The Deterrence of Internal and Cross-Border Terrorism

The Anantnag terror attack highlights the continuing threat of terrorism in Kashmir. The game theoretic literature on strategic deterrence focuses on measures that would successfully deter an aggressor from carrying out an attack. This literature divides possible actions into two types - deterrence by denial, and deterrence by the threat of punishment. Deterrence by denial refers to actions that either preempt attacks or neutralize their effectiveness. Actions like eliminating terrorists or cutting off funding sources fall in this category. Deterrence by threat of punishment refers to the creation of a credible threat perception that is strong enough to make the aggressor desist. This consists of two parts - first, the development of the capability to counter-attack effectively, and second, the willingness to do so. An important aspect of deterrence by threat of punishment is that the process of building counter-attacking capability may create a fear in the mind of the adversary that a preemptive attack is being planned. This may trigger the very action that is sought to be deterred. Thus deterrence by threat must always be conditional, i.e it should be very clearly linked to the initiation of the undesired action by the adversary. Further, it must always be accompanied by an assurance , i.e. a promise of rewards in case the adversary desists from the undesired action.

There is a view that classical deterrence theory does not apply to terrorism. This thesis is that terrorists have a value system that is immune to deterrence. Further, it is virtually impossible to make all possible targets secure against a person willing to blow himself or herself up. Finally, terrorists are convinced, with some cause, that governments seek their eradication , not deterrence. However, governments the world over have been using deterrence by denial to check terror for decades, especially by cutting off their funding channels. In addition, while core groups of terrorists may be immune to deterrence, a terror network is not a single entity but rather a system with many components - the top leaders are different from its lieutenants, foot soldiers, logistics providers, financiers, religious supporters, and allies in the local population. Many aspects of this system are amenable to a change of heart. Using ancillary components of a terror network to cut off the air supply of the core may be called deterrence by influence. Indeed, this method is being successfully used in Kashmir where many of the eliminations of terrorists reflect the co-option of the local population as informers and allies.

Overall, while all approaches must be used in concert, the methods that would work best against insurgent activities in Kashmir would be a. deterrence by assurance and b. deterrence by influence. The following three measures would aid in improving the situation.

1. Dropping the demand for the repeat of Article 370. Many in Kashmir have a feeling that the terrorists have given the Indian state a pretext to eradicate the special status of Kashmir. These people need to be assured that their support for the Indian government is not tantamount to a change in the nature of their state.
2. Cutting political patronage to gau rakshaks, or cow 'protectors'. The alienation of the people of the Kashmir valley cannot be separated from the increasing insecurity felt by Muslims in the rest of India. Especially abhorrent is gau raksha, which according to reports by journalists like Niranjan Takle, is a politically supported extortion business.
3. Putting forward a proposal to modify Article 35A to allow businesses run by non-Kashmiris to own land in Kashmir, provided ownership of locals is greater than 50%. This clause which is operative in many gulf countries would allow investment and employment to go up, while protecting the rights of locals.

The mandate of the Modi government must be interpreted as a call for reconciliation not a decree for muscular jingoism. A failure to read the tea leaves can only be divisive and, ultimately, disastrous.