Democracy without Delivery: How Political Elites Have Kept Nepal Poor and Unstable

The tussle of ego between the two towering figures — an authoritarian monarch and a democratic leader — was probably the most consequential yet inevitable mishap in the history of modern Nepal. In the mid-1950s, Nepal was on the cusp of a significant transformation that never happened.

One of the oldest countries in South Asia, endowed with rich natural resources, Nepal remains mind-bogglingly poor despite its immense potential. Had King Mahendra tolerated the newly-established democratic system and had Bishweshwar Prasad Koirala (B.P. Koirala), then prime minister and leader of the democratic front (Nepali Congress), been able to manage the dictatorial ambitions of the king, Nepal probably would not have seen an early demise of democracy in 1960, barely ten years after the dismantling of Rana oligarchy that had ruled Nepal for 104 years with iron fists, rendering monarchy a puppet figurehead and the citizenry a captive subject.

The king was young and ambitious and the democratic leader a visionary, probably, far ahead of his time and society. They both were men of letters with international connections and clouts and they both wanted a quick modernization of their society. Theirs was a time when the high tides of anti-colonial, democratic, and socialist movements were lashing against, and, in many cases, sweeping the old systems away. Theirs was a time of social upheaval and experimentation.

The king had to do something — most urgently — before the revolutionary tides would reach Nepal. He was growing impatient that the government led by B.P. Koirala, with a two-thirds majority in the parliament, was too slow to enact the changes it had promised. As a king, recently liberated from the clutches of the Ranas, he was not happy to stand on the sidelines and be a passive spectator of the messy bickering of the political system in the moment of urgency. He had his own ideas and ideals regarding what course the country should take for its modernization. Besides, he was growing suspicious that India was exerting too much influence on Nepal’s domestic politics.

Mahendra Shah staged a royal coup in 1960, a year after the first-ever general election of parliament in Nepal’s history. Using the power and legitimacy ‘bestowed’ upon him by tradition, he dissolved the parliament, revoked the constitution, banned political parties, and imprisoned political leaders, including prime minister B.P. Koirala. The person, who had spent his 30 years as a royal prisoner under the Rana regime, pushed the country into the dark age of the partyless Panchyat system which lasted for 30 years.

During his direct reign of 12 years, the king did introduce some progressive plans, of which the land reform policy of 1964, which seized lands from feudal landlords and redistributed them to the landless people, was the most notable. He resettled many Nepali villages from the hills along the southern border with India to prevent the growing cases of land encroachment from the south — the act now viewed by some as an effort to protect the country and snubbed by others as ‘Mahendra nationalism’.

The irony of history is that by suppressing the democratic process, the monarch inadvertently created a fertile ground for something he had feared the most — the spread of a radical ideology that could do away with Shah's dynasty if succeeded. His ambitions of being a benevolent dictator did not only alienate the staunch supporters of constitutional monarchy within the democratic framework, but the lack of freedom and democratic exercise also pushed many educated youths to the folds of the underground communist movement. During the 30 years reign of Mahendra and his heir Birendra, Nepal saw a groundswell of the anti-monarchy movement led by different factions of the communist party.

King Mahendra died of a massive heart attack at the age of 52 on his hunting trip to Chitwan in 1972 and B.P. Koirala, whom he had taken for an archenemy, remained an ardent supporter of monarchy throughout his life although he had to spend most of his life in jails or exile because of the feudal institution. Despite all the sufferings in the hands of the repressive system spearheaded by the monarchy, B.P. always viewed the institution as the most trustworthy partner when it came to preserving the national interest and sovereignty of Nepal.

When the small Himalayan Kingdom of Sikkim was annexed by India as its 22nd state after political maneuverings, B.P. returned to Nepal in 1976 with the hope of promoting national reconciliation, but the monarchy now headed by Eton-educated Birendra Shah was not forthcoming enough to initiate democratic reforms except for clearing the leader of the charges of treason and sedition. Many believe that Birendra’s referendum of 1980, in which citizens were asked to choose between the non-partisan Panchyat system and multiparty system, was only a ploy to present himself as a liberal ruler. B.P. died of cancer in 1982 at the age of 67 and it took Nepal another eight years to reinstate multiparty democracy when the historic people’s movement of 1990, jointly called by the Nepali Congress and United Left Front, an alliance of communist parties, forced the monarchy to concede power to the people.

“You guys have done a big disservice to yourselves and millions of Hindus across the world,” a man I had met in Sunnyvale, California in 2012 had said to me after knowing that I was from Nepal.

Checking him in the hotel, I had struck up a conversation with him because his ID had an Indian-sounding name. He had turned out to be a Fijian-Indian living in the United States.

“What was wrong with Hinduism and the king?” He had said, “Nepal could have become a modern country without sacrificing any of them.”

In this brief encounter, he remembered his visit to Nepal in the mid-1980s, giving a beautiful description of the Valley of Kathmandu and its religious shrines and cultural heritages. He had sounded as though he would rather have Kathmandu frozen in its ‘pristine’ past.

His biggest complaint was that the only Hindu kingdom that Hindus from around the world could identify with was gone.

Would Nepal have abolished monarchy if the royal massacre of 2001, in which, according to the official reports, the prince in line, Dipendra, had shot almost every member of the royal family dead at an evening party before shooting himself down, had never happened? Official reports said the prince went on a shooting rampage when his parents turned down his demand to marry a girl of his choice. Considering the fact that King Birendra had become more popular during the democratic system than in the Panchyat era, it is hard to speculate how many years it would have taken for the monarchy to come to an end — or if it would have come to an end at all — if the allegedly enraged and intoxicated prince had not spilled blood in the royal court, the securest place in the country.

After the restoration of multiparty democracy in 1990, Birendra had quietly assumed the role of a constitutional monarch, carefully eschewing political controversy and his cheerful gentlemanly nature had earned him popularity and trust.

By contrast, the leaders of the political parties had begun to lose their public support in a matter of a few years. The early years of democracy, which should have seen the institutionalization of the democratic system and meritocratic values, were squandered by politicizing every aspect of society. Girija Prasad Koirala, B.P.’s brother and the leader of the ruling Nepali Congress party, had a unique historical opportunity to lead the country on a new course of political reforms and economic development as a prime minister after the election of the parliament in 1991. Apart from his contributions to the Comprehensive Peace Accord in 2006, Girija Babu reminded a mediocre leader during his four different terms as a prime minister. Due to his monopolistic attitude in running the party and government, prominent leaders like Ganesh Man Singh (better known as the Father of Democracy) and Krisna Prasad Bhattarai (the Saint Leader) had to disassociate themselves from the party in bitterness. The Moist movement later worked as tinder on the dry ground of general hopelessness.

Following the shocking and traumatizing event of the royal massacre, Gyanendra Shah, Birendra’s younger brother and the surviving heir of the throne, was coronated as the king of Nepal, but the desperate and despotic actions he took, one after another, to reassert the central role of the monarchy in Nepal’s political process further alienated the common people and the political parties from the monarchy. With an ambition of being another incarnation of Mahendra, he took absolute power in February 2005, declaring in his televised address to the nation that “The days of the monarchy which can be seen but cannot be heard are gone.”

In a way, he addressed the pent-up frustration of the common people that the democratic system in Nepal had given rise to corruption, mismanagement, ineptitude, and the general sense of hopelessness. It was a time when the Maoist insurgency was in control of a large swath of the rural parts of Nepal and the revolt was poised to expand to the urban areas. Due to the lack of delivery and shortsightedness of politicians, the pro-democratic euphoria had now tuned into resentment, creating a breeding ground for the armed revolt. The king had expected that he would be able to consolidate his power by pitting the Maoists, who had taken to arms against the parliamentary democracy since 1996, and the political parties.

The country, renowned for its natural beauty and peaceful nature, was now reeling in violence. Although people did not come to the streets to cheer for the royal takeover, they also did not protest against the infringement of their democratic rights. Though suspicious, they wanted to give a benefit of the doubt to the new king, hoping that he might be able to steer the country away from violence and instability. However, it did not take long for this bubble of illusion to burst when Gyanendra’s political activism appeared to be more about serving his political and business interests than resolving the political crisis the country was stuck in. Although the Council of Ministers the king presided over included some renowned experts in their fields, the most unpopular royalists of the Panchayat era had a key role to play.

Would Nepal’s monarchy have become a relic of history as quickly as it did if the Indian establishment had not played an active role in forging an alliance between the democratic forces and the Maoist leadership against the king’s rule with the 12-point agreement in Delhi in 2005? Was it purely the democratic aspirations of the Nepalese people that India was aiding when it was hosting (or sponsoring?) this unlikely pact between Maoist insurgents (presumably, whose leadership was operating from their shelters in India) and the mainstream political parties or was it a deliberate move to intensify the “controlled instability” in Nepal by sidelining monarchy?

Following the 12-point agreement in April 2006, Nepalese people came to the streets to protest against the king’s direct rule, defying curfews and the deployment of armed police forces. They hoped this move, at least, would encourage the Maoists to settle their armed struggle and curb the king’s authoritarian rule.

Cornered and isolated, Gyanendra Shah had no option but to give in. Addressing the nation on April 24, he backtracked and reinstated the parliament he had dissolved which, in turn, on May 18 unanimously passed a bill — dubbed as Nepalese Magna Carta — that stripped the king of his hereditary titles and entitlements, including his designation as the supreme commander of the army, and declared Nepal a secular country.

The first Constituent Assembly of 2008, in which Maoists won a majority of the seats, formalized the process of declaring Nepal a secular republic inside the federal framework. However, the assembly failed to promulgate a new constitution in its mandated time and the election for the second Constituent Assembly was held in 2013 which too got enmeshed with the old divisive issues, especially the ones related to the ethnic demarcations inside the federal framework.

It became apparent how deeply involved the foreign powers were in Nepal’s political process when India imposed an unofficial but heavy-handed blockade on Nepal after the political parties agreed to expedite the process of finalizing a new constitution following the devastating impacts of the earthquake in April 2015.

The Fijian-American I had met in California — and, for that matter, many Indians, who in the same vein resent that Nepal has done away with its traditional legacies — had no idea that India’s constant meddling with the domestic affairs of Nepal, regardless of its long-term consequences, has led to the outcomes Indian establishment does not want to reckon with.

Had India been willing to understand Nepal’s sensitivities, for instance, it would not have trashed the joint EPG (Eminent Persons’ Group) report of 2018 that aimed to review and revise Indo-Nepal ties in the 21st-century context, addressing and accommodating the concerns of the two neighbors.

Today, the promise that a new constitution will usher Nepal to a new age of progress and prosperity has moved away like a mirage for Nepalese society. The political leaders, who used to be compared to Nelson Mandela, Yasser Arafat, and Bhagat Singh during the Panchayat era, have proven themselves incapable of and unwilling to deliver during the last few decades of democratic/republic Nepal. A country nestled between two major rising global powers, India and China, Nepal has barely taken a few strides when many countries around the world have made a giant leap forward.

The country that used to have a distinct presence in the international forums and used to be given due respect and recognition by the international community, now, suffers an identity crisis. The country that used to deal with Nehru and Mao with equidistance, and used to be a strong voice in the Non-Aligned Movement, now, runs the risk of having its geostrategic location as a disadvantage.

In the age when youthful demography is considered to be one of the biggest assets of any society, thousands of youths leave Nepal every month as migrant workers or students (if they are lucky). The economy of the country heavily relies on the remittance sent by the migrant workers who have untold stories of separation, and suffering. The students who manage to go to study in America, Europe, or Australia are not expected to return to their country and if they do return, it becomes a matter of social stigma. Having managed to send millions of youths out of the country become a matter of pride for the ruling elite.

During the Rana regime, the rulers used to get tributes and royalties for the recruitment of Gurkhas in the British Army, and now they receive remittances. In a way, the ground realities of the common Nepalese folks have remained the same despite all the political restructuring. Brain drain and the resulting demographic shift taking place in Nepalese society do not worry the politicians and policymakers. They have no sense of remorse about the lost opportunities with the lost generation.

The leaders are not concerned that Nepalese villages and farms are getting deserted — and reclaimed by wilderness in this process — and they are not worried that much of the remittance goes to import food and several other everyday commodities Nepal was self-reliant in the past. What matters to them is the steady flow of money to their coffers which hardly counts as the wealth of the nation. What matters to them is amassing wealth for their next election. The failure of the public education system — and the resulting educational divide among the citizens — does not worry them, for they can afford expensive education for their children both at home and abroad.

The communist parties of Nepal still reverberate the last echoes of revolutionary rhetoric, at least in theory. Their leaders represent the striking contradictions of Nepalese politics — the gap between what one preaches and practices. The movement that was initiated in 1949 by Puspa Lal Shrestha and his comrades with the aim of liberating the country from the clutches of feudal exploitation, protecting the country from the interference of expansionist and imperial powers, and empowering the downtrodden peasants and proletariats has become a far cry from its original lofty ideals.

If things have changed at all in the last sixty years, the peasants and proletariats have turned into migrant workers and the leaders into neo-elites, unabashedly occupied with the realpolitik of gaining and maintaining power. When the majority of Nepalese have no access to affordable medical care, these leaders frequent hospitals in Bangkok, Tokyo, and Singapore for their treatments and follow-ups, using the funds from the state coffers.

In the last general election of 2017, two major factions of the communist parties — Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist), led by K.P. Sharma Oli, and Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist Center) led by Puspa Kamal Dahal ‘Prachanda, made an alliance, promising a paradigm shift in Nepali politics. Tired of political instability and economic stagnation, the Nepalese people gave them a landslide victory (close to a two-thirds majority) in the house of representatives, but soon after the formation of the government and merger of the two parties under the banner of the Communist Party of Nepal, their traditional turf wars ensued.

At a time when the common people were suffering the worst impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, the leaders of the ruling party were busy in their efforts to depose each other from the party and government. In their blatant disregard of the electoral mandate, the leader showed one more time how egotistical and insensitive they had become. When the leaders of the world were working days in and days out to protect their citizens from the financial hardships caused by COVID, the self-proclaimed saviors of Nepal had more pressing things to do — engage in the power struggle, restricting the mobility of the people who were struggling to stay afloat.

When the court invalidated the merger of the two communist parties on the grounds of its disputed name, the leaders of the ruling party were happy to go back to their old ways, and they were happier to form new alliances when the court abrogated K.P. Oli’s second attempt to the dissolve the parliament in May 2021 for an early election. There was no sense of moral accountability in the leaders who had recently joined hands and sought public support to lead the nation to a ‘progressive era’.

During his prime ministership, Marxist K.P. Oli went to the extent of pandering to the religious sentiments of the public by claiming that the real Ayodhya, the birthplace of Hindu deity Rama, was in Nepal and as if that was what he was mandated for in the election or that could pave a road to socialism, he championed the renovation of the site, provoking controversies across the border. On the other hand, Prachanda, an old master of political maneuvering and flip-flopping, reassumed his old role of being a kingmaker.

The septuagenarian leaders of the communist party could have avoided the re-disintegration of their party and the resulting political instability in the country by handing the leadership roles over to a more dynamic younger generation, but for these leaders, the world revolves and must keep revolving around them. The communist leaders, be it Oli, Prachanda, Madhav Nepal, or Jhalnath Khanal, have repeatedly proven that they cannot stand having their colleagues or comrades in power.

Ironically, when Maoists had presented 40-point demand as an ultimatum to the government of Nepal in 1996 before declaring an armed rebellion against the state, Sher Bahadur Duba of the Nepali Congress was the prime minister of the kingdom. When the rebellion spread across the country, wreaking havoc on the status quo of the ‘old regime’, it was the Deuba government that had announced rewards on the heads of Maoist leaders Puspa Kamal Dahal ‘Prachanda’ and Dr. Baburam Bhattarai. With violence begetting more violence, thousands of Nepalese lost their lives, disappeared, or sustained injuries during the 10 violent and turbulent years in the history of modern Nepal.

After a quarter-century, Deuba is now serving his 5th term as a prime minister of the republic — with several innings and outings during the interval. The difference is that Maoist supremo Prachanda has now become a trusted ally of the Deuba government. No doubt, the mainstreaming of the Maoist party inside the democratic framework, with the accommodation of their agenda of broader social inclusion in the political system, shows the success of the home-bred process of The Comprehensive Peace Accord of 2006. And it also shows the faith of Nepalese people in non-violence and the collective wisdom of the society in avoiding retaliation and retribution.

However, seeing it from the perspective of a young person who was born in 1996 or after and who is now in their mid-20s, Nepali society has stagnated for far too long under the leadership — of all ideological lineage — of an old-fashioned generation for whom there is no such word as ‘retirement’ in their lexicon. Educated and tech-savvy, the new generation is well acquainted with the progress other societies have made in a brief period. They find it frustrating when they see the same tested and retested leaders from another era ruling the country indefinitely like in a never-ending game of musical chairs. They feel alienated from their own society when they see that scandals of corruption, mismanagement, and siphoning of money are dumped under the carpet and the ruling elites get richer and richer.

When they see no prospects of a secure and stable life in their own country, they vote by their feet and leave the country. The old platitude that Nepal has moved forward to being a republic state does not chime reassuring to an average Nepalese youth who is waiting for a tangible change in their life and in society. Ever since the restoration of democracy in 1990, the biggest change Nepalese society has seen is the displacement of the youths from their own country. With the passage of time, Nepali labor has become one of the cheapest commodities in the international market.

Would Nepal have become a more developed and more prosperous society if king Mahendra Shah and B.P. Koirala had found a common ground to join hands? Would Nepal have become as developed as South Korea (for both countries were on comparable socio-economic grounds in 1960)? The outcome of the events that did not happen in history is only a matter of a wild guess and wishful thinking. Given the upbringing of the king, he saw himself as born to rule and the hijacking of democracy was a logical consequence.

When you take a long journey and reach nowhere, all you can do is dwell in the past and think of the roads that could have led to a better place (at least, in theory).