Does Structure Create Culture?

Does structure create culture? When we consider culture change, do we downplay the ‘hard stuff’ like reporting lines, decision authority and yes, power? Prompted by discussion on the overuse of culture as a solution to all ills, I’ve re-read Andrew Hopkins’ 2019 book on structure. Hopkins claims it’s not education programmes, felt leadership or behavioural initiatives that shape organisational culture, but structure. It’s the reporting lines, power relations, internal political processes and the decision authority that individuals hold that determines culture. To improve culture, we need to deconstruct and then reconstruct the organisation so that the culture we desire can develop. Put simply, safety culture is thus less about abstract concepts and more pragmatic issues of who reports to who, and who gets to decide what i.e. power, structure and authority. This is very much about the "hard stuff" and lest we be under any illusion, Hopkins is arguing for centralisation of the oversight of decision-making on high hazard assets, and independence of risk functions. Underlying this, is Hopkins' view on control. Whilst I do not entirely agree with his argument and I don't subscribe to the whole thesis, I find his arguments refreshing and worth exploring.

The Soft vs Hard Stuff

In her 2003 novel, Lionel Shriver asks "We Need to Talk About Kevin". Well Hopkins thinks we need to talk about power, authority and reporting, and it’s role in risk and safety culture. Too often in safety discussions focus on processes and approaches, and when talk turns to culture, the dominating narrative is about the “soft stuff”, namely the intangible and symbolic actions as espoused by the likes of Edgar Schein in his seminal tiered model of culture involving artefacts, values and shared basic assumptions. But power, authority and organisational structure, i..e. the “hard stuff”, well this hardly gets any airtime. But it matters, and many argue it matters much more than the intangible. I was prompted to explore this after reading Rob Briner 's post asking why culture change is the ready-made solution to unethical organisational behaviour. Reading Rob's insightful observations, I was left pondering why so often the fix to failure is the intangible and abstract and not the structural? Too often, in case of emergency, break glass and reach for abstract notions of culture.

It's about power, and who holds it

Hopkins is by no means the first to highlight the role of power and authority in safety, quality and risk. The academic Stian?Antonsen has written before on the role of power in culture and quotes the late Charles Perrow who argued that organisational safety should be analysed through a power-oriented rather than a cultural perspective. Perrow’s view is summarised here:

Of course there are ‘cultures’ in companies, but on issues of risk and safety I think the issue is really power.

When outlining the role of structure in culture, Hopkins often contrasts it with the education approach. In referring to an education approach, he is referring to the 'Hearts and Minds' approach involving stages of cultural maturity (i.e. Pathological, Reactive, Calculative, Proactive and Generative) where the focus is on mindsets and behaviour. Within the educational approach, he also includes behavioural based safety and FELT leadership. He coins this the behavioural/education approach, where the focus on visible leadership, relationships and 'cultures of care' has become dominant view, to the point that I would argue it is how many people think of safety culture. He argues this approach is problematic, and using the example of Shell, he suggest it was merely symbolic and performative. In essence, Hopkins argues that for culture change to be successful, it needs to be supported by powerful structural change within the organization. So, its not either/or, it's both structural and educational.

The structures of power and control

But what exactly is Hopkins refering to when he talks about structure? Firstly, he is refering to organisational design?

Firstly, he is talking about reporting lines - who reports to who, and who has the power in decision-making. He cites several famous disasters to support his case, including BP Mocondo, NASA Columbia, BHP Brumadinho and Enbridge's pipeline explosion, and the role of organisational structure before and after these disasters. Lines of reporting matter a lot in safety and risk because they involve authority and independence. In high hazard environments, with independence comes challenge on safety-critical decisions, and independent assurance. So this is about where risk, quality and safety teams report to. Do they report to report to the local business (delegated / federal structures), centrally to an independent line or within a matrix structure? Hopkins advocates for safety-critical functions to be separated from operational/line management, so they bring independence, challenge and they are free to raise concerns through another reporting. I've worked and operated in all these arrangements and I 100% agree with Hopkins on this. Reporting lines and authority really do matter, and many of the challenges that those in risk functions experience can be traced back to this. And hence I believe Hopkins’ focus on structure is critical and not considered enough.

Different reporting lines entail different decision authorities. Put simply, who gets to decide on critical decisions that affect safety and risk, and what are is someone's power of authority to intervene. This again matters, because so many roles in safety, quality and risk are advisory and their actual power on key decisions is pretty low. Many safety-critical organisations will operate enterprise-wide technical standards and programmes, and this brings issues of decision authority. Who gets to approve exemptions and deviations, and how strictly are these standards are applied. So this involves organisational power, and who has it. Organisations have tried to answer these points with R.A.C.I matrix, but personally I think this confuses the matter futher. So if Edgar Shein thinks leaders can be understood by what they pay attention to, Hopkins thinks what is controlled centrally is what matters to leaders, as captured in the quote below.

If something is really important to an organisation, it will control it centrally.

Thirdly, he is talking about seniority of those who lead the safety, quality and risk function, where they sit in the organisational structure and the decision-making process (both formal committees and the more powerful informal channels). So here we touch on the soft skills required of those that lead risk functions, including their ability to influence strategically, executive disposition, active listening and the dark arts of lobbying within the corridors of power. And of course, judgement and their confidence to think and act independently. ?Now who teaches you that stuff in a safety and quality training? So this is as much about the character of the leader as their reporting line, and that often changes in response to failures, as he notes in this quote:

Organisations that have been sufficiently shaken by an incident frequently respond by creating a safety position answering to the CEO

All this discussion on power and structure brings me back to Rob Brinder's challenge on culture as a ready-made fix for every failure. How often do we consider organisational structure when failure happens, whether that involves simplifying it or, as Hopkins argues, introducing greater centralisation and oversight? And why in safety, quality and risk, do we not discuss power?

Caveats and cautionary statements

There are some caveats to this structuralist approach to culture which are worth highlighting.

Incentives: Hopkins highlights the role of bonus in undermining the best structure. This reminds us that we need to ask who pays the piper, and how is the piper paid? Hopkins reminds us that financial incentive for risk and governance function matter.

Competency: The risk and safety function need to be resourced by individuals who are competent and have technical understanding the risks of the business. In my opinion, here is the Achilles' Heel of many H&S and Quality functions. As the profession has grown, the focus on systems and processes has become dominant, and technical expertise diminished. I worry greatly about lack of technical capability in many safety, quality and risk teams, and the fact many lack the abilty to truely understand the technical risks within thier organisations.

Structure will only determine culture if positions specified in organizational charts are occupied by people with the requisite competence

Some final thoughts

So do I think structure create culture? To a point, yes. But there's much more to it that merely how organisations are set-up. The educational and leadership elements that Hopkins dismisses does matter. For me Hopkins does a great job reminding us that power, authority and reporting lines do matter in creating effective organisational cultures. It's as much about the hard stuff as the soft stuff, and we talk a lot about the latter and not enough about the former.

It's worth noting that Hopkins' argument is quite a traditional one and potentially at odds with the focus on decluttering, papersafe, and some of the Safety-II models. That is explored in chapter 4 of the book, but anyone who has worked in the types of control environments Hopkins advocates will attest to how bureaucratic, sclerotic they can be, and lacking in understanding of the risk. There is always two sides to every argument...

Finally, in his analysis of Hopkins' ideas Jean-Christophe Le Coze reminds us that more research is required to demonstrate the role of structure. True. For me, I don't interpret the structure create culture literally, but rather as a reminder that power, authority and indepdence matter, and we need to discuss them much more in safety, risk and quality.

References

?? Andrew Hopkins, "Organising for Safety: How Structure Creates Culture" https://www.amazon.co.uk/Organising-Safety-structure-creates-culture/dp/1925894150

?? Rob Briner's post:

https://www.dhirubhai.net/posts/rob-briner_%3F%3F%3F-%3F%3F-%3F%3F%3F%3F%3F%3F%3F-%3F%3F%3F%3F%3F%3F-activity-7199787388431126528-eTf3?utm_source=share&utm_medium=member_desktop

?? Jean Christophe Le Coze, "Hopkins’ view of structure (one step closer to strategy)". This is a great exploration of Hopkins' argumements. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0925753519321526

?? Stian Antonsen, "Safety culture and the issue of power" https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0925753508000374

?? Interview with Andrew Hopkins: ?????? https://www.leancompliance.ca/post/how-structures-create-cultures