Denialism

The industrial strategy of the Biden administration has been the subject of a heated discussion on the American left. From developing 'progressive technocrats' to adapt buildings to the viability of capitalist state-led 'decarbonization' in the face of global overcapacity and slowing economic development. Assessments to date have been varied, separating "the good, the bad, and the ugly," though with an emphasis on the first. In other words, albeit not very much beyond, the left's criticism has gone beyond "good, but not big enough." The geostrategic justification for this national investment drive, which involves reshoring production to the US mainland, buying up lithium mines, and funding the development of microchip facilities as part of a militaristic effort to outflank China, is mostly absent from these talks.

From the vantage point of the corridors of power, the US industrial policy's anti-China stance is not the sad by-product of the green "transition," but rather its driving force. The logic guiding the new era of infrastructure spending is fundamentally geopolitical, according to those who created it. Instead of looking to the New Deal as a model, one should instead look to the military Keynesianism of the Cold War, which was viewed by the "Wise Men" who fought it as a prerequisite for American victory in the war with the Soviet Union.

Policymakers are at a 'inflexion point' today, just as they were after 1945. In his 2020 presidential campaign essay, prospective national security adviser Jake Sullivan claimed that "history is again knocking":

A foreign strategy for the middle class, which was extensively described in a paper for the Carnegie Foundation and signed by Sullivan and a group of other Biden aides, destroyed flimsy divisions between national security and economic planning. Hopes that globalized trade would persuade other states to accept US predominance were misplaced. Another strategy was required. In his inaugural foreign policy speech, Biden stated that "there is no longer a clear distinction between foreign and domestic policy." "We must always keep the interests of American working families in mind when conducting ourselves abroad." The Democrat establishment was alarmed by Trump's win, which was formed in the deindustrialized heartlands of the opioid crisis and "American carnage." It seemed that what was good for Goldman Sachs was no longer always good for the United States.

There is not much ambiguity surrounding the overall cause of this departure from tradition. China is the only nation with the intention to change the world order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do so, as Secretary of State Antony Blinken emphasized in May 2022. Even worse, "Beijing's vision would disassociate us from the universal principles that have underpinned so much of the world's progress over the past 75 years." Fortunately, the protector of those ideals was prepared to respond.?Competition need not result in conflict, Blinken continued. The White House, however, would not rule out the possibility of war after designating China as its "pacing challenge," starting by "shifting our military investments away from platforms that were designed for the conflicts of the 20th century toward asymmetric systems that are longer-range, harder to find, and easier to move."

The "deep integration of domestic policy and foreign policy" became tangible three months later with the passing of the Inflation Reduction and CHIPS Acts. The drive to monopoly "chokepoint" or "stranglehold" technologies was verified by restrictions on the export of critical AI and semiconductor components to China, which were floated in September and certified the following month, thus declaring economic war. 'These acts', according to a CSIS report, 'show an unprecedented degree of US government participation to not only sustain chokepoint control but also launch a new US policy of intentionally strangling substantial portions of the Chinese technological industry - strangling with a purpose to kill.' Sullivan spoke menacingly to the Manhattan Project. He argued that the US had for too long sought merely a "relative" edge in delicate high-tech domains and that it would now "maintain as large a lead as possible." Following the invasion of Ukraine, technology sanctions against Moscow were stated to show that export controls "can be more than just a preventative tool." In the language of defense, supply-chain interdiction is a prime illustration of the fungibility of financial and strategic assets.

The music in Washington is militaristic. Nancy Pelosi flew into Taipei on an Air Force jet weeks before Congress voted on the IRA, accompanied by 12 F-15s and the USS Ronald Reagan carrier strike group (described by Thomas Friedman as "utterly reckless, dangerous, and irresponsible" and by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs as "a major political provocation"). However, the increased military threat from the US had already started under the Biden Administration, which only stopped to re-soldier unhappy NATO and SEATO members to the project rather than reining in Trump's bravado.

Since the 'Quad' alliance's revival at the start of 2021, which was shortly strengthened by the AUKUS accord, the United States has expanded its already sizable network of bases and supplemented them with rapidly deployable mobile forces, deep-strike capabilities, and unmanned systems. The objective, according to Ely Ratner, the Department of Defense's Asian relations coordinator, is to create "a more resilient, mobile, and lethal presence in the Indo-Pacific region." A new National Security Strategy focused on the "unprecedented" threat posed by China, along with orders for hundreds of Tomahawk cruise missiles, signaled a significant shift in Tokyo in the autumn of 2022. The Marine Littoral Regiment, a newly formed unit, was also deployed to Okinawa.

The disclosure of a document by the head of the US Air Mobility Command, whose 'gut' warned him that America will be at war with China by 2025, happened at the same time as the panic over unexplained balloon sightings at the beginning of 2023. Pentagon plans to double forces in Taiwan, along with an increase in weaponry supplies, were reported in February. In the case of a Chinese invasion, officials now openly discuss the possibility of detonating Taiwan's semiconductor production facilities. Biden has often stated his determination to use force in such a situation, openly breaking with the established diplomatic formula of "One China" (claimed by both Beijing and the KMT's Taipei, and formally recognised by Washington in the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué).?Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines acknowledged the Administration's decision to abandon "strategic ambiguity" during Senate testimony this March. The recurring mention of a "thaw" merely emphasizes the propensity for escalation.??

In a lecture on "Renewing American Economic Leadership" given at the Brookings Institution at the end of April, Sullivan should have allayed any remaining doubts the American left may have had about the global effects of Bidenomics. Sullivan reiterated the importance of power-political considerations above Panglossian market fundamentalism to those who were astonished the topic should be left in the hands of the National Security Advisor. The growth of China served as evidence against the desire for a worldwide laissez-faire. Beijing's control over lithium, cobalt, and other "critical minerals," not to mention its "military ambitions," "nonmarket economic practices," and lack of Western "values," called for a resolute response.?As a first step, the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, an anti-China trade cartel created as a response to the Belt and Road Initiative, invested in the production of microchips and electric vehicles. Sullivan declared, "We will resolutely pursue our industrial strategy at home, but we are unmistakably committed to not leaving our friends behind."?

Listening to Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen's speech at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies the week prior was sufficient to determine the scope of this "new Washington Consensus." The 'dove' to Sullivan's 'hawk', Yellen, began her speech by referring to 'China's decision to shift away from market reforms toward a more state-driven strategy, which has hurt its neighbors and countries across the world. She continued, "This has occurred as China is striking a more combative posture toward the United States and our allies and partners - not only in the Indo-Pacific but also in Europe and other regions."?In the face of a tense situation, US economic policy would follow four guiding principles: first, ensuring the "national security interests" of Washington and its allies; second, continuing to "use our tools to disrupt and deter human rights abuses wherever they occur around the globe; third, "healthy competition" with China, contingent on its renunciation of its "unfair economic practices" and adherence to the "rules-based global economic order; and fourth, "cooperation on issues." The hierarchy was obvious: there was rivalry, there was global law enforcement, there was cooperation.

The White House has argued rhetorically that its goal is "de-risking," not economic "decoupling" from China, a ploy of Ursula von der Leyen, the so-called EU president, who rallies Europeans to Washington's song. However, Biden's actions have raised questions about the fate that 'friends' in this administration are expected to receive. Germany and France were unprepared for the abrupt reintroduction of tariffs, capital controls, and government subsidies for industry after decades of US hedging on climate goals and hosannahs to the sanctity of free trade. 'Next Generation EU', the centerpiece of the 'Green Deal' unveiled by von der Leyen in January 2023, offers roughly €720 billion in grants and loans to European governments, an amount comparable to the IRA. However, as noted by Kate Mackenzie and Tim Sahay, EU countries have already given almost as much in subsidies this year alone to address the energy crisis brought on by the proxy war in Ukraine. Despite Scholz and Macron's trips to Beijing, the Union's desire for rejecting NATO's protector in Asia is about the same as its appetite for autonomous action in Europe. The last time von der Leyen's Brussels sidekick Josep Borrell was seen, he was urging the nations to send warships to police the South China Sea.

Technology bans, economic sanctions, and alliance politics all have a place in a broader strategic perspective that Pentagon war planners categorize under the keyword "denial." These actions are ostensibly intended to protect American forward positions around China's frontiers, starting with Taiwan's "military hedgehog." Despite differences in opinion on particular, a majority of establishment organizations think that the Administration should be ready to "deny" Chinese goals in the area, including the Quincy Institute, the Heritage Foundation, and the Center for a New American Security. 'Denial' is a labile notion, much like containment, its immediate antecedent. While others, motivated by deterrence theory, draw a distinction between 'punishment', or threats to inflict unacceptable harm on an adversary post facto, and an activist military posture, intended to make a territory unconquerable, place emphasis on its counter-position to control, or primacy – the idea that American might should be sufficiently awesome to dispel any thought of challenging it.

In either case, Washington must balance the need to ensure that no other country dominates one of the major global power centers (Asia, Europe, or the Persian Gulf) with evidence of its citizens' likely reluctance to support a major international conflict abroad following twenty years of nonstop armed escapades. Elbridge Colby, its most well-known theorist, believed that a "strategy of denial" might satisfy both requirements while managing resources and preparing the population for mobilization.?In this context, the American left's narrow focus on the domestic effects of Bidenomics is reminiscent of the European belle époque's "social imperialism," when the Webbs and Bernsteins celebrated a larger slice of the pie for their home working class as inter-imperial rivalries and colonial ravages accelerated toward catastrophe.

Naturally, Washington would prefer that Beijing abandon whatever plans it may have for Taiwan or the Philippines by using the complexity of American hardware and the power of its "anti-hegemonic" coalition in Asia. However, as the director of Naval Intelligence, Rear Admiral Michael Studeman, has cautioned, "we may be too late." If that were to happen, it would be crucial to force China to start fighting. The pertinent historical example is Imperial Japan in 1941, which was roused to launch its disastrous attack on Pearl Harbor by the American oil embargo.?According to Colby, "the United States' strategic goal should be to make China do what Japan did voluntarily: to try to realize its ambitions, China would have to behave in a way that will spur and harden the resolve of the peoples in the broader coalition to intervene, and for those engaged to intensify and widen the war to a level at which they would win it." Plans needed to be made in that regard. Colby has expressed sorrow over the fact that "we missed our chance to adopt a more nuanced defense strategy" and "now we're going to have to do things that appear very extreme."?

To reject, withhold, or abjure is to refuse. In Freudian terminology, verleugnung also refers to the incapacity or unwillingness to acknowledge a painful or distressing truth. Perversion is related to it as well because when the desired object is not present, attention may turn to a substitute object, or fetish. Such emotions are probably nothing new to the 46th President. Self-deception, however, is commonplace. Democratic apparatchiks downplayed the impact of Pelosi's jingoistic trip to Taiwan. According to progressive activist Tobita Chow and former Sanders foreign policy adviser Matt Duss, those who were alarmed by Pelosi's whistle-stop tour were the real threat, and their warnings were an example of "threat inflation."

Denial most frequently manifests as silence. Even sophisticated criticisms, some of which were featured in the recent Dissent symposium 'What's Next for the Climate Left?', barely take into account the relationship between increased domestic spending and an increasingly muscular Pacific policy, which Biden officials reaffirmed in speech after speech. The economist J. W. Mason expressed a cautious support for Biden's spending plan while acknowledging "the terrifying anti-China rhetoric that's a ubiquitous part of the case for public investment."? Mason stated, "War is different from industrial policy." Do radicals in America understand the distinction??

Recently, the financial press has started to register its discomfort with the hawkishness of Biden and Sullivan before the eco-socialist left. The Economist and Financial Times have distanced themselves from the Administration's more extravagant flights, suggesting that gung-ho rhetoric needs to be toned down before it creates a new reality, as Rumsfeld may have remarked. Adam Tooze published a forceful opinion piece in The FT arguing for a strategy of accommodation to China's ascent. The current White House is likely to view this approach as "either treasonous or non-planetary."

Chinese officials issued a tit-for-tat ban on the use of microchips made by Micron Technology, a company located in Boise, and Gina Raimondo, the secretary of commerce, said the US 'won't allow' the move. "We see it as economic coercion, pure and simple," A nuclear clash over the Taiwan Strait or coercion, "preserving our edge in science and technology" or "modernizing the kill chain," "market-distorting practices" or support for "American workers," "environmental justice" or "market-distorting practices"? Critical evaluations of Bidenomics should be clear about which is which.?