Digging Deeper into the legacy of Pat Gelsinger

Digging Deeper into the legacy of Pat Gelsinger

Last week, I wrote a glowing post about the incredible career of Pat Gelsinger—a leader who’s undeniably shaped the tech industry in big, bold ways. And while I stand by every word of praise, I think it’s only fair to look at the full picture. If we peel back the layers, there are definitely some missteps and decisions along the way that might have gone differently. Nobody’s career is perfect, and Pat’s is no exception.

Let’s start with VMware.

When Pat took the helm, VMware was already a powerhouse, leading the way in virtualization and redefining IT infrastructure. But then came the $67 billion Dell/EMC merger in 2016. This wasn’t a typical acquisition—it was the brainchild of outgoing EMC CEO Joe Tucci, who saw the merger as a way to cement EMC’s legacy and create a tech giant that could compete with the likes of IBM and HPE. There were so many moving parts to this deal that it was mind-melting, up to and including the mountains of private debt taken on by Michael Dell, the specialty shares required to split-off VMware, antitrust evaluations, SEC/FTC investigations, and so much more. For VMware, though, the deal was a double-edged sword. On one hand, it brought stability and a bigger platform to operate from. On the other, it tied VMware’s fate to Dell’s broader strategy, leaving the company less independent than it had been.

I've read countless hot takes and opinions from tech news and analysts over the last 10 years on the trickle-down effects of this deal, and not many of them were good for any of the companies involved. I personally believe it's one of those that should be studied. It diluted Dell's core business, it allowed a very muddy EMC portfolio to stay muddy, and it kneecapped VMware's rabid growth it had experienced for 10 straight years up to that point.

Pat did his best to navigate this new reality, but VMware’s role as a semi-independent arm of Dell Technologies wasn’t without challenges. The company found itself pushing hard into multi-cloud and Kubernetes with Tanzu, but those efforts struggled to gain the traction needed to compete with hyperscalers like AWS, Azure, and Google Cloud after already trying that experiment with Pivotal. Meanwhile, VMware’s core virtualization business—its bread and butter—wasn’t getting the same level of focus. It’s hard not to wonder if the strategic priorities during the Dell/EMC years hampered some of what made VMware such a standout company. Was it the right move for VMware to pivot so aggressively, or did it lose sight of its core in the process? And how much of this can we place at Pat's feet? These are all questions we'll likely never truly have answers to, for a variety of reasons.

And then there’s Intel.

When Pat returned in 2021, the company was facing a mountain of challenges: falling behind AMD, struggling to keep pace with TSMC’s manufacturing, and dealing with significant delays in product roadmaps. To make matters worse, this all happened in the middle of a global pandemic that threw supply chains into chaos. Pat came in with bold plans—IDM 2.0, a massive push for U.S.-based chip manufacturing, and a roadmap to bring Intel back to the forefront of innovation.

But bold plans don’t always lead to quick results. Critics have pointed out that while the vision was there, the execution left much to be desired. Intel had already lost significant ground, and catching up in a hyper-competitive semiconductor industry is no easy task. One particularly ambitious move was Intel’s foray into the GPU market to take on NVIDIA. While the idea of challenging a dominant player in a growing space is bold, the question remains:

Was this the right time for Intel to enter such a demanding and resource-intensive market?

NVIDIA has decades of dominance, a rich ecosystem, and unmatched mindshare, leaving Intel’s efforts feeling more like a gamble than a calculated move. Could those resources have been better spent shoring up Intel’s core CPU and manufacturing businesses, as they had already been fumbling behind AMD and TSMC?

The investments in manufacturing were ambitious, but they came at a time when Intel’s engineering fundamentals and product innovation still needed major work. Stock performance reflected these struggles, and while Intel made progress, it hasn’t yet reclaimed its position as the leader it once was.

Leadership at this level is never simple.

Pat’s vision and passion for innovation are undeniable, but even the best leaders face tough decisions. At VMware, could there have been a stronger effort to safeguard its independence and double down on core strengths during the Dell/EMC era? At Intel, was the decision to take on NVIDIA in GPUs too much of a distraction at a time when the company needed to focus on rebuilding its foundation? These are the questions that linger when we look at the full scope of Pat’s career.

None of this takes away from his remarkable legacy. But it’s a reminder that even the most celebrated leaders leave behind complex stories—ones filled with both extraordinary successes and moments of missed opportunity.

That’s what makes leadership so challenging, especially in an industry that evolves as fast as ours.

/Nick

As the vCenter Architect, I observed that Pat doubled down on the investments in vSphere. In 2015, the vCenter/vSphere products were in bad shape - but were recovering from serious product execution challenges related to 5.0->5.5 with the 6.0 release. From 2015->2023, vCenter + vSphere did exceptionally well, adding 30 million workloads (50->80) and powering two significant businesses that were marginal in 2015 (VMC/VCPP) The DELL/EMC era had problems, but the real issues were not doubling down. The real problems were (1) Silver Lake's two dividends. If VMware had 20 billion dollars of cash in 2022, Broadcom could not afford them. Instead of being purchased for 60 billion, Broadcom would have to spend over 80. (2) The Pivotal acquisition. The rumors about why this happened are legion. The reality is that Pivotal and VMware had very different corporate cultures, and any M&A should have flagged that risk. (3) Because of 1 and 2, VMware could not invest in areas that mattered. Silverlake forced VMware, a growth company, to operate as if it were a value company. (4) The internal corporate politics of EMC/DELL/Vmware during the acquisition were Kafaesque on a good day. And this is barely the tip of the ice berg.

Masroor Syed

Leading Cloud Storage Success

2 个月

both articles are well researched and a joy to read

Tuan P.

Semiconductor Technology Consultant

2 个月

My five Cents to Intel Problem : as an IDM the advantage lies with the product design and manufacturing under one hat! However there are not so many IDMs being able to compete with the combination Product Design (Apple or AMD) + Foundry Service (TSMC or Global Foundry)! This is due to the super efficient manufacturing process of the professional foundries! They are much much better than the manufacturing part of thr IDM ! It is for me is not understandable that the foundry guys can do it better than the manufacturing guys of the IDM! I said that because when a Foundry guy develop a process he has to make a process with a lot of options so that he can cater different needs of his customer! It is similar to offer a car with full options to the clienteles with different tastes! Normally a process with full options is more complicated and lengthy and hence expensive to run ! But the foundry guys have achieved remarkable success compared to the poor IDM manufacturing guys! Why the manufacturing of the IDM is not so successful is for me a questionmark! Maybe it is a management problem? At TSMC THE TOP MANAGER like CC WEI or Moris Chang knows exactly what‘s going on on the floor! I will continue next time

David Hesse

Lead Virtualization Specialist at ERGO Technology & Services

2 个月

Valid point

Mike Foley

Product Manager, public speaker, inventor, customer advocate, staff technical marketing architect, infrastructure security SME. I love working w/ customers & engineers to build solutions that solve customer problems

2 个月

Solid observations Nick. On the money. Another part would be the use of VMware by Michael Dell as a piggy bank to prop up Dell. Saddling it with debt, never really letting it put enough resources behind the (too many) projects it had taken on. Bloating it up to 39,000 employees. I’ll give Hock just enough credit for giving VMware the focus it needed. I just don’t agree with a number of his methods. (I had hoped to finish my career there. And with the job market like it is, I’m fearing I may have)

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