DETERRENT SUB METAPHYSICS--2

PROLIFERATING SUBMARINES MEAN CHALLENGES/OPPORTUNITIES

Continuing to try to get to the bottom of this important and “very deep” subject here in Part 2, we need to work our way through a few more challenging yet fascinating topics. A forward-leaning take on global maritime domain awareness is essential, and that is our main focus now.

SSBN Fleets Must Be Right-Sized to Be Truly Survivable as a Deterrence Team: It is, in an unfortunate but necessary bean-counting sense, efficient for one country, during nuclear wartime, to sink another country’s SSBNs. A single Columbia-class SSBN will have aboard, due to the allowed MIRVing norm and New START treaty limits, sixty-four separate thermonuclear warheads in total installed on its 16 SLBMs in their launch tubes.

(The U.S. is working on deploying a limited number of low-yield tactical nuclear warheads on a few deployed SLBMs, for better deterrence via flexible, proportional response of any first use of tactical nukes by an aggressor adversary.)

In comparison to this potent arsenal aboard a single SSBN, it would be a forlorn hope that anyone’s finite Ballistic Missile Defense system could destroy all the SLBMs on even a single SSBN during their boost phase, or even more impossible, stop all of those separate dozens and dozens of Reentry Vehicless once they are scattered in outer space in independent flight, reentering earth’s atmosphere toward their separate targets. However, a nuclear attacker or blackmailer’s own BMD, along with aggressive use of its SSNs, could together seriously erode the defender’s SSBN fleet and its launched SLBMs and RVs.

It is exceedingly unlikely that any adversaries could sink all of several U.S. SSBNs on patrol at any one time before our leadership would know – via incoming flash radio codes from our subs, emergency submarine message buoys, and seafloor-based surveillance sonar data – that nuclear hostilities had commenced, if this wasn’t already evident, so that POTUS could react appropriately.

Besides that, very importantly, enemy ASW warfare doesn’t directly affect the deterring and retaliating nukes of all the other U.S. Triad-leg delivery systems. These would all to some unknown extent (but probably a lot greater than 0.000%) survive any surprise first-use nuclear attack by an enemy. All this reinforces for the properly equipped United States, as for any similar Triad-equipped defending state, the total assurance of a devastating (and fully justified) retaliatory second strike.

The whole issue of correlating future BMD capability and capacity, with submarine fleet size and SSN-versus-SSBN tactics, deserves more study and practical attention. In a very dark future scenario, it could be that via using a mix of non-finite BMD (directed energy and particle beam weapons with rapid and essentially unlimited “ammo supplies”), very aggressive SSN-versus-SSBN tactics, along with close-in SSBN sorties, that an aggressor might seek to deplete, disarm, or side-step altogether a defender’s nuclear deterrence. But this idea is more science fiction and even fantasy that it is or could ever be science fact.

The ultimate vision of this comes back to President Reagan’s old idea of a comprehensive “Star Wars” space-based missile shield. He thought that by sharing the technology with the USSR, nuclear weapons could be rendered truly obsolete. But POTUS Reagan was known later to be suffering from Alzheimer’s disease, which degrades cognitive faculties for a decade before symptoms are overtly apparent. He did not vet the Star Wars dream concept with any of his advisers before springing it on the world. It was and still is hopelessly impractical for many technical reasons, and would be hopelessly expensive to implement even if all those tech problems could one day be solved. Also, the whole idea that it would be a panacea against nuclear war ignored the basic fact that thrse are many and varied ways to deliver nukes to their target that don’t go through outer space. These include Russian premier Vladimir Putin’s infamous “undersea long-range drone nuke torpedoes,” different types of aircraft, any number of surface vessels, and numerous means of smuggling nukes by land.  

Deterrent Sub Proliferation Demands Adequate SSN Fleet Size       

SSBN/SSGP/SSG/SSBP/SSB proliferation necessitates SSN fleet growth: A greater number of submarines owned by a greater number of states around the globe creates more and more work for a defending state’s SSN fleet. (Any state that owns SSBNs, SSBs, SSBPs, SSGs, and/or SSGPs is in this context a defending state.) This is because more areas of the world need to be patrolled for more vessels of interest, and known operational areas need to be surveilled more extensively, to gather intelligence, maintain forward presence, protect your own deterrent subs, and be well prepared for anything. Modern SSNs afford a state excellent mission diversity and flexibility, well beyond just strategic and tactical ASW.

If other states are obtaining more SSBNs, they too are very likely to also obtain more SSNs, to protect their own SSBNs, and for other missions that their leaders decide are required. China and Russia are both doing so. There is a clear and present danger here, of an arms race accelerating in submarine construction. To some degree, since SSNs perform active conventional missions all the time, and might some day even need to lethally engage adversary subs and surface ships of different types, a rising number of actual and potential peer competitor and adversary submarines puts upward pressure on any defender’s submarine fleet size, especially on its SSN fleet size. To some degree, very high quality of defender SSNs and crews can make up for some shortfall in total numbers, but this cushion of quality can only go so far – it can’t enable any SSN to be in two very different places at once.

How far can such a submarine arms race be allowed to go, before operational, national security, and maritime safety problems, are created for all undersea-going states?

Worldwide Sub Proliferation Could Go Beyond Modernization to a Genuine Arms Race: For the U.S., given its essential leadership role in the open world order, global free trade, freedom of navigation, and maritime security, to allow itself by design or default to fall behind autocratic, expansionist global and/or regional naval powers in submarine building and quality would be a serious error. Nor can we afford to neglect the operational challenges to America’s Silent Service of rogue states, such as North Korea or Iran, working on larger sub fleets, quite possibly in both states’ cases, some day, with nuclear weapons. National security and defense are by nature competitive endeavors between states.

During the Cold War, the U.S. had important advantages in the undersea realm, given the superior quieting, better sonar suites, and better trained and led volunteer crews of its nuclear subs, compared to the Soviet Union. But the competition continues apace.

As U.S. Navy Silent Service leadership has recently said, Russia and China are both catching up fast in this essential arena of world peace or war. This is partly due to their aggressive espionage over the years. But it is also due to their own undeniable talent, ingenuity, hard work, and ample funding. Had the relative roles of the U.S. and USSR under the waves been reversed during the Cold War, perhaps the Soviets would have won and America would have gone Communist. Now, in the 21st century, the U.S. and our allies, partners, and friends must work diligently to sustain world peace and international stability – via sustaining a totally viable and credible strategic nuclear deterrent triad force. This must include a robust and numerous SSN fleet, for all the reasons given above.

THE UNDERSEA DOMAIN IS EVER MORE CROWDED AND COMPETITIVE

Will there be undersea traffic jams? Unlike many military assets that, during peacetime, mostly remain on home turf or at foreign bases, submarines – like all navy ships – need to be underway. They need to get out of port continually, to train realistically and certify personnel preparedness, to verify mechanical readiness, and to maintain tip-top crew skills to complete their overseas missions and come home safe. As there become more and more subs at sea, undersea traffic congestion might become a real problem. SSNs busy identifying numerous submerged sonar contacts that turn out to be friendly or harmless (neutral) will be distracted from their main purposes. The same might occur for SSBNs/SSGPs/SSGs/SSBPs/SSBs, which generally need to carefully avoid any and all sonar contacts.

Submarines coming and going submerged through nautical choke points, such as the Strait of Gibraltar or Strait of Malacca, with zero underwater visibility and bad sonar conditions, could collide, or hit or be hit by a surface ship, with terrible results; this has indeed sometimes happened. Collisions seem more likely, too, as there are more and more deterrent subs and fast-attack subs following each other around at sometimes-close quarters. The impending population explosion of scientific, military, and even recreational manned and unmanned undersea vehicles and subs, of various sizes and capabilities, promises to make this whole underwater obstacle course even worse.

Diesel subs, even obsolete designs, can constitute dangerous smart minefields. As such, they are likely while on training missions, or operational patrols, to congregate at maritime choke points. This would make any undersea traffic jams even more likely, and even more dangerous. Good modern navies have various, often classified methods to prevent friendly vessels from getting too close to each other. But there is no international system of undersea traffic control analogous to what exists for air traffic control.

When is an arms race not an arms race? If a state’s targeted SSN fleet size (hull count) is based primarily on its own needs, rather than on keeping up with the Davey Joneses, and if projections indicate that its current submarine shipbuilding plan will, unless increased, lock in a shortfall against basic future numerical requirements, then that state acquiring a larger number of subs would constitute needs-based acquisition, and not a senseless, dangerous arms race. The replacement of worn-out subs by more modern classes, known as recapitalization, isn’t an arms race either. It is a necessary replacement of vessels now past their useful life expectancies.

Can and should SSBN/SSB/SSBP/SSG/SSGP proliferation be slowed or halted? There are some interrelated questions behind this basic question. Thinking back to the height of Cold-War tensions, would the U.S./NATO have preferred that the USSR not have any survivable triad submarine leg? How would this have affected mutual nuclear deterrence stability in that bygone, scary bipolar world—which has now officially returned in the form of an even more volatile, dangerous three-player game between the U.S., Russia, and China?

If, in today’s world, a state is bound and determined to obtain its own nuclear deterrence assets, should it be encouraged, or merely allowed, or discouraged, or actively prevented from acquiring a survivable submarine triad leg? Which of these approaches would be better for world nuclear stability – that is, at least pending eventual total nuclear disarmament?

Which approach would be better for America’s already-stretched shipbuilding budgets, and already-grueling Silent Service operational tempos? Would it help to have fewer potentially-adversary submarines to need to keep track of? What happens, and what should be done, if only one side in a durable, long-term dispute involving nukes – such as, say, India but not Pakistan – obtains SSBNs, SSBs, SSBPs, SSGs, or SSGPs?

If more and more NWOSs seek deterrent subs, will there in the early learning stages of the newcomer activities be an accelerated rate of lethal accidents among these ships and their nuclear weapons? How will the loss of entire subs with their whole crews, as did tragically occur during the Cold War to both sides, affect world stability? Would a sudden, inexplicable accident – perhaps with a nuclear detonation involved – risk starting an inadvertent nuclear war?

If a sub with nukes is disabled at depth while the crew remain alive, how might the presence of perhaps-damaged nukes on board affect the planning and execution of rescue operations? Since time would be of the essence, how best can the possibility of such an emergency ever occurring be prepared for in advance, by state navies and by international submarine rescue authorities? If the surviving crews themselves are not able to render safe their nuclear weapons, how best can nuclear ordnance disposal experts be gotten on scene ASAP as part of the rescue operations?

Could such disasters be prevented by foreign technical/procedural assistance, to new nuclear deterrent sub-owning states, from experienced submarine-owning states? Should such advisors be provided by the big nuclear powers (in competition for such nuclear-related client lists) as a form of humanitarian foreign aid and naval/nuclear disaster prevention? Or, should this assistance be sold by commercial defense contractors (including state-controlled ones in Russia and China) each bidding competitively on a for-profit basis? Might the U.S. be able to go after such business, or provide such foreign aid, for capitalist profits or for diplomatic influence (or both), without compromising military secrets?

These many open questions seem to be worthwhile topics for conferences and workshops on naval strategy and on global nuclear arms control. Answering them will not be easy or straightforward, but asking the right questions is a vital first step to successful worldwide nuclear peacekeeping.

What Global Norms and Bans About SSBNs, SSGPs, SSGs, SSBPs, and SSBs are Wise?

What international norms and agreements about nuclear deterrent subs are needed? We offer a few suggestions regarding survivable nuclear-deterrent submarine best practices and best perspectives, for further consideration by all interested parties.

·       It is important to “sanitize” home waters of lurking adversary nuclear-missile subs, because their proximity suggests they might have aggressive intentions. While protection of one’s own nuclear deterrent subs in bastions in one’s own home waters is stabilizing and makes eminent sense, in contrast should deployments overly close to adversaries’ coastlines be banned via an international norm? How can definitions of “overly close” be negotiated? What allowance is needed for states situated in constricted waters? During peacetime, enemy subs can be driven off by such tactics as Tom Clancy-style sonar lashings, or dropping non-lethal signal grenades. During wartime, lethal force is called for.

·       No state’s nuclear deterrence posture is survivable, reliable, and safe unless it includes high-quality strategic nuclear deterrence submarines, preferably SSBNs, or possibly SSGNs. Less un-affordable SSGPs, SSGs, SSBPs, or even SSBs, might sometimes be used as less-capable substitutes, provided that the limitations of these subs and their weaponry are not inconsistent with local geography, and hydrography, of both the deterrer and the deterree(s).

·       States that cannot afford the immense ongoing costs to acquire, base, and safely maintain highly capable deterrent subs and their nuclear missiles, and train and support elite crews, should avoid acquiring nuclear weapons altogether. Instead, they should look to obtain whatever nuclear deterrence protection they need by joining a major nuclear power’s protective nuclear deterrence umbrella.

·       Trying to prevent proliferation of nuclear deterrent subs among states that do not now own them could be a useful way to limit proliferation of nuclear weapons, by a sort of back door. This approach splits into the questions of counter-proliferation for the submarine vessels (hulls) that play host to the nuclear weapons, counter-proliferation for the nuclear-capable missiles, and counter-proliferation for the nuclear warheads hosted on these subs’ missiles. The most crucial juncture is denying the supply of nuclear warheads, since without them the vessels and delivery platforms become conventional weapons systems. On the other hand, if it were established as a clear global norm than every nuclear weapons state required a submarine-based nuclear deterrent triad leg, and it were somehow possible to prevent some states from ever obtaining the completed subs needed to establish such a deterrent leg, those states might be leveraged into not acquiring nukes. They could, instead, be encouraged and incentivized to enter into a nuclear umbrella treaty with an established nucler power that owns a good triad.

·       Some of the problems of insufficient warning time, for nuclear-deterrent cruise missiles carried on an SSGP near an adversary’s coast, might be avoided if there were a global ban on hypersonic nuclear cruise missiles launched from nuclear deterrent subs. If the allowed airspeed of such special-purpose, nuclear-equipped cruise missiles were limited by treaty, to subsonic or low-supersonic speeds (Mach 1.2 maximum?), they could achieve their intended nuclear deterrence purpose, while giving sufficient warning time when launched from any patrol areas that are close to an adversary’s coast due to restricted geography.

·       There should be a global ban on nuclear-armed drone mini-subs. This should include the type recently publicized by Russia, meant to sneak a nuclear weapon close to an adversary’s targeted commercial harbor, naval base, or coastal city, for nuclear blackmail or nuclear attack. Such weapons should be deemed terrorist devices, designed to spread raw fear and kill vast numbers of innocent civilians. They are surprise first-use nuclear attack weapons, given their zero warning time. They are especially not any sort of valid deterrent weapon.

CONCLUSION: FOR THE U.S. SSBN FLEET, ENOUGH IS NOT TOO MUCH

Like the total number of nuclear warheads that a state needs, the number of SSBNs the state should have in commission is not just a function of the number of deterrent subs or nuclear warheads owned by that state’s single biggest potential nuclear adversary. The necessary SSBN fleet size, in order to maintain an effective nuclear deterrence system in being, is a function of the aggregate size of all the strategic counterforce and countervailing assets owned by all potential nuclear adversaries that the deterrer needs to hold at risk over decades.

And just as the total number of nuclear warheads on hand in a state must take account of a long and volatile future timeline, the total number of SSBNs in commission in the U.S. needs to make allowance for the possibility of operational and/or combat losses. Then, in a worst case, that depleted SSBN fleet would also need to cope with a possible, further off, second nuclear conflict beyond the first one.

Just as any First Nuclear World War would likely cost America its facilities for manufacturing new nuclear weapons, that same war would surely lead to the destruction of America’s nuclear submarine construction facilities. Even with such facilities intact, and all the expert workers alive and healthy, it takes seven (7) years or more to build a new, replacement nuclear sub from scratch, given the finalized design for it.

Also, such deterrence-platform-fleet sizes and their warhead numbers need to take account that any state might need to deter and defend itself against more than one well-equipped nuclear aggressor simultaneously. In years to come, as Russia builds a larger and very capable SSBN fleet, China’s SSBN fleet will also grow in numbers and in modern capabilities. It may at times be very tempting for them to team up against America, in a prolonged contest where nuclear intimidation/blackmail and nuclear attack blend together most unpleasantly for us.

As Silent Service leadership has been emphasizing for some time now, the United States has determined after detailed modeling and analysis that one dozen (12) next-generation SSBNs are necessary and sufficient for America’s nuclear deterrence needs. There are several good reasons why the U.S. Navy needs to own twelve in order to assure that four are always in position, and why four at once in position are always needed:

·       Some SSBNs will be transiting to and from their assigned patrol areas, and thus will be out of position due to the relatively limited range of SLBMs compared to silo-based ICBMs.

·       Some SSBNs will be in port for maintenance and overhaul, and will be unable to launch missiles, or their missiles will be out of range of assigned targets.

·       The states that we need to deter occupy the vast Eurasian landmass, requiring some SSBNs to be in the Atlantic while others are in the Pacific, in order for their missiles to hold all strategic targets at risk.

·       Allowance must be made for unforeseen mechanical casualties and/or medical problems aboard some patrolling SSBNs.

·       Allowance must be made, in the worst case, for some wartime combat attrition, as well as for operational losses via mishap.

Clearly, the whole subject of America’s highly survivable SSBN nuclear deterrent fleet, and its recapitalization with the impending new Columbia class of an irreducible twelve vessels, is quite essential to the future survival of democracy, and even of civilization, in a world that is more potentially dangerous than it has ever before been in human history.

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