Do Electoral Systems Influence Policy Outcomes?
Himanshu Sharma
Sustainable Finance Advisor @ UN Environment Programme | M.P.A. /// *all views expressed here are personal and do not reflect the views/positions of my employer*
“A country?s electoral system is the method used to calculate the number of elected positions in government that individuals and parties are awarded after elections. In other words, it is the way that votes are translated into seats in parliament or in other areas of government (such as the presidency). There are many different types of electoral systems in use around the world, and even within individual countries, different electoral systems may be found in different regions and at different levels of government (e.g., for elections to school boards, city councils, state legislatures, governorships, etc.”
The purpose of the essay is to examine if the choice of electoral systems has any influence over policy outcomes in that country. For the sake of simplicity and familiarity, this essay will classify the numerous possible and existing electoral systems into two very broad categories : majoritarian and proportional representation. I will attempt to distinguish between these two systems, and at the same time, examine their impact on shaping public opinions and in turn, policy outcomes. There?s been a lot of research on the question of how electoral systems influence the representation structure, meaning the number of parties and the width of opinions represented in the legislature. Proportional representation systems have been observed as having more parties contesting elections (Katz, 1997) than majoritarian systems.
We can observe the same in case of the number of parties winning seats in the legislature, with proportional representation systems tending to produce more parties in the legislature than is the case with traditional majoritarian systems. (Lijphart, 1999). Majoritarian systems have less inclusion and a lower number of parties in the executive (Blais & Carty, 1987), and the opposition usually has less influence in the legislature as compared to proportional representation systems (Powell, 2000). There?s a sizable amount of literature showing a relationship between electoral institutions and their influence on the political structure, meaning the character and nature of political parties themselves. At the heart of such research is the assertion that electoral institutions shape the party systems (Duverger, 1954; Lijphart, 1994; Rae, 1971).
Not only that, electoral systems are also believed to have a significant effect on many other important democratic characteristics, including minority representation (Bowler, Donovan, & Brockington, 2003), the success/failure of interest groups and movements (Heidenheimer, 1973; Kitschelt, 1986), openness towards action on public opinion (Powell, 2000), legitimacy (Banducci, Donovan, & Karp, 1999; Banducci & Karp, 1999), conflict resolution (Lijphart, 1969), and corruption (Chang & Golden, 2006).
The trade-off between proportional representation and majoritarian systems is usually seen as a trade-off between single member constituencies and multi-member constituencies, or higher stability and decisiveness versus increased diversity and discussion. Proportional representation systems are characterized by a larger number of parties as part of the legislature and thus have more diversity of opinions and convictions They also promote dialogue and debate over a broader range of issues and ideas. One can expect a broader distribution on a right-left spectrum in countries with proportional representation systems, as compared to those with majoritarian ones (Katz, 1997, pp.150-60).
The same dynamic can be expected when it comes to the width of positions on policy issues like environmental policy and taxation. From this perspective, we can see that in a proportional representation electoral system, there is a much higher possibility of smaller, fringe parties getting entry into legislature and having a chance to enter into the elite policy-making circles. Being present in the legislature means these parties can bring a more diverse, and sometimes marginalized, issues into focus and start a debate which might eventually lead to positive policy outcomes. “Sensitive” policy positions, like those on gay rights, are generally very difficult for political figures and parties with “centrist” credentials to discuss, since they carry political costs which might be deemed too risky to take on. Hence, it is the smaller, niche parties which are tasked with bringing such issues to light.
Examples could be issues like gay marriage, which involves associating oneself or a party with a historically socially sensitive issue and an unpopular minority group, and environmental protection legislation, which requires the electorate to make material sacrifices. The commitment of people to tackle such issues tends to decline when they realize that they will have to incur some costs (Inglehart, 1995). As an example, while a huge portion of Americans might support some sort of legislation to protect the environment, it would be political suicide for a presidential candidate to publicly back legislation to increase gasoline prices (as a form of pollution tax). In the absence of a small parties supporting such views or dissenting opinions, elite consensus will maintain the status quo of gasoline taxes being low, and in turn, the public will continue to remain vehemently opposed to an increase in a tax of such nature.
Another example of the choice of electoral systems influencing public opinion, and thus policy, can be seen in New Zealand. New Zealand went from a majoritarian to a proportional system, and the Green Party won seats under the new system whereas it hadn’t been able to break into the legislature under the previous majoritarian system (Orellana, 2009; Hayward and Rudd, 2000). They were thus able to bring issues which had not been receiving attention under the previous electoral system into focus, and spark a debate on these topics. The arguments presented above far in no way means that majoritarian systems do not influence public opinion or innovate when it comes to policy. In fact, majoritarian systems have some inherent advantages, in the sense that they facilitate strong and stable governments, sometimes even strong enough to back unpopular legislation (Lijphart, 1999). An example can be UK?s decision to send troops to Iraq in 2003, a decision taken by Tony Blair in opposition to the popular sentiment of not doing so.
Historically, it should be noted that majoritarian systems have produced pioneering policies when it comes issues like voting rights for women. The first countries to grant their adult female citizens the right to vote were New Zealand and Australia, both having majoritarian systems in place. All forms of democracies permit a significant flow of information, and over a period of time, public preferences as a whole have mellowed/become more tolerant as technology has enabled higher labor productivity, increase in incomes and enabled much more diverse interactions. But the rate of progress on modern sensitive issues like gay rights and environmental change is faster in systems with proportional representation systems. Netherlands and Belgium, two countries which have lead the debate on euthanasia and legalized it, have proportional representation electoral system.
Proportional representation systems have their own problems when it comes to policy outcomes. Having a diverse set of opinions in the legislature also increase the probability to lengthy debates, fractious coalition governments and slower decision-making. When coalition governments are formed through negotiations and bargaining among parties after the elections, as usually happens in proportional representation systems (case in point being German coalitions), voters do not normally know exactly how their votes will affect the electoral outcome, and the resulting policy outcome. On the other hand, voters have an easier time guessing the impact of their vote on formation of a government, resulting in high prospective identifiability of potential governments (Strom, 1990).
The essay examined the influence electoral systems have on the political structure and flow of information within that structure, and as a result on policy outcomes. By influencing party systems, electoral systems have a direct impact on the time period it takes for certain policy issues to be considered and debated, the time it takes for the public opinion to change on such, and the time it takes for governments to address and respond to them. Although proportional representation systems have been observed as being more inclusive, and promoting progress faster when it comes to modern sensitive issues, majoritarian systems also have noticeable influence on policy outcomes as they tend to produce more stable governments and more efficient decision-making processes. The ideal solution lies somewhere in between.
For long-term positive policy outcomes, it is important to move towards a hybrid system, so that policy innovation as seen in proportional representation systems can be coupled with the stability and decisiveness of the majoritarian systems. As a parting analogy, table etiquette guides suggest having a maximum of 6-8 people at a table, with the purpose being having good conversations, while ensuring everyone gets involved but each voice can still be heard.