Does Africa Need a Nuclear Deterrent in an Increasingly Unstable World?
By
Curtis A. Smith
Reevaluating Africa’s Security Strategy in a Multipolar Era
For decades, Africa has operated under the assumption that diplomacy, multilateral cooperation, and non-alignment would ensure peace and stability. The post-Cold War order seemed to reinforce this approach, with the global consensus favoring arms control and nuclear nonproliferation. But today, that security paradigm is disintegrating. The pillars of the old order—U.S. global leadership, NATO cohesion, and the primacy of international law—are rapidly eroding. As the world transitions into a multipolar era, the question must be asked: Can Africa afford to remain militarily vulnerable in a world where nuclear weapons define sovereignty?
The Collapse of Global Security Agreements
For years, Africa has adhered to international treaties that ban nuclear weapons on the continent, most notably the Pelindaba Treaty, which establishes Africa as a nuclear-free zone. The justification for this treaty rested on the assumption that the world’s leading powers would uphold security norms, enforce nonproliferation agreements, and discourage the use of military force in international disputes. That assumption is now demonstrably false.
Recent global events have exposed the limits of diplomacy and the fragility of international agreements. The U.S., once the chief enforcer of global security, has retreated into isolationism, particularly under Trump-era foreign policy, which saw NATO allies questioning the reliability of American commitments. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine shattered Europe’s long-held belief that economic integration could prevent war on the continent. Meanwhile, China continues its assertive military expansion in the South China Sea, disregarding international rulings that challenge its claims. Iran, emboldened by global instability, is openly accelerating its nuclear program, despite decades of Western sanctions. North Korea remains a nuclear-armed state despite years of diplomatic efforts to curb its ambitions.
The common thread in these cases is that military power now dictates security in ways diplomacy alone cannot. Agreements and treaties are broken when convenient, and only nations with the means to defend themselves—militarily and, if necessary, with nuclear deterrence—are truly sovereign.
Every Major Power Has a Nuclear Shield—Why Not Africa?
The ability to project military power has historically been the defining characteristic of global leadership. Every nuclear-armed nation justifies its arsenal as a necessary deterrent to safeguard its sovereignty. India developed nuclear weapons to counterbalance Pakistan and China. Pakistan developed its own arsenal to prevent Indian military dominance. Israel maintains an undeclared nuclear capability to ensure its survival in a hostile region. The great powers—Russia, China, and the United States—rely on their nuclear arsenals not just for self-defense but as fundamental tools of geopolitical leverage.
Yet, Africa—home to more than 1.4 billion people, vast economic potential, and critical natural resources—has no nuclear deterrent of its own. In a world where major players define sovereignty through military strength, Africa remains reliant on external actors for its security. Historically, that reliance has come at a cost—Western military interventions, economic coercion, and a persistent vulnerability to foreign influence. If nuclear weapons ensure sovereignty, survival, and bargaining power, why does Africa—the last major region without a nuclear deterrent—remain unarmed?
Why South Africa is the Most Viable Candidate
Of all African nations, South Africa is the most qualified to spearhead discussions about a nuclear deterrent. It remains the only African nation to have successfully developed nuclear weapons, having built six atomic bombs under the apartheid regime before voluntarily dismantling them in the early 1990s. That decision was based on the geopolitical landscape of the time, which was vastly different from today. In the early post-Cold War era, U.S. global dominance seemed unshakable, and nuclear disarmament was seen as a means to gain diplomatic goodwill while ensuring economic and political stability.
However, that era is over. South Africa still possesses the critical infrastructure and technical expertise to restart a nuclear weapons program should it decide to do so. It has abundant uranium reserves, providing it with an independent supply of fissile material. Its scientific and industrial infrastructure, while needing modernization, is advanced enough to sustain nuclear development. Moreover, South Africa is one of the few African nations with the diplomatic influence necessary to lead a broader discussion on an African security doctrine.
Justifying an African Nuclear Shield
A nuclear deterrent for Africa is not simply about acquiring weapons—it is about ensuring that Africa is no longer left vulnerable in a world where economic coercion and military threats dictate policy. An African nuclear deterrent would accomplish several strategic objectives. It would deter foreign military interventions, whether by former colonial powers like France in the Sahel, or by external actors using military force to secure their interests on the continent. It would allow Africa to negotiate from a position of strength in international affairs, ensuring that African states are not treated as junior partners in global diplomacy. It would also provide a means of preventing regional military conflicts, such as the brewing tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia over water rights or the long-standing territorial disputes between Morocco and Algeria.
More importantly, a nuclear shield would signal that Africa is prepared to take control of its own security, rather than remaining dependent on the goodwill of powers whose interests may not always align with those of the continent.
Challenging Outdated Restrictions: Should Africa Still Honor the Pelindaba Treaty?
The Pelindaba Treaty, signed in 1996, prohibits the development, testing, and possession of nuclear weapons by African nations. But while Africa remains bound by this restriction, the world’s major powers routinely disregard treaties when convenient. The United States has withdrawn from multiple arms control agreements over the past two decades. Russia violated the Budapest Memorandum when it annexed Crimea. China has expanded its military reach despite international rulings against its territorial claims. Iran and North Korea have openly challenged nonproliferation efforts. If every major power prioritizes its military security over outdated treaties, why should Africa remain the only region in the world constrained by agreements that limit its sovereignty?
A Responsible Nuclear Strategy for Africa
Critics will argue that nuclear weapons should not be pursued due to their destructive potential. However, no responsible advocate for an African nuclear doctrine suggests reckless proliferation. A nuclear deterrent for Africa would need to be carefully managed under a structured framework, possibly under the oversight of the African Union. It would not be an offensive weapon but a purely defensive measure, modeled after responsible nuclear states such as India, which maintains its arsenal as a deterrent rather than a tool of aggression.
A responsible African nuclear strategy would focus on strategic deterrence, not escalation. It would ensure that no external force—be it Western, Eastern, or regional—could dictate African security policies without consequence. The focus would be on defensive security, ensuring that Africa has a say in global military dynamics rather than being a passive participant.
Conclusion: Is Africa Ready to Secure Its Own Future?
The post-World War II world order that relied on diplomacy and mutual agreements is unraveling. Military power, rather than diplomatic goodwill, now dictates sovereignty. The rapid militarization of emerging powers and the increasing disregard for international agreements suggest that Africa must reassess its position in the global security landscape.
If nuclear deterrence is essential for the survival of every other major power, why is Africa expected to remain unarmed? Should South Africa, with its history of nuclear capability, lead an effort to redefine African security policy? Should the African Union revisit the Pelindaba Treaty in light of modern threats? And if the West, Russia, and China ignore security agreements when convenient, should Africa continue to abide by constraints that limit its ability to protect itself?
These are no longer theoretical questions. The world is changing, and Africa must decide whether to change with it—or risk being left behind in a geopolitical environment where only those with the means to defend themselves can dictate their own future.