Do clients know what they need?

Do clients and users always know what they need (or want)? I'm not sure. Boeing's first jetliner, the 707, is a good example, as is the 747 Jumbo Jet. This is an excellent chance to utilize some knowledge from one of my hobbies, aviation. Joe Sutter's book about the 747's creation, for which he was the chief engineer, is not just a brilliant engineering, risk management, and sales book but also a treasure trove of insights into creating the iconic 747. Let me go ahead and unfold this.

Passenger air transport in the 1950s was dominated by large propeller planes with radial internal combustion engines, such as Lockheeds and Douglas'. Boeing's 307 and 377 were not a massive success; they were too heavy, luxurious, and expensive. Boeing learned much about jet planes from their engagement with the military forces. Boeing got a deal to construct a jet-driven tanker, the KC-135, in the 1950s. Based on what they learned and their prototype, the B367-80, they constructed a passenger airliner, the Boeing 707. Boeing only had a few clients interested in the 707 when they decided to build it. Airlines were hesitant to buy jetliners because (a) they were happy with their current propeller fleet and (b) jetliners were a new technology, and the airlines did not trust their reliability. Especially after the first jetliner, the Comet failed (*1).

Boeing developed a jet airliner in 1955 without a development partner or a Letter of Intent. Test pilot Tex Johnston did a test ride during a boating event in Puget Sound with a highly decorated crowd of airline executives and IATA(*2) representatives. Tex decided to fly a barrel roll, a maneuver where the plane was upside down for a moment. The crowd and media recognized this, convincing the people that this must be a reliable passenger airliner with jet engines. Being able to fly a barrel roll and the jet engine's reliability is independent, but it's media. The test pilot immediately got a short-notice invitation to the CEO's office, of course. When asked what he thought he was doing, he said, "I was selling airplanes." 865 Boeing 707s were built from 1956 to 1978. Its immediate competitor, the Douglas DC-8, arrived two years later, and 556 were built. The Boeing 707 was a huge success and paved the way for passengers traveling on jet engine-driven airliners. Airlines never asked for them.

1970 Pan Am got an airliner they needed, but they initially wanted something else. Let's go back to 1966. Juan Trippe, Pan Am's founder and CEO, reached out to Bill Allen, CEO of Boeing, to say he would like a plane that could fly twice as many passengers as the 707 and have double the range compared to the 707. Trippe desperately wanted a double-decker 707, and Allen wanted his chief engineer, Joe Sutter, to develop precisely what Trippe was asking for. Sutter, a very experienced engineer who learned much from the 707, 727, and 737 projects, pushed back. He knew a double-decker would be nonsense back then(*3). Making the body a lot wider, seating ten passengers abreast, and having two aisles was his solution, which is still in place more than half a century later for long-range planes. The 747 was born. He fought hard for it. However, one more reason why the 747 was such a success is essential. It was its plan B; hang on.

Boeing's management gave the 747 a very low priority. By far, the highest priority was the Boeing 2707 SST—never heard of it? No wonder. In the 1960s, the future of passenger air traffic was seen as supersonic. The 2707 SST was meant to be a Concorde competitor, just bigger and faster, which had never seen the light of day due to a massive cost explosion, and the oil crisis in the early 1970s was the final nail in its coffin. So, as passenger airliners were meant to be supersonic, plan B for the 747 was being a freighter. So, its construction allowed it to be versatile as a passenger aircraft, freighter, and many other special operations planes(*4). Remember, the Pan Am CEO wanted a double-decker single-aisle plane. Over 1,500 747s were built in over 50 years, and hundreds are still operating today. Its early-day competitors were the Lockheed L-1011 Tristar and the McDonnell Douglas DC-10. Only 250 Tristars were built, production ceased after 16 years, and only one is still flying. 446 DC-10s (including tankers) were built, production ceased after 20 years, and only a handful is still in operation.

Is it essential to ask prospects what they want? It is crucial to understand what they need to solve their problems—not necessarily what they think they want. There is this saying: If Henry Ford had asked what people wanted, they would have stated faster horses.

THINK OUTSIDE THE BOX TO RESOLVE CLIENT'S PROBLEMS. And understand the client's problem first!

(*1) Its windows were square, and material fatigue in the windows' corners, due to the pressurized cabin, led to some crashes. They changed that in later versions, but its reputation needed to be better to lead to success. In addition to that, Comet's engine placement within the wings could have been better too, making maintenance complex and costly.

(*2) IATA International Air Transport Association

(*3) The Boeing 377 from 1947 was a double-decker airliner, by the way. Sutter, of course, knew that.

(*4) The 747's later competitor, the Airbus A380, was never constructed to transport anything else but passengers. Two hundred fifty-four were built, and production ceased in 2021 after less than 20 years.