explore options to resolve outstanding issues.
The personal engagement of the COP president and the senior team will be vital to ensure that all parties feel they are heard. No party expects to get everything it is asking for – everyone knows there will need to be compromises and that everyone will be somewhat unhappy with the final outcome. But no-one wants to feel that they are the ones who have been left out. Indeed, one of the biggest risks in the final days arises when a party or group of parties feel that they have not had a fair chance to present their concerns and to defend their interests, a sense even that they have been neglected or even forgotten in the final rounds of consultation. If the president begins consultations with all negotiating groups, it is important to complete those negotiations so that all can be heard, finding time also to hear from countries that are outside the negotiating groups. The final compromise needs to be broadly fair in terms of respecting the interests of each party, but it is equally important that the process to get there is seen as fair. Listening to every party is therefore critical to ensure that the final deal has a chance of standing.
The president of the COP may sometimes seek the help of their colleagues in the national government to build support for the outcomes of the conference. For example, the finance minister might be in a good position to talk to their colleagues in other governments to help build agreement on issues related to climate finance. There may even be cases, for example where a point touches on the vital national interests of a country that go beyond the climate agenda, when the head of state or government might need to contact the leader of that country to try to ensure their support for the emerging deal.
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Using informal open format meetings
At this stage of the conference, presidencies often find it useful to convene a large, open format meeting with space for all negotiating groups to have several seats each at the table, and for other parties to be present, such as the “indaba” in South Africa in 2012, or the “comité de Paris” in France in 2015. Although not all parties can be seated at the table, they can all be in the room and can find ways to intervene should it be necessary. In addition, there is usually some access for observers. Such a format can enable a broad exchange on the key political points under each outstanding item, and the linkages between them. These meetings can sometimes be long and drawn-out, but even when they primarily take the form of a repetition of known views, they can nonetheless ensure that the process is seen as fair by giving everyone a chance to air their positions.[24]
An open format, even with a limited number of seats at the table, is quite different from convening a selected, small group in a closed room – something that has generally been avoided in recent years following the experience of Copenhagen. Copenhagen was the counterexample not to follow, when the Danish prime minister who had taken over as COP15 president convened a meeting of heads of state and government in a small room: some groups were not represented at all in the room, in particular ALBA, and so some parties did not feel that they were bound by the results. This does not mean that all parties have to be at the table, that would rarely be practicable, and there may be meetings where not all parties can be in the room, but there needs to be a sense of openness, inclusiveness, and a respect by the presidency of the diversity of parties’ interests with at least all the major negotiating groups represented to ensure transparency of the process.
Paradoxically, some successful conferences have made use of small formats at critical times: this was the case at COP16 in Cancún, and during the final full day of COP21 in Paris. In those cases, the presidencies had built political capital and had earned the support and trust of parties to enable them to carry the work to conclusion. Nonetheless, it remains a delicate balance to find, and trust can quickly break down if there is a sense that the president is not playing the role of an honest broker at such critical moments.
Iterations of texts under the authority of the president
Building on the work undertaken by the ministerial pairs and drawing on their own outreach and any guidance given in the open setting, the president may prepare several iterations of the final set of decisions, under their own authority, over the last few days of the conference. The number of iterations will vary from conference to conference (two or three is quite typical) and the precise manner by which questions are resolved will depend on the substance of the negotiations. Often, the presidency will start by seeking to reduce the number of open questions, tidying up as many secondary issues as possible, and leaving only a few open issues to be resolved in the subsequent iterations of the texts. Intermediate drafts may contain options on a few points, although presidencies may sometimes decide to present a “clean text” whilst recognising that parties may not yet be ready to accept it in full and that further modifications may still be required.
The presidency will need to find the right rhythm for issuing iterations of the texts during the second week. The precise flow will depend on many factors, but the presidency will usually want to generate and sustain the necessary momentum to drive work to its conclusion over the final days, allowing parties enough time (but not too much time) to absorb the proposals and coordinate on each draft before reacting, and for the presidency to consult further before producing a further iteration, whilst avoiding long gaps between iterations that could give the impression that negotiations are stalled.
The presidency can use a mix of approaches to consider the successive iterations of the texts: an open format can provide the place to start to bring together the overall outcome, testing and getting overall reactions, whilst that can be combined with further targeted consultations on each item, including where helpful continuing to use ministers to assist them to refine the detail.
There are pros and cons to the presidency preparing its “own” version of the final text or texts ahead of time. Possible advantages include being as well-prepared as possible and having options to hand that can be tested as the negotiations advance. Risks include the presidency getting locked into its own internal logic, especially if starting before the conference, and being less alert to the real concerns of parties and the options that may emerge. And should a “presidency draft” leak, it could seriously destabilise the process. So, whilst any presidency clearly needs to strengthen its analysis of options and work through possible solutions on key issues so as to be ready to bring them in as the second week progresses, many, including the French COP21 presidency, have been clear that they had not developed their own text, keeping the pressure on parties to find the way to overcome their differences.
It is nevertheless the role of the presidency to help parties come to agreement, and to that end it will need to work during the final days on possible compromise language on the key outstanding issues, drawing heavily on proposals made by parties. Targeted consultations by the presidency in the final days may include informally testing possible compromise language with negotiators and ministers to try to find ways to overcome remaining differences. This may be done by simply showing possible compromise language to a party on paper, without handing anything over to avoid intermediate drafts circulating widely before it is clear if they have their place in a text. There are risks in such consultations since parties will be very attentive to the balance that the presidency is seeking between the interests of different groups. It is also vital that anything coming from the presidency is tightly coordinated to avoid parties getting confusing or contradictory messages. Giving different messages to different parties is dangerous as they do talk to each other. If parties reach out to individual members of the presidency to feed in their own suggestions, they need to be engaged, and the information shared within the presidency.
Presidencies may also find it valuable to leave space for other players – such as some of the ministers who had led consultations for a few days – to develop and test possible compromise language first, and then bring it to the table. Compromise language may also emerge from bilateral discussions between parties or groups of parties as the negotiations head towards closing and the presidency will usually want to take on-board such proposals so long as they represent a balance acceptable to all parties and not just those making the bridging proposal. Whatever, the method used, the goal is to get to clarity on which possible solutions are likely to be acceptable and on what terms.
The presidency will have to consider when it is ripe to introduce compromise language into the text. Often, presidencies have preferred to leave some options on issues that are critical to the overall balance until the final iteration, and only then to introduce bridging language to avoid the risk of its being rejected prematurely. It is sometimes better for the balance to be slightly “off” in each iteration, perhaps more favourable to one group on some issues, to another group on other issues, with successive drafts moving towards balance and resolution in the final version. In this way, the final stages of the negotiation process can resemble a sailing boat trying to get to port against a head wind, tacking several times from side to side until it can finally enter the safe waters of the harbour.
When there are several decisions to be finalised, parties will often want to see them all together before taking an overall position. In effect, the set of decisions (including a cover decision if there is one) will be seen as a “package” and parties will want to be reassured that there is an overall balance between the way their interests are reflected across all of them.
The president will probably never use the expression “take it or leave it” to describe the final package of decisions, but this is effectively what is aimed for: a package that represents the best balance that can be found between the interests of all parties, none will be entirely satisfied, but none should feel they are the only ones who have been unfairly treated. This is sometimes put as all being “equally unhappy” with the outcome. It is always possible to make further changes, and sometimes final amendments are still necessary, even during the closing plenary, but at some point the process must end, and parties must either accept the final outcome, or leave with no results.
Timing of the final plenaries
All presidents hope to reach consensus on the set of outstanding decisions by the day the conference is due to close. However, conferences have a habit of overrunning, and it is often better to allow more time to get a good solution rather than to rush to respect a deadline then see things fall to pieces. So, if more time is needed, the presidency will want to delay the formal closing plenaries until everything is ready for adoption.
As a result, the presidency needs to have contingency plans for the conference overrunning, including to ensure that the services within the conference centre continue to function. It needs to inform parties when it is clear the conference will go into extra time so that they can make their plans – including modifying their return journeys.
Just as it is important to inform parties when the meeting is likely to run beyond the scheduled closing time, it is also wise to give an honest assessment of the likely timing of the final plenaries. Delegates and observers often find themselves in front a screen that announces the plenary for 10pm, then it is updated to midnight, then 3am … If the plenary is unlikely to happen during the night, it may be better to announce it for the following morning and let most of the delegates and observers go back to their hotels since only a small number will be actively involved in continuing consultations overnight. Any announcement on timing needs also to take account of the time the secretariat needs to prepare the final documents in the right format for the closing plenaries.[25] Being honest on timing can avoid the scenes of delegates slumped over their desks or sleeping in the corridors that may give the image of a conference spinning out of control. Sending the message that the president remains in control of the conference management and timing, and that the overrun is now part of its plans, allows a president to affirm their authority at a critical juncture.[26]
Even if the closing plenaries are delayed, it may be possible to hold an initial closing plenary a day or two before the end of the week to adopt decisions that have already been fully finalised by the subsidiary bodies and that are not part of the political package still being discussed.
Preparing the closing plenaries
Before going into the closing plenary to adopt the decisions, it may be helpful to provide parties with a final informal meeting (a large open format or an informal plenary) to react to the final texts. This approach was taken at COP17 in Durban where the final discussions took place in an informal setting before proceeding to the closing plenaries of the COP and the CMP. An advantage of the informal setting is that it allows parties the opportunity to look at the balance of outcomes across all the governing bodies.
In some cases, parties may use such a setting to express their willingness to accept the texts, despite their reservations on different elements. In other cases, parties may want to underline once again their concerns and make clear their disappointment on some proposals. In some cases, the president may judge that there need to be further adjustments to the texts to capture the final balance – perhaps tested in smaller break-out meetings or huddles. In other cases, however, parties may primarily need the opportunity to express their concerns and disappointment even if in the end they reluctantly agree to join the consensus.
Negotiating in the closing plenary is rarely a good way to resolve such final points, so the president will seek to avoid that scenario. But despite all the preparation, there may still be surprises. The president therefore needs to be ready to handle requests for intervention in the final stretch, to deal with points of order, and to have strategies and options to deal with all eventualities prepared with their team and the secretariat beforehand. If need be, the president may need to consult the secretariat and their senior advisors at key moments before proposing to the plenary how to proceed.[27] If there are direct criticisms of the management of the process by the president, there may be moments when the president finds it best to apologise to defuse the situation and then move on.[28]
If substantive interventions continue and do not allow the plenary to move to adoption of the decisions, it may be necessary to pause and call parties into a smaller format – for example, huddles may form in the main room, or the president may suggest meeting in a smaller meeting room. Following such last-minute consultations, the president may propose an oral amendment to the texts from the chair.[29]
There are different strategies for handling the final gavel on the key decisions. In some conferences, the president has allowed parties time to express themselves at length to express their concerns before proposing adoption – that was the approach taken in Glasgow. In others, the president may move directly to adoption after resuming the meeting, and only afterwards open the floor – that was how the Paris Agreement was adopted at COP21, likewise the decisions of the UAE Consensus at COP28. Both approaches have advantages and disadvantages – it is a political judgement based on the dynamic in the room.
Declaring consensus
Consensus is not the same as unanimity. Some parties may be unhappy with the outcome but decide not object to it. The key thing is that no party takes the floor to say that they formally oppose adoption of the draft that has been presented.[30] There may also be some parties that take the floor to indicate that they are unable to join the consensus but do not formally object to the adoption – that enables consensus to be maintained.[31]
Some conferences have adopted decisions despite continued opposition of one or several parties in the room. This was done with success in Cancún where the COP16 president Patricia Espinosa judged that there was consensus in the room even though Bolivia continued to express its opposition. Another example was the adoption of the Doha Amendment, and several related decisions, at COP18/CMA8 where the president, Abdullah bin Hamad Al-Attiyah, ran a rapid-fire adoption process with barely a pause or look at the room, ignoring several parties that had requested the floor on points of order. Although the decisions were adopted, : there were consequences for the process the following year, however, with a session of SBI totally lost, and subsequent presidencies have sought to rebuild trust in the decision-making process whilst ensuring their authority.
Adopting decisions as a package
Decisions are usually adopted one by one. Where they make up a package, the president may proceed to adopt the related decisions one-by-one and then pause to provide parties an opportunity to react. In Dubai, the president of COP28 made a short speech after adoption of the key decisions and gave them the collective name of the UAE Consensus.
Where decisions that make up a package fall under different governing bodies, the president may need to move rapidly between meetings of the different bodies to adopt related decisions, as was done at the closing of COP28 and CMA5 when some of the decisions of the UAE Consensus were taken under the COP, and others under the CMA.
A different approach was adopted in Katowice, when the COP first adopted a decision to transfer a package of draft decisions to the CMA, which then adopted the single decision 3/CMA.1 that adopted 17 distinct decisions as a single undertaking to complete most of the Paris Agreement work programme. This approach has not been used since, but similar approaches have been used in other multilateral fora to adopt key decisions at one go as a package.
Statements from parties
Once the key decisions of the conference have been adopted, groups and parties may wish to take the floor. Although many will want to express their support for the overall package and the progress made, they may use the opportunity to indicate their disappointment that some issues were not resolved to their satisfaction, and their hopes for further progress in future years. Some may ask for their concerns to be reflected in the report of the session. Along with the applause, such expressions of concern help to ensure the right final balance enabling the conference to be brought to a successful conclusion. They also underline how much remains to be done to tackle climate change and that individual decisions, however important, are merely steps on the way, “to be continued …”
The final plenary is not over with the adoption of the key “political” decisions. There will remain other issues to handle, including the adoption of other decisions prepared under the COP, CMP and CMA, reports from consultations, elections, the report of the session, information from the secretariat on the budgetary implications of the decisions adopted, etc. That can take considerable time. The president can if needed delegate some of this to a vice-president. Following the conclusion of substantive work, groups, parties and observers will get a chance to make their final statements.
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3. Some cross-cutting considerations
3.1. Ensuring unity within the presidency
Preparing a COP is not easy, it requires at least a year of intensive work ahead of the conference, coming to a head during a high-profile, high-risk international event, under the eyes of the entire world. The presidency team may bring together political rivals and senior officials with strong personalities from different ministries and other organisations and require them to work together. The second week can be particularly fraught, and there will be difficult discussions within the presidency on the best course of action at critical moments. Tensions are inevitable, the key thing is for them to be managed. In the end, there can only be one strategy, that of the president – whether that is collectively decided, or imposed from the top will depend on the internal dynamic of the presidency team, but once decided, the presidency needs to show discipline. Open differences and divergent messaging, especially during the second week, undermine trust in the president and the presidency team and make it difficult to achieve the desired outcomes.
The Danish team in charge of COP15 in Copenhagen in 2009 is the example not to follow. There were deep divisions between the original COP president Connie Hedegaard and her prime minister Lars L?kke Rasmussen and his chief advisor Bo Lidegaard.[32] Parties knew those tensions existed, but they spilled into the public domain when Hedegaard’s chief advisor Thomas Becker stepped down several weeks before the opening of the conference, then when the prime minister took over the role of COP president in the second week of the conference. Many factors contributed to those divisions and actions, but they also reflected divergent strategic analyses of how to run the conference. Such open divisions within the presidency led to a loss of trust, especially in Rasmussen as COP president in the second week, weakened the presidency and contributed to the failure of the COP.
Other presidencies have been more successful in managing internal tensions. It was no secret that Laurent Fabius, the French foreign minister who was president of COP21, and ecology minister Ségolène Royal were long-time political rivals within the French socialist party. However, the COP team was managed in a disciplined, interministerial manner and any internal differences did not spill over or have an impact on the negotiating process or the coherence of the presidency. Other presidencies have found their own arrangements to manage tensions to ensure that the overall COP team works as one with common messages and shared strategy. Having a shared analysis of the state of play, common lines to take, and strict management of any public interventions – including by others in government who may be questioned on the progress of the COP – can help reduce the risk of confused messaging.
The presidency also needs to be alert to possible differences with the secretariat. The input of the secretariat to the president’s strategy is critical given its detailed knowledge of the process, and it may legitimately make recommendations that are different from those being considered by the presidency. In the end, it is the president who must preside the COP, and once the shared strategy is fixed, the president, the executive secretary and their respective teams need to align their communication and ensure they give the same messages to all that they meet. That may also apply to others in the UN leadership. During the first week of the COP, the presidency also needs to support the subsidiary body chairs to help them bring their work to a successful conclusion: that requires mutual respect of the respective roles of the chairs and the president, and the president may find it wise to involve the chairs in developing the strategy for the transition to the second week of the conference.
3.2. Choosing the right facilitators
Choosing the right facilitators is not straightforward. There is a particular challenge due to the sheer number of facilitators that have to be mobilised to run technical work, especially under the subsidiary bodies. The secretariat usually suggests names to the chairs of the subsidiary bodies, or to the presidency for the governing bodies. In the end, it is the chairs or the president that have to decide which facilitators to go with, but even a chair who has been in the process for many years will not know all the negotiators, especially on items that they have never followed closely, and so they may need to take some of the proposals on trust. There may be changes and gaps in the list of facilitators right up to the opening of the session. The chair or president proposes the names of the facilitators when organising work on each agenda item. Formally, the subsidiary or governing body is asked to approve the proposal from the chair: in practice, the subsidiary or governing body does not usually challenge proposals for facilitators made by the chair or the president.
There are a number of senior negotiators in the process who are well-known and have long experience of helping facilitate different workstreams. When preparing a session, the same names are often suggested. There are advantages in making use of those who have a lot of experience, however that experience cannot be spread too thinly, and it is often best to use “safe hands” on issues that are expected to be particularly delicate. It is also vital to encourage new, younger facilitators to get involved and gain experience. Ensuring diversity, geographical and gender balance is essential.
Most facilitators are only able to work on one agenda item, although occasionally some may take up more than one. That may not a problem where the items are closely linked, for example different sub-items addressing the same overarching topic for which slots will not overlap. But the simple mechanics of avoiding overlap between different workstreams makes it almost impossible for most to take on more than one brief. The workload of being a facilitator is also a factor that all have to weigh when accepting to play such a role, especially if they also have important responsibilities within their delegation or negotiating group.
Another challenge is ensuring that the pairs of facilitators can work well together. The easiest case is when a pair has worked together in the past, have demonstrated an ability to cooperate and to deliver results. But there is often a need to put together pairs of facilitators who have not worked together before, and there is rarely much time for them to prepare ahead of the session – their first meeting will be the key test. That may work well, but it is also possible that tensions may arise. Facilitators may not have quite the same vision of their role: some understand their role as strictly impartial, others may be less successful in putting distance between their national or group position and their role as a facilitator. Some may struggle to be present for all the meetings, perhaps because of their national responsibilities, or even as a negotiator on another issue for their negotiating group: in such cases, the other member of the pair may find themselves taking on more of the workload and having to chair some sessions on their own. Personalities may simply not match: a conflict less on the substance, but on the way to run a meeting, especially if one of the pair has a dominant personality. And whilst it is vital to give young negotiators a chance to develop new skills, and to widen the group of experienced facilitators in the future, almost by definition that means that some of those brought in may need time to find their feet. There may also be tensions between the facilitators and their support in the secretariat. The chairs need to keep an eye on any emerging problems of this sort and intervene to help, to provide advice, or to adjust the arrangements if they are not working.
It is a rare occurrence, but parties may raise problems with the behaviour of individual facilitators during the session, for example if they have shown signs of bias, or have not shown respect to the positions of some groups or parties, or where the facilitator has a clash with a negotiator from one of the active parties in the room. Such concerns are usually raised with the chair who will investigate them and seek to resolve the problem with the facilitator in question. If facilitators need to show respect to delegates, the same is true the other way – parties can strongly defend their national positions without challenging the facilitators. Very occasionally, such concerns may require a change in facilitator during the session, but changes that do happen are more often due to someone having to step down because of the workload. The code of conduct applies to facilitators, as to all other participants in the conference, providing guidance for dealing with any cases of harassment that may arise.[33] A code of ethics for elected and appointed officers, including facilitators, outlines the standards of conduct expected of them in the performance of their duties, including when chairing bodies, facilitating formal and informal meetings, and their relations with parties, the secretariat and other participants in undertaking those duties and provides guidance on undertaking their role in an impartial manner.[34]
Some of these considerations may also apply when the president invites pairs of ministers to undertake consultations during the second week of the COP, including the need for geographical and gender balance in the team of ministerial facilitators, although the number of ministers needed is much smaller than the number of technical facilitators required for work under the subsidiary bodies. One issue that the presidency will need to consider is the support that the ministers can call on from their own delegations. There are some ministers who could be highly competent facilitators, but who have small or weak delegations that may struggle to provide the necessary support they will need during the second week. That may work the other way round, a strong delegation may have a minister who is not comfortable playing such an exposed role, for example some may face language problems and not be at ease working primarily in English. As noted in section 2.4 above, some recent presidencies have invited pairs of ministers to begin consultations ahead of the conference – giving them time to prepare their role, although potentially creating problems if the ministers find it difficult to work together as a pair. The French COP21 presidency did not invite ministers to consult on issues ahead of the conference, but it did hold several ministerial consultations during which a number of ministers helped facilitate discussions, providing the presidency with valuable information when it came to decide which ministers to use, and how to pair them, during the second week of the conference.
3.3. Involving observers
As an intergovernmental process, decisions under the UNFCCC are taken by the parties – represented by accredited representatives of their countries. Parties to the Convention that are not parties to the Kyoto Protocol or to the Paris Agreement are observer states under those processes and may not participate in decision-making under the CMP and the CMA respectively. There are currently no observer states under the Convention itself.
Nine constituencies of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are recognised by the UNFCCC and can apply for observer status: business and industry NGOs, environmental NGOs, farmers, indigenous peoples organisations, local government and municipal authorities, research and independent NGOs, trades unions NGOs, women and gender, and youth NGOs. Other groups such as faith-based NGOs, parliamentarians, and education and communications NGOS have been recognised, and a disability caucus is being formed. All of these constituencies have their own organisation and focal points. UN and other intergovernmental organisations also have observer status.
Non-governmental organisations may not take part in the decision-making process, but they do play an important role in fixing the political agenda on climate action, by bringing expertise in their areas of action, by having an influence on discussions within countries and on the international level. It is good practice for meetings to be open to observers – that is the default for contact groups, for informal consultations the rule is that the first and final sessions should be open, but parties are encouraged to keep all meetings open to observers. As the session progresses, however, it is common for negotiating meetings to move into a closed format and observer organisations are often keen to ensure that they still have access or at least regular updates on progress.
Chairs of the subsidiary bodies, and the presidency, regularly hold meetings with observer organisations. Recent presidencies, have held an open dialogue during the COP, creating a valuable space for an exchange between parties and non-party stakeholders, developing the programme with the non-governmental constituencies.
Certain observer groups have a strong interest for certain topics: for example, business representatives regularly follow work on carbon markets and technology particularly closely; representatives of trades unions have been actively involved in work on just transition and response measures. A special case is that of representatives of indigenous peoples who take an active role in work of the local communities and indigenous peoples platform and participate directly in its facilitative working group.
It will be important to enable observers, from all constituencies, to be in the loop, especially during the second week as many consultations move into rooms that are open only to parties. The daily stocktake during the second week will be an important moment for transparency but may prove insufficient. Enabling access of observers to any open consultations held by the presidency in the final days matters, even if the number of places in the room may need to be limited. Regular, targeted briefings and meetings of observers with senior members of the presidency throughout the COP can also ensure that they have a channel both for them to hear directly from the presidency what is happening, and for them to present their concerns and ensure that they are heard.
Many observer representatives are vocal commentators on the state of play and journalists frequently seek them out since, unlike representatives of government, they are often freer, and more interesting, in their quotes. They therefore have a significant influence on the perception of how the conference is moving towards success or failure and that can feedback into the negotiating rooms. A presidency cannot control the messaging of these actors, but it can ensure they are aware of what the presidency is seeking to achieve. In turn, it needs to be conscious of their influence on the public perception of the conference.
3.4. Communication
The COP has become a major world event and attracts considerable media attention. Communication in general is outside the scope of this note, but there may be points of interaction between communication and the management of the formal COP process.
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4. Looking forward
This note is intended to be descriptive, not prescriptive, presenting how decisions and conclusions have been developed and finalised under the UNFCCC process. It is inevitably incomplete, and my own errors, biases and preferences no doubt show through in places.
Some of what is presented in this note may constitute “good practice” and some may correspond to working practices elsewhere in other multilateral processes. However, some may be considered as “less good” or even “bad” practices. There is a culture of working in the UNFCCC that has developed over the years, influenced by experience, that is specific to the process and that has positive and negative aspects.
The inefficiencies of the UNFCCC process, and in particular the absence of a voting rule, are sometimes blamed, at least in part, for the failure to respond adequately to the urgency and the gravity of the climate crisis. Getting consensus is difficult and parties from different groups have used this over the years as a lever to slow down or even block progress on issues that went against their interests. The argument is that it would have been easier to get stronger decisions on some issues had it been possible to vote, for example to better and more accurately reflect key messages from the IPCC reports. Whilst there is considerable truth to this analysis, there are reasons to think that it is simplistic.
Building consensus is difficult, sometimes frustrating, but it has the advantage that no party can say that the results were reached against their active opposition. A voting rule might have allowed stronger decisions to be agreed, however, one party’s definition of stronger may not be shared by all. So, voting might also have led to dissatisfied parties questioning the process, ignoring its decisions, or even leaving, weakening the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement rather than strengthening it. And there is no guarantee that stronger decisions taken by voting would have led to stronger implementation of mitigation, adaptation, or mobilisation of climate finance. The fact is that efforts to tackle climate change are pushing multilateral governance to the limits, often beyond what many countries are comfortable accepting. Voting might provide a way to cut through some of the deep differences that exist between parties, but cutting holes in a fabric that is under tension will rip it, not strengthen it.
Irrespective of whether a voting rule would make a difference to overall ambition, there is little chance of making progress. The adoption of the rules of procedure has been blocked for almost 30 years, like other decisions it would require consensus, and there is no indication that parties have changed their positions on this. A proposal some years ago by Papua New Guinea and Mexico for an amendment to the Convention might have provided a way to get round the need for consensus to adopt the rules of procedure, since adopting an amendment to the Convention is one of the few decisions that can be taken by a vote of three-quarters of the parties. But it did not gain traction, and if agreed it would potentially have created different categories of parties that had accepted or not the amendment and have left the process even more problematic and difficult to handle than it is today. It might still be interesting to explore the possibility of a specific voting rule for adopting agendas to help overcome a regular bottleneck, but even that looks unlikely in the short-term.
Over the years, parties have learnt to work by consensus, despite its challenges, and to make progress, finding a collective way forward that respects the multiplicity of interests of all parties. That does not mean abandoning all attempts to improve decision-making. But our collective failure to tackle climate change with anything like the urgency required finds its origins less in the rules of procedure, and more in the deep challenges of addressing climate mitigation and adaptation in the real world and the power imbalances between countries. We need to find ways to cooperate and collaborate to enable all to overcome the many barriers to action – be they political, social, technical, financial, capacity, or other barriers. But that discussion takes us well beyond the scope of this note focused on process.
Even without a voting rule, there could be ways to improve practices to try to make the process more effective and efficient. A few suggestions:
These are no more than a list of suggestions, others might put together a different list entirely. Whatever the merits of individual proposals, it might be helpful to have a collective reflection on how to make the process better adapted to the challenges of implementation in the coming years. One way might be to aske the secretariat to prepare a technical paper describing good practices from other, comparable UN processes for consideration under the SBI agenda item on arrangements for intergovernmental meetings. Whilst it may not be appropriate to import practices from other processes wholesale, there are no doubt many things that could be learned.
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This note reflects my own views and understandings of the UNFCCC process, drawing on my experience as a negotiator, a chair, and as a member of several presidencies, as well as many conversations over the years with those more knowledgeable than me. I am grateful to some wise and experienced friends who provided valuable feedback on a draft of this note. The final version, including any errors, is entirely my personal responsibility and engages none but me. I am happy to hear reactions and to follow up to find ways to improve it. (Contact: [email protected])
[1] For simplicity, this note refers to decisions of the COP, but the same processes are followed to elaborate and then adopt the decisions of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP) and to the Paris Agreement (CMA) – although parties to the Convention that are not parties to the Kyoto Protocol or the Paris Agreement do not participate in decision-making under the CMP and the CMA respectively. The COP, CMP and CMA are collectively known as the governing bodies. The governing bodies meet once a year for a two-week session that is usually held in November or December. At its opening, the COP elects its president for the coming year, who also serves as president of the CMP and the CMA. The president is supported by a national team known as the presidency, including senior advisors and other experts.
[2] Consensus does not require unanimity, but that no party formally opposes adoption. See the discussion in section 2.7 below.
[3] The best-known example of this was probably at COP15 in Copenhagen in 2009 where parties reacted negatively when news leaked that the Danish COP15 presidency had been working on its own draft text while the formal negotiating process on a (very messy) party-driven text was still underway.
[4] The Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) work in much the same way as the governing bodies. The subsidiary bodies meet twice a year – the first session of the year is held in Bonn for two weeks in May or June, the second session of the year is held in conjunction with the first wee of the COP. Each of the subsidiary bodies supports the work of all three governing bodies. The chairs of the subsidiary bodies are elected by the COP.
[5] There are few differences in practice between the ways work is undertaken in a contact group and in informal consultations. There are some differences in terms of access to meetings by observers and the number of meetings that can be held in parallel. Contact groups have two co-chairs, informal consultations two co-facilitators. This note will use the terms negotiating groups and facilitators to refer to both formats.
[6] See section 3.2 for more detailed consideration of the choice of facilitators.
[7] The chairs of the negotiating group ahead of Paris were given a mandate in early September 2015 to prepare a non-paper containing a basis of negotiation for the Paris Agreement for the following meeting in October.
[8] Constituted bodies, such as certain expert groups and committees, are limited-participation subsidiary bodies with specific mandates. They report to the governing bodies, often through the subsidiary bodies.
[9] During the June session, the subsidiary bodies usually close this on the Thursday of the second week. During the COP, this has more often than not in recent years been the end of the first week, or the first day of the second week – however there is no firm rule and work under the subsidiary bodies has sometimes continued until well into the second week of the COP.
[10] The closing plenaries sometimes begin by taking up items for which documents are ready, then suspend the meeting until the remaining documents are available on the UNFCCC web site. This is often the cause of delays in the closing plenaries of the subsidiary bodies. When there is insufficient time to translate the documents into all UN languages, the chair may need to seek the indulgence of parties to allow the subsidiary body to consider the results and proceed to adopt their conclusions, despite the absence of translations.
[11] That is often the case, for example, with work on the Nairobi Work Programme under SBSTA. It was also the way that work advanced under the subsidiary bodies on the global stocktake during 2022 and in June 2023, with work forwarded to the CMA only at the end of the process in December 2023.
[12] For example, the Paris Agreement was developed under the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform that transferred a draft to the COP containing many open issues when it closed in the middle of COP21.
[13] Rule 16 of the draft rules of procedure provides that, “Any item of the agenda of an ordinary session, consideration of which has not been completed at the session, shall be included automatically in the agenda of the next ordinary session, unless otherwise decided by the Conference of the Parties.”
[14] Along with the Peruvian presidency of COP20, the incoming French presidency of COP21 organised five informal meetings throughout 2015 – two at head of delegation level, three with ministers (including the pre-COP) to help parties listen to each other and build understanding of where common ground might be found on key issues for the negotiation of what became the Paris Agreement.
[15] Whilst virtual meetings offer the opportunity for more frequent consultations with parties, there remain challenges, not least in enabling the participation of parties in all time zones around the world on a fair basis.
[16] For example, the French COP21 presidency held structured consultations with groups and parties during the first week of the conference on how best to organise work during the second week.
[17] If the president is unavailable to chair a meeting of the bureau, the meeting must be chaired by one of the vice-presidents of the bureau. It cannot be chaired by another member of the president’s team, although a representative of the presidency will of course be present to intervene and present their actions and plans.
[18] The composition of the bureau is based on the five UN regional groups, most of which do not correspond to the composition of the main negotiating groups under the Convention. As a result, many members of the bureau are not in a position to coordinate views of parties on matters of substance.
[19] Other crunch points include adopting the agendas at the opening, and the final decisions at the closing.
[20] For example, in Paris the whole of what became the Paris Agreement, and the associated decision contained many options on almost all key issues. In Katowice, the open questions were across a series of linked decisions.
[21] An example was the failure of the subsidiary bodies in Glasgow in 2021 to finalise a decision on response measures – consultations under the COP26 presidency were nonetheless held on the topic and resulted in a decision being agreed. That work remained at a technical level and did not involve ministerial consultations.
[22] There have been some exceptions to this balance between developed and developing countries. For example, during COP21, consultations on transparency as part of the Paris Agreement was undertaken by ministers from Brazil and Singapore. Some consultations may be undertaken by a single minister.
[23] The cover decisions from COP25, COP26 and COP27 grew progressively longer. Those adopted by COP27 and CMA4 in Sharm el-Sheikh had 17 sections and were over 9 and 10 pages long respectively.
[24] A lengthy informal meeting termed an indaba of the solutions took place in COP21 on the Thursday evening of the second week, chaired by Laurent Fabius, and ran into the early hours of the Friday morning, including spin-off meetings chaired by ministers on specific issues. It did not produce concrete outputs, but it contributed to building the political capital the president needed to complete work in the following two days.
[25] The constraints on document management presented in section 1.5 for the subsidiary bodies apply equally to the governing bodies, especially where the session overruns.
[26] Towards the end of COP21, Laurent Fabius announced that there would be no plenary on the Friday and that the outcome would be presented on the Saturday morning.
[27] It should go without saying, but it is vital at such points to make sure that the microphone is turned off and to bear in mind that their consultations will be projected on the screen and scrutinised by delegates in the room, even facial expressions have a meaning.
[28] This was used by Manuel Pulgar Vidal at COP20 in Lima, and Alok Sharma at the end of COP26 in Glasgow.
[29] The final plenary of COP21 was held following long consultations to agree how to handle the corrections to “shall” and “should” in article 4.4 of the Paris Agreement. In the end, the secretariat was invited to read out a number of “editorial changes,” the president then opened the final plenary and text was adopted. A slightly different approach was followed at COP26 in Glasgow, where objections from some parties in the plenary required the president to pause then propose several amendments to the final text.
[30] COP15 of the Convention on Biological Diversity in Montréal in December 2022 adopted the decisions making up the Kunming-Montréal Global Biodiversity Framework despite the objections of a party that had not made explicit its formal objection to their adoption. This controversial gavelling of the decisions created a rather confused ending to the conference, although the party concerned subsequently accepted the results.
[31] Nicaragua at the end of COP21 made an intervention to clarify that it was unable to join the consensus on the adoption of the Paris Agreement. Despite this, Nicaragua subsequently ratified the Paris Agreement.
[32] For analysis of the failure of COP15, see for example various articles and the book of Kai Monheim How Effective Negotiation Management Promotes Multilateral Cooperation: The Power of Process in Climate, Trade and Biosafety Negotiations (Routledge, 2015).
[33] The code of conduct can be downloaded from the UNFCCC web-side:? https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Code%20of%20Ethics%20for%20elected%20and%20appointed%20officers.pdf
[34] The code of ethics, endorsed by the COP bureau and applied provisionally, can also be downloaded: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Code%20of%20Ethics%20for%20elected%20and%20appointed%20officers.pdf
Photo credit: IISD/ENB Kiara Worth - closing SBSTA50 in June 2019 (for some reason I could not include this at the top of the note)
Thank you - greatly appreciate this.
Very insightful and fine granular - from someone who has spent MANY DAYS AND NIGHTS negotiating and preparing negociations. Many thanks, Paul!
UK Special Representative for Climate. Professor of Practice in Climate Policy, Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford
4 个月Thanks Paul.
Chair ICRT global, Board Advisor, NED, C-Level Executive,
4 个月This is really helpful and interesting. Thank you for sharing.
Climate negotiation and policy.
4 个月What a useful note to read (and read again a few times) as I get ready for COP 29. Incredibly valuable insights on the UNFCCC process Paul, congratulations and thank you kindly for sharing!