DIA Report Released Today—“Nuclear Challenges: The Growing Capabilities of Strategic Competitors & Regional Rivals”—China Content Curated Here!

Nuclear Challenges: The Growing Capabilities of Strategic Competitors and Regional Rivals (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, 23 October 2024 ).

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CHINA-FOCUSED CONTENT:

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China

China is undergoing the most rapid expansion and ambitious modernization of its nuclear forces in history—almost certainly driven by an aim for enduring strategic competition with the U.S. and a goal to actualize intensified strategic concepts that have existed for decades but are now being realized.17,18,19,20

China is fielding and developing a range of new nuclear capabilities that include its largest buildup of nuclear missile silos; ground-mobile, air-launched, and submarine-launched weapons; nuclear-capable HGVs; as well as C4ISR capabilities to support a launch-on-warning posture.21,22,23,24,25,26 China probably will introduce new capabilities which carry the potential to destabilize the status quo over the next decade as it develops concepts for new systems’ use and integrates them into its broader warfighting and deterrence doctrine.

Rapidly Expanding Nuclear Warhead Stockpile

China is fielding new nuclear capabilities at a faster pace than any time in its history.27,28 In 2020, the DoD estimated China’s operational nuclear warhead stockpile was in the low 200s and was expected to at least double by 2030. Beijing probably accelerated its nuclear expansion as its stockpile is now more than 500 operational nuclear warheads and is on track to exceed previous projections. While China’s nuclear stockpile is well below U.S. and Russian inventories, it has not declared an end goal nor acknowledged the scale of its expansion, and continues to limit engagement in substantive arms control discussions.29,30

By 2030, we estimate that China will have over 1,000 operational nuclear warheads, most of which will be fielded on systems capable of ranging the continental United States.31,32 Most of this stockpile growth is likely to come from the following PLA Rocket Force developments:

• A silo-based solid-propellant missile project likely consisting of about 300 silos.33,34 These silos are capable of fielding both DF-31 and DF-41 class ICBMs.35,36,37
• Silo-based liquid-propellant missile expansion; increasing the number of brigades while simultaneously increasing the number of launchers per brigade.38,39,40,41
• Mobile ICBM expansion; establishing additional mobile ICBM brigades while increasing the number of launchers per brigade from 6 to 12.42,43,44
• Theater capabilities expansion; establishing additional brigades of nuclear and conventional-capable DF-26 IRBMs.45,46,47

Nuclear Strategy and Force Posture

China’s nuclear strategy is based on PLA deterrence of an enemy first strike and counterstrike when deterrence fails, threatening retaliation against an adversary’s military capability, population, and economy.48,49,50,51 PLA

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planners very likely intend to avoid a protracted series of nuclear exchanges, and state that the scale and intensity of retaliatory force needs to be carefully controlled.52 China’s public declaratory “no first use” (NFU) policy is consistent with this approach to using nuclear force.53

China’s nuclear strategy probably includes consideration of a nuclear strike in response to a nonnuclear attack threatening the viability of China’s nuclear forces or C2, or that approximates the strategic effects of a nuclear strike, despite the NFU policy.54 Beijing probably would also consider using its nuclear force if a conventional military defeat in Taiwan gravely threatened the regime’s survival.i

For additional details, please see DOD’s Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2023: Annual Report to Congress

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Launch-on-Warning

The PLA is implementing a launch-on-warning (LOW) posture where it would be able to, upon warning of missile strike, launch a counterstrike before an enemy first strike can detonate. PLA writings suggest multiple manned C2 organs are involved in this process, warned by space- and ground-based sensors, and that this posture is broadly similar to the U.S. and Russian LOW posture. The PRC probably seeks to keep at least a portion of its nuclear force, especially its new silo-based units, on a LOW posture, and since 2017, the PLARF has conducted exercises involving early warning of a nuclear strike and launch-on-warning responses.

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The PLA likely seeks a diverse nuclear force, comprised of systems ranging from lower-yield precision-strike missiles to ICBMs with multi-megaton yields.63,64 This force is intended to ensure China can inflict unacceptable damage with both proportionate and overwhelming retaliatory capabilities, thus denying an adversary victory if a conflict escalates to the nuclear domain.65

China’s nuclear modernization almost certainly is an expansion of a longer-running trajectory of nuclear development, probably intensifying and expanding—rather than reinventing—early strategic concepts. The modernization is driven by multiple factors, including strategic ambitions, near- and medium-term security interests, technological capabilities, and parochial interests of military and industrial stakeholders. These factors include the following:

In the 1980s, Chinese senior leadership abandoned a number of nuclear modernization initiatives because China lacked the technical base to attain them and because they judged the international environment much more benign than before.66 By around 2010, with an improved manufacturing technology base, the PLA sought to build a larger nuclear force than it fielded during the 20th century.67 Portions of that force revived previously shelved concepts to be actualized over the 2010s and 2020s, to include “early warning counterstrike” (the PLA term for launch-on-warning), regional

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precision nuclear strike, and advanced missile defense penetration capabilities.68,69

? China continues to pursue at least qualitative or technical parity with an increasing scope of U.S. and Russian capabilities.70 This effort is part of a drive to have a “world class” military appropriate for a “great modern socialist country” by mid-century.71 Beijing views the United States as increasingly determined to contain China. It is increasingly willing to confront the United States and other countries in areas where interests diverge.72

? China is developing capabilities to “counterbalance”—directly counter or strategically obviate—assessed U.S. military advantages.73 Beijing’s perception of U.S. military superiority almost certainly reinforces its commitment to develop and field advanced conventional and nuclear capabilities, as well as improve warfighting capabilities in emerging domains like cyber and space.74,75,76

Recently Fielded Capabilities and Ongoing Improvements

In addition to its nuclear expansion, the PLA is conducting a sweeping modernization and improvement campaign.77,78 Over the last 5 years, China has probably achieved the following nuclear force milestones:

• Established a air leg of a newly formed triad—composed of PLA land, sea, and air forces—with the H-6N bomber capable of aerial refueling and carrying a nuclear-capable air-launched ballistic missile.79,80 China publicly displayed this bomber during its 2019 National Day parade.81
• Fielded DF-26 IRBMs, China’s first precision-strike nuclear capability.82 Chinese officials claim the “U.S. withdrawal [from the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty] will have a direct negative impact on global strategic stability.”83 Concurrent with this criticism, it fielded thousands of weapon systems, including the DF-26, that would be covered by the treaty if China were to participate.84
• Fielded two more Type 094 JIN-class submarines for a total of six SSBNs—providing enough capability for continuous peacetime deterrence patrols.85,86 Additionally, China has improved upon the JL-2 SLBM by fielding the more capable and longer-range JL-3, allowing China to range CONUS from protected bastion areas such as the South China Sea.87,88
• Fielded DF-31 class transporter-erector-launcher (TEL)-based road mobile ICBMs, that likely have improved survivability and lethality over previous versions.89,90

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Fielded the DF-41, China’s first road-mobile ICBM with MIRV capability.91 This system likely is intended to carry no more than three warheads per missile and has improved range and accuracy over DF-31 class ICBMs.92,93

Future Nuclear Capabilities

China almost certainly plans to continue substantial upgrades to all three legs of its nuclear triad, including: upgrades to existing weapons classes such as single and multiple warhead versions of the DF-5 liquid-propellant ICBM; a new SSBN class probably intended to field MIRVed SLBMs, judging from past developmental trends; and a strategic stealth bomber, according to Chinese state media.94,95,96,97

China very likely is also working to introduce a variety of completely new nuclear capabilities to its arsenal, some of which will be fielded in the near future, if not already fielded. These include the following

• A new “early warning counterstrike” posture similar to launch-on-warning or launch-under-attack supported by an array of space-based and ground-based sensors.98 At a minimum, China will likely incorporate its silo-based ICBM forces into this posture.99 President Putin has stated that Moscow is aiding China’s ballistic missile early warning system.100
• ICBM-range nuclear-armed HGVs. On 27 July 2021, China conducted a test of an HGV that traveled 40,000 kilometers. China likely intends to field this capability to evade U.S. missile defenses.101,102,103,104
• China probably seeks lower-yield nuclear warhead capabilities to provide proportional response options that its high-yield warheads cannot deliver, judging from a variety of sources. These sources include Chinese military

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writings, Chinese strategist publications, a defense industry publication, China’s 2019 defense white paper (which called for a world-class military), and subsequent President Xi guidance (which calls for enhanced and accelerated strategic deterrence).105,106,107,108 China announced in 2019 that all nuclear-weapon states should diminish the role of nuclear weapons in their national security doctrines and refrain from developing low-yield nuclear warheads.109 However, China likely initiated a low-yield nuclear warhead development program prior to this statement.110

• China’s global-range test of a nuclear-capable HGV in July 2021 demonstrates its technical ability to field a FOBS. China probably will pursue an operational FOBS capability judging from its long-term concerns about U.S. missile defense capabilities.111,112,113
• Beijing continues evaluating the utility and feasibility of developing and fielding other novel nuclear delivery systems.114,115,116,117

Nuclear Materials Production and Testing Activity

China is establishing new nuclear materials production and reprocessing facilities which are very likely intended to support its nuclear force expansion.118,119 While these efforts are consistent with China’s goals to increase nuclear energy generation and to close its nuclear fuel cycle, Beijing likely also considers this dual-use infrastructure as crucial to supporting its military goals, judging from Chinese nuclear industry reporting and think tank publications.120 Despite China’s public support for a fissile material cutoff treaty, China probably intends to use this infrastructure to produce additional nuclear warhead materials for its military in the near-term.121,122

• Plutonium. China is constructing two CFR-600 sodium-cooled fast breeder nuclear reactors at Xiapu, each capable of producing enough plutonium for dozens of nuclear warheads annually from blankets surrounding the core, according to think tank estimates and suggestions in Chinese state media and Chinese nuclear industry reporting.123,124 China originally planned to use Russian-sourced mixed-oxide (MOX)ii fuel for these reactors, but changed the order to use highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel through 2030, according to nuclear industry reporting.125,126,127 By using HEU fuel, the reactors have the potential to generate additional weapons-grade plutonium. China is constructing multiple new reprocessing plants that could extract this plutonium, according to a Western think tank.128
• China has reduced transparency in its nuclear program as its capabilities are increasing. China is capable of producing plutonium in existing reactors and separating it at its only operational reprocessing plant in Jiuquan, judging from Chinese state media.129 Since 2015, China has removed this reprocessing facility from its annual publication of civilian nuclear fuel production, fabrication, storage, and reprocessing facilities. Additionally, it ceased reporting its stockpile of separated plutonium to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 2017.130

Blankets refer to uranium placed around the fuel core for the purpose of breeding plutonium.

MOX fuel is a blend of uranium and plutonium.

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Uranium and Tritium. In the past several years, China’s organization traditionally associated with military uranium enrichment has expanded production capacity and likely will continue to do so.131 China is also working to expand and diversify its capability to produce tritium by methods such as using tritium production targets in reactors and extraction from tritiated heavy water, according to Chinese nuclear industry reporting. Tritium is used to enhance the efficiency and yield of nuclear bombs.

In recent years, China’s possible preparation to operate its Lop Nur nuclear test site year-round and lack of transparency on its nuclear testing activities have raised concerns regarding its adherence to the U.S. “zero yield” standard also adhered to by the United Kingdom and France in their respective nuclear weapons testing moratoria.132,133

Outlook

Beijing’s pursuit of enhanced nuclear deterrence over the next decade probably will increase leadership confidence—and the risk of miscalculation—as the PLA makes gradual improvements in its ability to signal and counter the U.S. The PLA’s accompanying doctrinal concepts for employing these new nuclear capabilities probably remain nascent, which may introduce a period during the next several years of escalatory risks because of insufficiently established and predictable tactics, techniques, and procedures. Coupled with PLA officers’ downplaying the risks of imperfect information

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management during crises, inexperience managing nuclear crises, and their perceptions that they can elicit intended adversary responses while maintaining sufficient battlefield awareness, Beijing may accept greater risks as its nuclear doctrine and capabilities mature.134 As China continues its effort to accelerate nuclear modernization and expansion, we expect to see the following developments—listed in no particular order—that will blur conventional and nuclear boundaries:

Nuclear Deterrence in Conventional Crises. Beijing probably will seek to increasingly integrate nuclear deterrence during conventional crises as part of a unified multidomain crisis-management framework. The PLA continues to discuss conventional and nuclear signaling, war control, counterspace, and cyberspace operations as a means for crisis management.135

Lower-Yield Warhead. Chinese military writings have noted that the introduction of new precise small-yield nuclear weapons could allow for the controlled use of theater-range nuclear weapons for warning and deterrence.136 Such discussions provide PLA’s doctrinal basis for limited nuclear employment on the battlefield, suggesting Chinese nuclear thinkers could be reconsidering their long-standing view that nuclear war is uncontrollable.137