Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu: Between Delegation and Entanglement

The entire Middle East and Gulf region will be at the centre of discussions between U.S. President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during the latter’s visit to Washington this week. These talks come amid concerns that the ambitions of both leaders could turn into nightmares for many world leaders and political figures. But a key aspect of analysing what emerges—or does not emerge—from the meeting is recognizing Trump’s negotiation style. Indeed, he often sets a high initial bar, using it as a starting point for negotiations or, at times, to impose a fait accompli. Observers of the meeting worldwide will not only focus on Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria from the perspective of Israeli calculations, but will also closely monitor the fate of Iran—especially its influence in Yemen and Iraq, as well as its nuclear ambitions, all of which will be central to the discussions between Trump and Netanyahu. The U.S.-Saudi relationship, as envisioned by Trump, will also be present in the talks because Trump’s foremost strategic policy still revolves around the so-called "Deal of the Century," which he insists on implementing in the Middle East region.

It is important to note that not everything Trump says will necessarily translate into immediate policy. For instance, when he talks about withdrawing U.S. troops from Syria, it does not necessarily mean an imminent departure. Some troops may remain if the military establishment deems it necessary. Rather, it should be understood that Trump often speaks in terms of long-term goals rather than immediate tactical steps.

His policy on Syria aligns with his broader strategic framework when he states that "Syria is not our fight." Indeed, Trump prefers that Turkey and its partners take on the responsibility of preventing the resurgence of ISIS rather than having American soldiers pay the price. At this stage, the U.S. is following a policy of delegation its policies. Thus, Trump wants to delegate Turkey with the task of preventing ISIS’s return while offering intelligence support to the new Syrian government bearing in mind that the U.S. previously shared intelligence with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham through backchannels despite classifying it as a terrorist group.

Turkey is also still crucial to Trump as a counterbalance against the shrinking Russian and Iranian influence in Syria. Russia was expelled from Syria following the fall of the Assad regime, and relations between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan remain strained. And Erdogan is unlikely to advise Syria’s transitional leader, Ahmad al-Sharaa, to accommodate Russian interests, such as maintaining military bases in Syria.

During a visit to Damascus last week, Russian envoy Mikhail Bogdanov was told by Syrian authorities that they are unwilling to renew the Russian-Syrian agreement concerning the Tartus and Hmeimim military bases and that Syria no longer perceives these bases as a security necessity. While they agreed discussions between Russia and Syria would continue, there is no agreement yet on Russia’s role in reconstruction or on Russia keeping its bases in return for paying high rents it cannot afford—something Turkey may have subtly suggested by dint of encouraging a smooth Russian withdrawal. Thus, there will be no return to the old Russian-Syrian alliance from the Assad era. Syrian authorities have also asked Russia to extradite Bashar al-Assad to Damascus for trial, to which the response was that the final decision lies with President Putin. Given this, Washington has little concern about Russia regaining influence in Syria, and Turkey serves as a barrier against that scenario anyway.

Trump may also be considering to distance himself from the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdish aspirations in Syria, and align closer with Turkey’s positions, though he is unlikely to abandon them entirely. One reason is that thousands of ISIS fighters remain in Kurdish detention camps in Syria. A most critical aspect of U.S.-Turkey relations, from Washington’s perspective, is also Turkey’s potential role alongside the U.S. in any military action against Iran if Iran refuses to comply with Trump’s demands regarding its nuclear program. In that case, a U.S.-Israeli-Turkish triangle could be called upon to exert direct military pressure on the Iranian regime.

With Tel Aviv, the U.S. needs Israel just as much as Israel needs the U.S., given that America is currently pursuing a delegation strategy to avoid direct military entanglement and risking its troops. At the same time, Trump is aware that Netanyahu wants to drag the U.S. into Israeli wars. But Trump is determined not to fall into the Israeli trap—there is a difference between delegation and entanglement, and he understands that distinction well.

Trump might employ a "good cop, bad cop" approach with Netanyahu. According to sources close to his administration, Trump wants to establish new rules of engagement in the Middle East, and build a new secure Middle Eastern order, though it remains unclear what that means in practical terms.

Trump is expected to make significant pronouncements during or after his meetings with Netanyahu, according to sources close to his team’s thinking. However, a source close to Trump denies that he plans to "throw Jordan under the Israeli extremist bus" by endorsing Netanyahu’s idea of turning Jordan into an alternative homeland for the Palestinians as a way to implement the two-state solution. Even if Trump’s team affirms Jordan's status as a U.S. ally and friend, such denials are insufficient unless he explicitly states his support for Jordan’s sovereignty.

Trump must use Netanyahu’s visit to reaffirm the U.S. commitment to Jordan’s sovereignty and rejection of the alternative homeland proposal and insist on the two-state solution and the establishment of a Palestinian state, as this is a key condition for Saudi Arabia and other Arab and Islamic nations if there is to be any chance of a "Deal of the Century."

As President of the United States, it is not permissible for Trump to use rhetoric that implicitly supports the forced displacement of Palestinians from Gaza or the West Bank, even if he frames it as a temporary measure for security and reconstruction. He may be eventually able to convince Egypt and Jordan to accept some Palestinian refugees, but his comments about Gaza being prime real estate for foreign investment make him sound like a greedy businessman rather than a visionary leader.

The biggest challenge remains Israel’s rejection of the two-state solution, a stance that enjoys considerable support in American political and intellectual circles. There is a growing effort to erase the two-state solution from the diplomatic discourse on the Middle East conflict.

Some now speak of phasing out the Oslo Accords which promised a Palestinian state and replace it with new promises and frameworks. This includes postponing the creation of a Palestinian state while merely keeping the idea "floating" on the agenda.

Israel argues that it cannot agree to a Palestinian state because this would be seen as a reward for the attacks of October 7, but at the same time, it cannot outright reject the concept, as that would undermine the "Deal of the Century." This is why it will be crucial to look out for what will emerge from Trump and Netanyahu’s summit.

Lebanon will also be discussed, because its ceasefire remains as fragile as the ceasefire in Gaza due to violations by both Israel and Hezbollah. Israel’s insistence on maintaining control over four or five strategic positions in Lebanon could negatively impact border demarcation efforts between the two countries. Trump should therefore press Netanyahu on the importance of a border delineation deal, not just between Lebanon and Israel but also between Syria and Israel, as this would facilitate the broader normalization process Trump seeks between Israel and the Arab and Islamic worlds.

Netanyahu will no doubt secure significant gains from his meeting with Trump due to the strong strategic alliance between the U.S. and Israel. However, Trump will not give Netanyahu everything without conditions. Israel remains valuable to U.S. interests in the Middle East, and Washington will not hesitate to delegate certain tasks to it. But despite this, Israel remains the primary beneficiary of its relationship with the U.S., not the other way around.

What’s new is that Trump wants to be remembered as a peacemaker on the global stage. Next week, he will face one of his biggest tests in that regard: dealing with Benjamin Netanyahu and his biblical ideology. For that reason, this visit is worth watching—not just for its importance to the U.S. and Israel but also for its impact on shaping the next phase of the American presidency.