Discussion Points in the Armenia-Azerbaijan Negotiation Track — September 2024

This material will analyze the likely contentious articles in the peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia.

I. Current Agenda Between Baku and Irevan

Azerbaijan and Armenia, in the post-conflict stage of their relations, have been unable to sign a Comprehensive Peace Agreement for the past four years. While both sides claim progress on the key provisions of the document, there are evident contradictions and attempts by regional and global powers to influence the negotiation process.

On September 6, 2024, President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev, during his speech at the Cernobbio Forum (Italy), stated that nearly 80% of the peace treaty text with Irevan had been agreed upon, and expressed confidence that the parties would achieve peace in the South Caucasus (1).

On September 10, 2024, Armenian PM Nikol Pashinyan, in his address at the "Yerevan Dialogue" event, offered more specifics on the matter, stating that 13 articles and the preamble [of the peace agreement] had been fully agreed upon; another 3 articles, consisting of two clauses each, had been partially agreed upon. He further clarified that “one clause in these articles is agreed upon, while the other is not” (2). It’s also worth noting the signing of a provision for joint work by the Baku and Irevan delimitation commissions on August 30, 2024 (3).

In his speeches, Pashinyan often references the "sovereign territory of the Republic of Armenia," which spans 29,743 km2 (4). Naturally, Pashinyan regularly reiterates his commitment to recognizing Azerbaijan's territorial integrity within its 86,600 km2 borders (5), based on the 1991 Alma-Ata Declaration.

However, the following section will address potential contentious issues in the articles, which serve as barriers to achieving a lasting peace between the two Caucasus states.

II. Possibly controversial articles

1) Uncoordinated article: Disputed territories on the conditional border

Since the signing of the trilateral agreement on November 10, 2020, which ended the Second Karabakh War, there have been several military clashes between Azerbaijan and Armenia, notably in 2021 and 2023, along the contested state border. These incidents occurred outside of the localized counterterrorism operations by the Azerbaijani armed forces aimed at restoring full sovereignty over Karabakh. Conflicting reports from Armenian sources claim that the Azerbaijani military has occupied between 60 km2 and 220 km2 of what was formerly Soviet Armenian territory (6). The discrepancies in these figures contribute to a lack of objective assessment of the situation on the ground.

For example, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has stated that the extent of the "occupied" Armenian territory amounts to around 200 km2. Speaking at the 2nd World Armenian Summit (September 17–20, 2024), Pashinyan emphasized that Armenia does not intend to reclaim these lands through military means, instead opting for diplomatic solutions (7).

2) Uncoordinated article: The issue of resolving the status of enclaves

On May 24, 2023, as part of the delimitation process along the contested border, Armenia returned four villages in the Gazakh region—Baganis Ayrum, Ashagy Askipara, Heyrimli, and Kyzylhajily—to Azerbaijan. These villages had been occupied by Armenian forces during the First Karabakh War and are located near the border, preventing them from being considered enclaves from Baku's perspective (8). This marked the first instance where Azerbaijan and Armenia resolved a territorial issue through negotiations.

As of spring 2023, four Azerbaijani enclaves remain within Armenia: Yukhary Askipara, Barkhudarly, Sofulu (Gazakh), and Karki/Tigranashen (Nakhchivan). In contrast, Armenia retains one enclave within Azerbaijan, the village of Artsvashen/Bashkend.

The return of the Gazakh villages sparked a resurgence of revanchist sentiment in Armenia. Former Armenian presidents Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan expressed disagreement with the decision, and the return also led to the formation of the "Tavush for the Homeland" movement, headed by Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan of the Armenian Apostolic Church.

The status of enclaves remains unclear. Initial contradictory statements from both sides surfaced in the spring of 2022, when Irevan proposed an exchange of enclaves, an idea rejected by Baku (9). The challenge with Armenia's "exchange" proposal lies in domestic resistance faced by PM Pashinyan. Armenian parliamentarians and experts are wary of this approach, citing concerns about a potential "internal blockade" (10). This refers to the Azerbaijani military's visual control over Armenia's strategic international highways, M-2 and M-4, which connect Armenia to Georgia and are vital for Armenian logistics and security (11).

3) Uncoordinated Article No. 3: The issue of changing the preamble of the Constitution of Armenia

In early August 2024, it was announced that the clause on opening regional communications, particularly the Zangezur Corridor, was removed from the negotiation process between Baku and Irevan by mutual agreement (12). According to Elchin Amirbayov, the special envoy of the President of Azerbaijan, the territorial claims against Azerbaijan enshrined in Armenia's current constitution remain the only obstacle to further progress in the peace process between the two countries (13).

Armenian PM Nikol Pashinyan has also emphasized the need to amend Armenia's constitution (14). However, his recent statements during an annual press briefing on August 31, 2024 (15), and at the "Yerevan Dialogue" forum on September 10, 2024, regarding Azerbaijan's territorial claims in its constitution tied to its legal succession from the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR) have caused confusion in Baku (16).

For instance, on September 18, 2024, Hikmet Hajiyev, head of the Foreign Policy Department of the Azerbaijani Presidential Administration, expressed in an interview with the state agency AZERTAC frustration over Armenia’s prolonged response (70 days) to the peace agreement proposals. He also mentioned the upcoming negotiations and the need for Armenia to amend its constitution (17).

III. Conclusion

To summarize, the ongoing negotiations between Baku and Irevan face challenges in the following key areas:

– Disputed territories along the provisional border: These arose after clashes between the Azerbaijani and Armenian armed forces, with Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan stating that 200 square kilometers of Armenian territory are now under Azerbaijani control.

– Status of enclaves: Even if there is an exchange of territories, it would be unfavorable for Irevan and could lead to significant political upheaval within Armenia.

– Amendment of Armenia's constitution: This has become a contentious issue, especially in light of recent statements by Prime Minister Pashinyan, adding complexity to the negotiation process.

These unresolved issues indicate ongoing tensions and a lack of mutual understanding, hindering progress toward a lasting peace agreement between the two states.

Resume:

It is highly probable that Azerbaijan and Armenia will not be able to come to a common denominator on the disputed articles of the peace agreement by the end of the year.

It is likely that the parties will most likely continue the demarcation/delimitation process of the conditional border, but only in those areas where the contradictions raise a minimum number of questions.

It is possible that the periodic repeated statements of the Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan regarding the length of the official border between Armenia and Azerbaijan are also aimed at making Baku realize: a) the de jure return of the Armenian enclave of Bashkent/Artsvashen to the territory of Azerbaijan; b) some lands on the conditional border, which, according to official Irevan, belong to the territory of Armenia.

It is possible that in this context, Pashinyan's statements about his government's intention to resolve the issue of disputed territories exclusively by peaceful means also serve as a message to the West and other members of the international community to blame the Azerbaijani side for a hypothetical military clash on the border.

It is possible that Azerbaijan, on the terms of the winning side, may exchange some disputed territories on the conditional border for the enclave of Bashkend/Artsvashen (de jure), and will not change its position on the issues of the 4 Gazakh enclaves and the village of Karki (Nakhchivan).

It is likely that Armenia will demand guarantees from Azerbaijan of non-use of (military) force in the event of the return of the Azerbaijani enclaves on its territory, where in such a scenario Azerbaijan will be able to visually control the interstate highways M-2 and M-4.

It is highly likely that in the event of the enclave issues being resolved by “exchange”, Iran will also oppose this, fearing an even smaller reduction in its influence in the South Caucasus. This may lead to another confrontation on the Baku-Tehran route.

It is highly likely that the long response of the Armenian leadership to Azerbaijan’s peace proposals is due to some strategic calculations, also concerning domestic political contradictions. Here, first of all, it is worth mentioning the fifth column in Armenia in the form of pro-Russian, revanchist forces - Bagrat Galstyan and the probable conspiracy of the former leaders of Armenia / the separatist regime in Karabakh - Robert Kocharyan, Serzh Sargsyan, Samvel Shahramanyan, etc.

It is obvious that Baku will not agree with Irevan's theses regarding the imminent signing of a peace agreement, because in reality there are obvious contradictions between the parties. It is worth adding here the issue of unblocking the routes (Zangezur corridor), which in itself is a critical issue and which must be resolved, but was simply postponed for future discussions. It is also obvious that the OSCE Minsk Group will not be dissolved.

It is likely that Pashinyan's popularization of the thesis on Armenia's territorial claims in the Constitution of Azerbaijan is an attempt to turn this into a "card" in the negotiation track with Baku. However, it is obvious that the Armenian government will indeed change the Constitution, but not in the near future, but by 2026.

Sources:

1. From peace treaty with Armenia to border delimitation: world media focus on Ilham Aliyev's participation in Cernobbio forum – https://report.az/en/foreign-politics/from-peace-treaty-with-armenia-to-border-delimitation-world-media-focus-on-ilham-aliyev-s-participation-in-cernobbio-forum/?

2. ??????????? ???????????? ?? ????????????? ?????? ????????????? ????????????????? ?????????? ?????. ???????? – https://news.am/arm/news/841655.html?

3. Armenian-Azeri Border Agreement Publicized – https://www.azatutyun.am/a/33103109.html?

4. ???????? ???? ????????? ??????????? ????? ??, ??? ?? ????????? ?????????? ?????????? ?????, ??? ??? ???????? – https://armenpress.am/hy/article/1137715?

5. 86 600 кв. км включают в себя и Нагорный Карабах - Пашинян – https://rus.azatutyun.am/a/32422655.html?

6. Территориальные изменения в результате армяно-азербайджанского конфликта с 1980-ых. Территориальные потери Армении в 2021-22 гг. – https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/blogs/83781/posts/56776?

7. Армения не намерена военным путем возвращать свои оккупированные территории - Пашинян – https://arka.am/ru/news/politics/armeniya_ne_namerena_voennym_putem_vozvrashchat_svoi_okkupirovannye_territorii_pashinyan_/?

8. Azerbaijan takes control of four villages on border with Armenia as part of deal – https://www.reuters.com/world/azerbaijan-takes-control-four-villages-border-with-armenia-part-deal-2024-05-24/?

9. Армения и Азербайджан нашли точки разъединения – https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5348001?

10. ?????????? ????????? ??????? ????????? ????????? ?????? ?????????? – https://hraparak.am/post/ed018320f041f0e53e10567d03ba4898?

11. Enclaves - islands of Armenian-Azerbaijani confrontation – https://jam-news.net/enclaves-islands-of-armenian-azerbaijani-confrontation/?

12. Armenia Confirms Removal Of Transport Links Provision From Draft Peace Agreement With Azerbaijan – https://www.azatutyun.am/a/33070066.html?

13. Amirbayov: Armenia's territorial claims in constitution remain main obstacle to peace – https://report.az/en/foreign-politics/amirbayov-armenia-s-territorial-claims-in-constitution-remain-main-obstacle-to-peace/?

14. ??? ?????? ???????? ? ??? ????????????????. ????? ???????? – https://verelq.am/hy/node/147378?

15. “Sign a peace treaty on already agreed terms”: Pashinyan's proposal to Baku – https://jam-news.net/pashinyans-august-press-conference/?

16. ????????? ??????????????? ??? ??? ?????????? ????????? ??-? ????????, ???? ?? ?????????? ???? ???? ????????? ???????? – https://news.am/arm/news/841681.html?

17. Помощник Президента: Ответ Армении на мирные предложения в течение 70 дней вызывает вопросы – https://azertag.az/ru/xeber/pomoshchnik_prezidenta_otvet_armenii_na_mirnye_predlozheniya_v_techenie_70_dnei_vyzyvaet_voprosy-3185910