Don’t Give Up on a Better Russia
An Opposition Activist in Moscow on How His Country Can Change
By Aleksei Miniailo - December 28, 2023
February 24, 2022, was the worst day of my life. When I woke up to news that Russia was invading Ukraine, it felt impossible to believe. I knew that Russian President Vladimir Putin had been massing troops along Ukraine’s borders, and I had read that Western intelligence agencies believed war was imminent. A couple of days before the invasion began, I had even submitted an application to hold an antiwar rally in Moscow. And yet the idea that Putin would try conquering Europe’s largest country—one with so many cultural and familial ties to Russia—still felt unfathomable. I hoped the headlines were wrong, and that journalists had mistaken another provocation for a full-blown attack.
Alas, they had not. As I read more, it quickly became evident that the assault was real. In photos and videos, I saw explosions on the streets where I once walked with my friends. My relatives in Zaporizhzhia were writing to me from a missile shelter. As a Russian opposition activist, I am no stranger to horrible Kremlin behavior: I have protested against rigged elections, seen my colleagues get arrested, and spent two months in jail myself—barely avoiding charges that carried a prison term of up to 15 years. But watching the invasion begin was more terrible than anything I had experienced before.
After it became clear the invasion was real, I gathered with friends and allies to brainstorm what we could do. It would have been easy, in that moment, for us to fall into despair. But as activists and researchers, we knew that Putin’s regime was less steadfast than it seems. We had seen Putin use polls and elections to create an impression, both within Russia and outside the country, that he has overwhelming support—an impression that helps him both control Russians and influence foreign politicians. And we worried that many Russian pollsters would struggle to adjust their methods to a wartime environment.
We began a research project, called Chronicles, in which social scientists would endeavor to understand how deep Russians’ support for the invasion actually goes. Pro-war sentiment appears to be much weaker than many think. Although most Russians passively accept the invasion, only 12 percent of Russians can boast at least a minimally coherent pro-war position: one where they simultaneously declare support for the war, say they would not accept a Russian loss, and believe that the state’s priority should be military spending instead of social spending. According to our research, the percentage of Russians who say they would support withdrawing from Ukraine without reaching Moscow’s military goals is higher than the percentage who say they would oppose such a decision—40 percent to 33 percent. (The latter figure has decreased from 47 percent in February.)
Russia’s elite has mixed feelings, too. According to many Western analysts, the Russian establishment is unified in support of Putin’ s “special military operation.” But relatively few Russian elites are vocal about their backing. Many of them—including those who are named among Putin’s possible successors—have, at various points, tried to distance themselves from the war. And even some of the war’s biggest supporters appear unhappy with Putin’s leadership. Yevgeny Prigozhin’s mutiny, which the former overall commander of Russia’s forces in Ukraine may have known about in advance, was a great illustration of this dissatisfaction. To end the mutiny, after all, Putin had to humiliate himself by negotiating with Prigozhin, a person who massacred army officers and publicly called Putin what, in Russian, translates to “accomplished old asshole.” The fact that Prigozhin later died in a mysterious plane crash hardly makes this outcome less embarrassing.
To help end the war and bring about democratic change, activists are working to capitalize on disaffection among both the establishment and ordinary people. Our team, for instance, is preparing a grassroots project that will paint a picture of what everyday life in a democratic Russia might be like. We believe that focusing on day-to-day issues is essential: to most people, the idea of better schools, hospitals, and cities is way more comprehensible and motivating than calls for establishing the rule of law and holding free elections. We must persuade Russians that, if the country works on improving itself instead of fighting abroad, they will be more prosperous and secure instead of poorer and more vulnerable. If Russians are convinced this is true, more of them might decide that the high costs of challenging the regime are worth the benefits.
Within Russia, pro-war sentiment appears to be much weaker than many think.
Western voices and policies often make this task—already tough—even tougher, by trying to collectively punish all Russians and treating the country as irredeemable, even with an end to the conflict and change in leadership. Most of Europe, for instance, is reluctant to accept Russians trying to flee Putin’s regime. Borders with Russia are being closed for ordinary Russians (although oligarchs still find ways to get out). Some Americans and Europeans have even talked about breaking Russia apart, arguing that it is the only way to overcome Moscow’s imperial legacy and make Europe safe. Such talk inadvertently bolsters Putin’s claim that the war in Ukraine is defensive and that he is protecting Russians from a rapacious NATO . It has driven much of the country’s elite even closer to Putin, even though many of them lost billions of dollars because of his conflict.
A different course would be more effective. To steer both the Russian establishment’s and ordinary people’s opinions toward returning occupied territories to Ukraine, the United States and Europe need to grant protection to people running from Russia, and they need to stop discriminating against Russians abroad. They have to make more compelling assurances that they will not try to dismember Russia, and they need to offer some form of amnesty to officials who oversee a democratic transition. Finally, and most important, they have to lay out a clear road map of how, and under what conditions, they will lift both individual and national sanctions.
This program may not satisfy Ukrainians and some of their allies, many of whom want to see Russia suffer for its malevolent deeds. It will also not inspire idealists, who believe that Russians should fight against the war and for democracy simply because doing so is right. As an idealist myself, I understand the disappointment.
But Ukraine, the West, and ordinary Russians should have a unified interest: ending the war as soon as possible, returning occupied territories to Ukraine, and returning to a peaceful life. The United States and Europe can help achieve these aims by convincing our peers that withdrawing and democratizing will have major benefits—instead of serious costs.
RISKS AND RETURNS
Individual decisions are typically motivated by potential risks and rewards. And for Russians today, the costs of pushing for democracy far exceed the benefits.
Moscow has long made sure that dissent is dangerous. Even before the war, simply attending a protest could easily land someone in jail, sometimes for years. But since the war began, the penalties have grown. Today, basic acts of resistance—like wearing a yellow T-shirt and blue jeans (matching the yellow and blue colors of the Ukrainian flag)—can land someone in jail. Depending on the scale of the action, the sentence might be short, but in a country where most people live on a salary of around $500 per month, even a brief period of detention can deprive people of the ability to feed their children. And lengthy sentences are common. Writing an article criticizing Putin or making social media posts calling for an end to the “special military operation” can lead to prison terms that might extend for up to 15 years.
Those are the legal punishments. Many Russian journalists and politicians have also been assassinated or nearly assassinated for criticizing the government during Putin’s reign. In 2003, Yuri Shchekochikhin, a Russian investigative journalist, died in suspicious circumstances; relatives, colleagues and civil society actors believe he was poisoned. Boris Nemtsov, one of the country’s most prominent past opposition leaders, was shot dead in 2015 near the Kremlin. Last June, when the antiwar activist Anatoly Berezikov died in detention, his lawyer said it was because of torture. Many other antifascist activists have been tortured—including by being electrocuted naked. Alexei Navalny, Russia’s most famous opposition leader, barely survived being poisoned by Russia’s Federal Security Service, the FSB; today, he is in prison. Vladimir Kara-Murza, an opposition activist, survived two poisoning attempts. Now, he is in jail for 25 years.
Since February 24, thousands upon thousands of Russians have stood up against the invasion. But they have not stopped it. More than 20,000 have, however, been detained by the police, many of whom were then beaten and tortured. They are only the latest protesters that, despite working hard and taking great personal risks, did not realize their aims. The widespread 2017 and 2018 demonstrations against Russian corruption and autocratic rule did not result in major reforms. Mass protests against Putin’s norm-breaking 2012 presidential campaign failed to stop his return to office. In fact, the last successful protest aimed at Russia’s federal government took place in 2005, when the elderly blocked the country’s most important highway to get their social benefits back.
Russia’s experience is, unfortunately, typical of autocratic countries. In Venezuela, years of demonstrations against President Nicolás Maduro yielded arrests and mass repression but no regime change. Iran’s 2022 antigovernment protests captured the hearts of people all over the world, yet public executions and thousands of arrests subdued the unrest. Next door to Russia, in Belarus, over 500,000 citizens—or at least one in every 20 people in the country—demonstrated against President Alexander Lukashenko’s fraudulent 2020 reelection. Ultimately, the Belarussian state snuffed out the dissent with unremitting violence. Even in democracies, protests are often ineffective. Millions of people in the United States demonstrated against the war in Iraq, but their government went ahead and invaded anyway.
In some post-Soviet states, protest movements have had more success. In Ukraine, for example, the 2014 Maidan revolution successfully toppled the country’s corrupt president after he tried to stop Ukraine from deepening relations with the EU . But Kyiv, unlike Moscow, was not an authoritarian regime. The demonstrators did not expect mass arrests or killings in retaliation for their actions. When over 100 people were, in fact, killed by the police, the movement had already gained almost unstoppable momentum.
The protesters also had support from major political parties, elected officials, newspapers, and television channels. Dissenters in today’s Russia do not have any such backing. Putin, slowly but steadily, has either subdued or destroyed these institutions. His regime went about it in a clever way. There was no obvious turning point in Putin’s takeover, no moment when democracy was dealt an undisputed final blow. Instead, he just piled on a series of straws that eventually broke the country’s back.
IN THE WAY
Russia, however, is not hopeless. There are opposition groups, including mine, that are trying to convince the country that a more democratic and peaceful future is both better and possible—and we are far from hopeless. According to our team’s phone polls, more Russians (46 percent) want the state to prioritize social spending over military spending than the other way around (26 percent). Almost half—47 percent—empathize with people who try to dodge military service, as opposed to the 36 percent of people who condemn their behavior. It is difficult to estimate the number of Russians who actively support the war—defined as Russians who volunteer, donate to troops, or otherwise go out of their way to assist with the operation. But by our estimates, the number is below five percent. In fact, willingness to serve in the army is so low that the state offers up to $11,000 just for signing the contract with the military. Russians are not unrestrained warmongers. Most are willing to end Moscow’s assault on its neighbor.
Critics might argue that our conclusions are prejudiced because of the team’s political positions. But the professional pollsters do all due diligence and use rigorous methods to ensure that our data is valid. We are transparent about how we conduct surveys, publishing our questionnaires and anonymized datasets so that any social scientist can check and criticize our work—critiques that we, in turn, use to improve our methods. And for the most part, our findings do not contradict those of other researchers, be it Russia Watcher or the Levada Center. They just show that, for many Russians, support for the war is paper thin.
That there is discontent, of course, does not mean there will be active opposition: responding to a poll is different from taking action. To turn unhappiness into constructive action, activists must persuade disaffected Russians that the return is worth the risk and that doing nothing at all will land Russia in an even worse situation than it is in now. In order to do so, Russian opposition figures try to explain Russia’s real economic situation and what is happening with the war through analytic materials and through political entertainment shows broadcast on YouTube, which is not yet blocked in Russia. We are also actively trying to show what a peaceful democratic Russia might look like.
The United States and Europe have in some ways complicated our task, in part through restrictions that make it harder for us to function. Mitya Aleshkovsky, for instance, a Russian nonprofit and media manager well known for his antiwar and anti-Putin stance, encountered numerous problems with international banks and PayPal when he tried to create a nongovernmental organization aimed at supporting Russia’s antiwar initiatives. Latvia revoked the license for TV Rain, a liberal Russian television channel that Moscow had kicked out. (Latvian officials contended, falsely, that the station supported the invasion.)
Western rhetoric has encouraged ordinary Russians to stand by Putin.
Western societies have also made life needlessly difficult for ordinary Russians fleeing the regime. The vast majority of NATO states make it hard for Russians to get visas or residence permits. The EU states that border mainland Russia—Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland—have prevented most Russians with existing tourist visas from entering. These barriers are entirely self-defeating. Ostensibly designed to demonstrate the anti-Putin stance of Western politicians, the restrictions’ most important accomplishment is reinforcing Putin’s message that the West views all Russians as the enemy. They also prevent many able-bodied and smart young men—the people whom Putin needs to prosecute his conflict—from evading conscription.
The West does, of course, have an interest in preventing a certain class of Russians from enjoying life in its cities: Putin’s cronies. And Washington and Europe’s post-invasion crackdown on Russian oligarchs, years overdue, was welcomed in the Russian opposition community. But the West may ultimately need to go easier on these figures than it would like. After Putin himself, Russia’s elite are the country’s most powerful people, and the West’s tough stance means they have zero incentive to push for an end to the conflict. The Kremlin, of course, will punish them for dissent. But U.S. and European commentators have threatened to punish them, too, as part of a peace agreement. As a result, their safest course of action is to stand by the current regime and its ongoing invasion. “For all his failures,” the political analyst Tatiana Stanovaya wrote in Foreign Affairs in November 2022, Putin “remains their best bet for preserving the regime that keeps them safe.”
Western rhetoric has also encouraged ordinary Russians to stand by Putin. Although the population has not bought in on the invasion, they do not want to see defeat in Ukraine destroy their country, and some U.S. and European groups have published articles declaring that Russia should be dismembered. For example, the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe—an independent commission of the U.S. government, designed to promote human rights and peace on the continent (and elsewhere)—declared that “decolonizing Russia” should be a “moral and strategic objective.” Most U.S. and European elites may not agree with these calls, but they are quickly picked up by Russian news outlets and blasted to every household in the country. Propagandists then use them to argue that Putin is, indeed, fighting to save Russia.
It is therefore little wonder that millions of Russians have not taken to the streets. They know that the costs of public dissent are far too high, and the potential returns of democratization seem very low.
ANTI-PUTIN, ANTIWAR, PRO-RUSSIAN
For many Western observers, what concerns Russia’s 140 million people is unimportant. Moscow launched an imperialist invasion, and so Russian suffering may simply be the price of stopping the Kremlin. Some Westerners may even want to see Russians hurt. According to reporting by The Washington Post, anti-Russian sentiment in Europe is on the rise, and Russian immigrants throughout the continent have been harassed, irrespective of their political views. In the Czech Republic, for example, a Prague University professor declared that he would not teach Russian students, and store owners have put up signs saying they will not welcome Russian visitors.
But this type of thinking is counterproductive (and it undermines principles of universal human rights). Antagonizing ordinary Russians will not help persuade people to actively oppose the invasion or support democracy. It will do nothing to transform Russia into a safe, committed, and predictable partner.
And Russia will need to transform if the world wants a satisfactory ending to this conflict, or if it wants to be sure that Moscow will not start new ones. The war has reached a stalemate, and so Ukraine may not be able to retake all occupied territory unless Russia decides to pull back. Even if Kyiv does succeed in pushing Russia out of Ukrainian land, the Kremlin is unlikely to call it quits. Given Putin’s past behavior, Moscow would likely continue ordering attacks from across the border or try to interfere in the elections in the United States or EU.
U.S. and European leaders would therefore do well to take a new approach. They could start by pledging explicitly, loudly, and repeatedly that they will not try to break Russia?apart in the event Moscow cedes or loses the war. They could continue by not rejecting ordinary Russians trying to come into their countries, both because those Russians are fleeing from participation in the war and because they are usually well educated and could greatly contribute to Western economies. The United States and Europe should also make it clear that the entire Russian elite would not be penalized if Russia stops or loses the war and transforms. Only those confirmed to have actively taken part in war crimes would face punishment.
To help win over elites, Western governments could suggest conditions under which officials without a track record of war crimes would be spared from personal sanctions when the war ends. If such officials defect, Western states could even lift sanctions on them before the war finishes. Relatedly, the United States and Europe may want to offer amnesty to Russians who have participated in minor regime crimes in exchange for a willingness to oppose Putin and make Russia return to a path of peace and cooperation. The West should bear in mind that most current high-level Russian officials have participated in corruption, electoral fraud, and other authoritarian offenses. If they are afraid of facing retribution for these sins, they are likely to stick with Putin and do their best to thwart democratization.
There are, of course, war criminals who need to be held accountable; my colleagues and I are not calling for amnesty all around. Nor are we calling for an end to all, or even most, of the sanctions right now. But the West could be more judicious in how it applies certain restrictions, and it should lay out conditions for ending them. Ordinary Russians need to know that, if their country withdraws from Ukraine, the West will lift sanctions and allow the Russian economy to grow, making it easier for them to earn a living.
Thankfully, some Western officials have made it publicly known they are willing to help the Russian people if the invasion comes to an end. In a June address in Helsinki, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken declared that the United States “is not [the Russian people’s] enemy.” At the end of the Cold War, “we shared the hope that Russia would emerge to a brighter future, free and open, fully integrated with the world,”?he said.?“For more than 30 years, we worked to pursue stable and cooperative relations with Moscow, because we believed that a peaceful, secure, and prosperous Russia is in America’s interests—indeed, in the interests of the world. We still believe that today.”
The West can help Russians stop fearing democratization and an end to the war in Ukraine.
To help activists create that peaceful, secure, and prosperous Russia, the West can do more than make encouraging statements. Western officials should offer specific promises and, when possible, act now to support Russians trying to flee the regime. They should offer ways out to accomplices of Putin who are willing to atone. Putin’s propaganda machine will try to hide Western overtures, but a coordinated anti-Putin, antiwar, pro-Russian policy will inevitably seep through. It should reach establishment figures quickly, given that they are both less influenced by propaganda and have easier access to outside information.
Taking these measures, of course, will not by itself change Russia. Foreign states ultimately have little power over my country’s domestic politics. At the end of the day, only Russians can bring democracy and peace to Russia. But these measures would remove some of the roadblocks that make the job of Russian activists—including mine—harder than is needed. It can help us show other Russians that our country can have a future free of isolation, one where they will have more opportunities to prosper than they do right now. It can help us persuade Russians that, if Moscow abandons its aggression, their children will not have to go to the frontline to earn $2,000 per month. The West can, in other words, help Russians stop fearing democratization and an end to the war in Ukraine.
This, in turn, will increase the chances that Russia will start addressing the evils it has inflicted. Ukraine would then hopefully get peace and reparations. Russians would get a better life. And the United States and Europe would get a predictable and constructive partner instead of a hostile dictatorship.-
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Maine Becomes Second State to Bar Trump From 2024 Primary Ballot
Maine’s?secretary of state cited?the Capitol riot in her decision, but California?included?Trump on the list of candidates for the state’s primary.
By Jacob Gershman - Updated Dec. 29, 2023
Maine’s top election official Thursday barred Donald Trump from appearing on the state’s primary ballot, the second time a state knocked the Republican former president off its ballot and escalating a national legal effort to disqualify him from office.
In a 34-page written decision , Maine Secretary of State Shenna Bellows, a Democrat, said the Constitution bars a second Trump term because of his actions surrounding the Jan. 6, 2021, attack on the U.S. Capitol following his loss in the 2020 presidential election.
Her decision, in which she found “he is not qualified to hold the office of the President,” comes after Colorado’s highest court ruled last week that Trump is ineligible for that state’s ballot. Both rulings invoked the same section of the post-Civil War 14th Amendment that disqualifies from public office those who swore to defend the Constitution and then “engaged in insurrection or rebellion” against the U.S.
In California, Secretary of State Shirley Weber late Thursday included Trump on the list of candidates for the state’s March 5 primary, despite facing pressure to reject his candidacy.
In Maine, eligibility challenges are first adjudicated administratively. The secretary of state’s ruling, which she issued after holding a public hearing , marks the first time that a state election authority has excluded the 2024 Republican presidential front-runner from a primary ballot.?
In her decision, Bellows said Trump “used a false narrative of election fraud to inflame his supporters” to “prevent a peaceful transfer of power.” She accused him of engaging in “incendiary rhetoric” and failing to take timely action to stop the assault on the Capitol.
“The weight of the evidence makes clear that Mr. Trump was aware of the tinder laid by his multi-month effort to delegitimize a democratic election, and then chose to light a match,” she wrote.
Trump has denied engaging in an insurrection and has accused his political opponents of trying to disenfranchise voters with dubious legal arguments.
A Trump campaign spokesman, responding to Bellows’s decision, said it was the election official herself who was guilty of “a hostile assault on American democracy,” calling her “a virulent leftist.”
The spokesman said the campaign would “quickly file a legal objection in state court to prevent this atrocious decision in Maine from taking effect.”
Anti-Trump voters have challenged Trump’s ballot eligibility in dozens of states through lawsuits and administrative petitions. Several Maine residents, including former state senators, brought challenges against Trump.
The former president has prevailed in a handful of early decisions in other states, including a Michigan court ruling this week rejecting a similar bid to keep him off the ballot in the battleground state. Election officials in several other states, including Democrats in Massachusetts and Oregon, have said they wouldn’t kick Trump off the ballot without a court order.
The U.S. Supreme Court is likely to be the final arbiter on these cases. Colorado Republicans on Wednesday asked justices to reverse the state’s first-of-its-kind judicial ruling, and Trump is expected to file his own appeal.
The Colorado ruling, the Republican petition stated, “poses a severe, immediate, and ongoing threat to the…electoral process throughout the country.”?
Maine and Colorado are both holding their presidential primaries on March 5 as part of Super Tuesday and are required to send out ballots to overseas and military voters weeks before then.
Congress drafted Section 3 during Reconstruction to prevent Confederates who rose up in arms against the Union from seizing back power through the ballot box.
Until Jan. 6, 2021, the provision was regarded as a Civil War remnant, largely forgotten and seldom litigated. After the Capitol riot, it got a fresh look from constitutional scholars, including some prominent conservative legal academics who have concluded that it can and should be enforced against Trump.
领英推荐
In Maine, Trump’s lawyers argued that the eligibility challenges go beyond the secretary of state’s authority. State law, his lawyers wrote , limits such claims to more mundane questions about a candidate’s residence and party designation.
State authorities in general aren’t empowered to enforce Section 3 without legislation from Congress authorizing such lawsuits, his lawyers said. They also contend that Section 3 may not be applied to a former president.
And they dispute that Trump actually engaged in an insurrection. Some legal scholars say that requires proof that Trump engaged in the attack, not just encouraged or aided it.
Trump is facing a federal trial on charges related to efforts to overturn the November 2020 election, but he has never been criminally charged with engaging in insurrection, a federal crime. Trump is also facing charges stemming from his 2020 loss in Georgia, where a local prosecutor has used a state racketeering law to allege Trump and others engaged in a “criminal enterprise” to subvert democracy. Trump has pleaded not guilty in the federal and Georgia cases.
Rep. Jared Golden (D., Maine), posting on X after the Maine decision Thursday, said that while he voted to impeach Trump after Jan. 6, “until he is actually found guilty of the crime of insurrection, he should be allowed on the ballot.”
The Trump campaign earlier this week demanded that Bellows recuse herself from the matter, describing the former executive director of the American Civil Liberties Union of Maine as a partisan who is “incapable of making a fair decision.” Trump’s lawyers cited social-media posts that she wrote lamenting the U.S. Senate’s vote in 2021 to acquit Trump on the charge he incited an insurrection at the Capitol.
“The Jan. 6 insurrection was an unlawful attempt to overthrow the results of a free and fair election,” Bellows wrote in a Feb. 13, 2021, posting. “Today 57 senators including King & Collins found Trump guilty. That’s short of impeachment but nevertheless an indictment. The insurrectionists failed, and democracy prevailed.”
Read more:
The Hill.
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SAMA to host 43rd IFSB council meeting in Jeddah - The role of Shariah-compliant funding in fostering sustainable economic growth
Updated 28 December 2023
RIYADH: The role of Shariah-compliant funding in fostering sustainable economic growth will take center stage at the 43rd Islamic Financial Services Board council meeting.??
Taking place on Dec. 29 at Jeddah’s Ritz-Carlton, the forum will be chaired by the Governor of the Saudi Central Bank and Chairman of the IFSB, Ayman Al-Sayari.??
This event signifies a pivotal moment that will influence the trajectory of the IFSB in 2024 and beyond, playing a significant role in shaping its strategic orientation and policies, as outlined by the bank.??
Bello Lawal Danbatta, secretary-general of the IFSB, expressed his secretariat’s optimism about garnering positive outcomes from the meeting, adding that it would enhance governance and results within the financial institution.???
“Our heartfelt appreciation to the SAMA governor for his admirable stewardship as the chairman of the council for 2023, and to the Saudi Central Bank for their tremendous support and remarkable dedication that resulted in the wonderful collaborations we have achieved together this year,” he said.??
Danbatta emphasized that the?steadfast?support and active participation of the council and full members of the IFSB in the meeting will be crucial for them to further their common mission of promoting the stability and resilience of the sector.?
Headquartered in Kuala Lumpur, the IFSB was officially inaugurated in November 2002 and commenced operations in March 2003. It functions as an international standard-setting body for regulatory and supervisory agencies with a keen interest in ensuring the soundness and stability of the Islamic financial services industry, encompassing banking, capital markets, and insurance.??
To advance its mission, the IFSB works toward the development of a prudent and transparent financial sector. It achieves this by introducing new standards or adapting existing international standards in accordance with Shariah principles. The IFSB then recommends these standards for adoption, according to its official website.??
As of August 2023, the IFSB includes 188 members from 58 jurisdictions. This membership comprises 81 regulatory and supervisory authorities, 10 international inter-governmental organizations, and 97 market players. These market players encompass institutions, professional firms, industry associations, and stock exchanges.?
SAMA became a part of the IFSB following a decision by the council of ministers announced in September 2002. The approval granted the bank the status of a founding member in this international body.
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A Common Water and Energy Future for Israel and Gaza
By Zafrir Rinat
The longer the war in the Gaza Strip rages, the deeper its destruction of Gaza's infrastructure and environment – and its effects on health. Israeli soldiers in the Strip and Israelis just over the border are also exposed, and the blight may creep farther. Asbestos waste, damage to agriculture and the spread of viruses and bacteria may cause widespread disease in Gaza and beyond.
These risks increase as water and sewage treatment facilities are destroyed and as alarming amounts of waste remain uncollected. This reality requires a response from Israel, but also from international agencies that must act for Gazans currently ruled by an organization more interested in the quality of its tunnels than the quality of life above them. As the war goes on, the risk increases that environmental hazards might be spread by animals as well.
Potential environmental problems created on the Israeli side are already being addressed; the Environmental Protection Ministry presented a plan this week. Waste hazards including asbestos would be removed from damaged buildings; the government plans to address the many locations where agricultural and construction waste have accumulated.
An initial budget has already been allocated, and more funds are due later. The government has even more ambitious goals, though it's doubtful they'll be fully implemented. The Energy Ministry wants renewable energy to produce the border communities' electricity. Instead of landfills, the Environmental Protection Ministry is talking about transferring waste to new recycling or power plants.
But Gaza has no government agency to carry out such tasks when the war is over. Even before the fighting, the Strip had only very partial infrastructure for both sewage treatment and waste collection and treatment. Some of this has been damaged, but a military journalist visiting a combat zone reported that the Israeli army realizes the importance of purification facilities, so, during one mission, it made sure not to hit one of the largest of these plants.
After the war, better facilities will be needed for collecting and sorting waste, purifying wastewater and generating electricity. It's unclear how long it will take to launch such a plan and then finish it, so temporary solutions will be necessary.
The Arava Institute for Environmental Studies can help find some of these solutions. The institute is the academic home for Israeli, Palestinian and Jordanian students, and in recent years it has specialized in harnessing off-grid technologies to help communities with no access to water, sewage or electricity networks. The institute aims to set up a consortium of professionals and nongovernmental organizations to implement its plan in Gaza.
"It's important to stress that this can be done in cooperation with organizations in Gaza that we have collaborated with," says Tareq Abu Hamed, the institute's executive director. "They're also willing to continue working together."
In recent years, the Arava Institute has helped establish several water and sewage treatment facilities in the West Bank and Gaza, including a water production facility based on Israeli technology . Another facility treats raw sewage by breaking down its organic components. After this purification process, wastewater can be used for irrigation. There are also solar energy plants; one of these in southern Gaza was severely damaged in an Israeli strike during the war.
The scope of these facilities' operations can be adjusted for the community they serve. "You can build a facility for one house, a school, or an entire village," Abu Hamed says. "Depending on the funding, they can be deployed to serve a population of hundreds of thousands of people."
As soon as possible, the Arava Institute hopes to train engineers, technicians, local authorities and farmers to set up and operate water, energy and sewage services. Israeli organizations' cooperation with this effort can help bring people together as they address shared needs and shared existential missions.
Read more:
Rebuilding Gaza post-war must include restructure of Palestinian education - opinion
A Gaza that places a premium on life, literacy, respect, and opportunity will surely outlive the new buildings that will soon dot the landscape.
By BENJI LEVY - DECEMBER 29, 2023
The eyes of the world remain fixated on Gaza. But true vision requires looking beyond the here and now and ensuring that the horror of the present day won’t be repeated. Assuming Israel succeeds in freeing its innocent hostages and neutralizing Hamas terrorists, what then??
The immediate concern will undoubtedly be repairing the physical and material devastation. New homes, roads, and infrastructure will be among the first items on the post-war agenda.
Yet, the building blocks of Gaza’s collective future will depend not just on the bricks and mortar of communal buildings but also on the social fabric of a viable future. While Gaza’s material welfare has been devastated in a matter of weeks, much of its moral and ethical wellbeing was destroyed by Hamas decades ago.?
n his seminal work, Imagined Communities, political scientist Benedict Anderson dissected how nations develop a sense of identity. He argues that nations are a cultural construct that can be shaped. In the case of Gaza, hatred, violence, and terror have been normalized, culminating in over 3,000 terrorists crossing the border on October 7 to wreak death and havoc and to be gleefully greeted by many more on their return as they paraded victims through the streets.
At the heart of the identity that precipitated this chaos sits a warped ideology fueling indoctrination. An estimated 100,000 children underwent military training and were taught to lionize armed “resistance” in summer camps across Gaza a few months ago. This supplements everyday schooling, which has been documented to contain hatred toward Jews and Israel , incitement to violence, and the glorification of martyrdom.?
And all of this is exacerbated by leaders of religious institutions, Hamas-controlled media, and social media propaganda, fueling a culture of death and destruction. October 7 did not happen in a vacuum. The seeds of terror were carefully sown by Hamas in classrooms and summer camps, from pulpits and TV screens. Tellingly, media reports are increasingly detailing how Gaza’s schools are being harnessed by Hamas to launch attacks and store weapons.?
Out with the old, but in with what?
SO, IF the stated aim of rooting out Hamas is achieved, what will fill this void??
A Gaza that places a premium on life, literacy, respect, and opportunity will surely outlive the new buildings that will soon dot the landscape. According to Anderson’s thesis, a new sense of identity can be constructed in place of Hamas’s ethos of hate. And so, just as Hamas hijacked education to poison young minds, education can fuel a new and brighter future.
While not a simple transformation, there are historical precedents. Japan’s meteoric post-World War II transformation into an economic powerhouse is something of a 20th-century miracle. It is no coincidence that just one month after Japan’s surrender in 1945, the American administration introduced new education policy guidelines that focused heavily on fostering a sense of cooperation, open-mindedness, and a love of peace.?
Meanwhile, the Saudi Arabian curriculum has steadily developed over the past few years , rooting out antisemitism from its textbooks and introducing a greater sense of gender equality. These reforms go hand-in-hand with the country’s ‘Vision 2030’ to steadily grow its economic and geopolitical curriculum. Clearly, no single curriculum is perfect, but these case studies offer hope.?
Instructively, before a single brick has been laid, the first step for any architect is to draw a plan of the finished product. So, too, must Gaza’s education be planned. When I served as the dean of a school in Australia, we reconstructed the educational offering by defining the ideal graduate. Once we were clear about what an ideal graduate looked like, we worked backward, developing each detail of the curriculum, each lesson plan, and a host of enrichment activities accordingly.
In the context of Gaza, a new educational reality will mean ensuring that graduates become productive members of society. It will mean that graduates are committed to building a Gaza that is prosperous and peaceful. It will mean graduates who are proud Palestinians and at the same time, active global citizens.?
These cannot be treated as vague concepts. They must infuse each facet of a reimagined education system that empowers the next generation. Such a system will require just as much time investment and careful planning as the rebuilt Gazan landscape, which the international community is already contemplating. Defining how this looks will require moderate voices in partnership with fine educators, experts, and those who truly understand how to connect with students.
Failure to prioritize education at the heart of Gaza’s post-war plan will mean that new buildings, new neighborhoods, and new schools will house hate once more. In other words, there will be no real future at all.?
The writer, a rabbi, lives in Jerusalem. He has headed global Jewish initiatives, schools, and communities and is the co-founder of Israel Impact Partners.?
Rebuilding Gaza post-war must include Palestinian education restructure - The Jerusalem Post ( jpost.com )
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